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the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine

Defense Issues, NATO Response to Terrorism

July 2007

Countering the Terrorist Mentality

This edition of eJournal USA, "Countering the Terrorist Mentality," provides a look at the complex, global problem of terrorism. Several of the world’s leading scholars in this field, including Walter Laqueur, Bruce Hoffman, Jerrold Post, David Kilcullen, Mohammed Hafez, and Mia Bloom, examine the motivations of those who carry out terrorist attacks and the techniques terrorist organizations like al-Qaida use to recruit and motivate them.

http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0507/ijpe/ijpe0507.htm
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U.S. ALLIES URGED TO MOVE DECISIVELY AGAINST TERRORISM FINANCING. Political will, legal tools required, U.S. Treasury secretary Paulson says. 14 June 2007

Washington -- U.S. allies need to accelerate the use of financial sanctions to address terrorism and weapons proliferation, U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson says.

“Everyone acknowledges that we must find effective ways to deal with these threats, short of military measures. Yet other nations are not moving quickly enough to accomplish this goal,” Paulson said in a June 14 speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.

He did not specify which countries have failed to act aggressively enough to counter terrorist threats.

Paulson outlined the U.S. campaign to cut off weapons proliferators, terrorists and money launderers from the global financial system and highlighted the campaign’s major achievements.

He also called on countries to muster their political will and upgrade their legal capabilities so that they can share responsibility for mutual security.


RICE SAYS WORLDWIDE COOPERATION NEEDED IN TERRORISM FIGHT (Secretary cites U.S. efforts with Latin American “tri-border” nations). By Eric Green, USINFO Staff Writer. 06 June 2007

Washington -- The United States is receiving “very excellent” cooperation from Argentina, Bolivia and Paraguay on combating suspected terrorist activity in the region where the three Latin American countries share a common border, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice says.

In a June 4 interview in Panama City, Panama, with the Telemundo television network, Rice said the United States appreciates the three countries’ cooperation to root out terrorism in what is called the “tri-border area.”

(…)
In the interview, Rice said the “best thing that we can do as governments” is to have “extensive counterterrorism cooperation, share information, share intelligence, arrest people when necessary, and remain absolutely vigilant.”

Transcript of the Rice interview with Telemundo:
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2007/06/86031.htm

Since 2001, the U.S. has appropriated over $15 billion to secure, stabilize, and reconstruct Afghanistan. More than 50 other nations have also been instrumental in this effort. Progress has been made in economic growth, infrastructure development, and training of the Afghan army and police, but the overall security situation has deteriorated significantly in the past year.

Previously, GAO identified several programmatic improvements such as improved planning, development of strategic plans and measurable goals, specific time frames, cost estimates, and identification of external factors. In this report, GAO identified the need for better coordination between the U.S. and other nations, more flexible options for program implementation, and timelier project implementation. GAO also identified several obstacles and challenges to the U.S. efforts.

CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS (HEARINGS, REPORTS, ETC.)


The Bush Administration recently announced its intention to create a new combatant command, Africa Common or AFRICOM, which will promote U.S. national security in Africa. The Administration envisions that the new area will encompass all African countries except Egypt. AFRICOM’s mission will be to work with African states and organizations to strengthen stability and security in the region.

A transition team has started the implementation of the new command. It is expected to be sub-unified under EUCOM by October 2007, and achieve full capability by October 2008.


INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO THE PALESTINIAN UNITY GOVERNMENT. Paul Morro. Congressional Research Service (CRS), Library of Congress. May 9, 2007. 07AD664

The new Hamas-led Palestinian government complicates U.S. policy toward the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the peace process. When Hamas took power, the Administration and some of its partners cut off contact and assistance, and supported moderates in Fatah. The international sanctions did not drive Hamas from power, and some assert that it provided an opening for Iran. Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, are pressing for recognition of the new government. However, in 2006, Congress tightened existing restrictions; and in 2007, a bill was introduced to further restrict contact and assistance.

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22659.pdf  [pdf format, 6 pages]

THE WHITE HOUSE

INITIAL BENCHMARK ASSESSMENT REPORT. The White House. July 12, 2007

This report to Congress is the first of two reports to be submitted and has been prepared in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense; Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq; the United States Ambassador to Iraq; and the Commander of United States Central Command. This assessment complements other reports and information about Iraq provided to the Congress and is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its Coalition Partners, or Iraq.


The fact sheet is responding to 13 "key myth" concerning the war in Iraq.  


Following an informal visit at the Bush family retreat in Kennebunkport, Maine, President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin signaled a new spirit of cooperation on the peaceful use and spread of nuclear energy with a proposal to help the international community generate nuclear power. The Declaration issued July 3 outlines a framework for the global sharing of nuclear expertise and technical assistance and follows extended U.S.-Russian talks on working with the international community to expand the safe use of nuclear energy.  

