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# Defense Issues, NATO Response to Terrorism

**Newsletter  
November 2006**

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***"...NATO today is an alliance that delivers,... one of the best examples of strong and effective multilateralism ..."***

*U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Victoria Nuland  
International Workshop on Global Security, May 23, 2006*

[http://nato.usmission.gov/Summit/Riga\\_Summit.asp](http://nato.usmission.gov/Summit/Riga_Summit.asp)

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## GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

### **RICE REAFFIRMS INTERNATIONAL COMPACT FOR IRAQ; Iraq policy debate is important because stakes are high, she says**

**By Howard Cincotta, Washington File Special Correspondent, 2006-11-04**

Washington – The United States has long stressed a multilateral, regional approach to Iraq, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice says, citing U.S. support for the International Compact with Iraq (ICI), which was launched at the United Nations earlier this year.

In an interview with Bloomberg Television on November 3, Rice said that she had earlier met with representatives from more than 30 nations in New York to encourage greater engagement with Iraq through the International Compact, and noted that other ICI meetings have included Iraq's neighbors like Syria and Iran.

The ICI is an effort to build a framework for Iraqi security, good governance, and regional economic integration, according to U.N. documents. The ICI recently held its first preparatory meeting in Abu Dhabi, co-chaired by Barham Salih, deputy prime minister of Iraq, and Mark Malloch Brown, deputy U.N. secretary-General.

As she has in a recent series of radio and television interviews, Rice stressed that any abandonment of Iraq by the United States at this point would provide terrorists with a destabilizing foothold in the region.

<http://www.uspolicy.be/Article.asp?ID=9B53AB7B-37D4-4E96-BBE5-D0EC7BEE08A6>

Transcript: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/75543.htm>

### **U.S. HELPS RUSSIA SECURE NUCLEAR SITES AGAINST THEFT, ATTACK; Joint government program aims to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation, 2006-10-27**

Washington – The United States has helped Russia secure 50 of its naval nuclear sites against the threat of theft or terrorist attack in an effort to protect them against nuclear weapons proliferation.

"Denying terrorists access to nuclear material is our top priority. These upgrades to Russian navy sites make it that much harder for terrorists to get their hands on dangerous nuclear material," said Linton Brooks, who heads the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).

According to an October 24 press release from the NNSA, the agency's personnel worked with the Moscow-based Kurchatov Institute and the Russian Ministry of Defense to install intrusion-detection sensors, access controls and hardened defensive positions at the naval sites.

"We are also working closely with Russia to ensure that the upgrades we provide are sustained and maintained. Just last year, the Kola Technical Center was opened to train Russian guard forces and provide the technical infrastructure needed to make certain the upgrades are effective for the long term," said Brooks.

The work at the naval sites is part of a larger joint project the NNSA is conducting with Russia to secure and eliminate vulnerable nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material and to install radiation detection equipment at ports and border crossings that might be used to transfer nuclear material.


Additional information on the program is available at the NNSA Web site:  
<http://www.mnsa.doe.gov/>

### **STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL EXPLAINS U.S. POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST; Zelikow keynote address at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2006-10-06**

(...)There is no official at the senior levels of the U.S. government who better exemplifies the connection between the understanding of the threat of radical Islam and radical Islamists and devising the sound strategies to confront that threat, especially in the Middle East. A highly accomplished scholar, thinker and public intellectual, Phil Zelikow was tapped by the September 11 Commission to serve as its executive director. In that capacity he was the person responsible for making the commission function and for producing a report that would merit the nation's trust and confidence.

<http://www.uspolicy.be/Article.asp?ID=4ED6BDD6-3648-4005-9E83-A0450215D343>

### **NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM September 2006**



America is at war with a transnational terrorist movement fueled by a radical ideology of hatred, oppression, and murder. Our National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, first published in February 2003, recognizes that we are at war and that protecting and defending the Homeland, the American people, and their livelihoods remains our first and most solemn obligation. Our strategy also recognizes that the War on Terror is a different kind of war. From the beginning, it has been both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas. Not only do we fight our terrorist enemies on the battlefield, we promote freedom and human dignity as alternatives to the terrorists' perverse vision of oppression and

totalitarian rule. The paradigm for combating terrorism now involves the application of all elements of our national power and influence. Not only do we employ military power, we use diplomatic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement activities to protect the Homeland and extend our defenses, disrupt terrorist operations, and deprive our enemies of what they need to operate and survive. We have broken old orthodoxies that once confined our counterterrorism efforts primarily to the criminal justice domain. This updated strategy sets the course for winning the War on Terror. It builds directly from the National Security Strategy issued in March 2006 as well as the February 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, and incorporates our increased understanding of the enemy

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/>

Full pdf document: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf>

## CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS (HEARINGS, REPORTS, ETC.)

### **IRAQ: POST-SADDAM GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY.**

**Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division**

**CRS Report for Congress, Updated Oct, 18, 2006.**



Operation Iraqi Freedom succeeded in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, but Iraq remains unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, compounded by burgeoning sectarian violence. According to its November 30, 2005, “Strategy for Victory,” the Bush Administration indicates that U.S. forces will remain in Iraq until the country is able to provide for its own security and does not serve as a host for radical Islamic terrorists. President Bush has said he believes that, over the longer term, Iraq will become a model for reform throughout the Middle East and a partner in the global war on terrorism. However, mounting U.S. casualties and financial costs —


without clear signs of security progress — have intensified a debate within the United States over the wisdom of the invasion and whether to wind down U.S. involvement without completely accomplishing U.S. goals.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/74895.pdf>

### **NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM**

**Larry A. Nicksch, Specialist in Asian Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division**

**CRS Report Updated October 5, 2006**



North Korea’s decisions at the end of 2002 to restart nuclear installations at Yongbyon that were shut down under the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework of 1994 and to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and its multiple missile tests of July 4, 2006, create a foreign policy problem for the United States.

Restarting the Yongbyon facilities opens up a possible North Korean intent to stage a “nuclear breakout” of its nuclear program and openly produce nuclear weapons. North Korea has also threatened to test a nuclear weapon. North Korea’s actions follow the disclosure in October 2002 that it is operating a secret nuclear program based on

uranium enrichment and the decision by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in November 2002 to suspend shipments of heavy oil to North Korea. North Korea claims that it has nuclear weapons and that it has completed reprocessing of over 8,000 nuclear fuel rods. U.S. officials and other experts state that North Korea probably had reprocessed most or all of the fuel rods and may have produced enough plutonium for 6-10 atomic bombs.


<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/74904.pdf>

## **CHINA AND PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND MISSILES: POLICY ISSUES**

**Shirley A. Kan Specialist in National Security Policy Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division CRS Report. Updated October 2, 2006**

Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances the national interest in reducing the role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of China's technology reportedly include Pakistan and countries that the State Department says support terrorism, such as Iran and North Korea. This CRS Report, updated as warranted, discusses the national security problem of China's role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response, including legislation, since the mid-1990s. China has taken some steps to mollify U.S. concerns about its role in weapons proliferation. Nonetheless, supplies from China have aggravated trends that result in ambiguous technical aid, more indigenous capabilities, longer-range missiles, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. As the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has reported to Congress, China remains a "key supplier" of weapons technology, particularly missile or chemical technology.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/74899.pdf>



## **THE WHITE HOUSE**

### **PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON THE SADDAM HUSSEIN VERDICT**

**TSTC Airport, Waco, Texas**

**Office of the Press Secretary, November 5, 2006**

**THE PRESIDENT:** Today, Saddam Hussein was convicted and sentenced to death by the Iraqi High Tribunal for the massacres committed by his regime in the town of Dujayl. Saddam Hussein's trial is a milestone in the Iraqi people's efforts to replace the rule of a tyrant with the rule of law -- it's a major achievement for Iraq's young democracy and its constitutional government.

