The United States joined in observing April 4 as the International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action to help draw attention to the global landmine problem. April 4 was designated as a day of remembrance by UN Resolution A/c.4/60/L.7/rev.1 on November 8, 2005. As the world leader in helping to reduce the impact of persistent landmines and unexploded ordnance left from past conflicts, the United States was honored to participate in the first annual observance of this day.

"April 4 presents another opportunity to remind the public that the global landmine problem still exists while also recognizing that great progress has been made in reducing it," remarked Dr. John Hillen, the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. "Through the concerted efforts of governments and private citizens, a world free from the humanitarian impact of landmines is coming closer to reality."

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/64077.htm

HTTP://WWW.MINEACTION.ORG/DOWNLOADS/1/UNMAS%20IN%202007%20FROM%20EMINE.PDF
The U.S. Humanitarian Mine Action Program supports mine action worldwide through bilateral and multilateral assistance and through more than 50 public-private partnerships with non-governmental organizations and civic groups. The U.S. has contributed well over $1 billion to mine action since 1993. To learn more, visit the following websites:

- U.S. Department of State’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement  
  www.state.gov/t/pm/wra

- U.S. Department of Defense Humanitarian Demining Research and Development Program  
  http://www.humanitarian-demining.org

- U.S. Agency for International Development’s Leahy War Victims Fund  
  www.leahywarvictimsfund.org

- U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention  
  www.cdc.gov/nceh/ierh/ResearchandSurvey/WarRelated.htm
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Issue # 44. 1st quarter 2007. NDU

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MISSILE DEFENSE AND EUROPE
Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs
Foreign Press Center Briefing. Department of State. March 28, 2007

Ambassador Fried: ".. the notion that somehow missile defense has to be seen as part of an emerging arms race between the United States and Russia, which is some of the odd commentary I hear from some Europeans, has no relationship to reality and the debate about missile defense ought to be conducted in a way, it seems to me, that reflects reality.

Second point is that NATO has, in fact, addressed missile defense issues, and read paragraph 25 of the Riga summit declaration, which refers to a threat, a threat to which missile defenses can provide an answer. The NATO study that the summit declaration refers to was a study of short- and mid-range missile defense systems. In theory, it's determined that the systems have the theoretical possibility of being effective. NATO has called for more work on this.

In our view, the more NATO is involved in this, the better. And the bilateral systems which the United States is preparing to discuss with the Poles and the Czechs could be -- and in fact we would all benefit if they were -- integrated with national systems and linked up with some sort of NATO-integrated system. It's early to discuss specifics. I'm not announcing anything. But in terms of our -- the general American view of the way ahead, it certainly includes a role for NATO.

I would also add that we look forward, we look forward to discussions with our Russian friends about missile defense issues, both to ease their concerns -- of course, we've had multiple high-level discussions with the Russians before, but if we have to keep explaining this, we are happy to do so; and to the degree to which the Russians are ready, I certainly think that cooperation with Russia is something we would be interested in."

http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/82329.htm

MEASURING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN IRAQ
In accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007 (Section 9010, Public Law 109-289)

The strategic goal of the United States for Iraq remains a unified, democratic, federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself, and that is an ally in the war on terror. One year ago, as described in the February 2006 edition of this series of reports, the Iraqi people were on their way to achieving these goals. The national constitutional referendum and elections in 2005 were victories for the Iraqi people. Unfortunately, these positive events were followed by a series of attacks that initiated a cycle of sectarian violence, undermined political gains, and challenged the Government of Iraq (GOI). To regain the initiative, the GOI is working with the United States and its Coalition partners, embarking on a new approach to restore the confidence of the Iraqi people
in their government; to build strong security institutions capable of securing domestic peace and defending Iraq from outside aggression; and to gain support for Iraq among its neighbors, the region, and the international community.

(…)

This report, like those preceding it, discusses measures of progress in political development, economic activity, and the security environment, noting the inextricable link between these areas and the Islamic, ethnic and tribal contexts that define Iraq as a state.

This information predates the new approach and sets the frame around which the new approach was designed. The report should be read as a baseline from which to measure future progress, and indications of success must be heavily caveated given the dynamic situation in Iraq. The situation in Iraq cannot be measured by daily or weekly trends; it is trend lines over the course of months that help fill in a picture from isolated and anecdotal events.


GLOBAL BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE: A LAYERED INTEGRATED DEFENSE

Through the dedicated efforts of many people, America and its allies are deploying an initial layered integrated ballistic missile defense system. The United States has come a long way since President Ronald Reagan first delivered his challenge to the defense community more than 20 years ago—to develop anti-ballistic missile technologies so that we would have more than just tools of retaliation in our arsenal. Although the nature of the threat has changed substantially since he envisioned the Strategic Defense Initiative, the harsh realities of today’s global environment will continue to prompt the United States to pursue his vision by fielding missile defenses as soon as possible. The proliferation of ballistic missile technology and its associated threats have accelerated in recent years. Considerable danger resides in the development of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons that can be paired with ballistic missiles for use against the United States, our troops abroad, our allies, and our friends. State and non-state actors may use weapons of mass destruction carried on ballistic missiles in an attempt to blackmail and intimidate the United States and its allies, and even murder hundreds of thousands of people. The combination of North Korea’s recent long-range missile test and their governments’ ability to develop weapons of mass destruction are considered a real threat to international peace and security.

Ballistic missile defense is one of the most complex and challenging missions in the Department of Defense. A ballistic missile’s altitude, speed, and range leave a defender little time to react. To meet this challenge, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is developing a layered integrated system capable of destroying a ballistic missile in each of three distinct phases of flight—boost, midcourse, and terminal. The system requires accurate missile identification and tracking with advanced sensors; advanced interceptor missiles or directed energy weapons (e.g., lasers); and reliable command and control, battle management, and communications to direct the engagement.

UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON IRAN
Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Conference Call Briefing With Members of the Press. Washington, DC. March 24, 2007

(...)The resolution is significant in the following respects: It builds on Resolution 1737, which was the first Chapter 7 resolution passed on December 23, 2006, and it opens up four new areas of sanctions. And these were all areas that were suggested by the United States at a meeting of the P-5 political directors in London at the end of February, and all of those four suggestions that the U.S. made at that meeting for new sanctions have been upheld in this resolution.

(...) there is no question that this is not a monolithic political environment inside Tehran these days. It's a tumultuous political environment. It's a divided policy community inside the government. We believe there is a faction inside that government that wishes to accept this offer to negotiate and get to the negotiating table. We also know very well there's a faction -- and the guy who's in the Security Council today, Foreign Minister Motaki, is undoubtedly a member of that faction -- which does not want to negotiate.

So our view is -- and this is the view of a lot of other countries involved with this -- that if you can build the pressure on Iran through these resolutions, then you're going to have a better chance of driving up the cost to the Iranian Government of its inaction, and those that wish to negotiate and keep a sense of integration with the rest of the world might have a stronger hand. There's no question that if Iran doesn't comply in 60 days with this resolution there'll be a third Security Council resolution at the end of May and in June. And it's going to be a tougher resolution because the deal we have on the Perm 5 is that these are a series of incremental steps upward, a gradual tightening of the pressure. We agreed on that a year ago. And so the third resolution would, by definition, have to be stronger.


REMARKS WITH THE IRAQ PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM (PRT) AFTER THEIR MEETING
Secretary Condoleezza Rice
Washington, DC. March 23, 2007

"I was glad that we had an opportunity to talk so that I could stress with you as the President did yesterday the importance of this Provincial Reconstruction Team effort. ...We don't want to just try and build and help the Iraqis build a stable, democratic society from the top down, but also from the bottom up. And that means that they have to have good local and provincial leadership, that they have to have good local and provincial governance, economic development."


By Judy Aita, USINFO Staff Writer. 20 March 2007

United Nations -- Emphasizing that 2007 is a turning point for Afghanistan, the United States urged the international community to increase its efforts to help stabilize the country.

In remarks to the U.N. Security Council March 20, U.S. Ambassador Jackie Sanders said even with robust and determined military action against the Taliban and its supporters, Afghanistan is "confronted with a ruthless enemy ... [that] will not be defeated by force of arms alone."

"It is essential that as the international community steps up its efforts to assist the Afghan authorities, it carries out a comprehensive security, political, and economic strategy," Sanders said.

The Security Council and the international community "need to continue to work toward a secure, stable, and more prosperous Afghanistan, based on the rule of law and human rights, so that the country will never again fall prey to extremists and terrorists," said Sanders, the U.S. alternate representative to the U.N. for special political affairs.

The United Nations, the ambassador said, should continue to promote a sustained international engagement in Afghanistan through the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board which helps the government and international community implement the five-year Afghanistan Compact and by reaching out to key members of the international community for support.

Full Text: http://www.un.int/usa/07_057.htm

CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS (HEARINGS, REPORTS, ETC.)

INTELLIGENCE ISSUES FOR CONGRESS
Richard A. Best Jr.

To address the challenges facing the U.S. Intelligence Community in the 21st century, congressional and executive branch initiatives have sought to improve coordination among the different agencies and to encourage better analysis. In December 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458) was signed, providing for a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with substantial authorities to manage the national intelligence effort. The legislation also established a separate Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Making cooperation effective presents substantial leadership and managerial challenges. The needs of intelligence “consumers” — ranging from the White House to cabinet agencies to military commanders — must all be met, using the same systems and personnel. Intelligence collection systems are expensive and some critics suggest there have been elements of waste and unneeded duplication of effort while some intelligence “targets” have been neglected.

ARMENIA, AZERBAIJAN, AND GEORGIA: SECURITY ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS
Updated February 1, 2007. 07AD364

The South Caucasus region has been the most unstable of the former Soviet Union states. “The regional governments have worked to bolster their security by combating terrorism, limiting political dissent they view as threatening, revamping their armed forces, and seeking outside assistance and allies. Congress has supported these initiatives and has passed the “Silk Road Strategy” (P.L. 106-113) in 1999 authorizing aid for democratization, free markets, conflict resolution, and regional cooperation.

Full Text:

THE WHITE HOUSE

FACT SHEET: EXPANDING PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS TO ACHIEVE IRAQI SELF RELIANCE
White House News, Office of the Press Secretary, March 22, 2007

"We will double the number of provincial reconstruction teams. These teams bring together military and civilian experts to help local Iraqi communities pursue reconciliation, strengthen the moderates, and speed the transition to Iraqi self-reliance." – President George W. Bush, 1/10/07

Under The President's New Way Forward For Iraq, The Number Of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) Will Increase. PRTs are joint civilian-military units that support local leaders and empower provincial authorities by working closely with the communities they serve. The expansion is a joint Department of State-Department of Defense mission that will employ both civilian and military resources toward a common strategic plan.

The Number Of PRTs Will Increase To 20 And In Personnel From 290 To Over 600. The Ten New PRTs Will Be Embedded In U.S. Brigade Combat Teams In Baghdad, Anbar, And North Babil Provinces.

Return to this article at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/03/20070322.html

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR
By George W. Bush
SPEECH at AEI, Thursday, February 15, 2007

As scholars and thinkers, you are contributing to a nationwide debate about the direction of the war on terror. A vigorous debate is healthy for our country, it really is, and I welcome the debate. It's one of the true hallmarks of a free society, where people can get up and express their beliefs in open forum. Yet five years into this war, there is one principle of which every
member of every party should be able to agree on--in other words, after all the debate, there is one thing we all ought to be able to agree on, and that is: We've got to fight the terrorists overseas, so we don't have to face them here at home again.

