Assistant Secretary Rose: Thanks very much for taking time to meet with me today. My name is Frank Rose. I’m the Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Compliance and Verification. That doesn’t really talk about what I do. I actually do a whole bunch of other things.

But what I thought I’d do is just take five minutes to frame up a couple of issues. First I’ll talk about missile defense. Second, U.S.-Russia arms control.

Let me start with missile defense. Over the past six years we have made very, very important progress on the U.S. Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense in Europe, also known as the EPAA. This is the U.S. contribution to the NATO missile defense system that was established at the Lisbon Summit in 2010.

Key achievements include the deployment of a missile defense radar in Turkey in 2011; the technical capability declaration of
the Aegis Ashore site in Romania in December of last year. Additionally, last year we completed the deployment of four multi-mission Aegis ships to Rota, Spain. And then this spring we will begin construction of the second Aegis Ashore site in Poland. These capabilities are designed to defend NATO Europe against threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic area. And let me be clear on this point. Our missile defenses, both the U.S. and NATO missile defenses, are not directed against Russia nor do they have the technical capability to engage Russia’s strategic deterrent. And this has been affirmed in numerous U.S. documents such as the 2010 Ballistic Missile Review. Also the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and several NATO heads of state in government summit declarations. In Chicago, 2012; Lisbon, 2010.

Let me say also a few things about U.S.-Russia nuclear arms control. Let me start with the New START Treaty. This is actually a good news story. Despite the challenges in the bilateral U.S.-Russia relationship, implementation of the New START Treaty is going well. On-site inspections in both the U.S. and Russia continue. The U.S. and Russia continue to exchange notifications of the movement of strategic forces as required by the treaty. Additionally, we also continue to notify our ballistic missile launches.
Furthermore, the Bilateral Consultative Commission created by the New START Treaty to work through implementation issues continues to meet and work through tough implementation issues.

So the bottom line with New START is despite all the challenges in the U.S.-Russia relationship, and as you know there are many, this is working well, and it is contributing to strategic stability.

That said, things are not as rosy with regards to the INF Treaty or Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. In July of 2014 the United States determined in its annual Arms Control Compliance Report that, “The Russian Federation is in violation of obligations under the 1987 INF Treaty not to possess, produce or flight test a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 kilometers to 5,500 kilometers or possess or produce launches of such missiles.”

We did not come to this decision lightly. And we have not given up on diplomacy. The United States’ prime objective is to bring Russia back into compliance in a verifiable manner through diplomatic means. And we have been engaged in a number of diplomatic initiatives to date.
However, our diplomatic efforts have not yielded many results, and as you may be aware, the United States is looking at potential military and economic measures to deny Russia any benefit. We have not made decisions as of yet, and if you have specific questions on those military measures I refer you to Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Brian McKeon’s testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on December 1st which outlines some of the things we’re looking at. So I’m going to defer to DoD if you ask me about specific military options.

But what I would say is, we don’t want to get in an action/reaction cycle with Russia. What we want is Russia to return to compliance in a verifiable manner.

So with those opening comments, let me turn the floor over to colleagues and I’ll be happy to answer your questions.

**Moderator:** Thank you, Assistant Secretary Rose.

**Press:** Heidi Jensen, Jyllands-Posten

Maybe you can just start by explaining who is the missile defense directed against. There was a lot of talk about Iran
early on, but we are supposed to becoming good friends with Iran now.

**Assistant Secretary Rose:** Let me say this. I think we are very hopeful that we will, that the Iran Nuclear Deal will cut off Iran’s path to a nuclear weapon, and that’s a good thing. But there are also a number of other activities that Iran is involved in which is of concern to the United States, our allies and partners. One of those issues that we are concerned about is their continuing development of ballistic missiles. And even conventionally armed ballistic missiles can have strategic implications.

As you’ve seen, they have conducted several ballistic missile tests over the past several months, and I would say as long as Iran continues to develop and employ these ballistic missiles, the United States will work with our friends and partners in the Gulf, in Europe, to defend against this threat. For example, I was just in the Gulf last month working with our partners as we develop options for increased U.S.-GCC cooperation.