During Saddam Hussein's trial, the court received evidence from 130 witnesses. The man who once struck fear in the hearts of Iraqis had to listen to free Iraqis recount the acts of torture and murder that he ordered against their families and against them. Today, the victims of this regime have received a measure of the justice which many thought would never come.

Saddam Hussein will have an automatic right to appeal his sentence; he will continue to receive the due process and the legal rights that he denied the Iraqi people. Iraq has a lot of work ahead as it builds its society that delivers equal justice and protects all its citizens. Yet history will record today's judgment as an important achievement on the path to a free and just and unified society.

The United States is proud to stand with the Iraqi people. We will continue to support Iraq's unity government as it works to bring peace to its great country. We appreciate the determination and bravery of the Iraqi security forces, who are stepping forward to defend

their free nation. And we give our thanks to the men and women of America's Armed Forces, who have sacrificed so much for the cause of freedom in Iraq -- and they've sacrificed for the security of the United States. Without their courage and skill, today's verdict would not have happened. On behalf of the American people, I thank every American who wears the uniform, I thank their families -- and I thank them for their service and continued sacrifice. Thank you very much.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/11/20061105-1.html>

**NEWLY PASSED ACT WILL HELP HALT IRAN'S WEAPONS PROGRAM, BUSH SAYS; Measure also would assist democracy activists, independent media**  
**By Peggy B. Hu, Washington File Staff Writer (2006-10-01)**

The Iran Freedom Support Act, which won final congressional approval September 30, will enhance efforts to halt Iran's uranium enrichment and weapons development programs and bolster U.S. support for democracy-building efforts in the country, President Bush says. Senate action sent the bill on its way to the president for his signature into law. The president welcomed congressional action, saying September 30 that the bill -- H.R. 6198 -- would codify current U.S. sanctions on Iran while providing his administration the flexibility "to tailor those sanctions in appropriate circumstances," and impose sanctions upon "entities that aid the Iranian regime's development of nuclear weapons." The bill would provide the president the authority to waive the imposition of sanctions but require the president to certify to Congress that such a waiver is vital to the national security interests of the United States and to notify Congress 15 days prior to the termination of any current sanctions. It also amends portions of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 related to Libya.

<http://www.uspolicy.be/Article.asp?ID=2086BB32-290E-4AEA-B28E-6FD566503069>

**BUSH SIGNS MILITARY COMMISSION ACT TO TRY TERRORIST SUSPECTS; Law sets guidelines for trials while preserving CIA interrogations**  
**By Vince Crawley, Washington File Staff Writer 2006-10-17**

Washington – President Bush has signed a new law that he says will allow terrorist suspects to receive fair trials while preserving the ability of the Central Intelligence Agency to continue interrogating suspected terrorist leaders and operatives.

“It is a rare occasion when a president can sign a bill he knows will save American lives,” Bush said October 17 while signing the Military Commissions Act of 2006 into law. “I have that privilege this morning.”

The new law “is one of the most important pieces of legislation in the War on Terror,” Bush said.

The new law authorizes the president to establish military commissions to try unlawful enemy combatants suspected of engaging in or planning hostile acts against the United States. The United States has said that al-Qaida and Taliban fighters in U.S. custody meet the definition of “unlawful enemy combatant” under the Geneva Conventions, which govern the rights of individuals in combat.

<http://www.uspolicy.be/Article.asp?ID=2ABFBE07-6D5A-4D84-A3AB-0C66A9E3962F>

Transcript of President Bush's statement and fact sheet on the Military Commissions Act of 2006:

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061017-1.html>

## THE U.S. AND NATO

### **UNITED STATES OUTLINES "AMBITIOUS AGENDA" FOR RIGA NATO SUMMIT, NOVEMBER 3, 2006: (Heads of state plan to discuss Afghanistan, global missions, allied partnerships)**

**By Vince Crawley, Washington File Staff Writer**

Washington -- Afghanistan will top the agenda of the November 28-29 NATO summit in Riga, Latvia, say senior U.S. diplomats, adding that the American priority will be to enhance alliance capabilities and partnerships for future global missions.

“Our goal for the Riga summit is to showcase a NATO that must have global missions, and has partners and capabilities to achieve those missions,” Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns told a German policy forum in late October.

At the operational level, Burns said, “Afghanistan is our topic number one – and the most difficult military mission NATO has ever undertaken.” The alliance’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) now patrols the bulk of Afghanistan and is providing security for the new government while also assisting reconstruction.

Leaders from NATO’s 26 member nations plan to meet in Riga at the end of November, and Burns said the United States and Europe have become “essential partners in meeting 21st century challenges.” Burns spoke October 23 to the Welt-am-Sonntag Bundeswehr Forum in Berlin. The State Department released the text of his prepared remarks on November 1.

In the second term of the Bush presidency, the United States has worked to strengthen bridges with Europe, Burns said, and is again working closely with trans-Atlantic partners to promote shared values around the world.

(...)

Having grown beyond its Cold War roots, NATO today “is part of a broader and growing web of multinational institutions seeking to address global challenges,” Burns said. “We need a NATO that works seamlessly with other key actors” such as the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, nongovernmental organizations and development agencies, he said.

[http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006\\_11/alia/a6110313.htm](http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006_11/alia/a6110313.htm)

Transcripts of Burns' and Nuland's remarks are posted on the State Department Web site:

<http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2006/75422.htm>; <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/75477.htm>

### **NATO BOOSTS AFGHAN "CONFIDENCE" IN RECONSTRUCTION, DIPLOMATS SAY, November 2, 2006 (Alliance ranks high in opinion surveys; Taliban attacks spark outrage) By Vince Crawley, Washington File Staff Writer**

Washington -- International diplomats, meeting in Belgium to discuss the urgent need for Afghanistan reconstruction, said recent NATO operations south of Kandahar have given the Afghan people "enormous" confidence that the international forces are serious about preventing the Taliban from returning to power.

Also, Taliban attacks against civilians and schools have undermined the Taliban's credibility among Afghans, who continue to hold positive opinions about the United States and the international community, the diplomats said.

Representatives of the United Nations, the World Bank and NATO's political civilian body met with reporters November 2 at alliance headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, following an informal Afghanistan planning session that also included partner countries that have contributed forces to the country.

Rebuilding Afghanistan is "a noble mission par excellence," yet its civil-reconstruction aspects often are overlooked in international media, which focuses on military operations, said Daan Everts of the Netherlands, NATO's senior civilian representative for Afghanistan. (See related article.)

More than 60 countries provide significant donor support for Afghanistan, said Chris Alexander of Canada, the U.N. deputy special representative to Afghanistan.

Alexander agreed with the assessment of NATO commanders that their large-scale military action against the Taliban in southern Afghanistan in September, known as Operation Medusa, has helped set the conditions for stability and reconstruction in a region formerly under Taliban influence.

[http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006\\_11/alia/a6110603.htm](http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006_11/alia/a6110603.htm)

A transcript of the November 2 news conference is posted on the NATO Web site:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s061102d.htm>

### **BUSH PRAISES NATO AS VALUES-BASED ALLIANCE AHEAD OF RIGA SUMMIT (2006-10-27)**

NATO has become a "values-based organization" that is working with the United States on three continents to overcome "radicals and extremists," President Bush told the alliance's secretary-general at the White House October 27.

"You've made NATO a values-based organization that is capable of dealing with the true threats of the 21st century," Bush told Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer of the Netherlands.