**THE U.S. AND NATO**

**GLOBAL NATO: CONGRESSMAN SUGGESTS CREATING WORLDWIDE ALLIANCE (NATO commander testifies on importance of trans-Atlantic military pact).**  
By Vince Crawley. *USINFO Staff Writer. June 22, 2007*

Washington -- NATO’s 26 nations should consider expanding membership well outside of Europe and North America -- perhaps inviting Pacific-region democracies to join -- the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee told NATO’s senior commander June 22. “In a period of globalization, where everything is globalized, from academics to trade, clearly NATO ideally would be transformed into a global security mission,” Foreign Affairs Chairman Tom Lantos said in a hearing devoted to the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Lantos directed his question to U.S. General Bantz Craddock, NATO’s supreme allied commander in Europe, and Daniel Fried, the assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs.  
Craddock and Fried replied that NATO planners are discussing how to best handle global missions, but discussion of expanding beyond the traditional North Atlantic region is still in its very early stages.  
THINK TANK PUBLICATIONS

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

EUROPE AND ISLAM. By Bernard Lewis. AEI Press. June 2007

This pamphlet is the text of the 2007 Irving Kristol Lecture, delivered at the annual dinner of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research in Washington, D.C., on March 7, 2007.
The 2007 Kristol Award was presented to Bernard Lewis, the Cleveland E. Dodge Professor of Near Eastern Studies Emeritus at Princeton University, and long the free world's preeminent student and interpreter of Islam, the Ottoman Empire, and the modern Middle East.
Following the terrorist attacks of September 2001, Professor Lewis's works attracted intense interest from a wider public seeking to understand the turmoil in the Muslim world that had exploded with such ferocity into the West.

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION


The time may be approaching when the only hope for a more stable Iraq is a soft partition of the country. Soft partition would involve the Iraqis, with the assistance of the international community, dividing their country into three main regions. Each would assume primary responsibility for its own security and governance, as Iraqi Kurdistan already does. Creating such a structure could prove difficult and risky. However, when measured against the alternatives—continuing to police an ethno-sectarian war, or withdrawing and allowing the conflict to escalate—the risks of soft partition appear more acceptable.
View Full Paper (PDF—638kb):


"The prevailing violence and lawlessness in Iraq drives tens of thousands of families from their home every month. Syria, because of its open border and the public services the state provides, has become a haven for many fleeing Iraqis," says Elizabeth Ferris, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and co-director of the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement. "The make-up of the Iraqi refugee community in Syria—comprised of all major sectarian affiliations, occupations, economic
backgrounds and home governorates—reflects the breadth of the violence in Iraq. The refugees' current situation in Syria is stable but precarious. While many are running out of funds, perhaps more importantly, most see no possibility in returning to Iraq in the near term."

http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/idp/200706iraq.htm

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE


A team of leading nonproliferation experts offers a blueprint for rethinking the international nonproliferation regime. They offer a fresh approach to deal with states and terrorists, nuclear weapons, and fissile materials through a twenty-step, priority action agenda. Starting with the premise that the United States cannot solve the nuclear proliferation challenge alone, the authors consulted with experts and officials in the United States and twenty countries across Europe, Asia, the Middle East, the former Soviet states, and Russia. The final report carefully captures the varying national interests driving nonproliferation policies—critical knowledge if the United States’ strategy is to win international support.

This new edition surveys the policies pursued by the U.S. and other governments over the past two years and compares them with Universal Compliance’s priority action agenda. New material also explores how the U.S.-India nuclear deal, the unresolved Iranian crisis, the North Korean nuclear test, and other developments challenge the future of the nonproliferation regime.


2007 Report Card (PDF):


In a provocative new policy brief, Ashley Tellis challenges the conventional wisdom that China’s antisatellite test (ASAT) was a protest against U.S. space policy, arguing instead that it was part of a loftier strategy to combat U.S. military superiority and one that China will not trade away in any arms-control regime.

Far from a response to assertive U.S. space policies, Tellis contends in Punching the U.S. Military’s “Soft Ribs”: China’s Antisatellite Weapon Test in Strategic Perspective that the ASAT test was part of a more ambitious goal—namely defeating superior U.S. conventional
forces, both in a potential war over Taiwan, as well as other long-term, geopolitical scenarios.

The author states that Chinese analyses of U.S. military operations since Desert Storm concluded that U.S. military might depends inordinately on space-based systems for its operational effectiveness and hence must be targeted if China is to be able to stand up to the enormity of U.S. conventional military power.


In this paper, the author “analyzes the unprecedented political role and power of Algeria’s military since the advent of formal pluralism in 1989, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s actions to reassert presidential authority, and the longer-term implications for democratic reform in Algeria.”

The key issue is the relationship between the civilian and military branches of the ruling elite; thus far, President Bouteflika has had significant success in curbing the military powers and reestablishing presidential authority. The author also delineates several challenges that could impede political reform.

[Note: Contains copyrighted material.]


United Nations Resolution 1540 would make proliferation more difficult and less attractive, facilitate the dismantlement of proliferation networks, and create momentum to strengthen other aspects of the nonproliferation regime—but major challenges preventing actual implementation need to be comprehensively addressed, says a new paper from the Carnegie Endowment.

Resolution 1540, introduced in 2004, is the most comprehensive response by the UN Security Council following the exposure of the transnational nuclear smuggling network set up by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan. The resolution is exceptional in that it compels every UN member state to criminalize the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to non-state actors in its national legislation and establish effective domestic controls to prevent proliferation.

In Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540: A Division of Labor Strategy, Monika Heupel, a former visiting scholar in the Carnegie Endowment’s Nonproliferation Program, argues that in light of the huge challenges faced, implementation depends upon applying a division of labor strategy. In this strategy, international organizations, individual
states, and NGOs would all utilize their comparative advantages to address the various implementation challenges.