We're acting on that principle. Since the attacks of September the 11th, we have been on the offense. I believe the best way to do our duty in securing the homeland is to stay on the offense. And we're not alone. That's what our fellow citizens have got to understand. We're not in this fight against extremists and murders alone.

http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25630,filter.all/pub_detail.asp

THINK TANK PUBLICATIONS

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

LEGACY AGENDA, PART II: THE BUSH DOCTRINE AND THE LONG WAR
By Thomas Donnelly, Colin Monaghan
NATIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK. AEI Online. March 6, 2007

In order to succeed in a struggle that will be fought on multiple fronts and will demand sacrifices from future generations, a sound strategy for fighting the Long War must be established. Though it may be unreasonable to expect President Bush to lay out a finely detailed approach to a war that will certainly endure for decades beyond the end of the current administration, it is imperative that he set out a general framework for future strategy-making and establish a hierarchy of strategic priorities. The Long War will ultimately be won or lost by future administrations and future generations of Americans, but it is up to President Bush to set the tone in the fight for the future of the Middle East and the Islamic world and to ensure that the principles of the Bush Doctrine endure. Whether or not everyone is prepared to admit it, the United States is in this struggle for the long haul, and it is time to build the foundation of a strategy that will lead to victory.

http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25720/pub_detail.asp
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20070306_200703NSOg.pdf

IRAQ IN BOOKS
By Michael Rubin
ON THE ISSUES. AEI Online. March 8, 2007

More than 500 journalists were embedded with U.S. military units as they rolled into Iraq on March 19, 2003. Though quality is uneven, their accounts while embedded inject color into the military campaign. War is a composite of tens of thousands of soldiers' experiences; any particular story is important, but its reflection of the overall operation is limited. In such accounts, quality is proportional to the author's recognition of the genre's constraints.
For ambitious authors, to embed is to play the lottery. Prior to combat operations, journalists do not know whether their units will be in the center of action. When war erupted, top journalists embedded with the Fourth Infantry Division found themselves sitting idle in the Eastern Mediterranean, unable to redeploy after the Turkish government's decision to deny the coalition access to Turkish territory.

http://www.aei.org/docLib/20070308_Rubin_g.pdf

THE MYTH OF MODERATE MULLAHS
Reuel Marc Gerech, AEI Resident Fellow
Published in The Weekly Standard, March 19, 2007

If the Reagan administration had learned in 1987 that the clerical regime in Tehran was doing what it is doing today, would Washington have approved of preventive strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities? If Reagan and company had seen Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini rapidly constructing uranium-enrichment centrifuges in underground facilities, pushing doggedly ahead on heavy-water research and a plutonium-making nuclear reactor, and spending profusely on the development of long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles that are effective weapons only if topped with WMD warheads, would more of the U.S. foreign-policy establishment have urged our European allies to support severe sanctions to dissuade the mullahs from developing the bomb? Would leading members of the Democratic party, who then controlled the House and the Senate, have been sympathetic to a military response to the mullahs' nuclear ambitions, or would they have argued for another round of engagement, quickly forgetting their disparagement of the White House's and the CIA's 1985 search for bribable "moderates" in a terrorist-supporting state with American blood on its hands?

http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25748/pub_detail.asp

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR CRISIS: LATEST DEVELOPMENTS AND NEXT STEPS
Daniel L. Byman, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs | Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade & Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, March 15, 2007

Iran's leadership is hostile to the United States and often aggressive in undermining U.S. interests in the Middle East. A nuclear weapon would make Iran an even more formidable threat. Despite this danger, U.S. options are limited at best. Many Iranian leaders are highly committed to the nuclear program, and it appears to enjoy widespread popular support. U.S. levers to move the clerical regime in Tehran, never strong, are weak. The debacle in Iraq has curtailed overall U.S. influence in the Middle East and improved Iran's bargaining position. U.S. policy will have to recognize the relative weakness of the U.S. hand even as it strives to maximize pressure on Tehran. Regime
change, bombing campaigns, and other high-profile and blunt forms of pressure are likely to fail and may even backfire. A U.S.-led multilateral strategy to press Tehran economically and isolate it diplomatically offers the most potential leverage. Such a strategy must be calibrated to strengthen voices in Iran that worry that the nuclear program will lead to international isolation, which in turn would derail Iran's economy. Washington also must prepare for the possibility that its best efforts will not sway Iranian leaders.

View Full Testimony (PDF—58kb):
http://www.brookings.edu/views/testimony/fellows/byman20070315.pdf

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

CORRECTING IRAN'S NUCLEAR DISINFORMATION
By Pierre Goldschmidt, George Perkovich

Iran is becoming more isolated because of its refusal to take steps to build international confidence that its nuclear program is only for peaceful purposes.

Last Saturday, for the third time in less than nine months, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution expressing its concern about the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear program and emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Much of Iran's isolation stems from its refusal to act on the demands of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the legally binding requests of the UN Security Council. Recent statements by Iranian officials may confuse the Iranian people and even leaders of the state, and can only reduce international confidence that Iran is acting in good faith. Therefore, it may help to clarify what is incorrect and misleading in these statements.

Most Iranians don't have the time or access to the most balanced and objective information that would allow them to get a full picture of Iran’s nuclear program as reported by the IAEA over the last 4 years. They deserve to be well informed on this important issue, since it could affect significantly their future economic development and well being.


WHAT ISLAMISTS NEED TO BE CLEAR ABOUT: THE CASE OF THE EGYPTIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
By Amr Hamzawy, Marina S. Ottaway, Nathan Brown

In March 2006, Carnegie senior associates Amr Hamzawy, Marina Ottaway, and Nathan Brown explored the ambiguous position of moderate Islamist movements on crucial political issues—what the authors referred to as “gray zones”. The paper elicited many responses, positive and negative, by representatives of Islamist movements.

In this Carnegie Policy Outlook, What Islamists Need to be Clear About: The Case of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Hamzawy, Ottaway, and Brown
respond to the reactions and critiques by Islamists and seek to explain the issues on which
Islamist movements need to achieve greater clarity in order to gain credibility in the West.
Using the case of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the authors address Western concerns
over the Islamist political vision and provide new analysis into the complexity of the
Brotherhood’s position on key issues such as Sharia law, religious identity, organization and
leadership, universal citizenship, and women’s rights.
“We believe that this attempt to explain Western views of a problem to an audience in the
Middle East typifies the Carnegie Endowment’s New Vision of what a twenty-first century
think tank should do, namely not only provide policy makers and analysts with information
and insights about other regions of the world, but also provide policy makers and analysts in
other parts of the world with a better understanding of the United States and the West,” said
the authors.

