



# Security & Defense

Foreign Policy • NATO • Response to Terrorism

December 2010



The United States is taking measures to free the world of nuclear weapons. Until that time, the U.S. is helping to secure the world's existing nuclear material, encouraging states to renounce nuclear weapons, and preserving access to safe nuclear energy.

[http://www.america.gov/nuclear\\_strategy.html](http://www.america.gov/nuclear_strategy.html)


<b>GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS</b> .....	<b>6</b>
PIPELINE SECURITY: TSA HAS TAKEN ACTIONS TO HELP STRENGTHEN SECURITY, BUT COULD IMPROVE PRIORITY-SETTING AND ASSESSMENT PROCESSES. U.S. Government Accountability Office. Web posted September 1, 2010. ....	6
<b>CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS (HEARINGS, REPORTS, ETC.)</b> .....	<b>6</b>
INTELLIGENCE ISSUES FOR CONGRESS. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Richard A. Best Jr. October 14, 2010. ....	6
HEZBOLLAH: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Casey L. Addis and Christopher M. Blanchard. October 8, 2010. ....	6
PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS: PROLIFERATION AND SECURITY ISSUES. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin. October 7, 2010. ....	6
DEFENSE SURPLUS EQUIPMENT DISPOSAL: BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Valerie Bailey Grasso. October 6, 2010. ....	7
AMERICAN JIHADIST TERRORISM: COMBATING A COMPLEX THREAT. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Jerome P. Bjelopera and Mark A. Randol. September 20, 2010. ....	7
CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS TO DEVELOPING NATIONS, 2002-2009. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Richard F. Grimmett. September 10, 2010. ....	7
<b>THE U.S. AND NATO</b> .....	<b>8</b>
LISBON SUMMIT DECLARATION, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon, November 20, 2010.....	8
ACTIVE ENGAGEMENT, MODERN DEFENCE--STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFENCE AND SECURITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION, Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, November 19, 2010. ....	8
<b>THINK TANK PUBLICATIONS</b> .....	<b>8</b>
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE. ....	8
DETER AND ASSURE: CHARTING A COURSE FOR AMERICA’S ASIAN ALLIANCES IN A NEW NUCLEAR AGE. Tim Sullivan. CDS Working Paper, AEI November 16, 2010.....	8
IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN; REFUGEES AS POLITICAL INSTRUMENTS. Ahmad K. Majidiyar, Ali Alfoneh. AEI Outlook Series, AEI Online, November 2010 .....	8
DEFENDING DEFENSE SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON U.S. MILITARY SPENDING REQUIREMENTS. AEI Online, October 14, 2010 .....	8
ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION . . . . .	9
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, November 2010.....	9
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, October 2010.....	9
THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES (ACUS) . . . . .	9
NATO AND TERRITORIAL MISSILE DEFENSE: A “NO BRAINER” OR MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS? Simon Lunn. ACUS, November 2010 .....	9
THE NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT: A SAG STRAWMAN. Atlantic Council. Julian Lindley-French et al. September 29, 2010. ....	9
BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER . . . . .	10
ASSESSING THE TERRORIST THREAT. Bipartisan Policy Center. Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman. September 10, 2010. ....	10
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION. ....	10
NEW START SHOULDN'T BE STOPPED. Michael E. O'Hanlon. Brookings Institution, November 18, 2010 .....	10
NEXT STEPS ON U.S.-RUSSIAN NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS AND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION. Brookings Institution. October 12, 2010.....	10
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE . . . . .	10
INDISPENSABLE INSTITUTIONS: THE OBAMA-MEDVEDEV COMMISSION AND FIVE DECADES OF U.S.-RUSSIA DIALOGUE. Matthew Rojansky. Carnegie Report, November 2010 .....	10
ARMENIA AND TURKEY: BRIDGING THE GAP. Thomas de Waal. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy Brief, October 2010 .....	11

IRAQ: MOVEMENT WITHOUT PROGRESS. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Marina Ottaway and Danial Kaysi. October 18, 2010. ....	11
IRAN: A VIEW FROM MOSCOW. Dmitri Trenin, Alexey Malashenko. Carnegie Report, October 2010 .....	11
TOWARD REALISTIC U.S.–INDIA RELATIONS. George Perkovich. Carnegie Report, October 2010 .....	11
CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS . . . . .	11
NAVIGATING POLITICAL CURRENTS TO ACHIEVE MIDDLE EAST PEACE. Center for American Progress. David A. Halperin and Matthew Duss. September 24, 2010.....	11
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY & COOPERATION.....	12
THE ETHICS OF VIOLENCE IN WAR. Richard Rhodes. Center for International Security & Cooperation. Lecture prepared for delivery in the Stanford University Ethics and War Series, Stanford University, November 11, 2010 .	12
CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY.....	12
NATURAL ALLIES: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE FUTURE OF U.S.-INDIA RELATIONS. Richard L. Armitage, R. Nicholas Burns, Richard Fontaine. CNAS Report, 10/18/2010 .....	12
COUNTERINSURGENCY AND THE FUTURE OF NATO. John A. Nagl, Richard Weitz. Working Paper, CNAS, 10/01/2010 .....	12
CRIME WARS: GANGS, CARTELS AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY. Colonel Robert Killebrew (Ret.), Jennifer Bernal. Report. CNAS, 09/28/2010 .....	12
AN INDISPENSABLE FORCE: INVESTING IN AMERICA’S NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES. John A. Nagl, Travis Sharp. CNAS Report, 09/21/2010 .....	13
CENTER FOR ARMS CONTROL AND NON–PROLIFERATION.....	13
KEY U.S. MILITARY LEADERS AND INFLUENTIAL MODERATES AND REPUBLICANS STRONGLY SUPPORT NEW START. John Isaacs. Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.....	13
THE MACROECONOMICS OF U.S. DEFENSE SPENDING: PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL SPENDING, AND THEIR IMPACT ON NATIONAL SECURITY. Center for Strategic & International Studies. Anthony H. Cordesman et al. November 9, 2010. ....	13
WIDER EUROPE, Fall 2010. Center for Strategic & International Studies. “UNINTENDED STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES”-Featured article by Janusz Bugajski .....	13
EUROPEAN DEFENSE TRENDS. Report By Guy Ben-Ari, David J. Berteau, Joachim Hofbauer. Center for Strategic & International Studies, Nov 4, 2010 .....	14
GEORGIAN LESSONS--CONFLICTING RUSSIAN AND WESTERN INTERESTS IN THE WIDER EUROPE. Janusz Bugajski. Center for Strategic & International Studies, Nov 1, 2010 .....	14
THE U.S. AIR WAR IN IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, AND PAKISTAN. Center for Strategic & International Studies. Anthony H. Cordesman and Marissa Allison. October 4, 2010. ....	14
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS . . . . .	14
NORTH KOREA TESTS U.S. 'STRATEGIC PATIENCE. Scott A. Snyder. CFR, November 22, 2010 .....	14
VENEZUELA’S TROUBLING NUCLEAR TIES. Council on Foreign Relations. Joel D. Hirst and Jonathan Pearl. October 28, 2010. ....	14
CAN NATO NUDGE RUSSIA WESTWARD? Council on Foreign Relations. Charles A. Kupchan. October 20, 2010. ....	15
THE MIDEAST MORATORIUM MESS. Council on Foreign Relations. Michelle Dunne. October 13, 2010. ....	15
PAKISTAN’S NEW GENERATION OF TERRORISTS. Council on Foreign Relations. Jayshree Bajoria. October 7, 2010. ....	15
U.S. STRATEGY FOR PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN. Independent Task Force Report No. 65. Richard L. Armitage, Samuel R. Berger, Daniel S. Markey. Council on foreign Relations, 2010.....	15
DELOITTE. . . . .	16
DEFENSE: NEW REALITIES, INNOVATIVE RESPONSE. Deloitte. October 4, 2010.....	16
HERITAGE FOUNDATION. . . . .	16
NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE EMP ATTACKS—WHAT THE U.S. MUST DO NOW. James Carafano, Ph.D. and Richard Weitz, Ph.D. Backgrounder #2491. Heritage Foundation, November 17, 2010. ....	16
NEW START: CRITICAL LIMITS ON U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE OPTIONS PERSIST. Baker Spring WebMemo #3056. Heritage Foundation, November 10, 2010 .....	16
THE 21 <sup>st</sup> –CENTURY MILITIA: STATE DEFENSE FORCES AND HOMELAND SECURITY. The Heritage Foundation. James Jay Carafano and Jessica Zuckerman. October 8, 2010. ....	16
NEW TECHNOLOGIES, FUTURE WEAPONS: GENE SEQUENCING AND SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY. The Heritage Foundation. Ethel Machi and Jena Baker McNeill. August 24, 2010. ....	17
INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, INC. (IFPA) . . . . .	17
38TH IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE ON NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND POLICY: AIR, SPACE, AND CYBERSPACE POWER IN THE 21ST-CENTURY. Conference report, September 2010 .....	17