"The real challenge of the future is to help people of moderation and young democracies succeed in the face of threats and attacks by radicals and extremists who do not share our ideology, [and who] have kind of a dark vision of the world," Bush said.

De Hoop Scheffer's visit to Washington takes place a month before the heads of state of NATO's 26-member nations are scheduled to meet in Riga, Latvia. Issues to be discussed at

the Riga Summit include ongoing missions in Afghanistan, the Balkans, Iraq, Mediterranean patrols and assistance to the African Union in Darfur, Sudan.

"NATO is delivering security in the 21st century," de Hoop Scheffer told White House reporters. "And that means defending values not only in Europe, but far away from NATO's traditional area."

<http://www.uspolicy.be/Article.asp?ID=7B7356E2-0A54-40A2-A50F-763DC7C449DA>

Transcript of the press conference:

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061027.html>

**PRESIDENT BUSH SUPPORTS NATO MEMBERSHIP FOR CROATIA BY 2008;  
Bush, Croatian Prime Minister Sanader meet at White House  
By Louise Fenner, Washington File Staff Writer, 2006-10-17**

Washington – President Bush met with Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader at the White House October 17 and said that during the upcoming NATO summit in Riga, Latvia, he would push for Croatia's admission to the alliance by 2008.

Bush said he believes "it's in the world's interest that Croatia join NATO, as well as the European Union. To that end, when I go to Riga, I will make the case that Croatia should be admitted. It seems like a reasonable date would be 2008."

NATO membership is expected to be a topic of discussion at the Riga summit November 28-29, and alliance leaders may signal what conditions should be met for the candidate countries to be offered membership as early as 2008. Croatia, Albania and Macedonia formally have requested membership.

<http://www.uspolicy.be/Article.asp?ID=52F8BB1E-3118-4054-AB52-32F8AA3AE2CE>

## **THINK TANK PUBLICATIONS**

### **AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE**

**NO THIRD WAY IN IRAQ: "REDEPLOYMENT" WILL NOT "INCENTIVIZE" THE IRAQI MILITARY. IT WILL LEAD TO ITS COLLAPSE**

**By Frederick W. Kagan, AEI**

**Published in *The Weekly Standard*, November 13, 2006**

The United States has two options in Iraq: stay and try to win, or cut, run, and lose. Attempts to chart a middle course--partial withdrawal or redeployment, accelerated hand-over to the Iraqis, political deals with Syria or Iran--ignore the realities of the military situation. The real choice we face is this: Is it better to accept defeat than to endure the pain of trying to succeed?

The U.S. military, under the stewardship of CENTCOM Commander General John Abizaid, has worked hard from the outset to avoid creating an Iraqi military that is dependent upon the continued presence of U.S. forces. The fear of such dependency is one of the pillars that has supported U.S. strategy from the outset. In order to avoid it, the U.S. military has never fully

committed to conducting coherent and comprehensive counterinsurgency operations on its own, preferring to wait until the Iraqis are able to undertake them. We are still waiting, and the insurgency is strengthening its organization and inciting chaos through mass murder and sectarian violence.

The Iraqi military, unfortunately, is still a work in progress. Although there are growing numbers of trained Iraqi soldiers formed into increasingly competent tactical units, those units remain highly dependent on American logistical support for food, shelter, ammunition, and transportation. This situation is not entirely the fault of the American military. It stems also from the failure of the Iraqi government to establish ministries capable of performing their assigned tasks--a failure abetted by woefully inadequate assistance from the nonmilitary agencies of the U.S. government. Abizaid and the U.S. military are right to feel let down in this regard by the rest of the government, but only partly. Their failure to establish reasonable security and safe working conditions in Iraq, particularly outside the Green Zone, where much of this effort would have to take place, is the principal cause for the lack of economic and political development.

[http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25105.filter.all/pub\\_detail.asp](http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25105.filter.all/pub_detail.asp)

## **BROOKINGS INSTITUTION**

### **IRAQI REFUGEES: CARRIERS OF CONFLICT**

**Kenneth M. Pollack, Director of Research, Daniel L. Byman, Nonresident Senior Fellow  
Brookings Institution, Saban Center for Middle East Policy  
Published in *The Atlantic Monthly*, November 2006**

Refugees from Iraq are on the move. More than 1.2 million of them have already fled the country, and recent anecdotal reports—a many-fold increase in the buses traveling daily from Baghdad to Jordan this summer, for example—suggest that the tempo of the exodus is increasing. If the violence in Iraq spreads, the number of Iraqis who flee to neighboring states may well triple. And if the nascent civil war in Iraq unfolds the way most other recent civil wars have, the refugees will remain outside Iraq for years.

All too often, where large numbers of refugees go, instability and war closely follow—as Middle Eastern history attests. Palestinian refugees, who with their descendants number in the millions, have been a source of regional violence and regime change for decades. They helped provoke the 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars by conducting cross-border attacks against Israel and inviting Israeli retaliation against the Arab states that hosted them. Later they turned against their hosts and catalyzed a civil war in Jordan (1970-71) and in Lebanon (1975-90). The "Palestinian question"—and the paltry Arab-state reaction to it—has also contributed to coups by militant Arab nationalists in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria.

<http://www.brook.edu/printme.wbs?page=/pagedefs/e20f6a647a6bff4035c2ac2a0a1415cb.xml>  
1

## CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

### **THE END OF THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME?**

**George Perkovich, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace**

**Published in *Current History*, November 2006**


The effort to constrain the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons is perhaps the most ambitious attempt ever made to extend the civilizing reach of the rule of law over humankind's destructive capacity. The United States, the Soviet Union, and other states laid the foundation for this mission in the 1960s with the negotiation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (npt).

The treaty enshrines three basic bargains at the core of the nonproliferation regime. States that had not tested nuclear weapons before January 1, 1967, promised not to seek the transfer or manufacture of nuclear weapons, while the states that had already tested nuclear weapons promised to work seriously toward eliminating their nuclear arsenals. States with advanced nuclear capability promised to assist non-nuclear weapon states to develop "the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes." And, less formally, states with nuclear weapons (primarily the United States and the Soviet Union) pledged to come to the assistance of non-nuclear-weapon states if they were threatened with nuclear attack.

[http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/perkovich\\_current\\_history.pdf](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/perkovich_current_history.pdf)

### **STRATEGIC ASIA 2006–07: TRADE, INTERDEPENDENCE, AND SECURITY**

**By Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Michael Wills**




**Publisher: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2006**

Edited by Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills, and written by some of America's leading specialists including Minxin Pei, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, this book examines the strategic balance in Asia and the increasing levels of trade and interdependence in the region, assessing the implications for the United States.

Strategic Asia 2006–07: Trade, Interdependence, and Security, the sixth volume in NBR's Strategic Asia series, examines how trade and interdependence fit into the grand strategies of various Asian states and how changing economic relationships could affect regional stability in Asia. Through a combination of country, regional, and topical studies, the book assesses trade and investment dynamics in the region, the rise of new powers, the ongoing processes of globalization, and the impact of economic interdependence on security, and evaluates how these trends are altering Asia's strategic environment.

<http://www.nbr.org/publications/book.aspx?ID=14>

**PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS IN THE POST-9/11 ERA****By Frederic Grare****Carnegie Paper No. 72, October 2006**

Taliban insurgents and their Al Qaeda allies, once thought defeated in Afghanistan, are regaining strength. Regrouped and reorganized, better equipped and financed, and more sophisticated tactically, they are threatening both the reconstruction process and the U.S.-led coalition forces on the ground. Pakistan-Afghanistan relations have been another casualty of the renewed violence. The resurgence of the Taliban movement and the growing insurgency in the provinces bordering the Pakistan-Afghan border have once again generated tensions between Kabul and Islamabad. The two countries are accusing each other of interfering in their respective domestic affairs.