CENTER FOR ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION

ANALYSIS OF NEW U.N. REPORT ON IRAQ SECURITY AND BENCHMARKS.
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. June 15, 2007


Language contained in the Supplemental also requires the President to submit a report to Congress on the status of the benchmarks no later than July 15, 2007, and to submit a second report no later than September 15, 2007. Prior to the September report, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq (Ryan Crocker) and the Commander of the Multi-National Forces in Iraq (David Petraeus) must be made available to testify before Congress. http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/archives/002292.php

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS)

A POISONED CHALICE? THE FLAWS IN THE FY2008 DEFENSE PROGRAM.

Defense budgeting often receives far less attention than defense policy and strategy, particularly the longer-term implications of defense spending. The attached briefing, however, shows that the Department of Defense future year defense program that is part of the FY2008 is based on fundamentally unworkable assumptions and is little more than a poisoned chalice.

It has long been clear that the Office of the Secretary of Defense was submitting Quadriennial Defense Reviews that were essentially meaningless because they were not accompanied by force plans, programs, and budgets that allowed them to be transformed into practice.

The attached briefing shows that the programming and budgeting problems in defense are far greater than a failure to go from concepts to workable plans for implementation. The FY2008 budget request for the FY2008-FY2012 period, like all its recent predecessors, budgets for victory in Iraq and Afghanistan in the coming year.
http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,3934/type,1/

The conflict between Hamas and Fatah (and in reality the Palestinian Authority) seems to have effectively divided Gaza and the West Bank into two separate bodies where any political compromise will be hollow and at best cloak a somewhat less overt level of struggle. Arafat’s divide and rule tactics, Israel’s shattering of the Palestinian security forces, the failure of the peace process at every level, Islamist extremism, and Israeli walls and settlements have all helped to create a divide that is far more polarized than even the most pessimistic Israeli and Palestinian government officials expected even a few short weeks ago.

Hamas turned out to be far better organized and far more effective than was expected, and clearly had planned at least many elements of the campaign in Gaza. The Palestinian security forces, on the other hand, were even weaker, more divided, more corrupt, and more unpopular. It is still unclear why Fatah was so ineffective and so badly prepared, and why intelligence on Hamas’s planning and capabilities was so bad. Even in May, some US advisors and Israeli officials were still counting on the training of the Presidential Guard and Hamas’s "weakness" to force Hamas to compromise. At least some IDF officers were saying that Israel could, in a dire emergency, intervene in support of the Palestinian Authority.


CYBER ATTACKS EXPLAINED. James A. Lewis. CSIS. June 15, 2007

The small Baltic country of Estonia was the target of a series of cyber attacks in May 2007. These were "denial of service" attacks, where an attacker floods the target network with bogus messages, causing its servers (computers that serve as a hub in a network) to slow or shut down.

The attacks caused grave concern among NATO officials, in large part because, at first, Russia was blamed. This attribution was wrong, in the sense that the attacks were not launched from Russian government computers. Like many things in cyberspace, it was difficult to tell who was at the other end of the Internet. Attribution in the Estonia case was made even harder by the use of "botnets." Botnets—short for robot networks—are the big new thing in cyber crime. A cyber criminal takes remote control of a computer by surreptitiously loading software on it. Most consumers don’t know that their computers have been compromised. Some botnets are huge, using tens of thousands of computers around the world. Having these gigantic criminal networks simultaneously send thousands of messages every minute overburdened Estonian servers and caused them to crash.

Attacks, crashes, robots—sounds like a war—and many commentators saw this as the first "cyber war." This was, of course, completely erroneous. Botnets are used all the time—they are the source of most spam—and are nothing special for cyber crime. This was not the first time that a government had seen foreign protestors attack servers and Web sites with botnets, hacks, and graffiti. China, Israel, India, Pakistan, and the United States have seen similar attacks, albeit on a smaller scale.


This report provides an overview of the recent issues, oversight responsibilities, and the future of the U.S.-South Korea military alliance. The U.S. Congress continues to be optimistic about the future of this relationship; although recently there has been a perception of increased anti-Americanism in South Korea. In the past Congress has paid little attention to the U.S.-Republic of Korea (US-ROK) alliance; as a result, there is no central coordination of the overall relationship.

[Note: Contains copyrighted material.]

Full Text:


Afghanistan is scarcely a “forgotten war,” but it has never received the same level of attention as Iraq. Canada, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. are on the offensive, and so far there is little evidence of a corresponding offensive by the Taliban. Mullah Dadullah Lang, the Taliban's best-known military commander, was killed in fighting in Southern Afghanistan in May. He was the third key Taliban leader to be killed in the last six months.

However, there is growing evidence that Afghans resent the U.S. and NATO military activity. The central government in Afghanistan “is ineffective (and often simply not present), it is corrupt and making little progress in providing services and effective governance.” The author argues that the U.S., NATO, and the Afghan government still have opportunities for victory, but the campaign in Afghanistan must become “a major exercise in armed nation building;” not just a counterinsurgency campaign.

[Note: Contains copyrighted material.]

Full Text:
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070521_uncertainmetrics_afghan.pdf  [pdf format, 9 pages]
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

RETHINKING TERROR LISTS. Lee Hudson Teslik.CFR. July 2, 2007
Terror lists are very much in vogue. Long the province of the U.S. State Department, which annually releases its Country Reports on Terrorism, the business of indexing terror organizations and “sponsor” states has diversified, with assorted think tanks and for-profit firms releasing their own, sometimes politically-colored rosters (WSJ.com). Now the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adds its brush to this canvas, crafting a blacklist of companies that report dealings with “state sponsors” of terrorism in their annual filings to the commission. SEC Chairman Christopher Cox says the project aims to protect investors from “indirectly subsidizing a terrorist state” (AP). But the list prompts outrage from companies and stirs debate more generally on the wisdom of releasing terror lists, given the potentially radioactive diplomatic consequences they tend to provoke.

FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS (FPIF)

This alternative foreign policy framework tells five different stories about our common future and the five principal challenges we face: climate change, global poverty, nuclear weapons, terrorism, and military conflict. It addresses five different sets of core misconceptions and offers five interconnected prescriptions for change. It offers a Just Security budget that would cut roughly $213 billion from the President's current budget request and yet make the United States safer and more secure.

HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Congress is considering legislation to extend habeas corpus rights (i.e., the ability to challenge the legality of detention in a civil court) to unlawful enemy combatants. Granting terrorists rights to which they are not entitled will not make the world a safer place and will not win over America's enemies and critics.[1] Worst of all, it will make armed conflicts more dangerous for soldiers and civilians. The current legal framework allows U.S. armed forces to do their job without adversely affecting military effectiveness or going against standards of international law. Congress should not undermine the United States' ability to detain unlawful combatants and, if appropriate, try them for war crimes.
http://www.heritage.org/Research/LegalIssues/upload/wm_1535.pdf
U.S. POLICY AND PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS: CONTAINING THREATS AND ENCOURAGING REGIONAL SECURITY. Testimony by Lisa Curtis, delivered before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia and the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives on June 27, 2007

The potential for the intersection of terrorism and nuclear weapons is arguably the greatest threat to American national, even global, security. As the U.S. seeks to deter the possibility of terrorists gaining access to nuclear weapons, it must consider carefully its policies toward Pakistan. The results of investigations into Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan’s nuclear black market and proliferation network demonstrate in stark terms the devastating consequences of nuclear proliferation by individuals with access to state-controlled nuclear programs.

http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/tst062707.cfm

HOW TO CONFRONT RUSSIA'S ANTI-AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #2048. June 27, 2007

President George W. Bush's meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Kennebunkport, Maine, on July 1–2 may be the last opportunity to improve U.S.–Russian relations before the two leaders leave office in 2008–2009. In Kennebunkport, President Bush may find out whether Putin's proposal at the G-8 summit to cooperate on missile defense with the U.S. is real or a sham. The U.S. should seriously examine this offer, which includes joint operation of the Russian-leased radar station in Gabala, Azerbaijan, because it may indicate a change in Russia's course toward Iran. It may also be a lever to salvage the frayed relationship between Moscow and Washington.

U.S.–Russian relations have deteriorated significantly since post-9/11 cooperation in 2001–2002, and Russian foreign policy is evolving fast. While Iraq, Iran, the war on terrorism, and the Middle East in general remain top priorities in Washington, the United States should pay close attention to a resurgent Russia because Moscow is trying to reorder the post–Cold War global security architecture, often in ways that are not in America's interests.


The Senate Armed Services Committee's version of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2008 (S. 1547) contains two provisions that will serve to delay the fielding of an effective missile defense capability. The first eliminates funding for a test bed for missile defense systems in space, and the second establishes operational testing requirements in order to continue development of the missile defense system. To help protect the American people, U.S. soldiers deployed abroad, and America's friends and allies from missile attack, the Senate should affirm its support for fielding missile defense systems in space.
and for the spiral development process for missile defense, which is necessary to field the complex missile defense system.


HEZBOLLAH'S TERRORIST THREAT TO THE EUROPEAN UNION. Testimony by James Phillips before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe. Delivered June 20, 2007

Hezbollah ("Party of God"), the radical Lebanon-based Shiite revolutionary movement, poses a clear terrorist threat to international security. Hezbollah terrorists have murdered Americans, Israelis, Lebanese, Europeans, and the citizens of many other nations. Originally founded in 1982, this Lebanese group has evolved from a local menace into a global terrorist network strongly backed by radical regimes in Iran and Syria and funded by a web of charitable organizations, criminal activities, and front companies.

http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/tst062007a.cfm

ENDURING ALLIANCES EMPOWER AMERICA'S LONG-WAR STRATEGY. James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. and Sally McNamara. Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #2042. June 15, 2007

The threats of the new century are international in character and indeterminable in length, and they require an international response. Alone, the United States cannot win the long war against transnational terrorism, nor can it respond effectively to the other emerging national security concerns of the 21st century. America needs allies. America's greatest strength is strength in numbers: the number of free nations that share its commitment to peace, justice, security, and--above all--freedom.

Building strong alliances requires a proactive strategy that reinforces rather than undermines the sovereignty of the state and at the same time strengthens the bonds of trust and confidence between free peoples, enabling them to act in their common interest. The focus of this strategy should be on building enduring alliances, not just "coalitions of the willing." As part of a comprehensive alliance-building strategy, the Administration and Congress should undertake initiatives to establish international partnerships that more closely resemble those with America's traditional long-standing allies during the Cold War.


