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NATO SECRET
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Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at the
Permanent Headquarters, Paris, XVIe., on Thursday
13th December, 1962, at 10.15 a.m.

PRESENT

President: The Rt. Hon. Earl of Home
Chairman and Acting Secretary
General: Mr. G. Colonna

BELGIUM

H.E. Mr. P.-H. Spaak : Vice-Chairman of the Council
of Ministers and Minister for
Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. P.W. Segers : Minister of Defence
H.E. Mr. A. de Staercke : Permanent Representative

CANADA

The Hon. Howard Green : Secretary of State for External
Affairs
The Hon. Douglas S. Harkness : Minister of National Defence
H.E. Mr. G. Ignatieff : Permanent Representative

DENMARK

H.E. Mr. Per Haekkerup : Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Victor Gram : Minister of Defence
H.E. Dr. E. Schram-Nielsen : Permanent Representative

FRANCE

H.E. Mr. M. Couve de Murville : Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. P. Messmer : Minister of Defence
H.E. Mr. François Seydoux : Permanent Representative

GERMANY

H.E. Dr. Gerhard Schröder : Federal Minister for Foreign
Affairs
H.E. Mr. H.J. von Merkatz : Federal Minister, representing
the Federal Minister of Defence
H.E. Mr. W.G. Grewe : Permanent Representative

NATO SECRET

GREECE

H.E. Mr. Evangelos Averoff-
Tossizza : Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Panayotis Papaligouras : Minister for Economic Co-ordina-
tion
H.E. Mr. Aristide Protopapadakis: Minister of Defence
H.E. Mr. Christian X. Palamas : Permanent Representative

ICELAND

H.E. Mr. Gudmundur I. Gudmundsson: Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Petur Thorsteinsson : Permanent Representative

ITALY

H.E. Mr. Attilio Piccioni : Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Giulio Andreotti : Minister of Defence
H.E. Mr. Adolfo Alessandrini : Permanent Representative

LUXEMBOURG

H.E. Mr. E. Schaus : Vice President of the Government
and Minister for Foreign Affairs
and Defence
H.E. Mr. Paul Reuter : Permanent Representative

NETHERLANDS

H.E. Mr. J.M.A.H. Luns : Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. S.H. Visser : Minister of Defence
H.E. Dr. H.N. Boon : Permanent Representative

NORWAY

H.E. Mr. Halvard Lange : Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Gudmund Harlem : Minister of Defence
H.E. Mr. Jens Boyesen : Permanent Representative

PORTUGAL

H.E. Mr. A.Franco Nogueira : Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. General M^r. Gomes de Araujo: Minister of Defence
H.E. Mr. V. da Cunha : Permanent Representative

TURKEY

H.E. Mr. Feridun Cemal Erkin : Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Ilhami Sancar : Minister of Defence
H.E. Dr. Fethi Çelikbas : Minister of Industry
H.E. Mr. Nuri Birgi : Permanent Representative

UNITED KINGDOM

H.E. Sir Paul Mason : Permanent Representative

UNITED STATES

The Hon. Dean Rusk : Secretary of State
 The Hon. Robert S. McNamara : Secretary of Defense
 The Hon. Thomas K. Finletter : Permanent Representative

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Mr. F.D. Gregh : Deputy Secretary General, Assistant Secretary General for Economics and Finance
 Mr. R.W.J. Hooper : Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs
 Mr. Johnson Garrett : Assistant Secretary General for Production, Logistics and Infrastructure
 Dr. W.P. Allis : Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs
 The Lord Coleridge : Executive Secretary

ALSO PRESENT

General C.P. de Cumont : Chairman, Military Committee
 General A. Heusinger : Chairman, Military Committee in Permanent Session
 General Dean C. Strother : Chairman, Standing Group
 Général de Corps d'Armée J.M. Guérin : Standing Group Representative

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1. The CHAIRMAN extended the warm welcome of the Council to its new President for the coming year, the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Lord Home.

2. Lord HOME said that he found it an agreeable duty to welcome his colleagues to the present meeting. He expressed his regret at the absence through illness of the Secretary General, but was happy to learn that he was making a good recovery. He was sure that the Council would wish to convey to him its best wishes and its hope that he would soon be able to resume his duties. He paid tribute to Mr. Colonna's efforts in preparing the present meeting and assured him of the confidence, co-operation and full support of the Council in his task of presiding it.

3. He suggested that Ministers might wish to begin by a general examination of the situation with which the Free World was faced in the wake of the recent events in Cuba and India, before passing to an examination of more particular problems.