Let me just sum up by saying we are hopeful that the Iran Deal will cut off Iran’s pathways to a nuclear weapon, though it’s going to take time to see if that is implemented, but we are hopeful. However, Iran is also involved in a number of other
disturbing activities such as the continued development of ballistic missiles, and we will work with our allies in defending against that threat.

**Press:** Julian Barnes, Wall Street Journal.

The Russian buildup in Kaliningrad and other bases of A2AD missile threat. I’m wondering from an arms control perspective, does the movement of weaponry or other Russian activities in Kaliningrad or elsewhere, has that raised concerns in terms of the areas that you work with in terms of arms control?

**Assistant Secretary Rose:** What I would say is that we are very concerned with a number of Russian activities. One, from some of the rhetoric which is unhelpful; but secondly, their disregard for some key European security related arms control treaties. The 2007 decision to suspend the INF Treaty. Secondly, their decision to violate -- sorry, the CFE Treaty. Sorry. In 2007. And their continuing violation of the INF Treaty. I think these individual violations are part of a larger set of concerns we have about Russia.

That said, I want to come back to the point I made a little bit earlier. Though we have serious concerns about a number of
their activities, their compliance with the INF Treaty, their compliance with the CFE Treaty, the New START Treaty is continuing to work well and we believe that they’re in full compliance.

So the answer to your question is yes, we are very concerned about numerous activities Russia is involved with, including in Kaliningrad, and that is having an impact on our thinking.

**Press:** Robin Emmott, Thomson Reuters.

As well as having an impact on your thinking, do you worry that these A2AD bubbles, as they’re described, actually limit NATO’s freedom of movement in any way?

**Assistant Secretary Rose:** Well, I’m going to defer to my colleagues who work these issues at NATO, but what I would say is there are ongoing studies here amongst the alliance to determine what is the best alliance response to some of Russia’s irresponsible behavior. Robin, I’m just not as engaged in these--

**Press:** From a purely U.S. point of view?
Assistant Secretary Rose: Well, like I said, I’m much more dealing with Russia on the arms control, kind of focused on kind of implementation of the New START Treaty as well as trying to bring them back into compliance with the INF Treaty.

But what I would say in general is, we are very concerned with some of the Russian rhetoric, especially rhetoric like the Russian Ambassador in Denmark used a couple of months ago, and that’s not helpful. I mean we don’t want to get into an action/reaction cycle with Russia. However, let me be clear. The United States will do what is necessary to protect the United States and our allies and friends in Europe.

Press: Iryna Somer, NA UNIAN.

I would like to continue with Russia.

Assistant Secretary Rose: I just can’t get away from Russia, can I? Much as I try.

Press: The illegal annexation of Crimea, Russian stopped its military. How does this change the security picture in the region? And do you see a sign of possibility to deploy nuclear weapons there? It is first my question, second concern Ukraine.
I know that you’re going to visit Ukraine. Can you please tell us what you actually will do.

**Assistant Secretary Rose:** First, we condemn Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and we think it would be both inappropriate and illegal for them to deploy nuclear weapons in Crimea.

Secondly, with regards to my upcoming visit to Kyiv, we will be discussing a broad set of issues. For example, modernization of the U.S.-Ukraine Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, as well as discussions on a number of topics related to conventional arms control in Europe and space security.

**Press:** [Bakham] [inaudible].

Sir, you served as the U.S. negotiator for the missile defense base in Romania. In this context I would like to ask you how useful to think we might be the facilitator like Deveselu in order to improve the U.S. and NATO missile defense strategy, especially this context of risk and instability in Eastern Europe.

**Assistant Secretary Rose:** What I would say is the Aegis Ashore site is critical to the NATO missile defense system.
Fundamentally, it will increase the defensive coverage of Southeastern Europe against medium and short range threats. I want to thank Romania for their excellent cooperation.

As I mentioned in my opening statement we had, what’s the exact term? You know, I mess up all these military terms. It’s called Technical Capability Declaration. And what that means is that construction of the site has been completed. Now the site has been turned over from the material developer, the Missile Defense Agency, to the U.S.-European Command which will begin several months of testing to make sure that the site is ready for operation. And then we will likely declare a U.S. decision late in the spring that the system is operational.