The real question to be answered is not whether U.N. peacekeepers could possibly be a "force multiplier" for U.S. armed forces, but rather whether and under what circumstances U.N. peacekeeping serves the vital, national interests of the United States.
What does or does not qualify as a vital, national interest of the United States is a subject of debate among experts in international relations and military affairs. What qualifies as a vital, national interest to the United States in the post-9/11 world may not have qualified in the pre-9/11 world, and vice versa. Suffice to say for purposes of the present hearing that the United States has benefited from the placement of U.N. forces in locations where the world may have otherwise called for U.S. military intervention, which has in turn allowed U.S. forces to deploy elsewhere in the world where our vital national interests are actually at stake.

http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/tst061307a.cfm


Globally, terrorists have shown an increasing interest in using small boats to attack military and commercial shipping and maritime facilities. The tactics and techniques of using commercial or non-commercial vessels (under 500 tons) or swimmers to emplace or deliver improvised explosive devices have proven effective and exportable. Contemporary operational practices by transnational terrorist groups include refining proven attack methods, sharing lessons learned, and encouraging others to adopt effective tactics. Thus, the possibility of such attacks in U.S. waters should not be ignored.

The small-boat threat needs to be addressed, but rather than focusing on this particular terrorist tactic, Congress and the Administration should invest in assets that improve the overall security of the maritime domain. The maritime sector is a large and diverse field with unique and daunting threats. Efforts should be expanded to improve U.S. situational awareness and law enforcement response rather than fixating on specific attack scenarios involving small boats or other terrorist threats.


Today at the G-8 summit in Heiligendamm, Germany, President George W. Bush announced that the United States and Russia are opening consultations on locating missile defense systems in Europe.[1] This comes in response to a Russian proposal to include a Russian radar in Azerbaijan in the mix of missile defense facilities that the U.S. had proposed to locate in the Czech Republic and Poland. The proposal may indicate a new openness on the part of Russia to missile defense facilities in Europe.

While the appearance of Russian openness may be encouraging, it is important for the American public and Congress to understand that the new consultations are the beginning of a process, not the conclusion of an agreement. As such, they raise important questions that only the consultations themselves can answer. Congress in particular needs to be aware of these important questions and to seek answers to ensure that any future agreement serves the national security interests of the U.S. and its allies.


In the cover article for National Review on March 5, Heritage Foundation Distinguished Fellow and former Senator James Talent (R–MO) urged the United States to commit 4 percent of its economic output or gross domestic product (GDP) to defense. Senator Talent is concerned that inadequate U.S. funding for defense will lead to a "hollow force" that lacks the man-power, training, operational capabilities, and/or modern weapons necessary to prevail decisively on the battlefield.

A policy of sustaining defense spending at 4 percent of GDP raises the same question from both ends of the ideological spectrum: Why 4 percent? Liberals may argue that this level of commitment is too high. Conservatives may question whether it is sufficient. The answer is that 4 percent would meet the military's requirements to protect the nation while allowing sustained long-term economic growth. The figure is based on separate arguments about why less than 4 percent is too little and why 4 percent is adequate in the context of robust economic growth.


INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (ICG)

WHERE IS IRAQ HEADING? LESSONS FROM BASRA. ICG Middle East Report N°67. 25 June 2007

Amid the media and military focus on Baghdad, another major Iraqi city – Basra – is being overlooked. Yet Basra’s experience carries important lessons for the capital and nation as a whole. Coalition forces have already implemented a security plan there, Operation Sinbad, which was in many ways similar to Baghdad’s current military surge. What U.S. commanders call “clear, hold and build”, their British counterparts earlier had dubbed “clear, hold and civil reconstruction”. And, as in the capital, the putative goal was to pave the way for a takeover by Iraqi forces. Far from being a model to be replicated, however, Basra is an example of what to avoid. With renewed violence and instability, Basra illustrates the pitfalls of a transitional process that has led to collapse of the state apparatus and failed to build legitimate institutions. Fierce intra-Shiite fighting also disproves the simplistic view of Iraq neatly divided between three homogenous communities.

SERBIA'S NEW GOVERNMENT: TURNING FROM EUROPE. ICG Europe Briefing N°46. 31 May 2007

Serbia finally has a new government but one that is deeply divided between pro-Western and nationalist forces. Facing two difficult issues – Kosovo status and cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) – its choice is between moving towards European integration or on to a more isolationist path. The government’s composition, deep mistrust among many of its members and the parliament’s nationalist majority suggest it will follow the second option. Pro-Western forces have suffered a significant setback, the government is vulnerable to manipulation by the security services and oligarchs, and the system of divided responsibility for the security services renders unlikely serious cooperation with the ICTY, especially the arrests of Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic. Although Kosovo independence could destabilise the government, it may surprise and last far longer and prove more stable than expected. The West should prepare for Serbia turning increasingly away from Europe and towards Moscow.


NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY (NDU)

JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY No.46. Third Quarter 2007. NDU

This issue focuses on Intelligence, Technology and U.S. Strategic Command. This is the longest issue of JFQ that has been printed in 10 years, thanks to an unprecedented number of submissions from civilian and military security personnel in the field. JFQ is especially interested in non-military professional insights and interagency collaboration lessons as joint forces move to the next level of skill orchestration through partnership with nontraditional partners and colleagues in the war on terror. Military personnel are the writers, developers, and keepers of conventional warfare doctrine for the low frequency, high severity wars for which there can be no lapse in vigilance.

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/i46.htm


At the start of the 21st century, there are many more highly capable foreign intelligence services in the world than ever before, and we are only just beginning to understand their modern potential as an extension of state power. The functions that U.S. counterintelligence (CI) performs in the face of these changing intelligence threats have well-established tactical objectives and processes, but their potential as an integral part of American national security strategy is just starting to emerge.
The work of clandestine services, engaged in intelligence collection and other activities, is an arena of international competition in which the advantage does not necessarily go to the rich or powerful. Foreign adversaries may not have a prayer of fielding costly and technologically demanding technical collection suites, but they can organize, train, equip, sustain, and deploy impressive numbers of case officers, agents of influence, saboteurs, and spies, and the United States has become the single most important collection target in the world.