4. The CHAIRMAN thanked Lord Home for his remarks. He was also sure that the Council would wish to transmit its best wishes to the Secretary General for a prompt recovery. He felt that Ministers would have taken due note of Lord Home's suggestion for the conduct of discussion.

NATO SECRET

I. REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

East/West Relations and Berlin

- Reference documents:
- (a) Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy.
Report by the Expert Working Group:
Document: C-M(62)109
 - (b) The Situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet-Occupied Zone of Germany.
Report by the Expert Working Group:
Document: C-M(62)111
 - (c) Policy towards the East European Satellites.
Report by the Committee of Political Advisers:
Document: C-M(62)143

5. Mr. RUSK (United States), referring to the Cuban affair, which he described as the sharpest confrontation in East/West relations since the Korean war, remarked that the vast improvements made in weapon systems had invested the crisis with an unprecedented degree of complexity and danger. The United States had greatly appreciated the prompt and steady support for its action which had

been given by its allies. The unity of NATO and the Organization of American States must have greatly impressed the Soviet Union and thus constituted an important element in the maintenance of peace. Any signs of dissension might well have led the Soviet authorities to draw an entirely different conclusion.

6. During the period of greatest tension, the United States had been very struck by how relatively little neutrality there was in the world. In general, he thought that the West could count on a favourable response from the non-aligned countries, which understood the true nature of Western aims and commitments.

7. A crisis like the Cuban experience had to be reviewed both in terms of how it had appeared at the time and how it had shaped up in retrospect. In the days immediately preceding President Kennedy's address to the nation on 22nd October, it had been the official view of the United States that the crisis had not arisen out of the known rejection of the Castro régime by all the other members of the inter-American system. President Kennedy had been cautioning the United States against extreme views regarding developments in Cuba until the very moment when the first clear evidence became available that MRBMs were in fact being established on the island. This unprecedented and reckless action by the Soviet Government had raised wholly different issues of the most far-reaching importance. It had transformed the problem of Castro into the basic issue of a potentially significant shift in the balance of power. The substantial augmentation of the Soviet Union's capability of striking at the principal nuclear deterrent of the Alliance had called for the taking of serious counter-measures, not only on military but also on political grounds.

8. In the second place, the crisis could not be properly understood without noting the deliberate deception which had been practised by the Soviet Union. The United States had been informed in the most specific terms, and on the authority of Chairman Khrushchev, that there was not and would not be in Cuba any missile capable of reaching the United States. It must be concluded that Mr. Khrushchev had intended to establish his operational missile sites in Cuba prior to his projected visit to the United Nations in late November and before a probable talk with President Kennedy at that time. It could now be supposed that he had been planning to raise such issues as Berlin in the most insistent form, and to attempt to use the presence of Cuban missile bases in support of something in the nature of an ultimatum. The disarrangement of any such timetable had been a clear gain for the West.

9. Thirdly, the United States had felt that it was critically important that the first disclosure of the information which had been rapidly accumulating during the week before 22nd October be accompanied by an announcement of remedial action. Otherwise, the entire Western hemisphere would have reacted with unpredictable results. Further, a disclosure of the information without the

necessary action might have allowed the Soviet Union to interpose an ultimatum of some sort which could have greatly increased the chances of war. It was believed that the Soviet Union had in fact been surprised by the action taken, and he suspected that the surprise itself had contributed to peace.

10. Fourthly, the United States had felt that it was important to try to handle the problem as a Western hemisphere problem as far as possible, in order to reduce the likelihood of a Soviet response in some other part of the world. Because of the severe risks affecting all its allies in any such grave confrontation with the Soviet Union, it must be noted however that the United States had been deeply conscious that it was not really able to take strictly "unilateral" action.

11. Fifthly, it had seemed that, although the missiles and bombers would have to be forced out of Cuba if necessary, it was common prudence to give the Soviet Government an opportunity to reverse its mistake and withdraw them before direct military measures were taken. The escalation of violence had been a very likely possibility and had only been avoided by Soviet actions during the critical period.

12. In the sixth place, it was necessary to note the importance of United Nations machinery in the management of the crisis. By the end of 23rd October the Soviet Union had apparently decided not to launch an immediate first nuclear strike, but to take the matter up in the United Nations. He had little doubt but that the United Nations forum had served to soften the commitments of prestige and to make it somewhat easier to find a solution by peaceable means. Although U Thant had not been able to accomplish the specific results which he and others had hoped for, his activity during the days of crisis had served to restrain the surge of events.