INSTITUTE FOR HOMELAND SECURITY SOLUTIONS . . . . .	17
BUILDING ON CLUES: EXAMINING SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN DETECTING U.S. TERRORIST PLOTS, 1999-2009. Kevin Strom, John Hollywood et al. Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, October 2010.....	17
INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR. . . . .	18
IRAQ'S LESSONS FOR TRANSITION IN AFGHANISTAN. LTG James M. Dubik (U.S. Army, Ret.), Marisa Cochrane Sullivan. Institute for the Study of War, November 15, 2010.....	18
VIDEO- POLICE TRAINING IN AN AGE OF GLOBAL TERROR, featuring LTG Jim Dubik (ret.) and Dr. Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution. Institute for the Study of War, October 22, 2010.....	18
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (ICG) . . . . .	18
STALEMATE IN SOUTHERN THAILAND. International Crisis Group. November 3, 2010.....	18
LOOSE ENDS: IRAQ'S SECURITY FORCES BETWEEN U.S. DRAWDOWN AND WITHDRAWAL. International Crisis Group. October 26, 2010. ....	18
NEW CRISIS, OLD DEMONS IN LEBANON: THE FORGOTTEN LESSONS OF BAB-TEBBANEH/JABAL MOHSEN. International Crisis Group. October 14, 2010. ....	19
COLOMBIA: PRESIDENT SANTOS'S CONFLICT RESOLUTION OPPORTUNITY. International Crisis Group. October 13, 2010. ....	19
FEDERATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA – A PARALLEL CRISIS. International Crisis Group. September 28, 2010. .	19
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT. . . . .	19
ENVIRONMENT, CONFLICT AND PEACEBUILDING AT IISD: ADDRESSING THE LINKS AMONG ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE, NATURAL RESOURCES AND SECURITY. International Institute for Sustainable Development. October 2010. ....	19
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH . . . . .	19
MARITIME SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: U.S., JAPANESE, REGIONAL, AND INDUSTRY STRATEGIES. National Bureau of Asian Research. John Bradford et al. November 2010.....	19
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH . . . . .	20
CAN MILITANTS USE VIOLENCE TO WIN PUBLIC SUPPORT? EVIDENCE FROM THE SECOND INTIFADA. National Bureau of Economic Research. David A. Jaeger et al. October 2010.....	20
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND THE QUALITY OF SUICIDE TERRORISM. National Bureau of Economic Research. Efraim Benmelech et al. August 30, 2010. ....	20
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY (NDU) . . . . .	20
JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY (JFQ) Issue 59, NDU, October 2010 . . . . .	20
PRISM 2, no. 1. NDU, December 2010.....	20
THE 71F ADVANTAGE: APPLYING ARMY RESEARCH PSYCHOLOGY FOR HEALTH AND PERFORMANCE GAINS. Eds Paul T. Bartone et al. NDU, September 2010.....	21
ENHANCING CIVILIAN PROTECTION IN PEACE OPERATIONS: INSIGHTS FROM AFRICA. A Research Paper FROM the Africa Center for Strategic Studies by Paul D. Williams. NDU, September 2010.....	21
PRIVATE CONTRACTORS IN CONFLICT ZONES: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE STRATEGIC IMPACT. T.X. Hammes. Strategic Forum. NDU, October 2010 . . . . .	21
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL . . . . .	21
BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES. National Research Council. September 24, 2010.....	21
NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE (NTI) . . . . .	22
NATO AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS: IS A NEW CONSENSUS POSSIBLE? Steven Andreasen, Malcolm Chalmers, and Isabelle Williams. NTI. October 2010.....	22
RAND. . . . .	22
RISKING NATO--TESTING THE LIMITS OF THE ALLIANCE IN AFGHANISTAN. Andrew R. Hoehn, Sarah Harting. RAND, November 2010 . . . . .	22
OBSERVATIONS ON RECENT TRENDS IN ARMORED FORCES. David E. Johnson, John Gordon, IV. RAND, 2010 . . . . .	22
LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT'S POST-9/11 FOCUS ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY. RAND Corporation. Lois M. Davis et al. October 28, 2010. ....	23
QUICK IMPACT, SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENTS, GUIDING VISION: THREE PROPOSED INITIATIVES FOR IMPROVING MOBILITY, QUALITY OF LIFE, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE WEST BANK. RAND Corporation. August 31, 2010. ....	23
SMALL ARMS SURVEY . . . . .	23
TIMOR-LESTE ARMED VIOLENCE ASSESSMENT-- FINAL REPORT. Ed. Robert Muggah and Emile LeBrun, October 2010. Small Arms Survey Special Report No. 12.....	23
STANLEY FOUNDATION. . . . .	23

GLOBAL LOCKDOWN: MOVING THE NEEDLE ON NUCLEAR SECURITY. Elizabeth Turpen. Policy Analysis Brief. Stanley Foundation, October 2010 .....	23
CREATING A 21ST-CENTURY NUCLEAR MATERIAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE. Kenneth N. Luongo. Policy Analysis Brief. Stanley Foundation, October 2010 .....	24
BEYOND BOUNDARIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST: LEVERAGING NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE TO ADDRESS SECURITY/DEVELOPMENT NEEDS WITH RESOLUTION 1540. Conference Report. Stanley Foundation, September 2010 .....	24
STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SIPRI) .....	24
INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT, 2005–2009. Siemon T. Wezeman. SIPRI Fact Sheet. November 2010 .....	24
THE LIMITATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION REPORTS ON ARMS EXPORTS: THE CASE OF CENTRAL ASIA. Paul Holtom and Mark Bromley. SIPRI <i>Insights on Peace and Security</i> no. 2010/5 .....	24
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE. U. S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE. ....	25
DECIDING TO BUY: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND MAJOR WEAPONS PROGRAMS. Quentin E. Hodgson. Strategic Studies Institute, November 10, 2010 .....	25
AMERICA’S MOST COMMITTED MUSLIM ALLY. Strategic Studies Institute. W. Andrew Terrill. November 2010. ....	25
SOME OF THE BEST WEAPONS FOR COUNTERINSURGENTS DO NOT SHOOT. Eric T. Olson. Strategic Studies Institute, October 26, 2010.....	25
OPERATION EUFOR TCHAD/RCA AND THE EU’S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY. Authored by Mr. Bjoern H. Seibert. Strategic Studies Institute, October 15, 2010.....	26
HARNESSING POST-CONFLICT "TRANSITIONS": A CONCEPTUAL PRIMER. Nicholas J. Armstrong, Ms. Jacqueline Chura-Beaver. Strategic Studies Institute, October 04, 2010 .....	26
PREPARING FOR ONE WAR AND GETTING ANOTHER? Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria, II. Strategic Studies Institute, September 23, 2010 .....	26
AN ARMY TRANSFORMED: THE U.S. ARMY’S POST-VIETNAM RECOVERY AND THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS. Suzanne C. Nielsen. Strategic Studies Institute, September 10, 2010.....	26
SOMALIA: LINE IN THE SAND—IDENTIFICAITON OF MYM VULNERABILITIES. Strategic Studies Institute. Eloy E. Cuevas and Madeleine Wells. September 9, 2010. ....	26
UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE. ....	27
KOSOVO: THE NEXT STEPS. U.S. Institute of Peace. Daniel Serwer. November 2010. ....	27
CIVIC EDUCATION AND PEACEBUILDING: EXAMPLES FROM IRAQ AND SUDAN. U.S. Institute of Peace. Daniel H. Levine and Linda S. Bishai. October 2010. ....	27
DANGEROUS LIAISONS WITH THE AFGHAN TALIBAN. U.S. Institute of Peace. Matt Waldman. October 2010.....	27
CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM FOR PEACE IN COLOMBIA. U.S. Institute of Peace. Virginia M. Bouvier. September 2010. ....	27
THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR-EAST POLICY. ....	28
POTENTIAL IRANIAN RESPONSES TO NATO’S MISSILE DEFENSE SHIELD. By Michael Eisenstadt. <i>PolicyWatch</i> #1722. The Washington Institute for Near-East Policy, November 19, 2010 .....	28
IF WAR COMES: ISRAEL VS. HIZBALLAH AND ITS ALLIES. Jeffrey White. <i>Policy Focus</i> #106. The Washington Institute for Near-East Policy, September 2010 .....	28
THE RED LINE: HOW TO ASSESS PROGRESS IN U.S. IRAN POLICY. Patrick Clawson. The Washington Institute for Near-East Policy, September 2010 .....	28
YALE GLOBAL. ....	29
WHY DO TERRORISTS BLOW THEMSELVES UP? YaleGlobal. Riaz Hassan. September 9, 2010.....	29

## GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS



**PIPELINE SECURITY: TSA HAS TAKEN ACTIONS TO HELP STRENGTHEN SECURITY, BUT COULD IMPROVE PRIORITY-SETTING AND ASSESSMENT PROCESSES. U.S. Government Accountability Office. Web posted September 1, 2010.**

The United States depends on a vast network of pipelines to transport energy. GAO was asked to review the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) efforts to help ensure pipeline security. This report addresses the extent to which TSA's Pipeline Security Division (PSD) has (1) assessed risk and prioritized efforts to help strengthen pipeline security, (2) implemented agency guidance and requirements of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act) regarding pipeline security, and (3) measured its performance in strengthening pipeline security.  
<http://bit.ly/dygzUq> [PDF format, 77 pages].

## CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS (HEARINGS, REPORTS, ETC.)



**INTELLIGENCE ISSUES FOR CONGRESS. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Richard A. Best Jr. October 14, 2010.**

To address the challenges facing the U.S. intelligence community in the 21st century, congressional and executive branch initiatives have sought to improve coordination among the different agencies and to encourage better analysis. In December 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458) was signed, providing for a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with substantial authorities to manage the national intelligence effort. The legislation also established a separate Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.  
<http://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=131679&coll=limited> [PDF format, 29 pages].

**HEZBOLLAH: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Casey L. Addis and Christopher M. Blanchard. October 8, 2010.**

Lebanon's Hezbollah is a Shiite Islamist militia, political party, social welfare organization, and U.S. State Department-designated terrorist organization. Its armed element receives support from Iran and Syria and possesses significant paramilitary and unconventional warfare capabilities. In the wake of the summer 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah and an armed domestic confrontation between Hezbollah and rival Lebanese groups in May 2008, Lebanon's political process is now intensely focused on Hezbollah's future role in the country. Lebanese factions are working to define Hezbollah's role through a series of "National Dialogue" discussions.