This book is an inquiry into the possibility of improving the operational thinking and decision-making of U.S. military individuals, teams, and forces who fight for their nation. The inspiration for this work lies in both the belief that information networking presents a unique chance to improve cognitive effectiveness in battle and the worry that U.S. security interests could suffer if this chance is missed. The United States is presently unrivalled in military power and assured of remaining so for the foreseeable future, thanks to its resources and the transformation of its forces based on networking principles. However, as adversaries of various sorts and sizes also adopt those same principles and exploit increasingly available and easily usable information technology (IT), U.S. operational advantages and strategic equities could be eroded. The unstoppable spread of information networking and knowhow gives rise to the need for a new edge—one that utilizes but transcends networks—by developing people, teams, and decisionmaking methods that convert information into better choices and outcomes. We call this new edge battle-wisdom.


**RAND**


Recent acts of terrorism and statements by terrorist organizations have focused attention on the economic damages that can be produced by terrorist activities and the desire of some terrorists to inflict economic harm in pursuit of their goals. Based on a review of the relevant literature, this report describes the range of economic effects of terrorist activities. It examines in detail the September 11, 2001, attacks and the extended terrorist campaign waged by the Provisional Irish Republican Army as examples of two extremes of terrorist economic targeting: high-impact, episodic terrorism and lower-level, but extended, campaign terrorism. From these examples, the authors develop a framework capturing the full range of costs that may result from economic targeting and use it to explore the range of defensive measures that might be used to respond to this threat.

TRADE-OFFS AMONG ALTERNATIVE GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS IN THE MARKET FOR TERRORISM INSURANCE INTERIM RESULTS. Lloyd Dixon, Robert Lempert, Tom LaTourrette, Robert T. Reville, Paul Steinberg. RAND. June 2007

This documented briefing presents interim findings from a RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy project that aims to inform the debate over extending the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA), as modified in 2005. The study uses analytic tools for identifying and assessing key trade-offs among strategies under conditions with considerable uncertainty to assess three alternative government interventions in the market for terrorism insurance: TRIA; no government terrorism insurance program; and extending TRIA without other changes in the program to required insurers to offer coverage for chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) attacks. The results suggest that TRIA performs better on the outcome measures examined for conventional attacks than letting the program expire but does not effectively address the risks CBRN attacks present to either businesses or taxpayers. The research also shows that requiring insurers to offer CBRN coverage without other program changes has little upside for CBRN attacks and can have significant unintended consequences in dealing with conventional attacks.


Commissions can bring together individuals inside and outside of government to combine experience, expertise, and political savvy. Commissions can conduct impartial inquiries, level hard criticism when warranted, help government officials and the public understand events, provide forums for diverse views, and alert the country to new threats. Commissions are not permanent government bodies. They have no authority beyond their powers of persuasion, which I think is good. Required to produce a public report, commissions come to see the American people as their primary constituency, the national interest as their sole guide, which enables them to rise above partisan politics and transcend bureaucratic agendas. Often they can say things that cannot comfortably be said by officials, including themselves as individuals in their current or former positions. Even when their recommendations are ignored by legislators or decisionmakers, commissions offer a nonpartisan dissenting voice.


Continuing conflicts between violent groups and states generate an ever-present demand for higher-quality and more timely information to support operations to combat terrorism. Better ways are needed to understand how terrorist and insurgent groups adapt over time into more-effective organizations and increasingly dangerous threats. Because learning is the link between what a group wants to do and its ability to gather the needed information and resources to actually do it, a better understanding of the group learning process could contribute to the design of more-effective measures for combating terrorism. This study collects and analyzes the available information on terrorist groups’ learning behavior, combining input from the organizational learning literature, published literature on terrorist and insurgent groups, and insights drawn from case studies and workshop discussions. It describes a model of learning as a four-part process, comprising acquiring, interpreting, distributing, and storing information and knowledge. This analytical framework, by providing a fuller picture of how terrorist groups try to adapt and evolve over time, may help in understanding the behavior of individual groups and the level of threat they pose; in developing effective counterstrategies to detect and thwart their efforts; and in appropriately allocating resources to counter potential and proven adversaries.


This companion report examines in detail the learning activities of five major terrorist organizations and develops a methodology for ascertaining what and why groups have learned. The study analyzes current understanding of that process and the factors that influence organizational learning. Part I presents detailed case studies of learning in five terrorist organizations: Aum Shinrikyo, The Radical Environmentalist Movement, Hizballah, Jemaah Islamiyah, and the Provisional Irish Republican Army. In Part II, a methodology is developed for ascertaining what and why groups learned, gaining insights into their learning processes, and discerning ways in which the law enforcement and intelligence communities might apply that understanding. Insights drawn from the organizational learning literature are then applied to the case studies. Law enforcement and intelligence activities.

STANLEY FOUNDATION


Francis Fukuyama and Michael McFaul present an argument for continued US efforts to promote democracy (and respond to a number of oft-heard counterarguments) as well as a plan to strengthen policy tools for those efforts. They acknowledge that democracy promotion has to be balanced by other traditional strategic interests, but they “reject the simple assumption that there is a zero-sum trade-off between these traditional security objectives and democracy promotion.” The authors advocate a concept of dual-track diplomacy that pursues these various goals simultaneously, but never turns a blind eye to repression and the abuse of power. Fukuyama and McFaul also call for the creation of a new Cabinet-level department of development, with resources and programs for democracy promotion that would be set up to be distinct from economic, political, or security support.

