May 3, 2012
Moscow, Russia
Agenda

- Ballistic Missile Threat
- U.S. Policy on Missile Defense
- Homeland Missile Defense
- Regional Missile Defense
- Addressing Russian Concerns
- Missile Defense Cooperation with Russia
Ballistic Missile Threat Continues to Advance

- Proliferation of ballistic missiles is a growing concern and constitutes an increasing threat
  - Proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction contribute to an unpredictable security environment
  - This security environment is marked by a persistence of regional conflicts and growing regional instability, as well as a broader and evolving set of opportunities and challenges

- Threats continue to grow quantitatively and qualitatively
  - Ballistic missiles allow rapid attack & WMD delivery
  - Shorter-range threats within key regions are growing rapidly: Iran, Syria, and North Korea possess 1000s of short- and medium-range missiles, potentially threatening to U.S. forces, allies, and partners
  - Long-range threat from North Korea and Iran still developing. North Korea tested ICBM/SLV in 2006, 2009, and 2012; Iran developing and testing Safir and Simorgh ICBM and/or SLV

  Iranian Simorgh SLV shows progress in booster design that could lead to an ICBM
U.S. Policy on Missile Defense

- **U.S. Homeland Defense:** U.S. will defend against limited intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attack
  - System designed to support that policy: not scaled, intended or capable of defending the U.S. against the larger and more sophisticated arsenals of Russia and China

- **Regional Missile Defense:** U.S. will defend deployed forces, allies, and partners in key regions
  - Europe, Middle East, and Asia/Pacific
  - Tailored response to emerging ballistic missile threats

- **Expand international efforts:** U.S. will work with allies and partners to provide pragmatic and cost-effective missile defense capacity
  - U.S. seeks to create an environment where the development, acquisition, deployment and use of ballistic missiles by regional adversaries can be deterred
Purpose: Protect the United States from limited ICBM attack by states like North Korea and Iran

United States can defend the shaded areas using:

- Ground-Based Interceptors in Alaska and California
- Land-based radars in Alaska, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Greenland

U.S. remains committed to maintaining and improving the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system

- Prepared to adjust plans to stay ahead of emerging threats
Missile defense supports U.S. security objectives

- Helps to deter and defeat regional aggression by denying an aggressor the prospect of achieving its objectives with the use of ballistic missiles
- Provides a stabilizing presence with deployments and training exercises, supports partner interoperability, and builds partner capacity

Missile defense enhances regional stability and security and contributes to deterrence by:

- Assuring allies and partners of U.S. commitment
- Countering ballistic missile coercion and WMD proliferation
- Providing protection if deterrence fails
- Reducing pressure for rapid escalation if deterrence fails
Regional Missile Defense

- **Purpose:** Defend U.S. deployed forces; protect allies and partners; enable allies and partners to defend themselves

- **Missile defense is a key element of U.S. security commitments in Europe, Middle East, and Asia/Pacific**
  - Tailored to the unique geopolitical features of each region
  - Phased to the evolution and availability of U.S./Allied BMD capabilities
  - Adaptive to the scope and scale of current and emerging threats

- **Through cooperation, missile defense is more effective**
  - International cooperation, both bilateral and multi-lateral, is central to U.S. regional missile defense efforts
EPAA Not Directed Against Russia

EPAA Elements:

**Phase 1 (Present):**
Initial defense vs SRBM/MRBM
- TPY-2 Radar in Turkey
- MD ship presence
- SM-3 IA interceptor

**Phase 2 (2015 timeframe):**
Enhanced coverage vs SRBM/MRBM
- Aegis Ashore site in Romania
- SM-3 IB interceptor
- Continued MD ship presence

**Phase 3 (2018 timeframe):**
Adds coverage vs IRBM
- Aegis Ashore site in Poland
- SM-3 IIA interceptor
- Continued MD ship presence

**Phase 4 (2020+ timeframe):**
Adds first layer capability vs potential Iranian ICBM
- SM-3 IIB interceptor
- Continued MD ship presence

Potential Threat Evolution
Addressing Russian Concerns About U.S./NATO Ballistic Missile Defense

- Russia has expressed concerns that U.S. missile defense systems, particularly Phases 3 and 4 of the EPAA, could undermine strategic stability

- U.S. continues to consult with Russia to directly address these concerns
  - We have shared our assessment that the ballistic missile threat is real and growing
    - Thousands of short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles; several states pursuing long-range missiles
  - We have explained the technical reasons why the EPAA cannot negate or undermine Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal
  - We have proposed extensive U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia missile defense cooperation
EPAA Cannot Negate Russia’s Strategic Deterrent

- EPAA is not positioned or designed to intercept Russian ICBMs
  - Ships, land-based sites, and radars are positioned to defend NATO Europe and United States against missiles from Middle East, not ICBMs from Russia.
  - This is true of all phases, including Phase 4, which will defend Europe and the United States against potential longer range missiles launched from Iran, not ICBMs from Russia.
  - EPAA is limited in capacity – only a few dozen interceptors, not enough to affect Russia’s strategic capabilities even if intercepts were possible.
  - EPAA is capable against emerging Middle East missile threats, but is not capable against sophisticated countermeasures and multiple reentry vehicles such as Russia deploys.

- Interceptors in Europe cannot intercept Russian ICBMs
  - U.S. missile defense system requires tens of seconds after threat ballistic missile burn out in order to generate a firing solution.
  - U.S. interceptors are not fast enough to catch Russian ICBMs - would result in “tail chase”.

- Russia has large and sophisticated nuclear arsenal
  - Well over a thousand deployed strategic warheads - land, sea and air delivered.
  - Sophisticated countermeasures and multiple reentry vehicles.
  - Many possible launch points for land and sea-launched ballistic missiles.
EPAA Cannot Negate Russia’s Strategic Deterrent

* Lines represent ground traces of trajectory from launch point to aimpoint

EPAA Not Designed or Positioned to Intercept Russian ICBMs
Missile Defense Cooperation with Russia is a Key U.S. Priority

- **Operational benefits of U.S.-Russia cooperation**
  - Cooperation enables more effective and efficient defense
    - Data sharing and fusion allows improved early warning and interceptor performance
  - Improves defense of all partners

- **Political benefits of U.S.-Russia cooperation**
  - Gain insights into BMD plans and capabilities
  - Enhance strategic stability
  - Sends clear message that proliferation will not go unchallenged
  - Build habits of cooperation that could flow to other areas

- **U.S. and Russia have exchanged serious proposals**
  - Joint Analysis - to design a cooperative BMD approach and provide a greater understanding of our respective capabilities
  - NATO-Russia BMD Centers - where we would combine sensor information and develop a common operational approach

MD cooperation is the best way for Russia to gain confidence that the U.S.-NATO system will not negate or undermine its strategic deterrent
Conclusions

- The ballistic missile threat is real and growing, and it challenges NATO, Russia, and many other nations.
- To reinforce regional stability, the United States and NATO are deploying missile defenses adaptive to the threat.
- U.S. and NATO missile defenses are not oriented towards Russia, and they can neither negate nor undermine Russia’s strategic deterrent.
- Cooperation is the best way forward and is in the interests of Russia, NATO, and the United States.
- Promising proposals are on the table and the pathway to increasingly robust cooperation is clear.
- U.S. and NATO look forward to a Russian political decision to cooperate.