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R41446.pdf>

**PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS: PROLIFERATION AND SECURITY ISSUES. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin. October 7, 2010.**

Pakistan's nuclear arsenal consists of approximately 60 nuclear warheads, although it could be larger. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional delivery vehicles. These steps will enable Pakistan to undertake both quantitative and qualitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal. Whether and to what extent

Pakistan's current expansion of its nuclear weapons-related facilities is a response to the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement is unclear. Islamabad does not have a public, detailed nuclear doctrine, but its "minimum credible deterrent" is widely regarded as primarily a deterrent to Indian military action.

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf>

**DEFENSE SURPLUS EQUIPMENT DISPOSAL: BACKGROUND INFORMATION.**  
**Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Valerie Bailey Grasso. October 6, 2010.**

The Department of Defense (DOD) through the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) component called DLA Disposition Services has a policy for disposing of government equipment and supplies considered surplus or deemed unnecessary, or excess, to the agency's currently designated mission. DLA Disposition Services is responsible for property reuse, precious metal recovery, recycling, hazardous property disposal, and the demilitarization of military equipment. The effort to dispose of surplus military equipment dates back to the end of World War II when the Federal government sought to reduce a massive inventory of surplus military equipment by making such equipment available to civilians.

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS20549.pdf> [PDF format, 6 pages].

**AMERICAN JIHADIST TERRORISM: COMBATING A COMPLEX THREAT.**  
**Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Jerome P. Bjelopera and Mark A. Randol. September 20, 2010.**

Between May 2009 and August 2010, arrests were made for 19 "homegrown," jihadist-inspired terrorist plots by American citizens or legal permanent residents of the United States. Two of these resulted in attacks and produced 14 deaths. By comparison, in more than seven years from the September 11, 2001, terrorist strikes (9/11) through May 2009, there were 21 such plots. Two resulted in attacks, and no more than six plots occurred in a single year (2006). The apparent spike in such activity after May 2009 suggests that at least some Americans, even if a tiny minority, continue to be susceptible to ideologies supporting a violent form of jihad. The report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred since 9/11.

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf>

**CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS TO DEVELOPING NATIONS, 2002-2009.**  
**Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Richard F. Grimmett. September 10, 2010.**

This report is prepared annually to provide Congress with official, unclassified, quantitative data on conventional arms transfers to developing nations by the United States and foreign countries for the preceding eight calendar years for use in its policy oversight functions. All agreement and delivery data in this report for the United States are government-to-government Foreign Military Sales (FMS) transactions. Similar data are provided on worldwide conventional arms transfers by all suppliers, but the principal focus is the level of arms transfers by major weapons suppliers to nations in the developing world. Developing nations continue to be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity by weapons suppliers. During the years 2002-2009, the value of arms transfer agreements with developing nations comprised 68.3% of all such agreements worldwide. More recently, arms transfer agreements with developing nations constituted 72.8% of all such agreements globally from 2006-2009, and 78.4% of these agreements in 2009.

<http://bit.ly/9WRdG8> [PDF format, 89 pages].

## THE U.S. AND NATO

**LISBON SUMMIT DECLARATION, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon, November 20, 2010**  
[http://www.nato.int/nato\\_static/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2010\\_11/2010\\_11\\_11DE1DB9B73C4F9BBFB52B2C94722EAC\\_PR\\_CP\\_2010\\_0155\\_ENG-Summit\\_LISBON.pdf](http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2010_11/2010_11_11DE1DB9B73C4F9BBFB52B2C94722EAC_PR_CP_2010_0155_ENG-Summit_LISBON.pdf)

**ACTIVE ENGAGEMENT, MODERN DEFENCE--STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFENCE AND SECURITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION, Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, November 19, 2010.**  
<http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf>

## THINK TANK PUBLICATIONS

### AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE



**DETER AND ASSURE: CHARTING A COURSE FOR AMERICA'S ASIAN ALLIANCES IN A NEW NUCLEAR AGE. Tim Sullivan. CDS Working Paper, AEI November 16, 2010**

As home to a number of the world's most dynamic economies, two rising powers, and six nuclear states, Asia is a region of enormous strategic importance to the United States. For over six decades, America has functioned as the preeminent power in Asia, playing a vital role in providing security and ensuring a stable balance of power that has allowed the region's states to flourish politically and economically. The U.S.

security framework in the region has rested historically upon a series of bilateral alliances and strategic partnerships. The arrangement has impressively stood the test of time despite concerns that the lack of an overarching, multilateral security architecture would lead to inefficiencies in the United States' pursuit of regional stability.

<http://www.aei.org/docLib/CDS%20Working%20Paper%20-%20Deter%20and%20Assure.pdf>



**IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN; REFUGEES AS POLITICAL INSTRUMENTS. Ahmad K. Majidiyar, Ali Alfoneh. AEI Outlook Series, AEI Online, November 2010**


As the United States and its allies target the Taliban in Afghanistan, Iran is using the forced return of Afghan refugees to leverage its influence in Afghanistan at the expense of U.S. interests. Waves of refugees cause humanitarian crises and are used to shield the movement of foreign terrorists into Afghanistan. This Outlook examines how the Iranian government systematically uses forced repatriation of Afghans living in

Iran both to undermine U.S.-led efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and to extract concessions from the Afghan government.

<http://www.aei.org/outlook/101003>

**DEFENDING DEFENSE SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON U.S. MILITARY SPENDING REQUIREMENTS. AEI Online, October 14, 2010**


Since the end of the Cold War, administrations of both political parties have underfunded the military, first harvesting a "peace dividend" by reducing the size of the force and then repeatedly postponing investments needed to replace worn out equipment and preserve the technological advantages that have been a



traditional source of American strength. Now, just as this strain on the military--engaged in today's persistent irregular wars, yet unable to prepare fully for the wars of the future--reaches a point of crisis, come new calls to cut the Defense Department's budget, amplified by the fears of a faltering economy, the federal government's desire to boost spending elsewhere, and its inability to rein in other spending. Yet the arguments frequently made for Pentagon spending cuts are concocted from a mix of faulty analysis and out-of-context "facts."

<http://www.aei.org/docLib/Defending-Defense-Final-10-13-2010.pdf>

## ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION



### **ARMS CONTROL TODAY, November 2010**

#### **Features**

NPT 2010: The Beginning of a New Constructive Cycle

Sameh Aboul-Enein

Abolishing Chemical Weapons: Progress, Challenges, and Opportunities

Paul F. Walker

Can Washington and Seoul Try Dealing With Pyongyang for a Change?

Leon V. Sigal

<http://www.armscontrol.org/epublish/1/v40n9>

### **ARMS CONTROL TODAY, October 2010**

#### **Features**

A Nuclear Posture Review for NATO, by Oliver Meier and Paul Ingram

Beyond Missile Defense: Alternative Means to Address Iran's Ballistic

Missile Threat, by Miles A. Pomper and Cole J. Harvey

Israel and Multilateral Nuclear Approaches in the Middle East, by

Thomas Lorenz and Joanna Kidd

<http://www.armscontrol.org/epublish/1/v40n8>



## THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES (ACUS)



### **NATO AND TERRITORIAL MISSILE DEFENSE: A "NO BRAINER" OR MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS? Simon Lunn. ACUS, November 2010**

The decision to develop a NATO TMD capability has a compelling logic.

Ballistic missiles pose a known and growing threat as they are acquired by more and more countries. At the same time advances in technology are making defense against them more feasible. Why not take advantage of U.S. plans to deploy this technology through the PAA as part of its missile defenses;

harness these plans to NATO's more limited goal of protecting military forces,

and in so doing create a defense system for Europe? The initiative would create – in the words of NATO Secretary General Rasmussen – “a common security roof,” ideally including Russia, at what he believes would be a bearable cost for Alliance members.

[http://www.acus.org/files/publication\\_pdfs/403/ACUS\\_Lunn\\_NATOTerritorialMD\\_Nov2010.pdf](http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/403/ACUS_Lunn_NATOTerritorialMD_Nov2010.pdf)

### **THE NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT: A SAG STRAWMAN. Atlantic Council. Julian Lindley-French et al. September 29, 2010.**

Julian Lindley-French and Yves Boyer have led a Strategic Advisors Group project called STRATCON 2010 to provide provocative ideas and fresh thinking concerning the NATO Strategic Concept.

<http://bit.ly/aGVtU8> [PDF format, 7 pages].

## BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER



### **ASSESSING THE TERRORIST THREAT. Bipartisan Policy Center. Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman. September 10, 2010.**

The report details how the terrorist threat has evolved since the attacks in 2001, including the development of homegrown networks and the increasingly diverse and decentralized nature of terrorism.  
<http://bit.ly/aHOvgA> [PDF format, 44 pages].

## BROOKINGS INSTITUTION


### **NEW START SHOULDN'T BE STOPPED. Michael E. O'Hanlon. Brookings Institution, November 18, 2010**

Ratification would be a modest step forward for arms control. Even more important, it would be a significant step forward for the U.S.-Russia relationship — which is working substantially better now than in years past. In addition, the pact does not prejudge the prospects for moving toward the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, sought by Presidents Ronald Reagan and Barack Obama and so many others. So skeptics of that idea need not worry about this treaty.  
[http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/1118\\_new\\_start\\_ohanlon.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/1118_new_start_ohanlon.aspx)

### **NEXT STEPS ON U.S.-RUSSIAN NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS AND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION. Brookings Institution. October 12, 2010.**

Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov described steps that Washington and Moscow could take to build on the substantial progress the two countries made on arms control and nuclear non-proliferation in the first half of 2010. Their ideas stem from a June meeting, in which Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) Director Alexander Dynkin and Brookings President Strobe Talbott also participated. In exchanges over the summer, they developed a joint paper with recommendations in four areas: steps to prepare for future negotiations on nuclear arms reductions after New START; principles for cooperation on missile defense; ideas for following up on the April nuclear security summit to secure all fissile material globally; and actions to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime.  
[http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/papers/2010/10\\_nonproliferation\\_albright\\_talbott/10\\_nonproliferation\\_albright\\_talbott.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/papers/2010/10_nonproliferation_albright_talbott/10_nonproliferation_albright_talbott.pdf)

## CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE



### **INDISPENSABLE INSTITUTIONS: THE OBAMA-MEDVEDEV COMMISSION AND FIVE DECADES OF U.S.-RUSSIA DIALOGUE. Matthew Rojansky. Carnegie Report, November 2010**

Having fallen to a historic low after the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, U.S.-Russia cooperation is again on the rise, thanks to last year's "reset" of the relationship. The U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission, launched at the July 2009 Moscow summit, aims to enhance cooperation between the two countries on a broad range of shared interests. Although the Commission appears promising so far, significant challenges lie ahead and the two sides must work closely to monitor both the structure and the substance of this new institution to ensure it continues to produce results.  
<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=41869>



### **ARMENIA AND TURKEY: BRIDGING THE GAP. Thomas de Waal. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy Brief, October 2010**


One year ago, Armenia and Turkey began a historic rapprochement and signed two protocols on normalizing their relations. Unfortunately, the process stalled in April. In an updated policy brief, Thomas de Waal argues that the protocols—the most positive initiative in the South Caucasus for many years—must be kept alive as the process still has the potential to transform the region.