In a new Carnegie Paper, Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations in the Post-9/11 Era, Visiting Scholar Frederic Grare examines the evolution of the situation in Afghanistan and takes a look at Afghanistan through Pakistan's eyes. In addition, Grare provides policy recommendations for regional relations in a post-U.S. Afghanistan. He suggests that only the end of military rule in Pakistan can clear the way for more stabilized relations with Afghanistan. To achieve these ends, democratizing Pakistan is first and foremost a strategic imperative.

Full text of this Carnegie Paper:

[http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cp72\\_grare\\_final.pdf](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cp72_grare_final.pdf)

**CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS)****OPTIONS FOR EXPANDING IRAQI FORCES: GOALS AND REALITIES****Anthony H. Cordesman****CSIS Report, November 2, 2006**

President Bush stated in late October that the US was changing tactics to try to make Iraqi forces ready to take over from US forces in 18-24 months, although Secretary Rumsfeld later made it clear that such benchmarks were goals, not deadlines.

Prime Minister Maliki responded by stating that this was US policy, and the Iraqi government would act on its own and make its own sovereign decisions. He then announced his own plan for building up and transforming Iraqi forces, a plan that was particularly ambitious because of the weaknesses in the existing force.

As the Department of Defense quarterly status report of August 31, 2006 makes clear, no one knows how many of the 312,400 men trained and equipped in all of the various branches of Iraqi forces are actually still in service. (Manning totals are as of October 25, 2006.) Moreover, the quality problems in Iraqi forces are illustrated by the fact that unclassified reporting on unit effectiveness has been cancelled. No reports are now issued on what units have Level I-IV readiness.

[http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/061102\\_options\\_iraqi\\_forces.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/061102_options_iraqi_forces.pdf)




**OPTIONS FOR IRAQ: THE ALMOST GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY****Anthony H. Cordesman****CSIS, October 11, 2006.**

Iraq is already in a state of serious civil war, and current efforts at political compromise and improving security at best are buying time. There is a critical risk that Iraq will drift into a major civil conflict over the coming months, see its present government fail, and/or divide or separate in some form.

The US cannot simply "stay the course," and rely on its existing actions and strategy. It needs new options to reverse the drift towards a major civil war and political failure. There are no truly good options that can guarantee success and there are many bad ones. This paper suggests that the US should avoid unilateral options and seek to negotiate new incentives with the Iraqi government and its allies.


[http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/061011\\_iraqoptions.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/061011_iraqoptions.pdf)

**VOICES OF AFGHANISTAN: AN EVALUATION STUDY****Seema Patel****CSIS Report, October 30, 2006**

Afghans are less hopeful today than they were a year ago. The state-building mission has lost ground, and is slipping further into the "danger zone." These are the initial findings and first impressions of Measures of Progress 2006, a study being conducted by the PCR Project, to evaluate the impact that reconstruction efforts have had on the average Afghan.

Seema Patel discussed her insights on the project at an event held at CSIS shortly after she returned from conducting the project research in Afghanistan.

[http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/061030\\_voices\\_initial.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/061030_voices_initial.pdf)

**STRATEGIC STUDY ON BIOTERRORISM****Jennifer Mackby****CSIS Report, October 16, 2006**

This Strategic Study on Bioterrorism, sponsored by the CSIS Strengthening the Global Partnership Project, was conducted to increase the awareness of the threat of bioterror and to identify means by which States can prevent and respond to such threats to increase their biosecurity. It addressed bio-threat and response scenarios, risk assessment, modern diagnostic techniques and methods to strengthen capabilities for early detection, surveillance and response to natural and bioterror disease outbreaks, the technical issues to be solved and political, social and psychological aspects of bioterrorism.


The Group recommended that in order to prevent dangerous microorganisms from falling into the hands of terrorists, it is essential to secure and consolidate them in certified facilities or

destroy them. This can be achieved through bilateral arrangements or through the G8 Global Partnership. In addition, the Group agreed that because the first alarm of a bio-attack will probably be sick patients in the hospital, it is critical to enhance the early detection of microorganisms in the environment and the rapid diagnosis of patients.

European countries (such as France, Germany, Switzerland, Sweden and the United Kingdom) that have substantial biotechnology industries and experience working on biodefense and with infectious diseases could work with the Russian Federation to increase security and accounting of pathogen collections, and to strengthen export control restrictions. [http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/061016\\_bioterrorism.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/061016_bioterrorism.pdf)

## TRANSATLANTIC APPROACHES TO SANCTIONS: PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

**Robin Niblett and Derek Mix**  
**CSIS Report, October 10, 2006**



In today's security environment, the United States and Europe face many common challenges, from preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to countering international terrorism, and promoting democratic government. The problems require strategies to deal with state actors such as Iran, North Korea, and Belarus, as well as with a whole host of non-state entities. However, despite this prevalence of overlapping foreign policy objectives, transatlantic cooperation in pursuing common goals is prone to breaking down in debates over which means to use.

Few policy areas illustrate this dilemma more clearly than that of the design and application of international sanctions. The use of sanctions as an effective and manageable instrument of national foreign policy or multilateral action has come under serious question in recent years, and it is clear that both sides approach the question of sanctions from very different perspectives. Yet, with differences over the utility and use of force likely to persist well into the future, it is imperative that U.S. and European leaders make a serious effort to develop a more coordinated approach to the use of sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy. [http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/061010\\_sanctions.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/061010_sanctions.pdf)

## THE NATO RIGA SUMMIT

**Simon Serfaty**  
**CSIS Report, October 2, 2006**

The next NATO Summit, which will be held in Riga, Latvia, later this year, cannot be merely a transition or even a consolidation summit, designed to await the next wave of political leaders on either side of the Atlantic. Indeed, the Summit will be about more than NATO: it will be about the best ways to reassert publicly the terms of Euro-Atlantic engagement.

This paper pursues a discussion previously started with Simon Serfaty's EU paper, Moment of Reflection, Commitment to Action, released by CSIS on




August 1, 2006. It is based on a two-day seminar that took place in Riga, Latvia on September 15-17, 2006 with a group of leading experts on NATO, representing the United States and 13 other NATO and EU countries.

[http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/061002\\_nato\\_riga.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/061002_nato_riga.pdf)

## COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

### **NATIONAL SECURITY CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. OIL DEPENDENCY: REPORT OF AN INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE**

**Council on Foreign Relations Press, October 2006. 80 pages ISBN 0-87609-365-9**



In recent years, energy prices have surged. President George W. Bush, in this year's State of the Union address, warned of an addiction to imported oil and its perils.

Yet there is no consensus on what should be done to shake the addiction. Virtually everything concerning energy has changed—except U.S. policy.

The Council on Foreign Relations established an Independent Task Force to examine the consequences of dependence on imported energy for U.S. foreign policy. Since the United States both consumes and imports more oil than any other country, the Task Force has concentrated its deliberations on matters of petroleum. In so doing, it reaches a sobering but inescapable judgment: The lack of sustained attention to energy issues is undercutting U.S. foreign policy and national security.

The Task Force goes on to argue that U.S. energy policy has been plagued by myths, such as the feasibility of achieving “energy independence” through increased drilling or anything else. For the next few decades, the challenge facing the United States is to become better equipped to manage its dependencies rather than pursue the chimera of independence.