13. The present situation regarding Cuba might be summarised as follows. The United States was reasonably confident that all MRBM and IRBM missiles had in fact been removed from Cuba. It was even more confident that the IL-28 light jet bombers had departed. The Soviet Union had stated categorically that there were no nuclear warheads in Cuba. It was not known whether this was in fact true, because they were relatively easy to hide. The United States had never been able to identify nuclear warheads on the island, but assumed that there had been some. There remained in Cuba a substantial number of Soviet military personnel, estimated as at least 12,000, and some of these were organized into small, but heavily armed, combat groups. The surface-to-air missiles remained, and were operated by Soviet personnel. A number of MIGs were present, some flown by Russians. The Soviet Union had indicated that the military elements manning, servicing and guarding offensive weapons would be removed. Their departure was apparently continuing, but the United States must be concerned about the retention in Cuba of any significant Soviet military presence.

14. It did not appear that the Cuban question would be easily brought to a full conclusion in the present discussions at the United Nations. No arrangements had been made for continuing safeguards in Cuba against the presence or reintroduction of offensive weapons. Failing effective safeguards, overflights would have to continue, which might at any time lead to armed encounters. President Kennedy had proceeded about as far as possible in the present circumstances in declaring that the United States did not intend to invade Cuba, but the Soviet Union was thinking of far more categorical and formal assurances than could prudently be given in the face of so much uncertainty. No assurances could be given which would modify in any way the United States inter-American treaty commitments, create a ~~sanctuary~~ for Castro's interference with neighbouring countries or recognise a Soviet military presence or political intervention in the Western hemisphere. The United States had no desire or intention to invade Cuba, but formal assurances in the absence of far-reaching safeguards against Soviet and Cuban offensive action in the future were a quite different matter.

15. Although it was perhaps premature to assess the full implications of the crisis, he suggested that the Council might give thorough attention to the episode with a view both to seeking further understanding of the events and to providing guide lines for future action. Some of the questions which should be examined were as follows:

- (a) how had it been possible for the Soviet leaders to suppose that a massive movement of offensive weapons into Cuba could be accomplished without the most violent reaction?
- (b) what had led the Soviet leaders to rectify their mistake promptly when confronted with the prospect of immediate military action? Were these considerations special to Cuba or did they have wider application? Were the signals from the Free World to Moscow effective?
- (c) In the Cuban situation it was the Soviet Union which had had to face the fact that the only serious riposte which it could make on the spot would be through nuclear war, in which it would have to take the initiative. Although it could not definitely know, the United States had not believed that the Soviet Union would destroy itself for Cuba, even though, in the process, it could have inflicted grievous damage on the United States. What did this mean with respect to the range of choices which NATO Heads of Government ought to have before them in the event of crises elsewhere, with respect to the nature of forces in being and to strategic doctrine?

- (d) How important had it been in the Cuban affair to plan for an opportunity for the adversary to reverse a fatal mistake? Would the result have been the same had there been an automatic ultimatum, a sudden strike against missile sites and military installations in Cuba, or a declaration of war against Cuba?
- (e) It would furthermore be revealing to reflect on the record of the Cuban crisis from the point of view of "crisis management" for the future. The interplay of information, communications, decisions co-ordination and operations within a framework which had been shifting from hour to hour, led him to believe that crisis management within the Alliance in particular the question of communications, needed the most urgent attention;
- (f) Was there any serious question of Communist-Free World confrontation anywhere in the world which was not of the greatest interest to NATO? In his opinion, NATO could not be uninterested in any such question anywhere. He believed that this was inherent in the threat from which NATO wished to secure itself, which was world-wide.

Concerning press references to other and broader questions which had entered into both private and public exchanges with the Soviet Union in the course of the Cuban crisis, it had been the view of the United States that the crisis should be well past before any serious or profitable discussion could be expected with the Soviet Union on other matters. There had been several indications to the effect that the Soviet Union was of much the same opinion. There had been no elaboration in private of the general language used in the public exchanges about relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union apparently still had in mind its old idea of a pact between the two groups. In the view of the United States, this was a matter which could best be approached through practical steps in disarmament.