[http://carnegieendowment.org/files/armenia\\_turkey.pdf](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/armenia_turkey.pdf)

### **IRAQ: MOVEMENT WITHOUT PROGRESS. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Marina Ottaway and Danial Kaysi. October 18, 2010.**

Moqtada al-Sadr's decision to support Nouri al-Maliki's quest for a second term as Iraqi prime minister has given new impetus to negotiations over the formation of a new government but it has not solved any of the underlying obstacles preventing the creation of a politically viable government.

<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=41743>



### **IRAN: A VIEW FROM MOSCOW. Dmitri Trenin, Alexey Malashenko. Carnegie Report, October 2010**

Although Iran and Russia have substantial economic and military ties, Moscow is increasingly wary of Tehran's growing ambitions. In a new report, Dmitri Trenin and Alexey Malashenko offer a view from Moscow and detail how Iran's desire to develop nuclear weapons and long-range missiles—while refusing to compromise with the international community—threaten Russia.

[http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/iran\\_view\\_moscow.pdf](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/iran_view_moscow.pdf)



### **TOWARD REALISTIC U.S.-INDIA RELATIONS. George Perkovich. Carnegie Report, October 2010**

As President Obama prepares to visit India next month, he faces criticism that his administration has done too little to enhance U.S.-India relations. George Perkovich argues that expectations for a partnership between the two countries in the near term are unrealistically high and overlook how their interests, policies, and diplomatic style will often diverge. U.S. policy cannot do much to help India's rise, but it can inflict major damage on global problem-solving efforts if it defers too readily to the narrow, often

mercantile demands of the current relationship.

[http://carnegieendowment.org/files/realistic\\_us\\_india\\_relations.pdf](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/realistic_us_india_relations.pdf)

## **CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS**



### **NAVIGATING POLITICAL CURRENTS TO ACHIEVE MIDDLE EAST PEACE. Center for American Progress. David A. Halperin and Matthew Duss. September 24, 2010.**

Matthew Duss explain why the renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations will require sustained and determined U.S. involvement from the onset.

<http://bit.ly/dfBKyK> [PDF format, 22 pages].

## CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY & COOPERATION

### **THE ETHICS OF VIOLENCE IN WAR. Richard Rhodes. Center for International Security & Cooperation. Lecture prepared for delivery in the Stanford University Ethics and War Series, Stanford University, November 11, 2010**

What can possibly explain the transformation that sometimes happens from non-violent civilian to combatant to criminal? Pulitzer Prize winning author and CISAC affiliate Richard Rhodes tackled this bedeviling question head-on in a recent lecture for Stanford's Ethics & War series, co-sponsored by the Center for International Security and Cooperation.

[http://cisac.stanford.edu/publications/the\\_ethics\\_of\\_violence\\_in\\_war/](http://cisac.stanford.edu/publications/the_ethics_of_violence_in_war/)

## CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY



### **NATURAL ALLIES: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE FUTURE OF U.S.-INDIA RELATIONS. Richard L. Armitage, R. Nicholas Burns, Richard Fontaine. CNAS Report, 10/18/2010**

The economic, political, and military rise of India is reshaping world politics and promises to make India both a true global power and one of the most important bilateral partners of the United States. This report, authored by former Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns and CNAS Senior Fellow Richard Fontaine – and endorsed by over 20

esteemed foreign policy experts - provides a blueprint for the path forward for this critical relationship.

<http://www.cnas.org/node/5111>

### **COUNTERINSURGENCY AND THE FUTURE OF NATO. John A. Nagl, Richard Weitz. Working Paper, CNAS, 10/01/2010**

In this first working paper produced by The Transatlantic Paper Series, CNAS President John Nagl and Non-Resident Senior Fellow Richard Weitz evaluate how NATO can best implement counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.

<http://www.cnas.org/node/5337>



### **CRIME WARS: GANGS, CARTELS AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY. Colonel Robert Killebrew (Ret.), Jennifer Bernal. Report. CNAS, 09/28/2010**

As illustrated by the unprecedented violence in Mexico, drug trafficking groups have evolved to not only pose significant challenges to that country, but to governments and societies across the Western Hemisphere, including the United States. Crime Wars: Gangs, Cartels and U.S. National Security surveys organized crime throughout the Western Hemisphere, analyzes the challenges it poses for the region and recommends the United

States replace the "war on drugs" paradigm with comprehensive domestic and foreign policies to confront the interrelated challenges of drug trafficking and violence ranging from the Andean Ridge to American streets.

<http://www.cnas.org/node/5022>



**AN INDISPENSABLE FORCE: INVESTING IN AMERICA'S NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES. John A. Nagl, Travis Sharp. CNAS Report, 09/21/2010**

Since the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, the National Guard and Reserves – which comprise nearly half of total U.S. military manpower – have served repeatedly in Iraq and Afghanistan while simultaneously protecting the homeland against threats ranging from natural disasters to terrorism. Yet America's need for operational service by its cost-effective Guard and Reserves will last beyond the current conflicts. The authors argue that

although policymakers have taken great strides in recent years to support the Guard and Reserves, the U.S. government still is not investing sufficiently in the policies, laws, and budgets required for the Guard and Reserves to fulfill their current and future role in U.S. national security. They recommend that the Pentagon take advantage of this opportune moment, when the wartime experience of the Guard and Reserves make them more capable than ever before, to make further improvements in roles and missions, readiness, cost, education and the “continuum of service” concept of flexible 21st century personnel management.

<http://www.cnas.org/node/4997>

## CENTER FOR ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION

**KEY U.S. MILITARY LEADERS AND INFLUENTIAL MODERATES AND REPUBLICANS STRONGLY SUPPORT NEW START. John Isaacs. Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation**

[http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearweapons/articles/031009\\_conservatives\\_for\\_nuclear\\_weapons\\_cuts/](http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearweapons/articles/031009_conservatives_for_nuclear_weapons_cuts/)

## CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS)



**THE MACROECONOMICS OF U.S. DEFENSE SPENDING: PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL SPENDING, AND THEIR IMPACT ON NATIONAL SECURITY. Center for Strategic & International Studies. Anthony H. Cordesman et al. November 9, 2010.**

The U.S. faces growing pressures on its defense spending. The U.S. is still dealing with two ongoing wars and has a very different role in global power projection than its allies. So far, it has not made realistic efforts to project the cost of these wars in its defense budget, and the Afghan war is almost certain to put major new pressure on the defense budget in FY2012 and beyond.

[http://csis.org/files/publication/101108\\_FY11\\_macro\\_defense.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/101108_FY11_macro_defense.pdf) {PDF format, 63 pages}.



**WIDER EUROPE, Fall 2010. Center for Strategic & International Studies. “UNINTENDED STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES”-Featured article by Janusz Bugajski**

The conventional wisdom that improved U.S.-Russia relations are automatically advantageous for all European and post-Soviet states needs to be scrutinized. Closer ties between Washington and Moscow may encourage some European and Eurasian capitals to seek less confrontational relations with Russia and to develop their bilateral agendas, but this largely depends on Moscow's approach. Indeed, two potential negatives may result from the current U.S.-Russia détente. First, it may generate

profound anxieties that Washington has abandoned East European, South Caucasian, and Central Asian national interests in order to obtain Moscow's cooperation in combating pressing security threats. This could either worsen relations with Russia as fears of domination increase or it could encourage greater official acquiescence to Moscow because of the absence of sufficient Western protection or leverage. The latter scenario can also polarize and radicalize domestic politics. And second, Moscow itself will feel emboldened by a perception that Washington is willing to disregard the security interests of East European and Central Asian states in order to ensure cooperation with Russia.


<http://csis.org/publication/wider-europe-fall-2010>



**EUROPEAN DEFENSE TRENDS. Report By Guy Ben-Ari, David J. Berteau, Joachim Hofbauer. Center for Strategic & International Studies, Nov 4, 2010**

The international security challenges facing European governments are more complex than ever. In parallel, the economic recession has forced governments to make difficult choices in their defense budgets that will greatly affect their near- and long-term military capabilities.

<http://csis.org/publication/european-defense-trends>



**GEORGIAN LESSONS--CONFLICTING RUSSIAN AND WESTERN INTERESTS IN THE WIDER EUROPE. Janusz Bugajski. Center for Strategic & International Studies, Nov 1, 2010**

Russia's invasion, occupation, and partition of Georgia in August 2008 initially sent shock waves throughout Europe and NATO and appeared to signal a new confrontational phase in Moscow's relations with the West. This volume places the conflict in the context of Russia's broader objectives, its internal weaknesses, the limitations of EU and NATO policies, and America's security priorities.