Full text : <http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/EnergyTFR.pdf>

Figures and tables: <http://www.cfr.org/publication/11683/>

## FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS (FPIF)

### **BREAKING UP THAT OLD GANG OF MINE**

**Col. Daniel Smith, U.S. Army (Ret.)**

**Foreign Policy In Focus, October 18, 2006**

George Bush's most steadfast backer in the March 2003 preventive war invasion and occupation of Iraq has been British Prime Minister Tony Blair. The Bush-Blair “dynamic duo” act is, however, about to end. Blair is soon to resign his post in favor of the Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown.

A top British military official has called for troop withdrawal from Iraq. Does this mark the beginning of the end of the special military relationship between the White House and 10 Downing Street?

<http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/3617>

## **OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM: A RETROSPECTIVE**

**Stephen Zunes**

**Foreign Policy In Focus, October 18, 2006**

It has become a given, even among many progressive critics of Bush administration policy, that while the U.S. war on Iraq was illegal, immoral, unnecessary, poorly executed, and contrary to America's national security interests, the war on Afghanistan—which was launched five years ago last week—was a legal, moral, and a necessary response to protect American national security in the aftermath of 9/11. Virtually every member of Congress who has gone on record opposing the Iraq War supported the Afghanistan War. Similarly, a number of soldiers who have resisted serving in Iraq on moral grounds have expressed their willingness to serve in Afghanistan.

Relatively speaking, the war in Afghanistan has not been nearly as much the unambiguous tragedy as the U.S. war on Iraq. Only the most committed pacifists or the most extreme among the ideological critics of U.S. intervention would have ruled out the possibility of at least some use of force against al-Qaida following the 9/11 attacks against the United States.  
<http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/3616>

## **HERITAGE FOUNDATION**

### **SADDAM HUSSEIN ADJUDGED SERIAL MASS MURDER**

**James A. Phillips**

**Heritage Foundation WebMemo #1247, November 7, 2006**

An Iraqi tribunal has convicted former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein of mass murder and sentenced him to death. Bringing Saddam and his henchmen to justice is a welcome milestone on Iraq's grueling path from dictatorship to democracy. Without resolving Saddam's fate, national reconciliation would be a difficult proposition for Iraq's Shia Arabs and Kurds, long persecuted by Saddam's Sunni-dominated regime.

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/wm1247.cfm>

### **PRIVATE CONTRACTORS ON DEPLOYED MILITARY OPERATIONS: INTER-AGENCY OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES**

**by Matthew Uttley**

**Heritage Lecture #972, October 31, 2006 (Delivered June 15, 2006)**

So why is contractor support a significant con-temporary issue? The answer to this question falls under three headings:

First, the available data suggest that contractor personnel as a proportion of overall force numbers have increased with successive post-Cold War military deployments. Civilian contractors accounted for 1 in 60 of deployed personnel in Iraq during 2001. In Bosnia the ratio had become 1 to 10; then in Kosovo it was 1 to 2. Statistics for the current Iraq deployment indicate a ratio of approximately 1.5 contractors to each member of the military. Consequently, this suggests a trend whereby the presence of contractors is increasing over time.

Second, financial statistics indicate that the market for private military actors is growing. The market value almost doubled between 1990 and 2000, and predictions are that it will double again by the end of the decade.

Third, the trend since the Cold War has been for private contractors to provide an increasingly sophisticated array of logistics and equipment support functions to armed services. What we observe is an increasing spatial shift of logistic functions that were provided to armed service in the home base towards the front line.

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl972.cfm>

## **DENYING TERRORISTS SAFE HAVEN IN PAKISTAN**

**Lisa Curtis**

**Heritage Backgrounder #1981, October 26, 2006**

The recent upsurge in Taliban attacks against coalition forces in Afghanistan and continuing links of global terrorist networks to groups based in Pakistan are leading many in the United States to question Islamabad's commitment to fighting the global war on terrorism.

Washington should review Pakistani efforts to deny terrorists safe haven and its overall policy toward Pakistan, which is at the center of international anti-terrorism efforts.

Pakistan has made invaluable contributions to combating al-Qaeda over the past five years by capturing scores of key leaders and helping to foil numerous deadly plots. However, Islamabad will need to adopt a more comprehensive policy against violent extremism to fully deny groups and individuals the use of Pakistani territory as a base for global jihad.

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1981.cfm>

## **THE U.S.-KOREA ALLIANCE ON THE ROCKS: SHAKEN, NOT STIRRED**

**Balbina Y. Hwang, Ph.D.**

**Heritage Lecture #970, October 16, 2006**

The question I was asked to address is whether the U.S.–ROK alliance is at risk. The short answer is “yes,” but the reasons why and the ensuing prescriptions are far from simple. Thus, for the sake of efficiency and clarity, I will begin with my conclusion and then provide an explanation: The maintenance of a strong U.S.–ROK alliance is absolutely in the short-, mid-, and long-term strategic interests of the United States.

Every few years, usually in response to public disagreements between Washington and Seoul, vocal critics will call for an end to the U.S.–Korea alliance and American disengagement from the Korean peninsula. While such views are not new in the half century of the alliance, they have increasingly gained credence in recent months, with headlines on both sides of the Pacific predicting the imminent end of the formal relationship.

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/hl970.cfm>

**U.S. POLICY AND THE GEORGIAN-RUSSIAN CRISIS****Dr. Ariel Cohen****Heritage WebMemo #1235, October 10, 2006**

Amid great power fretting over North Korea's nuclear test and continuing Iranian truculence against the West, Russia escalated its confrontation with the neighboring Georgia. Moscow is now using Georgia's arrest of four alleged Russian intelligence officers two weeks ago as a pretext to escalate its conflicts with Tbilisi. This is a dangerous development for the West, and specifically the United States, which could see its influence in the Caucasus region crumble if Russia is successful in forcing Georgia into its sphere of influence. U.S. policy must walk a fine line of encouraging settlement of the current dispute without becoming a liability through over-involvement.

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/wm1235.cfm>

**WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: CURRENT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES****Baker Spring****Heritage Lecture #968, October 4, 2006 (Delivered September 26, 2006)**

The challenge to the national security of the United States posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and nuclear weapons in particular, along with the related challenge presented by terrorism, should be of supreme concern to Congress. Thus, this is a timely and important hearing.

Earlier in this hearing, the Subcommittee heard from Dr. Hans Blix. Dr. Blix has served as the chair-man of an international commission recommending approaches to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The report of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (hereafter referred to as the Commission), entitled Weapons of Terror: Free-ing the World of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Arms, was released on June 1, 2006.[1] Given the seriousness of this report and the attention it has drawn, I think it will be useful to focus my remarks on some of the more important recommendations of the Commission.

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl968.cfm>

**INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (ICG)****ISRAEL/HIZBOLLAH/LEBANON: AVOIDING RENEWED CONFLICT****Middle East Report N°59****ICG, 1 November 2006**

UN Security Council Resolution 1701 halted the month-long fighting between Israel and Hizbollah but did little to resolve the underlying conflict and, if poorly handled, could help reignite it. The resolution has held remarkably well, with only limited violations. However, the temptation by either party to overreach could trigger renewed fighting. The greatest threats would be attempts by Israel or UN forces (UNIFIL) to use 1701 as a blunt means of disarming Hizbollah in the south or by Hizbollah to test UNIFIL's resolve. 1701 should be seen as a transitory

instrument that can stabilise the border by containing both sides' military impulses until bolder action is taken to address both domestic Lebanese matters (reforming and democratising the political and electoral systems; building a strong sovereign state and army; resolving the question of Hizbollah's armaments) and, especially, regional issues (in particular re-launching the Syrian track and engaging Iran). In short the international community must be modest in implementing 1701 for as long as it is not prepared to be ambitious in its regional diplomatic efforts.