16. As to the question of Berlin, it would be dangerous to think that the Cuban experience had necessarily created a situation more favourable to the resolution of this major point of confrontation in Europe. The central issue on Berlin which had emerged between the West and the Soviet Union during the past eighteen months was whether Western troops were to remain in West Berlin. Unless the Soviet Union was willing to abandon the position it had taken on this crucial point, nothing else could fall into place. The initiative for new proposals which could provide a basis for fruitful discussions must therefore rest with the Soviet Union. Given the present uncertainties, the Alliance could not afford to relax or optimistically assume that any easy solution of the Berlin problem was possible. It must continue to develop its plans to meet all contingencies and maintain its unity in the face of both Soviet threats and divisive actions.

17. One indication of Soviet intentions might well be afforded by the Soviet attitude on disarmament and arms control negotiations. The current negotiations in Geneva had generally confirmed that not much real progress could be expected in this area. The Soviet resistance to reasonable inspection arrangements and the inherent complexity of the subject matter made it imprudent to approach disarmament talks with great expectations. On the public opinion front, the West had neutralised the advantage which the Soviet Union had gained from its espousal of "general and complete disarmament". The Soviet Union was no longer out-bidding the West, whose position was now sounder and more fully thought out than its own. The effort must be made to preserve this negotiating advantage.

18. He was convinced that eventually the common interest in bringing the arms race under control would prevail, and that a real basis would emerge for preliminary steps in disarmament. Meanwhile, the United States considered the negotiations in Geneva useful firstly in so far as they educated key leaders, particularly of neutral opinion, regarding the great complexities of disarmament. Secondly, the continuation of the Geneva meeting provided a forum in which any opportunities which might arise for agreement could be seized. Thirdly, the negotiations highlighted the Western willingness to explore in depth alternatives to the arms race consistent with its security. This was why the United States had urged that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee be recognised as a continuing body, despite the fact that the prospects for early progress in this field were not hopeful.

19. As to the arms control, there were certain limited measures which might present an opportunity for achieving early progress, such as an agreement to refrain from deploying nuclear weapons in outer space, or an agreement on measures to reduce the risk of war. Success in these efforts was certainly not predictable, but they should be continued not only in the interests of Atlantic security but also as a contribution toward a more stable world.

20. A nuclear test ban still represented the most likely area of agreement in the arms control field, despite many setbacks. The Soviet Union's interest in this subject might be reviving, after a period of coolness in 1960 and 1961 which was possibly attributable to pressure from Communist China. The United States continued to believe that it was in the Free World's interest to achieve a nuclear test ban, if only because it would inhibit the proliferation of national nuclear capabilities. Such an agreement would be consistent with Western military security provided that the inspection arrangements incorporated in it were adequate. Although the Soviet Union still refused to accept the on-site inspection which was regarded as necessary by the West, the possibility of a further revision of the Soviet attitude could not be discounted. The United States intended to maintain pressure in this matter. It knew of no technical

developments making inspection unnecessary. Full safeguards against the misuse of inspection for espionage purposes were provided in the Western position. Viewed objectively, there was no reason from any legitimate security standpoint for the Soviet Union not to accept the West's proposals.

21. As to the longer-range questions of East/West relations, he thought that the Alliance must give them urgent and careful attention. The situation was changing and could change to the advantage of the West if the West caused it to do so. There was no question but that the Soviet leadership faced some very serious problems both within the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc, and in its relations with the rest of the world. Differences with Communist China were real and could develop still further. De-Stalinisation continued, partly in response to the internal pressures of public opinion. Critical economic problems presented the Soviet leaders with formidable difficulties in the allocation of resources. The attraction of Communist propaganda seemed to be fading in important parts of the world and Communist parties themselves seemed to be in a state of confusion.

22. These problems gave the West a freer hand in exploiting the opportunities which were now opening up in the Free World to promote its own goals. In this connection, he wished to mention particularly that the cohesion and vitality of NATO depended not only on common efforts in the political and military fields but also on the success of co-operation in the economic field. The economic interdependence of the Atlantic Community should be fully recognised and all member countries of the Alliance should act within NATO and in the framework of other organizations in a manner calculated to enhance the common good. The United States' will and capacity to act in this way was demonstrated by its new Trade Expansion Act, whose effects would not be limited to the members of NATO but benefit the Free World as a whole. The United States had further expressed its keen interest in the development of liberal policies by the European Economic Community. The member countries of the Alliance could and must work out such problems together, since the economies of the advanced countries had now become inseparable from each other.