REQUIEM FOR PALESTINIAN REFORM: CLEAR LESSONS FROM A TROUBLED
RECORD
By Nathan Brown

Between 2002 and 2006 the Palestinian government made numerous strides
towards democratic reform, yet the outcome of the 2006 elections revealed a
flawed foundation behind the movement. International backers, such as the
United States and EU, viewed democratization as a means to weaken Arafat
and promote a peace settlement with Israel, yet unexpected results led these
actors to harshly turn against the Palestinian reform movement. What can this
combination of successful reform initiatives and disillusioned
failure mean for future democratic reform, not only in Palestine, but in the Middle East?
What lessons can be learned for future reform movements?

CATO

ESCAPING THE TRAP: WHY THE UNITED STATES MUST LEAVE IRAQ
by Ted Galen Carpenter
CATO Policy Analysis no. 588. February 14, 2007

The U.S. military occupation of Iraq has now lasted longer than U.S.
involvement in World War II. Yet there is no end in sight to the mission.
Staying in Iraq is a fatally flawed policy that has already cost more than 3,000
American lives and consumed more than $350 billion. The security situation
in that country grows increasingly chaotic and bloody as evidence mounts that
Iraq has descended into a sectarian civil war between Sunnis and Shiites.
Approximately 120 Iraqis per day are perishing in political violence. That
bloodshed is occurring in a country of barely 26 million people. A comparable
rate of carnage in the United States would produce more than 1,400 fatalities
per day.
CENTER FOR ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION

BREAKDOWN OF THE FEB. 13, 2007 NORTH KOREA AGREEMENT
March 5, 2007

In a welcome break-through to an impasse in the negotiations to stop North Korea’s nuclear weapon program, which had lasted almost eighteen months, the members of the Six Party Talks (United States, China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, and South Korea) announced on February 13, 2007 an agreement to shut down North Korea’s nuclear reactors at Yongbyon. The agreement sets out a process to begin implementation of steps that will move North Korea closer to rolling back its nuclear weapon program. Full text of the February 13th agreement:


CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS)

TESTIMONY: IRAQI FORCE DEVELOPMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF CIVIL WAR
Anthony H. Cordesman
CSIS. March 28, 2007

Iraq is already in a state of limited civil war, and may well be escalating to the level of a major civil conflict. What began as a small resistance movement centered on loyalists to the Ba’ath and Saddam Hussein has expanded to include neo-Salafi Sunni terrorism, become a broadly based Sunni insurgency, and now a series of broader sectarian and ethnic conflict.

The current combination of Sunni Neo-Salafi extremist insurgency, Sunni Arab versus Shi’ite Arab sectarian conflict, Shi’ite versus Shi’ite power struggles, and Arab versus Kurdish ethnic conflict could easily cause the collapse of the current political structure. In the best case, it could lead to a Shi’ite or Shi’ite-Kurdish dominated government, with strong local centers of power, and an ongoing fight with Iraq’s Sunnis. In the worst case, it could escalate to the break up of the country, far more serious ethnic and sectarian conflict, or violent paralysis. It has already led to widespread ethnic cleansing in urban areas by militias and death squads of all three major ethnic and religious groups.

If Iraq is to avoid a split and full-blown civil war, it must do far more than create effective Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). No such effort can succeed without an integrated strategy to forge a lasting political compromise between its key factions: Arab-Shi’ite, Arab Sunni, and Kurd – while protecting other minorities. Political conciliation must also address such critical issues as federalism and the relative powers of the central and regional governments, the role of religion in politics and law, control over petroleum resources and export revenues, the definition of human rights, and a host of other issues.

The “Persian” or “Arabian” Gulf creates major strategic uncertainties for Iran, its neighbors, and the world. It is a 600-mile-long body of water that separates Iran from the Arabian Peninsula, and one of the most strategic waterways in the world due to its importance in world oil transportation. Incidents in the Gulf can escalate quickly in ways that neither Iran nor its potential opponents intend. Iran’s actions in Lebanon and in dealing with Hamas and the PIJ can provoke other unintended crises, and Iran is caught up in a broader, Sunni-dominated struggle for the future of Islam where some key Sunni Islamist extremist movements deny the legitimacy of Shi’ite beliefs. Military history is rarely determined by intentions and policy in peacetime, and crisis management often becomes an oxymoron as event spiral out of control, misperceptions dominate actions, and escalation becomes both asymmetric and an end in itself.


Defense planners in Beijing are paying close attention to Japan but also convey considerable and growing confidence in China’s ability to manage Japan as a military problem. Japan is seen as increasingly likely to be involved in a dispute over Taiwan, though some in China’s military see Japan’s declaratory policy in this regard as not consistent with its real interests and what they anticipate to be its likely military restraint in crisis and war. Japan is also seen as a significant military factor in China’s maritime security environment – which is the focus of China’s military modernization campaign. On the other hand, there is little to suggest that China is actually developing military capabilities specifically focused on Japan, with the important exception of medium-range ballistic missiles.

Defense planners in Tokyo take China as a central preoccupation. They seem more focused on China as a military problem in the East China Sea than in a Taiwan confrontation. But they also tend to resist making significant military investments to deal with China – especially for missile defense – at a time of many competing demands for defense transformation. But the political leadership has committed Japan to missile defense against North Korea.

http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/issuesinsights_v07n02.pdf
ISRAELI AND US STRIKES ON IRAN: A SPECULATIVE ANALYSIS
Anthony H. Cordesman
CSIS Report. March 5, 2007

Israel and the US differ over the timing and level of risk posed by Iran's nuclear efforts. The US sees a mature or serious Iranian nuclear threat as coming well after 2010. Israel claims to see it as coming as early as 2009 -- although much of this may be Israeli hype designed to push the US into diplomatic action, and military action if that fails.