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4484&l=1>

Full report:

[http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle\\_east\\_north\\_africa/arab\\_israeli\\_conflict/59\\_israel\\_hizbollah\\_lebanon\\_avoiding\\_renewed\\_conflict.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east_north_africa/arab_israeli_conflict/59_israel_hizbollah_lebanon_avoiding_renewed_conflict.pdf)

## **THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: TO REACH A LASTING PEACE** **ICG Middle East Report N°58, 5 October 2006**



If there is a silver lining in the recent succession of catastrophic developments in the Middle East, it is that they may impart renewed momentum to the search for a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is, admittedly, a slender hope. Since the collapse of the peace process in late 2000, none of the region's parties has displayed the requisite capacity or willingness to reach an acceptable compromise, while the international community has shown more fecklessness than resolve. But the Lebanon war must serve as a wake-up call: so long as the political roots of the Arab-Israeli conflict are not addressed, it will remain a bottomless source and pretext for

repression, radicalisation and bloodletting, both in the region and beyond. Now is the time for an international push to launch a new peace initiative.

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4427&l=1>

Full report:

[http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle\\_east\\_north\\_africa/arab\\_israeli\\_conflict/58\\_the\\_arab\\_israeli\\_conflict\\_to\\_reach\\_a\\_lasting\\_peace.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east_north_africa/arab_israeli_conflict/58_the_arab_israeli_conflict_to_reach_a_lasting_peace.pdf)

## **IRAQ BODY COUNT**

### **REALITY CHECKS: SOME RESPONSES TO THE LATEST LANCET ESTIMATES** **Hamit Dardagan, John Sloboda, and Josh Dougherty** **Iraq Body Count Press Release, 16 October 2006**

A new study has been released by the Lancet medical journal estimating over 650,000 excess deaths in Iraq. The Iraqi mortality estimates published in the Lancet in October 2006 imply, among other things, that:

- On average, a thousand Iraqis have been violently killed every single day in the first half of 2006, with less than a tenth of them being noticed by any public surveillance mechanisms;
- Some 800,000 or more Iraqis suffered blast wounds and other serious conflict-related injuries in the past two years, but less than a tenth of them received any kind of hospital treatment;

- Over 7% of the entire adult male population of Iraq has already been killed in violence, with no less than 10% in the worst affected areas covering most of central Iraq;
- Half a million death certificates were received by families which were never officially recorded as having been issued;
- The Coalition has killed far more Iraqis in the last year than in earlier years containing the initial massive "Shock and Awe" invasion and the major assaults on Falluja.

**If these assertions are true, they further imply:**

- incompetence and/or fraud on a truly massive scale by Iraqi officials in hospitals and ministries, on a local, regional and national level, perfectly coordinated from the moment the occupation began;
- bizarre and self-destructive behaviour on the part of all but a small minority of 800,000 injured, mostly non-combatant, Iraqis;
- the utter failure of local or external agencies to notice and respond to a decimation of the adult male population in key urban areas;
- an abject failure of the media, Iraqi as well as international, to observe that Coalition-caused events of the scale they reported during the three-week invasion in 2003 have been occurring every month for over a year.

In the light of such extreme and improbable implications, a rational alternative conclusion to be considered is that the authors have drawn conclusions from unrepresentative data. In addition, totals of the magnitude generated by this study are unnecessary to brand the invasion and occupation of Iraq a human and strategic tragedy.

<http://www.iraqbodycount.org/press/pr14.php>

## **MAXWELL SCHOOL OF SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY**

### **ASSESSING PAST STRATEGIES FOR COUNTERING TERRORISM, IN LEBANON AND BY LIBYA**

**Louis Kriesberg**

**Maxwell School of Syracuse University 2006**

American strategies to deal with terrorist attacks against Americans in Lebanon in the 1980s and by Libya since the beginning of the 1980s are examined. The consequences of the various strategies employed by U.S. government officials over time and the strategies employed by American non-governmental actors and by international organizations are compared. In addition, alternative strategies that might plausibly have been employed are also discussed. Official actions that relied

largely on military methods and were conducted unilaterally tended to be less effective, even counterproductive, compared to actions that were multilateral and relied significantly on diplomatic approaches, often aided by intermediaries.

[http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/parc/PDFs/Assessing%20Past%20Strategies\\_Kriesberg.pdf](http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/parc/PDFs/Assessing%20Past%20Strategies_Kriesberg.pdf)

**NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY (NDU)*****JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY***  
**Issue 43, 4th Quarter 2006**

This issue of JFQ also contains an expanded Interagency Dialogue section with an exceptional article by Supervisory Special Agent Paul J. Shannon, Federal Bureau of Investigation, who is the Director for Law Enforcement Policy on the Homeland Security Council at the White House. This cross-agency program is a useful example of interagency cooperation to share information where no pipeline for such sharing previously existed.

We hope you find the information in JFQ useful and timely, interesting and provocative. All articles are peer reviewed, though not refereed, to keep the content on the cutting edge, while presenting a broad range of research and educated opinion pieces; we do not homogenize or censor legitimate analysis and discourse, believing the risk of sharing information openly, in conduct of our mission, is less than the risk of impeding it.

JFQ emphasizes scholarly research, carefully considered commentary, and interagency synergy, international senior leader crosstalk, and interviews. See our Web site for more research and added features.

Although there may be little “new” in conflict and warfare, security dilemmas, or human nature, there are always new ways to examine and consider contemporary issues.

[http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq\\_pages/i43.htm](http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/i43.htm)

**SOUTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY CHALLENGES: AMERICA’S RESPONSE?**

**by Marvin C. Ott**

**Strategic Forum No. 222, October 2006**

**Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University**




Transnational and geopolitical challenges are shaping the security environment in Southeast Asia. Rapid economic change, actual and potential disease epidemics, and a growing sense of shared interest and grievance among the region’s Islamic populations are among the region’s main transnational concerns. In its most extreme form, Islamist sentiment has manifested itself in jihadist movements, including some with connections to al Qaeda.

Geopolitically, China’s rise poses a multifaceted strategic challenge to the region. For China, Southeast Asia is an arena of opportunity: geographically proximate, economically attractive, and historically

subordinate with influential resident Chinese populations. Southeast Asia sits astride sea lanes that are rapidly becoming China’s energy lifeline. Moreover, Chinese security analysts see Southeast Asia as the weak link in any U.S. effort to contain China.

Following 20 years of rapid economic development, Southeast Asia in the early 1990s was an increasingly vibrant, cohesive, and selfconfident region. Regional institutions, notably the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), reflected the growing sense of regional identity and shared purpose.

<http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Strforum/SF222/SF222.pdf>

**RAND****STRIKING FIRST: PREEMPTIVE AND PREVENTIVE ATTACK IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY****By: Karl P. Mueller, Jasen J. Castillo, Forrest E. Morgan, Negeen Pegahi, Brian Rosen**

Following the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, U.S. leaders recast the national security strategy to place greater emphasis on the threats posed by terrorists and by states from which they might acquire weapons of mass destruction, and announced that in the future the United States would take advantage of opportunities to strike at potential adversaries before they attacked.

RAND Project AIR FORCE examined the nature and implications of this doctrine of striking first. This study focused on three central questions: First, under what conditions is preemptive or preventive attack worth considering or pursuing as a response to perceived security threats?

Second, what role should such strategies be expected to play in future U.S. national security policy? Finally, what implications do these conclusions have for planners and policymakers in the U.S. Air Force and the other armed services as they design military capabilities and strategies to deal with national security threats in the next decade?

The study concluded preparing for such operations should not be a key driver for change in U.S. military capabilities because large-scale U.S. first strikes will be infrequent and present few unique operational military requirements, although the intelligence requirements for these strategies are highly demanding. Planners should also recognize that this doctrine may affect the types of threats posed against U.S. forces and interests by potential adversaries.