23. The Alliance must also seek ways to improve the effectiveness of its political consultation. There had been improvements in this field, but more could still be done. There must be an attempt, through advance political planning, to create a common foundation of policy which would facilitate the quick decisions which would need to be taken. The NATO procedures of consultation must be adapted to the foreshortened time-scale of modern military technology and the global nature of the Communist threat. To achieve this, he hoped that greater efforts could be devoted to bringing together under NATO auspices, at frequent intervals, senior policy-making officials of the member governments. These officials could initiate a discussion which in certain instances

might usefully be translated into agreed policy guide-lines for the Alliance. Consideration might be given to using the interval before the next Ministerial Meeting to formulate measures which would improve the capacity of the Alliance for collective action. One possible step would be an exchange of views among the Permanent Representatives who, if they considered it expedient, might report their suggestions for any improvements to the Spring meeting. He also wished to stress the importance attached by the United States to periodic meetings between planning advisers, such as the recent meetings of the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group. Such exchanges could contribute substantially to a common understanding of the long-term objectives of the Alliance and help to define the joint or separate responsibility which could be exercised by member countries in the achievement of these objectives.

24. In conclusion, he wished to stress the justified confidence which could be placed in NATO. The record showed that the West was more successful in solving its problems than the Soviet Union in solving theirs and that continued positive efforts in the political, military and economic fields could considerably improve its position vis-à-vis the Communist bloc. The West should not hesitate to seize any suitable opportunity. The capacity of the Soviet Union was limited, whereas the West's was far from exhausted. NATO had continued to build up its military strength and had come to be an essential part of the Free World system. He thought that from the events of the past few weeks it could move forward into a new phase of international relations with a sense of confident anticipation.

25. Mr. ERKIN (Turkey) thanked Mr. Rusk for the explanations he had given on the Cuban crisis. He thought that the Alliance had given proof of its solidarity and cohesion and that this firm attitude might well have considerable repercussions on future developments. He recalled that at the Athens meeting, he had already stressed that the "relative" calm which then existed in East-West relations might be destroyed at any moment. He considered that the present situation held as much danger as promise and that, this being so, the policy of the countries of the Alliance should remain unchanged: to be prepared to meet any threat whatsoever and to seek out ways and means of solving the most difficult problems through negotiation, while carefully avoiding any action which might give the enemy the impression of a reduction in the total strength of the Alliance or of relaxation in its defensive effort. He was convinced that determination and firmness were as important as the balance of forces.

26. After pointing out that Soviet action in Cuba might have been based on a mistaken assessment of the determination of the Alliance, he said that in order to take advantage of the favourable climate which had been created for the West, the latter must avoid two extremes which consisted firstly, in over-exploiting this favourable situation, and secondly, in welcoming indiscriminately any advances which the Soviet Union might make in order to give the

impression that favourable arrangements in East-West relations were within the realm of possibility. Nevertheless, he thought it was not out of the question that the USSR realised that certain arrangements between the two blocs might be in its interests, which would undoubtedly lead to a substantial improvement in East-West relations. This possibility should be considered without undue optimism since any favourable development in these relations was bound up with contingencies beyond the control of the countries of the Alliance.

27. He emphasised that, in actual fact, Communist moves in the five continents had in no way become less serious and that various subversive tactics continued to be used everywhere; exploitation of all forms of opposition which might promote anarchy and unrest, material aid to all movements engaged in a fomenting civil war and launching peace and propaganda offensives in the democratic countries which, because of their system of freedom of information and expression, were more vulnerable. He thought that the West should take action, in particular, against an insidious form of propaganda suggesting that now was a propitious time for a general détente; this might affect opinion in the free countries in such a way as to have detrimental effects on defence policy.

28. Referring to tactics which might be used to weaken the offensive potential of the West, he recalled that, during the Cuban crisis, the USSR had sought to have nuclear missiles withdrawn from certain NATO countries. He considered these missiles of vital importance because of their deterrent effect and that in order to maintain the overall nuclear potential of the Alliance, it was essential that obsolete equipment be replaced by more advanced missiles, and that these be so placed from the standpoint of camouflage and mobility that they could be used with the maximum safety and efficiency. He recognised that, in view of the progress achieved in this field, missiles mounted in ships might be better able to serve these aims and that the plans relating to the existing potential should therefore be reviewed. He emphasised, however, firstly, that during any transition period during which fixed missile systems would be replaced by mobile missile systems, it was essential that the overall defensive capacity of the Alliance and that of each of the member countries, separately, should remain intact. He considered, moreover, that this change, which would be designed to increase the nuclear power of the Alliance, should not be made in such a way as to be misinterpreted by public opinion or to give the enemy the opinion that the West was prepared to make concessions in this field. Consequently with the exception of events such as effectively controlled general disarmament, the implementation of any decision which might be taken on the subject of missiles within the framework of a re-organization of nuclear defence should be deferred for a certain time in order to avoid giving the enemy any impression of appeasement.