Official US policy is to leave all options on the table, and emphasize diplomatic activity through the EU3 and the UN. The US estimates of timelines for Iran's nuclear and missile efforts also leave at least several years in which to build an international consensus behind sanctions and diplomatic pressure, and a consensus behind military options if diplomacy fails.

The US would also have the potential advantage of finding any Iranian “smoking gun,” improving its targeting and strike options, and being able to strike targets in which Iran had invested much larger assets. The fact Iran can exploit time as a weapon in which to proliferate, doe not mean that the US cannot exploit time as a weapon with which to strike Iran.

Israel, on the other hand, sees Iran as an existential threat. A single strike on Tel Aviv and/or Haifa would raise major questions about Israel's future existence.

http://www.csis.org/media/csис/pubs/070305_iran_israelius.pdf

BREAKING POINT: MEASURING PROGRESS IN AFGHANISTAN
Seema Patel
CSIS. February 23, 2007

The report's conclusions are based on 1,000 structured conversations that took place in half of Afghanistan's provinces; 13 surveys, polls, and focus groups; 200 expert interviews; and the daily monitoring of 70 media sources and 182 organizations. The current study is a follow-up to a 2005 baseline report. (For more on that report, please click here: http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,2580/ )

http://www.csis.org/media/csис/pubs/070223_breakingpoint.pdf

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

AFTER THE SURGE.
The Case for U.S. Military Disengagement from Iraq

Steven Simon, Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies
Council on Foreign Relations. Special Report
No. February 2007

Iraq has come to dominate U.S. foreign policy—and the controversy over Iraq has come to dominate the debate over U.S. foreign policy. This report by Steven N. Simon, the Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, makes a major contribution to that debate.
After the Surge: The Case for U.S. Military Disengagement from Iraq is premised on the judgment that the United States is not succeeding in Iraq and that Iraq itself is more divided and violent than ever. It concludes that the administration’s decision to increase U.S. force levels will fail to prevent further deterioration in the situation—and that there is no alternative policy with the potential to turn things around.

As a result, Simon urges the United States to disengage militarily from Iraq, a disengagement that in his view should involve a negotiated accord with Iraq’s government, a dialogue with Iraq’s neighbors, and new diplomatic initiatives throughout the region. Simon argues that if the United States does all this, it can minimize the strategic costs of its failure in Iraq and even offset these losses in whole or in part.

http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/IraqCSR23.pdf

BOLIVIA ON THE BRINK
Eduardo A. Gamarra
The Center for Preventive Action, Council Special Report, Council on Foreign Relations
February 2007. 07AD382

This report addresses Bolivia’s current social, political, and economic challenges. The author argues that the U.S.’s current “wait and see” approach should be abandoned. The author further proposes that the U.S. move to a more proactive course to emphasize democratic preservation and conflict prevention and to develop closer relations with Bolivia through trade and military training to push the Morales government away from the influence of Cuba and Venezuela.

[Note: Contains copyrighted material.]

Full Text:
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/BoliviaCSR24.pdf [63 pages]

FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS (FPIF)

IRAQ AND THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE
Chris Lindborg
Foreign Policy In Focus March 20, 2007

The Iraq War tore at the already frayed fabric of transatlantic security relations. Although European countries declared their solidarity with the United States after September 11, they were increasingly uncomfortable with Washington’s emphasis on unilateralist approaches to global problems. After President Bush took office in 2001, his administration upset many European leaders by refusing to sign the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, opposing the International Criminal Court, and killing the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. In October 2001, Washington was reluctant at first to use the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the campaign to oust the Taliban in Afghanistan. While taken aback by U.S. reluctance, NATO leaders and Europeans generally approved of the U.S.-led operation.
This was not true of the 2003 Iraq invasion, which widened the fissures between the United States and Europe as well as within Europe itself. Indeed, the invasion of Iraq led to one of the most damaging diplomatic rows in transatlantic relations since the end of World War II. Since the invasion, the Iraq War has continued to erode trust and military resources. With the recent British decision to withdraw a substantial number of troops from Iraq, the coalition of the willing is now on its last legs. The only glimmer of hope lies with recent poll data that reveal that Europeans and Americans share similar views of global security threats.

http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4085

HERITAGE FOUNDATION

THINKING FOR THE LONG WAR: STRATEGIC PLANNING AND REVIEW FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
by James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.
Heritage Lecture #1008. Delivered on March 20, 2007

America must consider more deeply the requirements for fighting and winning the long war.[1] Congress needs comprehensive assessments of the nation's homeland security programs and an independent review that evaluates how national defense and home-land security programs fit within the context of the overall interagency national security effort.

I would like to (1) review the lessons that can be drawn from other government post–Cold War efforts to conduct strategic assessments; (2) make recommendations for the next steps in conducting national security assessments; and (3) offer specific proposals for the homeland security component of these reviews.


NAVY TRANSFORMATION: A STABLE, LONG-TERM VIEW
by The Honorable Donald C. Winter, Ph.D.
Heritage Lecture #1004. Delivered on February 7, 2007

As one who recently left the private sector, where the pressure on business leaders to focus on quarterly reports seems to be inexorable, I notice that in Washington, D.C., there is also a tendency to focus on the short term. A new crisis emerges almost daily. And, politically, there is always another election just around the corner.

From a military and a Department of the Navy point of view, the short-term imperatives are quite clear. We must fight today's wars—in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and in terrorist hot spots around the world. But we must also look to the long term. We must transform our forces for the future—and we cannot delay. The Navy needs to transform the fleet to be better positioned to meet the challenges of an uncertain future.

DELAYED EMERGENCY APPROPRIATIONS PUT U.S. FORCES AT RISK
by Mackenzie Eaglen
Heritage Foundation WebMemo #1410. March 27, 2007

Already this year, two Army combat brigades were forced to skip their National Training Center rotations to prepare soldiers for the challenges they will face in Iraq. In recent congressional testimony, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, Richard Cody, stated that Army units preparing to go to Iraq and Afghanistan "are becoming less prepared for war as the military continues to struggle with shortages in equipment and training. Readiness continues to decline in our next-to-deploy forces." Similarly, in recent testimony before Congress, Marine Corps Commandant-General James Conway described Marines' current lack of training for contingencies other than Iraq, including amphibious and mountain warfare.