So I think it is a critical capability for the NATO missile defense system which will be supplemented by the four Aegis ships that we have deployed in Rota and in the 2018 time frame we will have the second Aegis Ashore site become operational in Poland.

Press: Philippe Regnier, from Le Soir Newspaper, from Brussels.

Do you expect some further reaction from Russia when the construction of the ashore site in Poland will begin? What’s
the time frame of these works, and how many months, years do we have to wait before it’s operational?

**Assistant Secretary Rose:** Well, I never anticipate what our Russian friends are going to say. I would refer you to our Russian colleagues for comment on that.

But let me come back to the point I made earlier. U.S. and NATO missile defenses are not directed against Russia nor do they have the technical capability to defend against Russia. I’m on record for several years about this and I have not changed my tune.

Secondly, about the development of the European Phased Adaptive Approach in NATO missile defense. The radar in Turkey has been operational since 2011. The Aegis Ashore site in Romania, as I mentioned earlier, will become operational in the spring of 2016. I don’t have an exact date. I’m just using spring. We will begin construction of the second Aegis Ashore site in Poland sometime this spring and that is scheduled to become operational in the 2018 time frame.

The key difference between the Aegis Ashore site in Romania versus Poland is that we are waiting upon the completion of a
new ballistic missile defense interceptor. It’s called the SM3, Standard Missile 3, Block 2A. This is a missile that the United States is co-developing with Japan. We have had two successful fly-up tests this year with our Japanese partner, and that is scheduled to become available in the 2018 time frame.

Whereas the site in Romania is really designed to deal with those shorter range threats, the site in Poland will have this larger interceptor which is designed to deal with medium and intermediate range missiles. These are missiles with a range of between 3,000 and 5500 kilometers.

Again, right now we are on budget and on target. The U.S. Congress has authorized and appropriated the money for the beginning of the construction of the Aegis Ashore site in Poland. We can get you the exact budgetary numbers if you would like. We are making good technical progress on the SM3 Block 2A interceptor. And we actually learned a lot with regards to the Aegis Ashore site that we built in Romania. So hopefully we can apply many of the lessons we learned from Romania as we build the site in Poland.

**Press:** Brooks Tigner, Jane’s Defense. Two questions, if I may. Both on missile defense.
I was just curious if there’s any behind-the-scenes informal exchanges of EPAA radar tracking data, whether it real or simulated has been given to Russia or exchanged with Russia as occasionally took place before the invasion of Ukraine. That was a confidence-building measure.

Secondly, has there been any attempt in your talks with the Russians to trade off their potential return to compliance with INF against concessions by NATO and U.S. on missiles?

Assistant Secretary Rose: Let me take your second question first. We have made it very clear that one, our missile defenses aren’t directed against Russia, nor do they have the capability. Secondly, the President has been very very clear that the U.S. is moving forward with missile defense, the U.S. government in general, not because of Russia. We’re not going to agree to limitations on our systems. Because we need to have the flexibility to deal with a dynamic and evolving threat.

Let me give you an example.

Press: That was not my question. My question was, in your private talks --
Assistant Secretary Rose: No.

Press: -- have there been any attempts by the Russians to trade the two off [inaudible].

Assistant Secretary Rose: Not in my private talks with the Russians.

Press: Thank you.

The other question on tracking data, is that completely dead?

Assistant Secretary Rose: Well, I don’t think we ever shared tracking data with the Russians.

Press: [You did.]

Assistant Secretary Rose: I don’t recall that. I will follow up with you if you’d like.

What we did do, though, is we had in this administration and in previous administrations proposed a number of very robust options for missile defense cooperation. I do not recall us
ever providing Russia tracking data. Like I said, we will follow up with you, but to the bet of my recollection, that did not occur. But I will follow up with you.

But we did put a number of proposals on the table to include missile defense modeling and simulation. We conducted missile defense theater exercises between the U.S. and Russia on a bilateral basis and between NATO and Russia on a multilateral basis. Furthermore, we also proposed the establishment of these two NATO Missile Defense Centers. One focused on kind of planning and coordination, the other on early warning. But I’ll follow up with you on that.