<http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG403/>

Full document: [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND\\_MG403.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG403.pdf)

**MARITIME TERRORISM: RISK AND LIABILITY****By: Michael D. Greenberg, Peter Chalk, Henry H. Willis, Ivan Khilko, David S. Ortiz**  
**RAND Report, October 2006**

Policymakers have become increasingly concerned in recent years about the possibility of future maritime terrorist attacks. Though the historical occurrence of such attacks has been limited, recognition that maritime vessels and facilities may be particularly vulnerable to terrorism has galvanized concerns. In addition, some plausible maritime attacks could have very significant consequences, in the form of mass casualties, severe property damage, and attendant disruption of commerce. Understanding the nature of maritime terrorism risk requires an investigation of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences associated with potential attacks, as grounded both by relevant historical data and by intelligence on the capabilities and intentions of known

terrorist groups. These risks also provide the context for understanding government institutions that will respond to future attacks, and particularly so with regard to the U.S. civil justice system. In principle, civil liability operates to redistribute the harms associated with



legally redressable claims, so that related costs are borne by the parties responsible for having caused them. In connection with maritime terrorism, civil liability creates the prospect that independent commercial defendants will be held responsible for damages caused by terrorist attacks. This book explores risks and U.S. civil liability rules as they may apply in the context of these types of attacks.

<http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG520/>

Full report: [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND\\_MG520.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG520.pdf)

## **I WANT YOU! THE EVOLUTION OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE**

**By: Bernard D. Rostker**

**RAND, September 2006**



As U.S. military forces appear overcommitted and some ponder a possible return to the draft, the timing is ideal for a review of how the American military transformed itself over the past five decades, from a poorly disciplined force of conscripts and draft-motivated “volunteers” to a force of professionals revered throughout the world. Starting in the early 1960s, this account runs through the current war in Iraq, with alternating chapters on the history of the all-volunteer force and the analytic background that supported decisionmaking. The author participated as an analyst and government policymaker in many of the events covered in this book. His insider status and access offer a behind-

the-scenes look at decisionmaking within the Pentagon and White House. The book includes a foreword by former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird. The accompanying DVD contains more than 1,700 primary-source documents — government memoranda, Presidential memos and letters, staff papers, and reports — linked directly from citations in the electronic version of the book. This unique technology presents a treasure trove of materials for specialists, researchers, and students of military history, public administration, and government affairs to draw upon.

<http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG265/>

## **STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE. U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE**

### **ALLIANCES AND AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY**

**Dr. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall**


**SSI *Letort Papers*, October 2006**

One of the greatest challenges facing the United States today is the translation of its overwhelming might into effective influence. Traditionally, the United States has leveraged its power through bilateral and multilateral alliances. However, the end of the Cold War and the events of September 11, 2001, have led some policymakers and analysts to question the value of alliances in American foreign and defense policy. This monograph advocates that allies are more important than ever to the achievement of U.S. national security goals.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=730>

Full document: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB730.pdf>



**SHAPING THE PLA'S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT****Edited by Dr. Andrew Scobell, Dr. Larry M. Wortzel****SSI, October 2006**

This volume addresses the role of the Chinese military in shaping its country's security environment. The PLA itself is shaped and molded by both domestic and foreign influences. In the first decade of the 21st century, the PLA is not a central actor in China's foreign policy the way it was just a few decades ago. Nevertheless, the significance of the PLA should not be discounted. The military remains a player that seeks to play a role and influence China's policy towards the such countries and regions as United States, Japan, the Koreas, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Taiwan. It is important not to overlook that, in times of crisis or conflict, the role and influence of the PLA rise significantly.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=709>

Full document: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB709.pdf>

**CONFRONTING THE UNCONVENTIONAL: INNOVATION AND TRANSFORMATION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS****David Tucke****SSI Letort Papers, October 2006**

Are there limits to military transformation? Or, if it seems obvious that there must be limits to transformation, what are they exactly, why do they arise, and how can we identify them so that we may better accomplish the transformation that the U.S. military is capable of? If limits to military change and transformation exist, what are the broader implications for national policy and strategy? The author offers some answers to these questions by analyzing the efforts of the French, British, and Americans to deal with irregular threats after World War II.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=729>

Full document: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB729.pdf>

**ARTICLES FROM U.S. JOURNALS***(Contact the IRC for copies)*

**Allison, Graham THEY ALL FALL DOWN (*Foreign Policy*, web exclusive, posted October 2006) AA06401**

According to the author, professor of government and director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, "In the battle of wills between North Korea and the United States, the score is Kim Jong Il, 8; George W. Bush, 0. And yet, the White House doggedly pursues a strategy that has repeatedly failed to achieve American objectives. Despite the overwhelming power of the United States and the abject weakness of North Korea, David has so far bested Goliath with superior strategy and tactics. It's a situation no one should applaud." Countries around the world should think carefully about

how North Korea's new nuclear status affects their own national interests. North Korea's test is a blow to the nonproliferation regime; it is also likely to trigger proliferation in East Asia, particularly in Japan and South Korea, in spite of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and increases the risk that terrorists will explode a nuclear weapon in the U.S. Since China is the only actor with real leverage, the U.S. will need to "endorse Chinese-led assurances that North Korea will not be attacked as long as it observes agreed-upon constraints." And to reduce the risk of North Korea selling nuclear weapons to terrorists, "the United States and its allies should announce a new policy of nuclear accountability. Kim Jong Il must be put on notice that the explosion of any nuclear weapon or material of North Korean origin on the territory of the United States or its allies will be treated just like a North Korean nuclear attack and will be met by a full retaliatory response that guarantees that this could never happen again."

Available online (with registration) at

[http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\\_id=3620](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3620).

**Dunlap, Charles J. Jr. AMERICA'S ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE (*Armed Forces Journal*, September 2006) AA06402**

A Major General and deputy judge advocate general of the Air Force, Dunlap argues that air power in all its forms -- from air superiority fighter jets to precision bombers to ground attack planes and transport to unmanned surveillance planes -- is America's asymmetrical military advantage, not its ground forces. He says the volunteer army is too costly to generate the numbers of troops needed for a true occupation force in Iraq, while air power's real-time intelligence-gathering capability, paired with precision-guided weapons, can put at risk any adversary's high-value assets.

Available online at <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/09/2009013>.

**Ebadi, Shirin; Sahimi, Muhammad LINK HUMAN RIGHTS TO IRAN'S NUCLEAR AMBITIONS (*New Perspectives Quarterly*, vol. 23, no. 2, Spring 2006, pp. 39-42) AA06403**

The authors provide a history of Iran's nuclear program, as well as recommendations for effectively deterring the threat of its nuclear power. They suggest that the U.S. enter direct negotiations with Iran; secondly, they propose that the U.N. appoint a special human rights monitor for Iran, the World Bank stop providing loans to the Tehran regime, and Western nations downgrade diplomatic relations with Iran. The EU should also cease investments in Iran until this country establishes a democratic political system because, only as a true democracy, will this nation feel secure enough to avoid nuclear options.