<http://csis.org/publication/georgian-lessons>

**THE U.S. AIR WAR IN IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, AND PAKISTAN. Center for Strategic & International Studies. Anthony H. Cordesman and Marissa Allison. October 4, 2010.**

The U.S. is fighting an air war in Pakistan at least four different levels, according to the report. It is using unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) to support U.S. forces in "hot pursuit" in the border area. It is using them to attack Taliban and other insurgent forces near the border to limit their capability to operate in Afghanistan.

[http://csis.org/files/publication/100610\\_AfPakAir.War.Stats.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/100610_AfPakAir.War.Stats.pdf) [PDF format, 15 pages].

## COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

**NORTH KOREA TESTS U.S. 'STRATEGIC PATIENCE. Scott A. Snyder. CFR, November 22, 2010**

Revelations regarding North Korea's enriched uranium program pose a direct challenge to the Obama administration's policy on a number of fronts.

[http://www.cfr.org/publication/23479/north\\_korea\\_tests\\_us\\_strategic\\_patience.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/23479/north_korea_tests_us_strategic_patience.html)

**VENEZUELA'S TROUBLING NUCLEAR TIES. Council on Foreign Relations. Joel D. Hirst and Jonathan Pearl. October 28, 2010.**

Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez returned to Caracas after completing a whirlwind tour of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Iran, Syria, Libya, and Portugal. Chavez's goal was to advance

agreements "to accelerate the fall of imperialist hegemony and the birth of the new world of equilibrium and peace," as he stated in Damascus. While the rhetoric is familiar, the initiatives pursued on this trip could pose major challenges to the Obama administration. Washington must develop sensible policy options, particularly when it comes to Venezuela's cooperation with Iran and Chavez' own nuclear ambitions, say the authors.

[http://www.cfr.org/publication/23267/venezuelas\\_troubling\\_nuclear\\_ties.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/23267/venezuelas_troubling_nuclear_ties.html) [HTML format, various paging].

**CAN NATO NUDGE RUSSIA WESTWARD? Council on Foreign Relations. Charles A. Kupchan. October 20, 2010.**

The French-Russian-German summit in Deauville this week sought to bring Russia closer to the West. Russia accepted an invitation to next month's NATO summit, but CFR's Charles Kupchan says Moscow questions the sincerity of Euro-Atlantic overtures.

[http://www.cfr.org/publication/23191/can\\_nato\\_nudge\\_russia\\_westward.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/23191/can_nato_nudge_russia_westward.html) [HTML format, various paging].

**THE MIDEAST MORATORIUM MESS. Council on Foreign Relations. Michelle Dunne. October 13, 2010.**


Direct peace talks between Israel and Palestinians were halted in early October after the expiration of the ten-month moratorium on settlement construction. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has so far not accepted Obama administration incentives to extend the moratorium for two months. The administration is now scrambling to avoid the collapse of the peace talks, and struggling with a dilemma it helped create by launching a peace process "without having a solution wired for the expiration of the settlement moratorium," says the author. Dunne believes Netanyahu is looking for a way to renew the moratorium, but his recent offer a two-month settlement freeze if Palestinians recognize Israel as a Jewish state is "less a serious proposal than an attempt to show that the Palestinians are the intransigent party."

[http://www.cfr.org/publication/23143/mideast\\_moratorium\\_mess.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/23143/mideast_moratorium_mess.html) [HTML format].

**PAKISTAN'S NEW GENERATION OF TERRORISTS. Council on Foreign Relations. Jayshree Bajoria. October 7, 2010.**

Pakistan has emerged as a terrorist sanctuary for some of the world's most violent groups, including al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and homegrown militants, that threaten the stability of Pakistan as well as the region.

[http://www.cfr.org/publication/15422/pakistans\\_new\\_generation\\_of\\_terrorists.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/15422/pakistans_new_generation_of_terrorists.html)



**U.S. STRATEGY FOR PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN. Independent Task Force Report No. 65. Richard L. Armitage, Samuel R. Berger, Daniel S. Markey. Council on Foreign Relations, 2010**

This report, issued by the Council on Foreign Relations, discusses the United States' current approach to facing challenges in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although the likelihood of success in Afghanistan is unclear, as long as terrorist groups like al-Qaeda function freely in Afghanistan and Pakistan the safety of American citizens across the world will be threatened. The report provides recommendations for actions in

Afghanistan and Pakistan. "According to the report, For now, the United States should assume the lead, with the goal of encouraging and enabling its Pakistani and Afghan partners to build a more secure future. Yet even the United States cannot afford to continue down this costly path unless the potential for enduring progress remains in sight. After nine years of U.S. war in the region, time and patience are understandably short."

[http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Pakistan\\_Afghanistan\\_TFR65.pdf](http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Pakistan_Afghanistan_TFR65.pdf)

## DELOITTE



### **DEFENSE: NEW REALITIES, INNOVATIVE RESPONSE. Deloitte. October 4, 2010.**

The report identifies five key areas for significant growth in the Aerospace and Defense (A&D) sector, including: Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, Cybersecurity, Government services and IT, Business Process Improvement, and Globalization and International Markets .

<http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom->

[UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/AD/us\\_ad\\_DefenseRealities\\_09282010.pdf](http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/AD/us_ad_DefenseRealities_09282010.pdf)

## HERITAGE FOUNDATION



### **NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE EMP ATTACKS—WHAT THE U.S. MUST DO NOW. James Carafano, Ph.D. and Richard Weitz, Ph.D. Backgrounder #2491. Heritage Foundation, November 17, 2010.**

Most Americans—whether members of the public or politicians in Congress—ignore or are unaware of the very real threat of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack. A nuclear device detonated high in the atmosphere above the American mainland can easily disable the country’s electrical grid—shutting down nearly all communications,

transportation, and service systems. Overnight, daily life as Americans know it will be a thing of the past. There are ways to prevent devastation from an EMP — and the U.S. must invest in them now before it is too late. Two of the country’s preeminent national security experts explain how to prevent the worst.

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/11/EMP-Attacks-What-the-US-Must-Do-Now>

### **NEW START: CRITICAL LIMITS ON U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE OPTIONS PERSIST. Baker Spring WebMemo #3056. Heritage Foundation, November 10, 2010**

The State Department continues to assert that the new strategic nuclear arms control treaty with Russia, called New START, imposes “no constraints on deploying the most effective missile defenses possible.” This sweeping assertion is simply inaccurate. New START limits U.S. missile defense options at two levels. The first level is the essential context within which the treaty exists and that—according to both the Obama Administration and Russian leaders—permits the treaty to be viable and effective. The second level is within the text of the treaty itself, where there are several direct limitations or other requirements regarding missile defense.

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/11/New-START-Critical-Limits-on-US-Missile-Defense-Options-Persist>



### **THE 21<sup>st</sup> –CENTURY MILITIA: STATE DEFENSE FORCES AND HOMELAND SECURITY. The Heritage Foundation. James Jay Carafano and Jessica Zuckerman. October 8, 2010.**

State militias have helped to defend the United States since the Revolutionary War. Today, 23 states and territories have organized militias, most commonly known as State Defense Forces (SDFs). SDFs provide governors with a cost-effective, vital force multiplier and resource, especially if state National Guard units are deployed out of state. However, in general, SDFs are underfunded and under supported. Some

states at high risk for a natural or man-made disaster have not even created SDFs. The U.S. and its states can no longer afford to sideline these national security assets.

[http://thf\\_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/bg2474.pdf](http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/bg2474.pdf) [PDF format, 21 pages].



**NEW TECHNOLOGIES, FUTURE WEAPONS: GENE SEQUENCING AND SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY. The Heritage Foundation. Ethel Machi and Jena Baker McNeill. August 24, 2010.**

Since the completion of the human genome project in 2003, there has been a surge of investment and discovery in both the gene sequencing and synthetic biology sectors of biotechnology. While the information contained in genome databases is not inherently dangerous, it can be used for destructive purposes. With synthesis technology becoming less expensive, more accurate, and faster every year, it is foreseeable that by

2020 malefactors will have the ability to manipulate genomes in order to engineer new bioterrorism weapons. The authors discuss the possibilities.

[http://thf\\_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/wm2986.pdf](http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/wm2986.pdf) [PDF format, 3 pages].

## INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, INC. (IFPA)



**38TH IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE ON NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND POLICY: AIR, SPACE, AND CYBERSPACE POWER IN THE 21ST-CENTURY. Conference report, September 2010**

The conference report addresses the defining issues for the U.S. Air Force (USAF) in the twenty-first-century security environment as well as the planning, operational, and investment challenges facing the USAF in the years ahead. These include balancing legacy missions with irregular warfare demands; determining where the USAF can take risks in platform modernization and how best to assign acquisition priorities in a constrained

budget environment; identifying and promoting new mission areas and service competencies; and articulating an up-to-date strategy for enabling and supporting twenty-first-century security planning that facilitates combatant-commander security cooperation and joint and Allied/coalition operations, and contributing as well to broader interagency requirements. Building on previous conferences in this series, the 38th IFPA-Fletcher National Security Conference brought together a unique mix of expertise from government and the private sector; from the civilian and military communities; from think tanks, industry, and academia; and from the United States and abroad.

<http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/USAFreportweb.pdf>

## INSTITUTE FOR HOMELAND SECURITY SOLUTIONS



**BUILDING ON CLUES: EXAMINING SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN DETECTING U.S. TERRORIST PLOTS, 1999-2009. Kevin Strom, John Hollywood et al. Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, October 2010**

Since 2001, the intelligence community has sought methods to improve the process for uncovering and thwarting domestic terrorist plots before they occur. Vital to these efforts are the more than 17,000 state and local U.S. law enforcement agencies whose role in the counterterrorism process has become increasingly recognized. As part of an on-going study for the

Institute for Homeland Security Solutions (IHSS), this report examines open-source material on 86 foiled and executed terrorist plots against U.S. targets from 1999 to 2009 to determine

the types of information and activities that led to (or could have led to) their discovery. Our findings provide law enforcement, homeland security officials, and policy makers with an improved understanding of the types of clues and methods that should be emphasized to more reliably prevent terrorist attacks.