**Press:** Lon Cook, Associated Press.

If I could come back to Heidi’s question on the threat many years ago when I started writing about this. I remember the formula was rogue states like Iran and North Korea and then North Korea slipped off and we were left mainly with Iran.

**Assistant Secretary Rose:** North Korea has not slipped off.

**Press:** They’re back in the view finder.
**Assistant Secretary Rose:** Absolutely. Listen, North Korea, as you saw, continues to conduct destabilizing actions in the Asia Pacific region. Most recently their nuclear test last week which Secretary Kerry condemned and the Secretary General of NATO condemned. They also have large numbers of ballistic missiles and they test them often.

These missiles are short range missiles, medium range missiles, intermediate range missiles, and long range missiles.

Now the U.S. has in place a number of cooperative efforts with our friends and partners in the region to defend against this threat. For example, we have Patriot batteries deployed in the Republic of Korea and we are working with Korea on there to help them develop their Korean Integrated Air and Missile Defense System. We are working with Japan. For example, we have sold them the Aegis system and they have, I believe, four ships currently armed with the SM3 missile and they are procuring two additional missiles. They own Patriot. Furthermore, the U.S. 7th Fleet deploys a number of Aegis ships in Japan and we have deployed two missile defense radars.

With regards to the long range threat, as you may be aware in March of 2013 we made a decision to deploy 14 additional long
range missile defense interceptors because we were surprised. We did not believe initially that North Korea had the capability to develop a road mobile ICBM. They have done just that, and that was the driver for the March 2013 decision for us to deploy the Hedge, and Secretary of Defense Hagel at the time made that announcement.

One point I do want to make as well, sometimes when we talk about missile defense we try to separate U.S. homeland missile defense from our extended deterrence commitments. The point I always like to make is that there is a reason why North Korea is trying to develop long range ballistic missiles. It’s to try to prevent the U.S. from meeting its commitments to our friends and allies around the world. And our homeland missile defenses are a key element in denying North Korea or countries like North Korea who seek to hold the United States at risk to ensure that we can protect our own people, but also help us meet our security commitments to our allies and friends around the world.

**Moderator:** Julian?

**Press:** So Russia has never accepted what you have said here today and what U.S. officials have said for many years which is the missile defense system is not aimed at them. They
categorically deny that. They seem to truly believe that, so much as one can tell, propaganda versus real belief, but they have been very consistent on that point.

**Assistant Secretary Rose:** That they have.

**Press:** Given the new tensions between NATO and Russia, is or maybe I’ll phrase it different. Is there a danger that building out and bringing to NATO initial operating capability in missile defense is destabilizing? Given that it cannot stop Russian missiles, and given that Russia is doing things to bolster their defenses or offensive capability in light of these investments. Why isn’t -- Why do you think missile defense systems is stabilizing rather than destabilizing in this current new situation?

**Assistant Secretary Rose:** Julian, I think that’s a very good question.

One, the Russians know that our missile defense capabilities don’t have the ability to intercept their ballistic missiles. The key Russian concern, and I was asked about this by Senator Corker at my confirmation hearing. What is the Russian concern? In my opinion, they know that given the current state of our
technology, these systems can’t intercept Russian warheads. Their long-term concern is that in the future, absent legally binding constraints, we will develop systems that could potentially negate their strategic deterrent. That is their long-term concern.

It’s kind of interesting. I always like to tell this story because it illustrates the point. Three or four years ago I was in a senior level dialogue with senior officials from the Russian Ministry of Defense and Foreign Affairs. And one of their generals, who will go unnamed, gave an interesting presentation on U.S. missile defenses. And it had a U.S. Aegis ship in the Baltic and simulated that shooting down Russian strategic missiles.

So I asked the question. I said, General, that is a very, very interesting presentation, but can I ask you this question? How fast are you attributing the missile on that ship? And he looked at me very seriously. He said 10 kilometers per second. I said General, we have never created a ballistic missile or rocket as well as I’m aware of, a land-based one that had a velocity burnout of 10 kilometers per second. I said if you can find me a sea-based missile defense interceptor that has a
velocity burnout of 10 kilometers per second please let me know because I want to buy stock in that company.