This article is currently available on the Internet at:

[http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/2006\\_spring/10\\_ebadi.html](http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/2006_spring/10_ebadi.html)

**Garza, Thomas J. CONSERVATIVE VANGUARD? THE POLITICS OF NEW RUSSIA'S YOUTH (*Current History*, vol. 105, no. 693, October 2006, pp. 327-334) AA06404**

The Russian government's policies, particularly the war in Chechnya, have prompted increasing political activism among its youth. The author tracks youth culture and political

organizations from the Communist youth organizations of the Soviet period, to the “informal” groups of the Perestroika years, to political scene. While small numbers have organized around pro-democracy, green, and leftist causes, the vast majority belongs to right wing, pro-Putin organizations, such as Nashi (“ours”), whose members’ activities range from community service to, more worryingly, participation in xenophobic protests and racist attacks. With Russian popular culture becoming increasingly youth friendly, activists of all stripes are participating in Russian political life, and utilizing new technologies to mobilize a new level of engagement in civil society.

**Gorenburg, Dmitry** **RUSSIA CONFRONTS RADICAL ISLAM** (*Current History*, vol. 105 no. 693, October 2006, pp. 334-340) AA06383

Policies undertaken by Moscow and regional governments are worsening an already volatile situation in the North Caucasus. Russia's Muslims account for 10 percent of the country's population, but are geographically concentrated and growing, even as the Slavic majority continues to spiral downward in a dramatic demographic decline. The government's inability to recognize the ethnic and sectarian diversity of its Muslim population, its use of radical Islamic "Wahhabism" to justify its centralization of power, and its failure to address the endemic poverty and corruption that breeds radicalism is increasing the incidence of Islamic violence. What began as an ethno-nationalist struggle in Chechnya metastasized into a broader global Islamist conflict, as foreign benefactors provided forces, funds, and other support. While the violence has cooled in Chechnya, attacks have spread to neighboring Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and North Ossetia, underlining the need for Russia to change course in the region by understanding the differences among its Muslims, appointing regional leaders trusted by their constituents, and focus on promoting economic development and reducing corruption.

**Huliaras, Asteris** **EVANGELISTS, OIL COMPANIES, AND TERRORISTS: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY TOWARDS SUDAN** (*Orbis*, vol. 50, no. 4, Fall 2006, pp. 709-724) AA06384

The author, associate professor of geopolitics at Harokopion University of Athens, writes that the Bush administration has pursued a policy of constructive engagement with Sudan. Huliaras attributes this policy to three competing spheres of influence: American evangelicals, the war on terror, and oil interests. Evangelicals urged stricter sanctions, but while they played a significant role in placing Sudan on the U.S. foreign policy agenda, Huliaras notes that their influence was far more limited. After 9/11 Sudan became important for the United States because it possessed intelligence vital to the war on terror. Also, Sudan has increased oil production in the last five years and, because of the U.S. desire to diversify its sources of energy, the crisis in Darfur was marginalized by oil interests and the war on terror.

**Kaplan, Robert WHEN NORTH KOREA FALLS (*Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 298, no. 3, October 2006, pp. 64-73) AA06385**

Kaplan, correspondent for Atlantic and a visiting professor at the U.S. Naval Academy, notes that Pyongyang's missile tests and nuclear brinksmanship may obscure a greater threat: the prospect of the collapse of the North Korean regime. He writes that there is evidence that the internal workings of the regime are starting to fray -- "totalitarian regimes close to demise are apt to get panicky and do rash things." A war on the Korean peninsula would be "horrific", as the North maintains a huge standing army and thousands of artillery batteries along the DMZ. Kaplan describes various scenarios that might happen with a breakdown of authority in Pyongyang, and how it might affect the strained relations between Japan, Korea and China. He suspects that a unified Korea after such an event would probably not be viable, as South Koreans would not be interested in the disruption a collapse of the North would produce. He believes that the ultimate beneficiary would be China, which might use a Greater Korea as a key in its long-term plans for dominating the Asian economic sphere.

**Wallander, Celeste SUSPENDED ANIMATION: THE U.S. AND RUSSIA AFTER THE G-8 (*Current History*, vol. 105 no. 693, October 2006, pp. 315-320) AA06386**

Relations between Moscow and Washington are at an all-time low and are likely to deteriorate further over the next two years, as the leaders struggle to cooperate on proliferation and terrorism, but find the rest of their diplomacy in "suspended animation." Recent disputes since this year's G-8 summit in St. Petersburg illustrate the depth of disconnect, including the breakdown Russia's WTO entry negotiations, recent U.S. sanctions imposed against two major Russian firms doing business with Iran, and international reaction to Russia's state-controlled energy companies' dealings with its neighbors. The fundamental problem, the author argues, is that each wants what the other will not give: the United States wants a free, democratic, and secure future for Russia and its neighbors, while Russia wants to be considered a great power on its own terms ("sovereign democracy"), as well as undisputed influence in the former Soviet republics. As long as their respective leaderships persist in defining their interests in these opposing terms, the U.S. and Russia can look forward to only periodic tactical cooperation in areas of urgent mutual interest.

**Daalder, Ivo; Goldgeier, James GLOBAL NATO (*Foreign Affairs*, vol. 85, no. 5, September/October 2006, pp.105-113) AA06366**

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's functions have evolved since it was established in 1949. As the world's premier multinational military organization, NATO is essential to the management of current international crises, varying from peacekeeping in Afghanistan to tsunami relief in Indonesia. Ivo Daalder, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, and James Goldgeier, Professor of Political Science at George Washington University and Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, argue that NATO would "enjoy greater legitimacy" if it were to open its membership to non-European democracies aligned with NATO's goals. Countries like Japan and Australia would contribute to NATO's efforts because an increasingly global world demands an increasingly global coalition, and "global threats cannot be tackled by a regional organization," the authors note.

**Hochman, Dafna REHABILITATING A ROGUE: LIBYA'S WMD REVERSAL AND LESSONS FOR US POLICY** (*Parameters*, vol. 36, no. 1, Spring 2006, pp. 63-78) AA06368

The author cites Libya as a role model for other rogue nations that wish to engage in voluntary disarmament. This approach recognizes motivation for voluntary disarmament as attributable to multiple causes. In Libya's case, this motivation came from three sources: Libyan concern about al-Qaeda caused a desire to ally with the U.S.; Libyan preoccupation with its reputation and international image; and the pressure exerted on Congress by the families of the victims of Pan Am Flight 103. The combination of these threats caused Libya to perceive greater danger in maintaining its nuclear and chemical programs than in destroying them.

This article is currently available on the Internet at:

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06spring/hochman.htm>

**Sagan, Scott D. HOW TO KEEP THE BOMB FROM IRAN** (*Foreign Affairs*, vol. 85, no. 5, September/October 2006, pp.45-59) AA06369

As an open supporter of terrorism with strong anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiments, a nuclear Iran would pose a grave threat to the United States and its allies. Scott D. Sagan, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, describes the dangers of "deterrence optimism" and "proliferation fatalism" when approaching the problem of Iran's nuclear program. He argues that, with "no viable military option at hand," the only way to effectively prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon is for the United States and other global players to understand and help satisfy the concerns that drove Iran to develop a nuclear program in the first place.

**Yost, Casimir HAMAS, ISRAEL, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE** (*Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 2, Summer 2006, pp. 139-145) AA06370

The author, director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, describes the recent changes in the Israel-Palestine situation caused by the elections of Hamas and Olmert and presents Israeli and Palestinian "myths" that he sees as barriers to a negotiated settlement of the problems. He points out that Fatah and its allies actually received 56% of the votes, but won only 43% of the seats because Hamas was better organized -- the Fatah vote was divided among multiple candidates. "Now much depends on how Hamas's success or failure is viewed by the Palestinian people. If Hamas is viewed as standing up for the rights and dignity of the Palestinian people, it could emerge strengthened. If, on the other hand, Hamas is perceived by Palestinians as a barrier to a better future, the 2006 elections could well have been the party's high-water mark." Given the current situation, the best outcome may be an unstable tolerance between the two parties, "but the more likely eventuality will be renewed conflict with a third Intifada."

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