29. With regard to political developments in the Communist bloc countries, he said that, in his opinion, despite the Cuban crisis, Mr. Khrushchev had maintained his hold on the Soviet Union and that he had also succeeded in bringing the Communist countries, with the exception of China and Albania, into line on Soviet policy. He also thought that relations between the USSR and China had unquestionably become more strained, either because of the behaviour of the USSR during the Cuban crisis or because of China's aggression against India, and that the ideological dispute developing between the two countries seemed to be becoming crystallised. He considered that the USSR had attained a fairly high level of economic and social development whereas China was far from enjoying the same advantages and that this state of affairs was likely, for a fairly long period, to affect the relations between the two countries and their respective assessment of the principles which should govern East-West relations. Nevertheless, while hoping that these differences would be fully exploited in so far as they could improve relations with the USSR, he thought that in the event of armed conflict, Communist solidarity would prevail over any other consideration.

30. Referring to the Berlin problem he said he thought it unlikely that the USSR would attempt to make up for loss of prestige in Cuba by any violent counter-move over Berlin. On the contrary, he felt that the lesson of Cuba had been severe enough for the USSR to avoid in future placing the West in an intolerable situation. In his view, therefore, the Council should maintain its position on Berlin and, if the USSR wished, through negotiation, to arrive at an agreement taking into account the legitimate interests of all, NATO, while preserving a firm attitude, should answer any attempt at conciliation in the same spirit.

31. In general, the attitude of the USSR on the Berlin problem and on the question of disarmament seemed to him to offer a means of testing whether the USSR had in fact decided to adopt a conciliatory position which would open the way to a broad understanding between East and West. However, Mr. Gromyko's latest statements at the United Nations and during the discussions of the United Nations Political Committee did not, in his view, reveal any real change in the attitude of the Soviet Union towards disarmament.

32. As for the problem of nuclear tests, he did not think the chances of reaching agreement were any more real. In his view, the proposals made from time to time by the Soviet Union and its satellites for a nuclear-free zone in certain areas of Europe, or for the abolition of foreign bases, were merely attempts to upset the existing balance at the expense of the West, by restricting the deployment of NATO atomic weapons and increasing the Communist bloc's superiority in conventional weapons in Europe. He pointed out, moreover, that these proposals were linked to the revision of the European security system and that the maintenance of the present balance of forces was still an essential condition of any

far-reaching agreement which might be concluded with the Soviet Union. As for the abolition of foreign bases, this was in fact an attempt to destroy the military potential of the Alliance. He therefore felt that NATO should only agree to discuss these proposals as part of a general and complete disarmament programme to be carried out gradually under effective international control.

33. At the end of this analysis of East-West relations, Mr. Erkin pointed out that the Soviet Union's propaganda for peace and peaceful co-existence had no doubt lost some of its effectiveness through the Soviet action in Cuba and Communist China's armed attack on India. He considered, in particular, that the Chinese aggression had undoubtedly had a deep effect on the Indian people and on international opinion. He regretted, however, that such a very small minority among the neutralist countries had sided with the Indian people. In view of the silence of the majority of the so-called uncommitted countries in the face of this aggression, he thought NATO should carry out a detailed study of the problems raised by this attitude.

34. In conclusion, he stressed that, despite a certain détente in the general atmosphere, there was no definite sign of any slackening either in the expansion of international Communism or in the Soviet military threat and that, in these circumstances, the unity and solidarity of the Alliance was a vital necessity. Here certain ideas underlying various movements towards integration in the Western community might be a source of inspiration; among his country's reasons for deciding to join the Common Market was the wish to see a strengthening of the unity and solidarity of that Community.

35. He expressed his Government's keen satisfaction at the establishment and operation of the consortium which, in accordance with the decision taken at the Athens meeting, had been set up to foster the economic development of Turkey. He warmly thanked all the members of the Alliance who had unanimously taken this decision, as well as those members who were taking part in the consortium. There was no doubt that Turkey, which shared Western ideas and was now firmly committed to economic expansion and social justice within a system of democracy and freedom, would be in a position to make a more effective contribution to the common cause.