And his response back to me was very clear. He says, well you’l get there. So that’s their long-term concern.

A lot of the rhetoric that is coming out of Russia, they understand the technical -- I’ve talked to the Russians an awful lot. They know this. Their concern is about the future.

I don’t think the deployment of these systems in this current environment is destabilizing. Limited numbers, limited capabilities, and we have been very very transparent about our missile defenses. That’s another point I always make. The Russians express their concern about the future, but we’re pretty transparent. Every year during the budget cycle there is testimony. It tells you how much money we are spending on missile defense. If you go to the Missile Defense web site they basically have a chart every year that shows you how many weapons of this. So we’re pretty transparent.

Our objective was to try to use cooperation, and this is not just the Obama administration’s view. It was the Bush administration’s view, the Clinton administration’s view, and
the Herbert Walker administration’s view, that we would use missile defense cooperation as a transparency and confidence-building measure to give them insight to show them this was not about Russia.

However, despite all the things we put on the table, it didn’t address Russia’s fundamental concern. And Russia’s fundamental concern with missile defense is this. They need legally binding limitations on U.S. and NATO missile defenses, and the U.S. has been very, very clear. We cannot accept that.

One more?

**Moderator:** We have time for just one more question.

**Press:** A very Danish question.

**Assistant Secretary Rose:** I actually was involved in the negotiations on the Thule radar about ten years ago when I was at the Pentagon.

**Press:** Then you know about it. As you know, the government is concerned with putting radars on [inaudible].
**Assistant Secretary Rose:** The SMART-L.

**Press:** Yeah. I mean how important is that?

**Assistant Secretary Rose:** Well, just for those of you who aren’t as up to speed on NATO missile defense, NATO itself does not own interceptors or sensors. What the NATO Missile Defense System is, it is a command and control system.

I always like to say, and you know this, NATO is an integrator of national military capabilities. Now when NATO made the decision to establish the NATO Missile Defense System in 2010, it was agreed that NATO Would buy the command and control infrastructure and it would be up to individual nations to provide the interceptors and sensors.

Now the United States through the European Phased Adaptive Approach, provided the first national contribution and in 2012 we assigned the radar in Turkey to the NATO Missile Defense System, and hopefully later on this year we will assign the Aegis Ashore site, once it’s checked out, to the NATO system. We strongly encourage other allies to provide national capabilities. And it just doesn’t have to be interceptors.
You know, sometimes in the missile defense world we get obsessed about interceptors and numbers of interceptors, but with regards to missile defense, really in many ways the most important element is having good discrimination and sensor capability. So I would say the United States applauds the efforts of Denmark. I know the Netherlands is also looking at, has made a commitment to upgrade their radars, because that will dramatically improve our capability as a collective to defend against threats, and actually because of the better discrimination capabilities, require us to use less interceptors.

**Press:** One quick follow-up. North Korea. Where can they reach? What’s the farthest they can go at the moment?

**Assistant Secretary Rose:** What I would say is this. They have large numbers of short and medium range missiles, specifically SCUDs and NoDongs that can reach all of South Korea, most of Japan if not all of Japan. Furthermore, they probably have the capability to reach Guam. You may know that the United States has a THAAD system deployed in Guam. We believe, based on testing, that they have the technical capability to reach the United States, but there are questions, and we can get you the exact language from the intelligence community as to their ability to miniaturize a warhead and reach the United States.
I’ll follow up with you, because Director Clapper has been very very clear. But they do have a long range launch capability that we believe has the technical capability to reach the United States, but there are some questions about payload. But we can follow up with you, Robin, on --

Press: In theory they can do it but in practice they still can’t?

Assistant Secretary Rose: Well, I would say -- Let me get you the exact language from the intelligence community because I want to make sure I get this right for you.

Moderator: We have to break --

Assistant Secretary Rose: But if you can follow up with Robin on the Clapper statement.

Moderator: I definitely will. Thank you so much.

Assistant Secretary Rose: Thank you.

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