These intangible impacts of delayed funding are missed opportunities that cannot be made up when the money arrives later in the year. Further delay means more irreparable harm.

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (ICG)

ISLAM AND IDENTITY IN GERMANY
ICG Europe Report N°181
14 March 2007

The experience of Germany, with the largest Muslim population in Western Europe after France, shows that a significant Muslim population at the heart of Europe need not produce either violent Islamist groups or destabilising social unrest. Politicians now acknowledge it is a country of immigration, with a large and permanent Turkish and Muslim component. Citizenship is at last on offer, if still under difficult conditions. Neither political nor jihadi currents of Islamism have had much appeal for those of Turkish origin, three quarters of the Muslim population, and the handful of terrorist suspects that have been found have been either German converts or dual nationals of Arab origin. But there are issues that must still be addressed more effectively if the genuine integration that will ensure social peace and stability is to be created. While the political system has been preoccupied with finding, or creating, a single Islamic interlocutor for itself, more important are practical issues, especially education and jobs, which matter to the many still disadvantaged among the more than two million of Turkish origin and the hundreds of thousands of others of Muslim background.

AFTER MECCA: ENGAGING HAMAS
ICG. Middle East Report N°62. 28 February 2007

It has been a year since Hamas formed its government – and what a dismal year it has been. The Islamists thought they could govern without paying an ideological price, Fatah that it could swiftly push them aside and regain power. By imposing sanctions and boycotting the government, the Quartet (U.S.,
European Union (EU), Russia and UN) and Israel hoped to force Hamas to change or persuade the Palestinians to oust it. Washington promised security and economic aid to encourage Fatah to confront Hamas and help defeat it. The illusions have brought only grief. The 8 February 2007 Saudi-brokered Mecca Agreement between the Palestinian rivals offers the chance of a fresh start: for Hamas and Fatah to restore law and order and rein in militias; for Israelis and Palestinians to establish a comprehensive ceasefire and start a credible peace process; and for the Quartet (or at least those of its members inclined to do so) to adopt a more pragmatic attitude that judges a government of national unity by deeds, not rhetoric. The adjustment will not be comfortable for anyone. But the alternative is much worse.


VENEZUELA: HUGO CHÁVEZ’S REVOLUTION

After eight years in power, President Hugo Chávez won an overwhelming re-election in December 2006. Flush with oil revenues, bolstered by high approval ratings and at the start of a six-year term, he expresses confidence about advancing what he calls his Bolivarian Revolution, named after Simón Bolívar, the country’s independence hero, and installing his still only vaguely defined “Socialism of the 21st Century”. There are concerns in Venezuela and much of the hemisphere, however, that to do so the ex-colonel and one-time coup leader may be willing to sacrifice democratic principles. He is not yet a dictator and for the most part has not tried to act in a dictatorial manner, but the trend toward autocracy is strong. If he continues to build personal power at the expense of other institutions and militarise much of the government and political life, there will be serious risks for internal conflict, especially if the oil boom that cushions the economy falters.

http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/getfile.cfm?id=2765&tid=4674&type=pdf&l=1

ENSURING BOSNIA’S FUTURE: A NEW INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY ICG Europe Report Nº180. 15 February 2007

International policy in Bosnia is in disarray, and a new engagement strategy is required. The present High Representative, whose performance in 2006 has been much criticised, announced on 23 January 2007 that he would leave by mid-year. The Peace Implementation Council (PIC), to whom he reports and which is responsible for guiding implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, meets on 27 February to decide the way forward. The most immediate issues to be resolved are whether the Office of the High Representative (OHR), and the robust ‘Bonn powers’ available to it, should continue in their present form.

This is not the time to begin disengagement: Bosnia remains unready for unguided ownership of its own future – ethnic nationalism remains too strong – and 2007 promises new tensions with the approach of the Kosovo status decision. But the central role in pressing Bosnia’s politicians to meet the many outstanding Dayton commitments and become a candidate for
genuine European integration should now be played by the European Union, through its Special Representative (EUSR). OHR should be closed by the end of 2007, the Bonn powers – now effectively unexerciseable – should terminate with it, and – to avoid uncertainty, and enable time for effective planning and implementation of the transition – these decisions should be made and announced without delay.

http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/getfile.cfm?id=2744&tid=4655&type=pdf&l=1

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY (NDU)

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE WAR ON TERROR. JOINED FORCES QUARTERLY Issue # 44. 1st quarter 2007

NDU

The two focus areas in this issue of Joint Force Quarterly are highly complementary. In the Forum, we explore lessons learned in the war on terror, and in the Special Feature section, the spotlight is on U.S. Joint Forces Command—a combatant command uniquely organized to ensure that the lessons learned by joint forces are not too severe. In addition to the excellent lineup of articles addressing both areas, JFQ has interviewed key leaders to provide broader coverage of the issues, pursuant to our mandate for continuing education in joint, integrated operations.

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/i44.htm

CAN DETERRENCE BE TAILORED?
M. Elaine Bunn

Deterrence, the hallmark of Cold War–era security, needs to be adapted to fit the more volatile security environment of the 21st century. The Bush administration has outlined a concept for tailored deterrence to address the distinctive challenges posed by advanced military competitors, regional powers armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and nonstate terrorist networks—while assuring allies and dissuading potential competitors. The goal of deterrence is to prevent aggressive action or WMD use by ensuring that, in the mind of a potential adversary, the risks of the action outweigh the benefits, while taking into account the consequences of inaction. Deterrence requires detailed knowledge of the society and leadership that we seek to influence. U.S. decisionmakers will need a continuing set of comprehensive country or group deterrence assessments, drawing on expertise in and out of government, in order to tailor deterrence to specific actors and specific situations. The capabilities needed for tailored deterrence go beyond nuclear weapons and the strategic capabilities of the so-called New Triad, to the full range of military capabilities, presence, and cooperation, as well as diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments.