36. Mr. PICCIONI (Italy) said that the Cuban crisis was undoubtedly the crucial political event of the past six months. Its favourable outcome, which marked a turning point in East-West relations must be primarily attributed to the bold, balanced and statesmanlike initiative of the United States, but was in some measure due to the spontaneous solidarity evidenced by all Western nations at the decisive moment of crisis. The attitude of the Soviet Union had revealed the unprincipled empiricism of its policy, and had at the same time aroused speculation and hopes, which appeared somewhat unfounded at the present stage. While it was

true that, as a result of the measures taken to overcome the crisis, a rapidly deteriorating international situation had been somewhat improved, and that in consequence the door should be left open to serious negotiations, the post-war record of Communism argued against any large measure of optimism on the part of the West.

37. As a result of the Cuban and Sino-Indian crises, the political and strategic stature of the uncommitted nations had been reduced to a realistic level, while the importance of the two great military blocs had been correspondingly enhanced. The non-aligned countries had moreover been obliged to recognise the necessity of taking sides at times of grave deterioration in the international situation; in fact, several of them had rallied with the West, thus demonstrating that the sharing of neutralist ideals provided an unsatisfactory basis for political alignments.

38. He thought that the prospect of negotiations with the Soviet Union was now an established fact. The main problem at this stage was to decide upon the instruments and timing of the negotiations, and to define negotiable areas and the degree of compromise acceptable in each case. Guide lines for future negotiations might most appropriately be established by the Council in Permanent Session. A fresh collective assessment of all sources of international tension was now required, in order that the West might develop a common position on each question, within the framework of the firm yet flexible policy which had proved so effective in the Cuban dispute. The relative lack of urgency over Berlin should not be interpreted as signifying disinterest or weakness on the part of the West, but simply considered as evidence that the Soviet Union, aware of Western determination, had become somewhat more flexible on this question, which it now viewed in a world wide context, thus in his view increasing the likelihood of reaching a modus vivendi.

39. Recognising that the internal situation of the Soviet bloc might prevent Mr. Khrushchev from making negotiable overtures on Berlin, the West should demonstrate its willingness to engage in constructive talks, provided that corresponding goodwill was shown by Moscow; it might perhaps even take some initiative, once the Cuban crisis was over. If the conciliatory spirit displayed by Mr. Khrushchev during the Cuban crisis were again to be manifested in the case of Berlin or disarmament, a general dialogue with the Soviet Union would then become possible.

40. The Cuban affair provided both an opportunity for assessing the present effectiveness of the Alliance and a stimulus for the improvement of Western political and military co-ordination. While recognising that geographical and tactical considerations had made the United States unwilling to engage in prior consultations with regard to its Cuban initiative, he believed that the Alliance should, in so far as was possible, obviate the danger of acute and unexpected crises by means of comprehensive contingency planning.

41. Noting that no fully satisfactory solution had yet been found to the problem of political consultation within NATO, he went on to reiterate the position of the Italian Government on this question, viz:

- a number of recommendations on this subject contained in the report of the Three Wise Men had not yet been acted upon; consideration should now be given to their implementation;
- present Ministerial Meetings allowed insufficient time for full and comprehensive discussions, and were not frequent enough to follow a rapidly evolving international situation. The Council should, therefore, examine the possibility of convening two supplementary annual meetings, so conceived as to allow a wide and informal exchange of views, with no fixed Agenda, final communiqué, official speeches or press statements.

42. While the NATO response to the Cuban crisis had been fully satisfactory from the political and military points of view, it had been found wanting on the psychological plane, the Alliance having failed to establish an effective contact with vast sections of public opinion. As a result, some uncertainty and even opposition had been evident in some quarters in member countries at the beginning of the crisis, and its successful resolution could not now be fully exploited. Bearing this lesson in mind, NATO must make every effort to find an effective psychological response to the ideological campaign of Communism. It should, in particular, vindicate before the world the spiritual values inspiring its actions, and expose the expansionist ambitions and active colonialism of the Soviet Union and China.

43. Stressing the need to maintain and reinforce the political and military unity of the Alliance, Mr. Piccioni pointed out that this unity:

- had appreciably strengthened the Western posture during the recent crisis;
- had invested the West with a moral authority which had agained it the support of many neutral countries, particularly those of Latin America,
- was vital to the Western negotiating position.

44. In this connection, he expressed support for the views of the United States concerning the present need to enhance the conventional strength of NATO, and recommended that studies should begin immediately with respect to the technical and financial implications of the possible creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force.

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45. In conclusion, he said that the European members of NATO were convinced that one of the most effective means of improving its unity would be the development of highly integrated, homogeneous groups, representing a powerful focus of political and economic attraction in the collective interests of the Alliance, only true political and military unification would allow Europe to make an effective contribution to the common effort.