[http://edocs.mipt.org/DesktopModules/MIPT\\_eDocuments/handlers/GetDocBinary.aspx?d=9879](http://edocs.mipt.org/DesktopModules/MIPT_eDocuments/handlers/GetDocBinary.aspx?d=9879)

## INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR



### **IRAQ'S LESSONS FOR TRANSITION IN AFGHANISTAN. LTG James M. Dubik (U.S. Army, Ret.), Marisa Cochrane Sullivan. Institute for the Study of War, November 15, 2010**

The United States actually experienced two types of transitions in Iraq. The first occurred from 2004 to 2006, where responsibilities for security and governance were handed over to the Iraqis even as the security situation continued to deteriorate and even if their capacities were insufficiently developed. This approach was widely deemed a failure. The second approach began in 2007 and continues today. Six factors govern the more successful second approach. While they may be applied differently in Afghanistan, they will certainly be important considerations in the months ahead.

<http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iraqs-lessons-transition-afghanistan>

### **VIDEO- POLICE TRAINING IN AN AGE OF GLOBAL TERROR, featuring LTG Jim Dubik (ret.) and Dr. Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution. Institute for the Study of War, October 22, 2010**

<http://www.understandingwar.org/press-media/webcast/video-police-training-age-global-terror>

## INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (ICG)

### **STALEMATE IN SOUTHERN THAILAND. International Crisis Group. November 3, 2010.**

The deadly conflict in Thailand's predominantly Malay Muslim South is at a stalemate. Although military operations might have contributed to the reduction in violence, the government of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva has made little effort to tackle the political grievances that drive the insurgency, according to the author.

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/thailand/B113%20Stalemate%20in%20Southern%20Thailand.ashx>

### **LOOSE ENDS: IRAQ'S SECURITY FORCES BETWEEN U.S. DRAWDOWN AND WITHDRAWAL. International Crisis Group. October 26, 2010.**

Iraq's security forces have improved the safety of their citizens, but these problems present longer-term threats that urgently need to be rectified. The new legislature faces the critical challenge of setting up a transparent framework that clearly defines the role and mandate of various security institutions and imposes accountability and oversight, while ensuring immunity from undue political interference. Agencies that lack a basis in law ought to be either dismantled or properly regulated and overseen. This will be no easy task, considering that parliament has not met for months, that it is itself deeply divided and that it will confront a large, competing list of priorities. But it will be all the more important as the U.S. military presence winds down. [PDF format, 50 pages].

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/99%20Loose%20Ends%20-%20Iraqs%20Security%20Forces%20between%20US%20Drawdown%20and%20Withdrawal.ashx>

**NEW CRISIS, OLD DEMONS IN LEBANON: THE FORGOTTEN LESSONS OF BAB-TEBBANEH/JABAL MOHSEN. International Crisis Group. October 14, 2010.**

The crisis that has gripped Lebanon since the murder of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri five years ago has taken a new and dangerous turn. The report looks at risks of escalation by focusing on two volatile neighbourhoods of Tripoli. The anticipated implication of Hizbollah members by the international tribunal investigating the 2005 assassination raises existential issues: inter-communal relations, the legitimacy of the resistance embodied by Hizbollah, the tribunal's credibility, survival of the current national unity government, the future of the recent Saudi-Syrian rapprochement and the country's fragile stability.

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-syria-lebanon/lebanon/B29-new-crisis-old-demons-in-lebanon-the-forgotten-lessons-of-bab-tebbaneh-jabal-mohsen.aspx> [HTML format, various paging].

**COLOMBIA: PRESIDENT SANTOS'S CONFLICT RESOLUTION OPPORTUNITY. International Crisis Group. October 13, 2010.**

President Juan Manuel Santos has taken welcome steps toward reform in his first ten weeks but now must put in place and execute a truly comprehensive and integrated conflict resolution strategy for Colombia to secure sustainable peace. [PDF format, 36 pages].


<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/latin-america/colombia/34%20Colombia%20-%20President%20Santoss%20Conflict%20Resolution%20Opportunity.ashx>

**FEDERATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA – A PARALLEL CRISIS. International Crisis Group. September 28, 2010.**

Whether the Federation – the mostly Bosniak and Croat part of Bosnia and Herzegovina – can solve its government crisis after October 3<sup>rd</sup> elections will go a long way to determining whether the country can survive, says the report.

<http://bit.ly/96ZA2b> [PDF format, 34 pages].

**INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT**



**ENVIRONMENT, CONFLICT AND PEACEBUILDING AT IISD: ADDRESSING THE LINKS AMONG ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE, NATURAL RESOURCES AND SECURITY. International Institute for Sustainable Development. October 2010.**

The brief contends that a better understanding of the links between environmental change and human security is vital for effective conflict prevention, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. The connections between environmental issues and conflict are many and complex. There is a crucial need to understand these links and transmit


them to policy-makers and practitioners.

[http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2010/brochure\\_environment\\_conflict\\_peacebuilding.pdf](http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2010/brochure_environment_conflict_peacebuilding.pdf) [PDF format, 6 pages].

**NATIONAL BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH**

**MARITIME SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: U.S., JAPANESE, REGIONAL, AND INDUSTRY STRATEGIES. National Bureau of Asian Research. John Bradford et al. November 2010.**

Pirate activity in strategically important waterways around the globe, from the Strait of Malacca to the waters off the Horn of Africa, has garnered significant attention recently from states dependent on these waters for international trade



and the free movement of goods. State responses have ranged from independently dispatching naval forces to patrol major sea lines of communication, to multinational patrols and information sharing mechanisms to increase domain awareness. Less visible, but of equal—or perhaps greater—importance are the efforts of ship owners, operators, and maritime industry groups toward increasing ship security and combating pirate attacks.

[http://nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/SR24\\_MaritimeSecurity.pdf](http://nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/SR24_MaritimeSecurity.pdf) [PDF format, 64 pages].

## NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

### **CAN MILITANTS USE VIOLENCE TO WIN PUBLIC SUPPORT? EVIDENCE FROM THE SECOND INTIFADA. National Bureau of Economic Research. David A. Jaeger et al. October 2010.**

The paper investigates whether attacks against Israeli targets help Palestinian factions gain public support. We link individual level survey data to the full list of Israeli fatalities during the period of the Second Intifada (2000-2006), and estimate a flexible discrete choice model for faction supported. It finds some support for the “outbidding” hypothesis, the notion that Palestinian factions use violence to gain prestige and influence public opinion within the community.


<http://www.nber.org/papers/w16475.pdf> [PDF format, 28 pages].

### **ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND THE QUALITY OF SUICIDE TERRORISM. National Bureau of Economic Research. Efraim Benmelech et al. August 30, 2010.**

The study analyzes the link between economic conditions and the quality of suicide terrorism. While the existing empirical literature shows that poverty and economic conditions are not correlated with the quantity of terror, theory predicts that poverty and poor economic conditions may affect the quality of terror. Poor economic conditions may lead more able, better-educated individuals to participate in terror attacks, allowing terror organizations to send better-qualified terrorists to more complex, higher-impact, terror missions.

<http://bit.ly/a06Lqa> [PDF format, 40 pages].


## NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY (NDU)



### **JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY (JFQ) Issue 59, NDU, October 2010**

This issue focuses on a true operational reserve.

<http://www.ndu.edu/press/jfq-59.html>




### **PRISM 2, no. 1. NDU, December 2010**


### **PRISM 1, no. 4. NDU, September 2010**

PRISM is a security studies journal chartered to inform members of U.S. Federal Agencies, allies, and other partners on complex and integrated national security operations; reconstruction and nationbuilding; relevant policy and strategy;

◀ <http://www.ndu.edu/press/prism2-1.html>

<http://www.ndu.edu/press/prism1-4.html> ▶






**THE 71F ADVANTAGE: APPLYING ARMY RESEARCH PSYCHOLOGY FOR HEALTH AND PERFORMANCE GAINS. Eds Paul T. Bartone et al. NDU, September 2010**

71F, or "71 Foxtrot," is the AOC (area of concentration) code assigned by the U.S. Army to the specialty of Research Psychology. Qualifying as an Army research psychologist requires, first of all, a Ph.D. from a research (not clinical) intensive graduate psychology program. Due to their advanced education, research psychologists receive a direct commission as Army officers in the Medical Service Corps at the rank of captain. In terms of numbers, the 71F AOC is a small one, with only 25 to 30 officers serving in any given year. However, the 71F impact is much bigger than this small cadre suggests. Army research psychologists apply their extensive training and expertise in the science of psychology and social behavior toward understanding, preserving, and enhancing the health, well being, morale, and performance of Soldiers and military families.

<http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/books/71F-Advantage.pdf>



**ENHANCING CIVILIAN PROTECTION IN PEACE OPERATIONS: INSIGHTS FROM AFRICA. A Research Paper FROM the Africa Center for Strategic Studies by Paul D. Williams. NDU, September 2010**

The protection of civilians is a critical issue in African security. Nearly 600,000 civilians in 27 African countries have been massacred in the past two decades. Tens of millions more have been killed in battles, displaced, or perished from indirect causes of such attacks and the continent's armed conflicts. Not only are civilians the main victims of Africa's wars, but also an increasing number of United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions have called upon peacekeepers to protect them. For many, civilian protection is the very essence of peacekeeping.

<http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/ACSS-Research-Papers/ACSS-1.pdf>



**PRIVATE CONTRACTORS IN CONFLICT ZONES: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE STRATEGIC IMPACT. T.X. Hammes. Strategic Forum. NDU, October 2010**

The United States has hired record numbers of contractors to serve in the conflict zones of Iraq and Afghanistan but has not seriously examined their strategic impact. There are clearly advantages to using contractors in conflict zones, but they have inherent characteristics that have serious negative effects during counterinsurgency operations.