The clarity and credibility of American messages in the mind of the deterree are critical to tailoring deterrence threats. U.S. policymakers need mechanisms to assess how their words
and actions are perceived, how they affect each adversary’s deterrence calculations, and how they might mitigate misperceptions that undermine deterrence.

PEW

IRAQ AND VIETNAM: A CRUCIAL DIFFERENCE IN OPINION
The Military's Prestige Remains High despite Discontent with War
Jodie T. Allen, Nilanthi Samaranayake, and James Albrittain, Jr.

While public opinion with respect to the rightness and progress of the war in Iraq has followed a path not unlike that charted during the Vietnam War, one important difference stands out: public attitudes toward the military.

RAND

IRAQI SECURITY FORCES: DEFINING CHALLENGES AND ASSESSING PROGRESS
By: Olga Oliker
Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on March 28, 2007.

"Is it important to know how many Iraqis are serving? Yes, it is. It is crucial for the Iraqis, so that they can make their payroll numbers make sense. It is also important for the United States, as we seek to assess how capable Iraq’s security forces are. But knowing how many Iraqis are in uniform is not enough. In order to determine whether the Iraqi Security Forces are up to the task, we must be able to assess their not just their quantity, but also their capacity or quality, and, no less important, their loyalty".

BUILDING MODERATE MUSLIM NETWORKS
By: Angel Rabasa, Cheryl Benard, Lowell H. Schwartz, Peter Sickle
RAND Report. March 26, 2007

Radical and dogmatic interpretations of Islam have gained ground in recent years in many Muslim societies via extensive Islamist networks spanning the Muslim world and the Muslim diaspora communities of North America and Europe. Although a majority throughout the Muslim world, moderates have not developed similar networks to amplify their message and to provide protection from violence and intimidation. With considerable experience fostering networks of people committed to free and democratic ideas during the Cold War, the United States has a critical role to play in leveling the playing field for Muslim moderates. The authors derive lessons from the U.S. and allied Cold War network-building experience, determine their applicability to the current situation in the Muslim world...
world, assess the effectiveness of U.S. government programs of engagement with the Muslim world, and develop a “road map” to foster the construction of moderate Muslim networks.


**THE VICTIMS OF TERRORISM: An Assessment of Their Influence and Growing Role in Policy, Legislation, and the Private Sector**

By: Bruce Hoffman, Anna-Britt Kasupski


Little attention and analysis have focused on terrorism victims, including survivors. This report focuses on the organized groups of families and friends that have emerged since September 11, 2001, to become a powerful voice in U.S. counterterrorist policy and legislation. These groups were remarkably successful in getting the 9/11 Commission established as well as the enactment of the commission’s most important recommendations. This report documents these groups’ number and diversity, their wide disparity in mission and services, in addition to the effectiveness of their strategies for achieving their missions. It also compares the 9/11 victims’ groups to those formed in response to previous terrorist attacks both in the United States and abroad, highlighting the lessons the 9/11 groups learned from these precedents and the differences between 9/11 groups and those that preceded them.


**LEARNING LARGE LESSONS: The Evolving Roles of Ground Power and Air Power in the Post-Cold War Era**

By: David E. Johnson

RAND Monograph. March 2007

The relative roles of U.S. ground and air power have shifted since the end of the Cold War. At the level of major operations and campaigns, the Air Force has proved capable of and committed to performing deep strike operations, which the Army long had believed the Air Force could not reliably accomplish. If air power can largely supplant Army systems in deep operations, the implications for both joint doctrine and service capabilities would be significant. To assess the shift of these roles, the author of this report analyzed post–Cold War conflicts in Iraq (1991), Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (2003). Because joint doctrine frequently reflects a consensus view rather than a truly integrated joint perspective, the author recommends that joint doctrine — and the processes by which it is derived and promulgated — be overhauled. The author also recommends reform for the services beyond major operations and campaigns to ensure that the United States attains its strategic objectives. This revised edition includes updates and an index.

COUNTERINSURGENCY IN A TEST TUBE: Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)
By: Russell W. Glenn
RAND Monograph, March 2007

With a matter of weeks to prepare, Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) personnel landed on July 24, 2003, armed for conflict but equally ready to restore peace without firing a shot in anger. RAMSI’s aim was to assist the existing government in reestablishing order and rebuilding this island nation plagued by escalating militia violence, crime, and corruption. RAMSI police forces, with the much larger military component in a supporting role, were patrolling the streets alongside their Solomon Islands counterparts on the very day of arrival. This and many other early actions on the part of RAMSI leadership presented a clear and cohesive message that would characterize operations from that day forward: RAMSI had not come to take charge through the use of force, though it had the capability to do so; it had come to assist and protect. This study reviews the remarkable successes, and the few admitted shortcomings, of RAMSI operations through the lens of broader application to current and future counterinsurgency efforts. Foremost among these lessons is the need for consistency of mission and message from leadership down to the lowest echelons of an operation, ensuring that the population is appropriately and consistently informed.


MISFORTUNES OF WAR: Press and Public Reactions to Civilian Deaths in Wartime
By: Eric V. Larson, Bogdan Savych
RAND Monograph. February 2007

This monograph, part of a larger study of ways to reduce collateral damage undertaken for the U.S. Air Force, analyzes media and public reactions to civilian casualty incidents, whether these incidents affect media reporting or public support for military operations, and, if so, how. It analyzes case studies of incidents of civilian deaths in the February 1991 bombing of the Al Firdos bunker in the Gulf War, the April and May 1999 attacks on the Djakovica convoy and Chinese embassy during the war in Kosovo, the June 2002 attack involving an Afghan wedding party during operations in Afghanistan, and the March 2003 incident involving a large explosion in a crowded Baghdad marketplace to describe and explain how the U.S. and foreign media and publics have responded. For each case study, the study team examined press, public, and leadership responses to these incidents and found the following. First, while avoiding civilian casualties is important to the American public, it has realistic expectations about the actual possibilities for avoiding casualties. Second, the press reports heavily on civilian casualty incidents. Third, adversaries understand the public’s sensitivities to civilian deaths and have sought to exploit them. Fourth, during armed conflict, the belief that the United States and its allies are trying to avoid casualties most affects support for U.S. military operations, both at home and abroad. Fifth, while strong majorities of Americans typically give U.S. military and political leaders the benefit of the doubt when civilian casualty incidents occur, this does not necessarily extend to foreign audiences. Sixth, when civilian casualty incidents occur, it is at least as important to get the
story right as to get the story out. Finally, attention to and concern about civilian casualties both at home and abroad have increased in recent years and may continue to do so.


STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE. U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

GEORGIA AFTER THE ROSE REVOLUTION: GEOPOLITICAL PREDICAMENT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
Authored by Dr. Svante E. Cornell.
SSI Monograph. March 19, 2007

The attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, enhanced the importance of both the Transcaucasus and Central Asia to American security. Overflight rights through the Caucasus to Central Asia and Afghanistan are vital components of the ongoing military effort there by both U.S. and NATO forces. But this region has multiple conflicts and fault-lines. As multiple recent crises show, Russo-Georgian tensions connected with South Ossetia and Abkhazia could erupt into open violence at any time. The author outlines the possibilities for conflict in this region and the qualities that make it strategically important, not only for Washington and Moscow, but also increasingly for Europe.


THE IRAQ WAR: LEARNING FROM THE PAST, ADAPTING TO THE PRESENT, AND PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE
Authored by Dr. Thomas R. Mockaitis
SSI Monograph. February 23, 2007

Taking full account of the factors beyond the control of the U.S. military and avoiding glib comparisons with Vietnam, the author examines how the American approach to the war in Iraq has affected operations there. He also draws on the experience of other nations, particularly the United Kingdom, to identify broad lessons that might inform the conduct of this and future campaigns. He documents the process by which soldiers and Marines in Iraq have adapted to the challenging situation and incorporated both historic and contemporary lessons into the new counterinsurgency doctrine contained in Field Manual 3-24.


RUSSIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE SOURCES AND LIMITS OF "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS"
Authored by Dr. Cynthia A Roberts
SSI Monograph. February 2007

How best to engage an increasingly authoritarian Russia that is neither fully excluded nor embraced by the leading Euro-Atlantic institutions remains a
critical unresolved security challenge nearly 20 years since the Cold War’s end. This analysis of the difficult engagement between Russia and the European Union reveals why shallow cooperation and costly standoffs characterize Russia’s troubled partnerships with the West.

UNITED NATIONS

YEAR IN REVIEW: 2006: NEW CHALLENGES, NEW HORIZONS
07AD397

2006 was a record-breaker in terms of deployment for peace operations--just under 100,000 uniformed and civilian personnel serving throughout the world. Additionally, there was an unprecedented growth of peace agreements and ceasefires or cessation of hostilities accomplished with UN political and diplomatic support. This annual report provides an overview of each of the areas where support was provided.

[Note: Contains copyrighted material.]

Full Text:

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

IRAQ AND ITS NEIGHBORS: "MARMARA DECLARATION" March 23, 2007 -

High-level policymakers and leading foreign policy figures from Iraq and its six neighboring countries met in Istanbul March 21-23 to identify key action points in the proposed regional Iraqi stabilization effort. The group released the 36-point "Marmara Declaration" calling for important regional agreements between Iraq and its neighbors.

PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS IN IRAQ
USIP Special Report
March 2007

In January 2007, President Bush announced that the United States would double the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), small civilian-military units that assist provincial and local governments to govern effectively and deliver essential services, as part of his plan for a "New Way Forward" in Iraq. This report examines the U.S. experience with PRTs in Iraq, notes shortcomings, and suggests ways they could be more effective.
Getting U.S. civilian and military officials to work together effectively during post-conflict interventions is an enormous challenge. In Afghanistan and Iraq the United States has experimented with "Provincial Reconstruction Teams," which combine civilian and military personnel. PRTs are intended to assist with security, governance, and reconstruction by enabling civilians to work in insecure areas. This report examines the U.S. experience with PRTs in Iraq, notes shortcomings, and suggests ways they could be more effective. The report is based on statements by panelists at a public forum held at the Institute on February 14, 2007, and on interviews conducted by the author with government agencies and commercial contract firms that participate in the PRT program.

Robert M. Perito is a senior program officer at the United States Institute of Peace. From 1967 to 1995 he was a foreign service officer with the State Department, retiring with the rank of minister counselor. From 1995 to 2001, he served as deputy director of the Justice Department's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program.


FROM REJECTION TO ACCEPTANCE: ISRAELI NATIONAL SECURITY THINKING AND PALESTINIAN STATEHOOD

This report follows the evolution of Israeli national security thinking of an independent Palestinian state. The author outlines the obstacles and the opportunities that face this peace process. “The international community widely accepts a two-state solution as the framework for resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Israeli approach to this formula has undergone a revolutionary change in the past two decades, from total rejection to broad acceptance.”

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EXPLOSIVE HARVESTING PROGRAM
Hess, Robert

Summary: There is an overwhelming need to remove and safely dispose of explosives from
left-over munitions in a cost-effective way, notes the author. Programs to dispose of cleared
and surplus munitions often rely on outside advisors or on equipment that must be shipped
from afar. Hess highlights two organizations, the Golden West Humanitarian Foundation and
the Cambodian Mine Action Centre, that have collaborated to address the challenge through
the Explosive Harvesting Program. Golden West, with U.S. Defense Department funding, has
developed a program in Cambodia to disarm munitions using standard equipment and locally
fabricated tools. The author says the program is a good local start for long-term clearance
efforts and “lessens the ammunition-storage risks for the general public and reduces
environmental damage caused by bulk demolition of ordnance.” The State Department is also
funding expansion of the program in 2007 that focuses on explosive identification, ordnance
cutting, main charge removal and training. The article may be viewed on the Internet at:
http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/10.2/r&d/hess/hess.htm [IS;JSP]