(...) Apart from serving US strategic interests, democracy promotion is also the right thing to do. First and foremost, democracy is the best system of government. Leaders who have to compete for popular support to obtain and retain power are compelled to respond to the preferences of the people. The marketplace of political competition is also a built-in driver of better governance. At a minimum, democracy provides a mechanism for removing bad rulers, and when political competition is absent, as in autocracies, it produces complacency and corruption, with no mechanism for producing new leaders. Second, democracies provide more, and more stable, welfare for their people than do autocracies. Third, the demand for and appeal of democracy as a system of government are widespread, if not universal. The United States, therefore, has a moral interest in promoting democracy. Clearly, American leaders constantly face situations in which immediate security interests require cooperation with autocratic regimes, but such policies should not be defended on moral or ethical grounds.


STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE. U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

POLITICAL TRENDS IN THE NEW EASTERN EUROPE: UKRAINE AND BELARUS. Dr. Arkady Moshes, Dr. Vitali Silitski. SSI Monograph. July 02, 2007

This monograph contains two individual reports: Belarus and Russia: Comradeship-in-Arms in Preempting Democracy by Dr. Vitali Silitski and Ukraine: Domestic Changes and Foreign Policy Reconfiguration by Dr. Arkady Moshes. Belarus remains the last true dictatorship in Europe, and as such, its internal and external security agenda is an abiding matter of concern to the European and Western communities. But its trajectory is of equal concern to Moscow, which has been the prime external supporter and subsidizer of the Belarusian government under President Alyaksandr’ Lukashenka. But despite this support, tensions between Moscow and Minsk are growing. The brief energy
cutoffs imposed by Moscow at the start of the year and Belarus’ retaliation shows that not all is well in that relationship. Not surprisingly, Lukashenka has now turned back to the West for foreign support, but it will not be forthcoming without significant domestic reform which is quite unlikely. Ukraine presents a different series of puzzles and challenges to Western leaders and audiences. It too has suffered from Russian energy coercion, but its political system is utterly different from Belarus and in a state of profound turmoil. Therefore, precise analysis of what has occurred and what is currently happening in Ukraine is essential to a correct understanding of trends there that can then inform sound policymaking. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB781.pdf

UKRAINE'S MILITARY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. Professor Marybeth Peterson Ulrich. SSI Monograph. June 11, 2007

America’s new allies in Central and Eastern Europe have been struggling with defense reform since the end of the Cold War. Only recently since the Orange Revolution has Ukraine’s national political and military leadership seriously engaged the process of radical and comprehensive defense reform. This monograph applies the various roadmaps for reform developed in the postcommunist states of Central European states to the emerging Ukrainian case. The author draws upon this mixed picture to suggest a framework focused on key areas in need of reform as well as key conditions that facilitate the achievement of reform objectives. The result is a richly developed monograph revealing Ukraine’s main strengths as well as obstacles limiting the improvement of its military capabilities. Ukraine’s interests in the East and West, along with the reality of its divided society, shape the outcomes to date and constrain the future of its Euro-Atlantic orientation. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB778.pdf

RETHINKING INSURGENCY. Dr. Steven Metz. SSI Monograph. June 05, 2007

The U.S. military and national security community lost interest in insurgency after the end of the Cold War when other defense issues such as multinational peacekeeping and transformation seemed more pressing. With the onset of the Global War on Terror in 2001 and the ensuing involvement of the U.S. military in counterinsurgency support in Iraq and Afghanistan, insurgency experienced renewed concern in both the defense and intelligence communities. The author argues that while exceptionally important, this relearning process focused on Cold War era nationalistic insurgencies rather than the complex conflicts which characterized the post-Cold War security environment. To be successful at counterinsurgency, he contends, the U.S. military and defense community must rethink insurgency, which has profound implications for American strategy and military doctrine. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB790.pdf
UNITED NATIONS

REVISED KOSOVO RESOLUTION SUBMITTED TO U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL
(Change would allow for 120-day negotiation period between Serbia, Kosovo). By Judy Aita, USINFO United Nations Correspondent. 20 June 2007

United Nations -- The United States and two European members of the U.N. Security Council have submitted a revised resolution that would pave the way for Kosovo's independence.

Submitted during a closed council meeting June 20, the new draft would allow for a four-month period for negotiations between officials in Serbia and Kosovo to give the two sides time to reach an agreement before the independence plan drawn up by U.N. special envoy Martti Ahtisaari goes into effect. It asks U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon "to immediately convoke the parties to continue final status negotiations within the 120-day period" and says that the Ahtisaari plan will go into effect unless the Security Council "expressly decides otherwise after conducting an evaluation."

The council's evaluation of the negotiations would be made "on the basis of a report by the secretary-general or his representatives," the draft says.


UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE


Since spring 2003, Sistani has become the preeminent and best financed of the grand ayatollahs remaining in the city of Najaf—and by extension, in Iraq. He remains one of the most powerful figures in Iraq and he brings the Shi’is closer together across the greater Middle East.

(…)

As the general representative of the Hidden Imam, quietist Sistani can remain totally aloof from all political matters, while at times of perceived moral decadence, political corruption, great injustice, or foreign occupation, he can become more active in political affairs by engaging in activities such as consultation, guidance, and even the promotion of sacred norms in public life.