<http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-260.pdf>

## NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL

**BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES. National Research Council. September 24, 2010.**

Biometric recognition, the automated recognition of individuals based on their behavioral and biological characteristic, is promoted as a way to help identify terrorists, provide better control of access to physical facilities and financial accounts, and increase the efficiency of access to services and their utilization. Biometric recognition has been applied to identification of criminals, patient tracking in medical informatics, and the personalization of social services, among other things. In spite of substantial effort, however, there remain unresolved questions about the effectiveness and management of systems for biometric recognition, as well as the appropriateness and societal impact of their use.

<http://bit.ly/bKVFog>

## NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE (NTI)




### **NATO AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS: IS A NEW CONSENSUS POSSIBLE? Steven Andreasen, Malcolm Chalmers, and Isabelle Williams. NTI. October 2010**

The paper recommends that text in the Strategic Concept should include a flexible formula making clear NATO's willingness to support a further reduction and consolidation of U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe and an intent to engage Russia in a process leading to greater transparency, accountability, consolidation and reductions of U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The paper, published by RUSI and

commissioned by NTI's Nuclear Security Project (NSP), also suggests that the Alliance agree on a process and work plan going forward to reassure allies that the Strategic Concept will consider and protect allied interests going forward.

<http://www.nuclearsecurityproject.org/atf/cf/%7B1fce2821-c31c-4560-bec1-bb4bb58b54d9%7D/RUSI%20-%20NATO%20AND%20NUCLEAR%20WEAPONS.PDF>

## RAND



### **RISKING NATO--TESTING THE LIMITS OF THE ALLIANCE IN AFGHANISTAN. Andrew R. Hoehn, Sarah Harting. RAND, November 2010**

NATO's success in Afghanistan — or lack thereof — will have significant implications for the alliance itself. Success could promote the image of a capable global security alliance. Failure, or even an indeterminate outcome, would cloud the alliance's own future. The authors examine the risks, commitments, and obligations of the current mission in light of NATO's history and with an eye toward the future, as well as the effects on the

alliance's internal dynamics. Drawing on a wide range of sources, the authors describe how NATO came to be involved, concerns and tensions that have developed over the investments and risks that member and nonmember states have in the operation, management of the expectations of nations and peoples, and the need for a coherent, comprehensive, and coordinated long-term strategy.

[http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG974/?ref=homepage&key=t\\_nato\\_flag](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG974/?ref=homepage&key=t_nato_flag)

### **OBSERVATIONS ON RECENT TRENDS IN ARMORED FORCES. David E. Johnson, John Gordon, IV. RAND, 2010**

For an ongoing project entitled "An Army for Full Spectrum Operations: Lessons from Irregular Wars," RAND Arroyo Center researchers assessed recent "irregular" conflicts and their implications for U.S. Army force mix and capabilities, as well as for the elements that support or operate with ground forces. This paper provides initial research observations on how various militaries view the role of heavy forces (tanks and other armored vehicles) in irregular warfare (IW) and hybrid warfare environments. The views of the U.S. Marine Corps, the British Army, the Canadian Army, the Danish Army, and the Israeli Army are discussed. What emerges from the research to date is that each of these forces believes that there is a role in IW and hybrid warfare for heavy forces, including tanks, because they reduce operational risk, minimize friendly casualties, and provide an intimidation factor against adversaries.

[http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional\\_papers/OP287/?ref=homepage&key=t\\_abrams\\_tank](http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP287/?ref=homepage&key=t_abrams_tank)

**LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT’S POST-9/11 FOCUS ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY. RAND Corporation. Lois M. Davis et al. October 28, 2010.**

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the need for increased counterterrorism (CT) and homeland security (HS) efforts at the federal, state, and local levels has taken the spotlight in public safety efforts. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, many law enforcement agencies (LEAs) shifted more resources toward developing CT and HS capabilities, and the federal government continues to support these efforts with grants provided through the Department of Homeland Security. The monograph examines the long-term adjustments that large urban LEAs have made to accommodate the focus on CT and HS, as well as the advantages and challenges associated with it.

[http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND\\_MG1031.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG1031.pdf) [PDF format, 177 pages].

**QUICK IMPACT, SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENTS, GUIDING VISION: THREE PROPOSED INITIATIVES FOR IMPROVING MOBILITY, QUALITY OF LIFE, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE WEST BANK. RAND Corporation. August 31, 2010.**

The report describes three demonstration projects based on the Arc, RAND's proposal for a sweeping infrastructure corridor linking urban centers, within and between the West Bank and Gaza.

<http://bit.ly/b6FMhq> [PDF format, 20 pages].

## SMALL ARMS SURVEY

**TIMOR-LESTE ARMED VIOLENCE ASSESSMENT-- FINAL REPORT. Ed. Robert Muggah and Emile LeBrun, October 2010. Small Arms Survey Special Report No. 12**

A little more than a decade after independence and the violence and displacement that accompanied it, Timor-Leste remains a country in transition. While it has stabilized in the post-independence period, the after-effects of the 2006 crisis continue to play an important role in the political debate and security atmosphere in the country. Communal violence remains at times a feature of life in rural areas, and small arms—left over from the pre-independence period and more recently leaked from defence and police forces—sometimes fuel both gang-related and community violence.

<http://www.timor-leste-violence.org/pdfs/Timor-Leste-Violence-Special-Report-12.pdf>

## STANLEY FOUNDATION



**GLOBAL LOCKDOWN: MOVING THE NEEDLE ON NUCLEAR SECURITY. Elizabeth Turpen. Policy Analysis Brief. Stanley Foundation, October 2010**

As announced in President Obama’s historic Prague speech in April of 2009, the administration hosted the first Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) one year later in Washington, DC. The summit’s objective was to build a foundation for multilateral commitments addressing “all vulnerable nuclear materials” in four years. The summit produced a communiqué that embraced President Obama’s four-year commitment to improving the security of fissile material. The summit also produced a comprehensive work plan detailing the initiatives and activities that this effort would entail. This policy analysis brief examines the international instruments and efforts enshrined in the communiqué and the multifaceted nature of implementation as detailed in the work plan.

<http://www.stanleyfdn.org/resources.cfm?id=434>

**CREATING A 21ST-CENTURY NUCLEAR MATERIAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE. Kenneth N. Luongo. Policy Analysis Brief. Stanley Foundation, October 2010**

The April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, drew international attention to the threat of nuclear terrorism and the need to adequately protect weapon-usable nuclear material around the globe. It was an unprecedented event: the first such gathering of political officials to discuss the subject. The summit was a success in the sense that the attendees agreed to take steps to fully implement the existing elements of the nuclear material security regime. But the scope and results of the summit also raised an important question—are the current components of the nuclear material security architecture, even if fully and rapidly implemented, sufficient to protect the global stockpile of fissile material from terrorist exploitation? This question was neither asked nor answered at the summit.

<http://www.stanleyfdn.org/resources.cfm?id=433>

**BEYOND BOUNDARIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST: LEVERAGING NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE TO ADDRESS SECURITY/DEVELOPMENT NEEDS WITH RESOLUTION 1540. Conference Report. Stanley Foundation, September 2010**

Widely considered to be the cradle of civilization itself, the Middle East not only boasts the origin of many major religions, it is a part of the world rich in history, culture, and natural resources. Regrettably, the region is also afflicted with the internecine discord that all too often accompanies those physical and social attributes. This report proposes an innovative, “whole-of-society” approach to bridging the security/development divide in the Middle East that would leverage donor investments in both security assistance and development assistance, so as to ensure recipient state buy-in and an enduring return on investment.

<http://www.stanleyfdn.org/resources.cfm?id=432>

**STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SIPRI)**

**INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT, 2005–2009. Siemon T. Wezeman. SIPRI Fact Sheet. November 2010**

This SIPRI Fact Sheet shows that combat aircraft together with related weapons and components accounted for one-third of worldwide arms transfers in the past five years and highlights concerns about the economic and security consequences of these transfers.

<http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1011.pdf>



**THE LIMITATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION REPORTS ON ARMS EXPORTS: THE CASE OF CENTRAL ASIA. Paul Holtom and Mark Bromley. SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security no. 2010/5**

All European Union (EU) member states are required to submit information on arms export licences and arms exports for inclusion in the EU annual reports on arms exports. The example of Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan—shows that the data in these EU annual reports has only a limited utility for monitoring exports of arms and military equipment. The specific case of Uzbekistan, which was subject to an EU arms embargo between 2005 and 2009, shows that certain transfers of apparent concern have been reported but not investigated, while other transfers have not appeared in the annual reports.

<http://books.sipri.org/files/insight/SIPRIInsight1005.pdf>

## STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE. U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

**DECIDING TO BUY: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND MAJOR WEAPONS PROGRAMS. Quentin E. Hodgson. Strategic Studies Institute, November 10, 2010**

The development and procurement of major weapons programs in the United States is a complex and often drawn-out process complicated by political considerations and often sharp disagreements over requirements and the merits of systems. Secretaries of Defense since Robert McNamara have sought to impose discipline on the process, with varying degrees of success. Conflicts between a Military Service and the civilian leadership are inevitable. A Service wants to develop the most advanced system to address its perceived need, whereas the Secretary of Defense must balance competing requirements across the Department of Defense. The military and the civilian leadership may also have different strategic perspectives that feed this conflict. Through the detailed analysis of three case studies—the Nuclear Surface Navy in the 1960s, the B-1 Bomber in the 1970s, and the Crusader Artillery System in the 2000s—the author explores some of the common themes and sources of friction that arise in civil-military relations concerning major weapons programs. He concludes with some thoughts on how the Secretary of Defense can anticipate and reduce these sources of friction, while retaining an environment that supports healthy debate.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1030>

**AMERICA'S MOST COMMITTED MUSLIM ALLY. Strategic Studies Institute. W. Andrew Terrill. November 2010.**


On December 30, 2009, a young captain and military intelligence expert was murdered in Khost, Afghanistan, by an al Qaeda suicide bomber. He died along with seven comrades from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in a covert operation gone terribly wrong. After his death was announced, the officer was described as a hero throughout his country, and the head of state was among the mourners at his funeral. His name was Sharif Ali bin Zaid, and he was a Jordanian and a Muslim. In considering his case, such bravery and commitment can hardly come as a surprise. Even before 9/11, the United States and Jordan were cooperating in the struggle against al Qaeda, and a senior Jordanian intelligence official is thanked by name in former CIA Director George Tenet's memoirs for such cooperation. Somehow in the rage over the New York Mosque and Cultural Center, many of America's Muslim allies have been forgotten. Jordan is an especially important case.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1031> [HTML format with a link].