46. Dr. SCHRÖDER (Germany) having expressed appreciation of the United States manner of handling the Cuban crisis, considered that four lessons could be drawn from the course of these events:

- (i) Mr. Khrushchev's policy of "peaceful co-existence" did in no way exclude deceitful and aggressive actions and threats;
- (ii) the Soviet should be aware that the United States were prepared to take even extreme risks in defending their vital interests;
- (iii) it was clear to the Soviets that the United States had been supported by all Latin American and NATO countries;
- (iv) it was important for the West to have several military alternatives ranging from conventional means to the inter-continental ballistic missile.

47. He believed that a most important conclusion to be drawn from the crisis was the clear demonstration of the limits of Soviet power; it was certain that Cuba constituted a retreat and defeat for the Soviets. Although Soviet propaganda had tried to turn this defeat into victory, it should be remembered that a military confrontation had compelled the Soviet withdrawal from Cuba. Thus, in any future Soviet proposals for negotiating problems of East-West conflict, Soviet willingness to make concessions should not be considered as proven.

48. Further, the Cuban crisis had revealed limitations to the Soviet powers of action. He did not believe that the Soviet Union and China had agreed on a concerted attitude on India, but rather that the Chinese attack further complicated an already difficult situation for the Soviets, and handicapped their freedom of action.

49. Moreover, Soviet power was manifestly limited by the economic situation in the Soviet bloc. The Seven Year Plan was unlikely to be fulfilled, and the recent measures announced by Mr. Khrushchev to eliminate shortcomings in industry and agriculture were limited to organizational reforms. But since these could not be effected merely by increasing the Party's control over the economy, it was likely that economic problems would continue to disturb the Soviet leadership.

50. Again, he thought that the danger of Soviet under-estimation of Western determination and resulting Soviet miscalculations had been greatly reduced. Soviet abstention from pressure on Berlin during the Cuban crisis was probably due to their full realisation of the West's determination to defend its vital interests and their own inferiority in inter-continental weapons as well as to their unwillingness to increase further the risk of military conflict. In future, he believed that the Soviets would proceed with greater caution especially in Berlin. He was not convinced that the Soviet reaction in Cuba did not shed light on the Soviet attitude in the Berlin crisis, since both situations showed that the Soviets did not desire to wage an all-out nuclear war for the sake of limited objectives and that the West could, by a display of determination, prevent the Soviets from taking extreme risks. It was certain that the Soviet objective in the German and Berlin problem remained unchanged even after Cuba; on the other hand, their willingness to make concessions did not seem to have increased, nor their desire to be rid of the Berlin crisis. The United States talks with the Soviet Union showed that in view of Soviet intransigence no basis for negotiation existed. It was now for the Soviets to show their preparedness to negotiate, by ceasing their continual demand for the withdrawal of the forces of the Three Powers from Berlin.

51. Finally, he said that the success of a common NATO policy would continue to depend on its strengthening the spiritual and material viability of Berlin. It was of great importance that the population of Berlin should feel itself supported by all NATO nations. Although conditions in East Germany had not improved since August 1961, and resistance to the Communist régime, together with labour unrest, had increased, the East German population had rejected any increase of inter-zonal trade on the grounds that it was likely to benefit the régime as such, and not the population. However, the Federal Republic was interested in intensifying inter-zonal trade, not for its economic benefits, but with a view to weakening the Berlin Wall and increasing the dependence of the Soviet-Occupied Zone on West Berlin deliveries, in order to prevent Ulbricht from exerting any further pressure on West Berlin.

52. In conclusion, he considered that the solution of the Cuban crisis by the United States had had, at least temporarily, a mitigating effect on the Berlin problem; but that this problem continued to demand political vigilance, the strengthening of Western defences and co-operation within NATO.

53. The COUNCIL:

agreed to resume discussion that afternoon.

II. PLACE OF NEXT MINISTERIAL MEETING

54. The CHAIRMAN said that he was instructed by the Secretary General to state that the Canadian Government had kindly extended an invitation to the Council to hold its 1963 Spring Ministerial Meeting in Ottawa. He invited Ministers to reply.

55. The COUNCIL:

- (1) accepted with pleasure the kind invitation by the Canadian Government to hold the 1963 Spring Ministerial Meeting in Ottawa;
- (2) authorised the Chairman to communicate this decision to the press forthwith;
- (3) agreed to consider the question of the date at its meeting on Saturday, 15th December (see C-R(62)64).

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