Sistani’s religious network is increasingly becoming an important source of local governance in southern Iraq, where many Iraqis are hired and at times agree to conduct duties that are usually carried out by the state.


“This report examines the correlates of individual-level support for terrorism in fourteen Muslim countries. I identify a variety of factors that are correlated with support for terrorism. These factors can be divided into several categories: attitudes toward Islam, attitudes toward the United States, attitudes toward politics and economics in the home countries, and demographic factors.

“I find that support for terrorism is positively correlated with anti-Americanism, the belief that Islam should play a significant role in politics, the belief that the United States poses a threat to Islam, and, surprisingly, the perception of free expression. Moreover, education, perceived state of the economy, and support for democracy are not found to have any significant relationship to support for terrorism.”

http://www.usip.org/pubs/working_papers/wp1.pdf  [pdf format, 52 pages]


“Behavioral scientists have devoted considerable attention to religious extremism and the psychological factors that contribute to an individual’s propensity toward violence.” The author, after interviewing several individuals who have made the transition from violence to peace, offers other observations. These observations are:

• Stress, crisis, and trauma play an important role in the change process;
• Geographic relocation may play a role for some;
• A reorientation in outlook and direction may be involved for some extremists; and
• Personal relationships are a key factor.

The author ponders how some societies that are surrounded by violence and threats still produce individuals who “become seekers of peace, advocates and practitioners of nonviolent conflict resolution.”

THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR-EAST POLICY


This month, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates will appoint a commander for the newly created U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). Set to launch sometime this fall and become fully operational with 1,000 American personnel by September 2008, AFRICOM will be responsible for all African countries except Egypt. Although no African state poses a direct threat to the United States, Washington is concerned about the growth of al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups throughout the continent. Africa has the fastest population growth rate in the world, and several of its countries, such as Nigeria, Angola, Libya, and Sudan, are important sources of crude oil.

By placing Africa under a single commander, AFRICOM will herald a new mindset regarding U.S. policy in the region. Similarly, the chosen location (or locations) of the new command's headquarters will be a symbol of American priorities and prestige on the continent. Although the greater Middle East will now fall within the jurisdiction of three commands rather than two, AFRICOM's creation signals an important structural rethinking of the U.S. military's view of the region.

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2635


In April 2007, Syria's nationwide parliamentary elections passed with little fanfare, as much of the population showed apathy toward a process they view as undemocratic. Despite the unusually open display of skepticism among the people, the country's organized opposition movements could do little more than call for a voter boycott. Indeed, the domestic opposition today is a loose, disorganized, and heavily persecuted movement. What are its prospects for success in the battle against the Asad regime -- which, as the "lion of Damascus" in more ways than one, seems to be solidifying its grip on internal power?

In this Washington Institute Policy Focus, Syria expert Seth Wikas takes a comprehensive look at the opposition's past victories and more recent setbacks. Drawing from his months of research while living in Damascus, he offers an on-the-ground perspective on the challenges that opposition members face in attempting to organize and speak out despite vigorous regime suppression. He also outlines the major regional developments that have allowed the regime to further divide and dilute the various factions arrayed against it. Throughout, he sheds light on past and potential missteps -- from strengthening already potent Islamist factions to mismanaging initiatives aimed at funding worthwhile opposition efforts -- that U.S. policymakers must avoid if they hope to help rather than hinder the Syrian opposition.

ARTICLES FROM U.S. JOURNALS


Summary: The author says the PSI’s focus on interdiction has constrained some trade in weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related material or has forced “rogue traders” to change tactics. The initiative, with over 80 supporting nations, has evolved from maritime interdiction to port inspections and aerial interdictions, as well as coordinated efforts to disrupt financial networks that could supply this trade. He also points to ship-boarding agreements the United States has concluded bilaterally with seven countries covering about 70 percent of the world’s commercial fleet measured by tonnage. Valencia, a senior fellow with a Malaysian government-sponsored policy research institute, says that secrecy surrounding PSI interdictions and methods make it difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the four-year-old initiative. Greater transparency would help, he said, as well as bringing PSI into the United Nations system.


Summary: On January 11, a Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon destroyed one of the PRC’s obsolete Feng Yun-1C weather satellites in a direct strike, creating more than 1,000 pieces of debris of sufficient size to be tracked from the ground. Debris from the test has been identified at altitudes as high as 3,600 kilometers which the author says is four times higher than the position of the original target. He says the international community has expressed its grave concern regarding this debris, which poses an increased risk to both manned space flights and commercial assets in space. “The real danger lies less in the military realm,” Forden says, “than in the long-term risk to civilian communications, weather forecasting and pure scientific research conducted by all space-faring nations.” He points to the evolving Code of Conduct for Space-Faring Nations, which contains a pledge that nations would endorse, agreeing to abstain from generating space debris. The author says this would help protect global economic interests in outer space “by instituting an international taboo against creating dangerous space junk.” He suggests that the timing is right to conclude a treaty banning the most dangerous ASAT systems.


Summary: In this report prepared exclusively for the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), Schmid, an MIPT Senior Fellow and former U.N. counterterrorism officer, discusses the challenges of global energy security. He notes the vulnerability of energy infrastructure, and their attractiveness as targets of “small deed / large consequence” attacks. Schmid argues that a comprehensive strategy will not only have to address the issue of disruption of energy flows, but it will also have to come to grips with the way our communication systems and financial systems react to terrorist challenges. This is the first of a series by MIPT Senior Fellows.
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