**SOME OF THE BEST WEAPONS FOR COUNTERINSURGENTS DO NOT SHOOT. Eric T. Olson. Strategic Studies Institute, October 26, 2010**

Reconstruction, defined in U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07 as “the process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political, socioeconomic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create the foundation for long-term development” has leapt to the forefront of Army priorities, measured by the important role that it plays in today's counterinsurgency operations and its prominence in the latest doctrine. This paper examines the history of reconstruction as a part of Army operations, assesses the capabilities of today's forces to conduct successful reconstruction operations in support of a counterinsurgency campaign, and makes recommendations to build a capability that is commensurate with the demands of our doctrine and the imperatives of the modern battlefield.


<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1027>



**OPERATION EUFOR TCHAD/RCA AND THE EU'S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY. Authored by Mr. Bjoern H. Seibert. Strategic Studies Institute, October 15, 2010**

In the post-September 11, 2001 security environment, the United States faces a complex combination of threats from state to nonstate actors, many with regional or even global reach. Weak and fragile states have become a U.S. security challenge because they provide breeding grounds for terrorism, weapons proliferation, and trafficking in humans and narcotics. How does the U.S. propose to answer this challenge?


<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1026>



**HARNESSING POST-CONFLICT "TRANSITIONS": A CONCEPTUAL PRIMER. Nicholas J. Armstrong, Ms. Jacqueline Chura-Beaver. Strategic Studies Institute, October 04, 2010**

A widely accepted and understood definition of "transition" is necessary to enable U.S. military, interagency, and multinational planners to foster greater collaboration and unity of effort as operations move toward a "clear, hold, build, transition" strategy.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1025>



**PREPARING FOR ONE WAR AND GETTING ANOTHER? Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria, II. Strategic Studies Institute, September 23, 2010**


The idea that war or strategy is driven by a paradoxical logic is attractive, but a number of questions remain unanswered. If war has its own logic, rather than its own grammar, where does the logic of policy fit in? If the logic of strategy is paradoxical, how can it be taught? What are paradoxes, and can they be useful in guiding our strategic choices?

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1021>

**AN ARMY TRANSFORMED: THE U.S. ARMY'S POST-VIETNAM RECOVERY AND THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS. Suzanne C. Nielsen. Strategic Studies Institute, September 10, 2010**

Drawing on the literature on military innovation and reform, the author examines an important case of military change: the transformation of the U.S. Army in the 2 decades preceding the Persian Gulf War of 1991. The findings of this study have significant implications for how the U.S. Army should think about implementing changes needed today to meet new strategic, economic, and technological challenges.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1020>



**SOMALIA: LINE IN THE SAND—IDENTIFICATION OF MYM VULNERABILITIES. Strategic Studies Institute. Eloy E. Cuevas and Madeleine Wells. September 9, 2010.**

The War on Terrorism has taken an effect on the American public for nearly 10 years since that faithful day in 2001. With hundreds of thousands of service members and their family members directly or indirectly playing a role in this war, the U.S. Government has cast its net on an elusive and fleeting set of individuals who defy the best leadership, technology, funding, and resources the U.S.-led coalition can muster

against them. Concentrated in Somalia but expanding its influence in neighboring countries, the Al-Shabaab Organization has actively been undermining the U.N.-supported African Union

(AU) peacekeeping forces, the fledging Somali Transitional Federal Government, and all the U.N. efforts to support the Somali people.

<http://bit.ly/bWRRam> [HTML format with links].

## UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE



### **KOSOVO: THE NEXT STEPS. U.S. Institute of Peace. Daniel Serwer. November 2010.**

A small group of experienced American Balkans hands met in October at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C. to discuss the situation and the way forward. This Peace Brief summarizes salient points from their discussion.

<http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PB%2067%20-%20Kosovo%20The%20Next%20Steps.pdf>

[PDF format, 4 pages].



### **CIVIC EDUCATION AND PEACEBUILDING: EXAMPLES FROM IRAQ AND SUDAN. U.S. Institute of Peace. Daniel H. Levine and Linda S. Bishai. October 2010.**

Between 2006 and 2010, the United States Institute of Peace developed several civic education programs for Iraq and Sudan as part of broader efforts to promote post conflict stability and development and help prevent a return to violence. The report describes those programs after first examining the conceptual bases for civic education and how they differ from and overlap with human rights. <http://bit.ly/cu8SIq>

### **DANGEROUS LIAISONS WITH THE AFGHAN TALIBAN. U.S. Institute of Peace. Matt Waldman. October 2010.**

This report is based on six months of field research between January and June 2010, funded by the U.S. Institute of Peace and Canadian Global Peace and Security Fund. The aim was to better understand insurgent motivations and objectives, and in light of this, to assess the feasibility, risks, and implications of negotiations. [PDF format, 16 pages].

<http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR%20256%20-%20Dangerous%20Liaisons%20with%20the%20Afghan%20Taliban.pdf>

[PDF format, 16 pages].



### **CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM FOR PEACE IN COLOMBIA. U.S. Institute of Peace. Virginia M. Bouvier. September 2010.**

The new Colombian administration that took office in early August faces a unique set of peacemaking challenges and opportunities related to the country's internal armed conflict. Following a spate of tensions with neighboring countries regarding the presence of illegal armed groups along Colombia's border areas, newly-inaugurated President Juan Manuel Santos moved quickly to create new mechanisms with his neighbors to ensure that contentious regional issues are addressed before they reach the

boiling point.

<http://bit.ly/c7c7py> [PDF format, 5 pages].

## THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR-EAST POLICY

### **POTENTIAL IRANIAN RESPONSES TO NATO'S MISSILE DEFENSE SHIELD. By Michael Eisenstadt. *PolicyWatch* #1722. The Washington Institute for Near-East Policy, November 19, 2010**

The new "Strategic Concept" of NATO offers the advantage of an early initial capability to defend Europe against the emerging Iranian ballistic missile threat. For now, the Islamic Republic is unable to reach targets in Eastern Europe, but that could change as early as 2012 if Tehran decides to commence production of the medium-range Sajjil-2 missile. And because the NATO concept hinges first on the deployment of ship-based missile systems to the eastern Mediterranean, followed later by the deployment of land-based interceptors, it entails certain vulnerabilities that Iran could exploit in the near term.

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3272>



### **IF WAR COMES: ISRAEL VS. HIZBALLAH AND ITS ALLIES. Jeffrey White. *Policy Focus* #106. The Washington Institute for Near-East Policy, September 2010**

The next war on Israel's northern border will bear little resemblance to the 2006 confrontation between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Hizballah in Lebanon. This conflict is likely to be broader and much more intense, certainly Israel's most serious since 1973, with the potential to transform the wider region both militarily and politically. In this new Washington Institute Policy Focus, Jeffrey White offers not a prediction of war, but rather an estimation of what renewed hostilities between Israel and Hizballah might look like. In a meticulously calculated forecast of the future battlefield -- supplemented by original maps and graphics -- White outlines the capabilities and operational objectives of the two sides, the potentially game-changing roles played by Syria and Iran, and the possible impact on the region's postconflict military and political environments.

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus106.pdf>



### **THE RED LINE: HOW TO ASSESS PROGRESS IN U.S. IRAN POLICY. Patrick Clawson. The Washington Institute for Near-East Policy, September 2010**

Washington currently lacks broad consensus on how to deal with the persistent and dangerous strategic challenge posed by the Iranian regime. Supporters of current Obama administration policy emphasize progress made toward forging international consensus, delaying Iran's nuclear goals, and taking away the regime's "enemy narrative" about U.S. intentions. Others are pessimistic, emphasizing how little Iranian actions have changed despite U.S. efforts, and how boldly Iran continues to defy the international community. If the pessimists are correct, Tehran and Washington are headed for a test of wills -- most likely initiated when Iran inadvertently crosses a U.S. red line and elicits a forceful American response. How can policymakers measure the effectiveness of U.S. Iran policy with an urgency that allows for critical adjustments to ward off crisis? A recent Washington Institute workshop raised competing ideas about how to define progress with Iran. This new *Strategic Report* contains the assessments and recommendations of the high-level participants in this multipanel event.

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/StrategicReport05.pdf>

## YALE GLOBAL

### **WHY DO TERRORISTS BLOW THEMSELVES UP? YaleGlobal. Riaz Hassan. September 9, 2010.**

Nine years after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the world shares a perception that suicide attacks are unusual acts committed by the poor, the psychologically impaired, the morally deficient, the uneducated or the religious fanatics. Yet analysis of more than 1500 suicide attacks between 1981 and 2008 by author Riaz Hassan reveals far more complex motivations. Instead, altruism emerges as one of the major driving forces among young terrorists who previously demonstrated exemplary conduct. Sadly, evil can be ordinary, as noted by philosopher Hannah Arendt. Terrorists, shaped by their social environment, show a common tendency to abide by collective wisdom and follow orders. Daily life is difficult, unjust, even tenuous, in war zones or refugee camps – nurturing resistance and hatred among youth. Increasing numbers of youth in conflict zones, feeling helpless to shape a larger, uncaring world, view suicide attacks as a way to call attention to the plight of their community.

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