




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the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine

Defense Issues, NATO Response to Terrorism

September 2007



Al-Qaida Remains Significant Terrorist Threat, Report Says International cooperation remains essential to counter terrorism

By David McKeeby
USINFO White House Correspondent
2007-07-17

Washington — The terrorist organization al-Qaida remains a persistent and evolving threat to the United States, according to a new report from the U.S. intelligence community.

"The main threat comes from Islamic terrorist groups and cells, especially al-Qaida, driven by their undiminished intent to attack [the United States] and a continued effort by these terrorist groups to adapt and improve their capabilities," according to declassified key findings based on the National Intelligence Estimate The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland.

As a result, the United States remains in "a heightened threat environment," White House counterterrorism adviser Frances Townsend said July 17.

<http://www.uspolicy.be/Article.asp?ID=99EFAA55-9356-4384-9F90-20883FEC636F>

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


"Driven largely by the accelerating pace of tribal engagement and the increasing tempo of Coalition operations, developments in Iraq are unfolding more rapidly and with greater complexity today than when we completed our January NIE. Regional variations in security and political circumstances are great and becoming increasingly more distinct—for example, intra-Shia violence in southern Iraq is very different from patterns of violence elsewhere. The intelligence assessments contained in this NIE largely focus on only a short period of the Iraqi conflict—the last six months—and in circumscribed areas—primarily the central provinces, which contain the center of

gravity for Iraq's security prospects and in which we have a greater Coalition presence and therefore more information. The unfolding pace and scope of security and political realities in Iraq, combined with our necessarily limited focus of analysis, contain risks: our uncertainties are greater, and our future projections subject to greater chances of error. These issues, combined with the challenges of acquiring accurate data on trends in violence and continued gaps in our information about levels of violence and political trends in areas of Iraq without a substantial Coalition presence and where Intelligence Community collectors have difficulty operating, heighten our caution. Nonetheless, we stand by these judgments as our best collective assessment of security and political conditions in Iraq today and as likely to unfold during the next six to 12 months."

http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/August_2007_Iraq_NIE.pdf

STRATEGY TO ENHANCE INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. July 2007



This strategy establishes the overarching framework for the secure flow of cargo through the supply chain and builds on:

- existing national strategies,
- plans specific to individual segments of the supply chain or transportation system, and
- numerous programs and tactical plans developed and implemented by appropriate Department components and agencies.

Specifically, it follows the flow of cargo throughout the chain, from point of origin to final destination. It provides the overall strategic structure in which United States cargo security programs and efforts operate and clarify how those programs harmonize with similar international programs.

<http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/plcy-internationalsupplychainsecuritystrategy.pdf> (PDF, 1.5 MB)

MORE MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLES SHIPPED TO MIDDLE EAST. By Sgt. Sara Wood, USA. American Forces Press Service. Aug. 17, 2007



U.S. Air Force airmen load a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle onto a C-5 Galaxy aircraft Aug. 16, 2007, at Charleston Air Force Base, S.C.

U.S. troops serving in Iraq will have a little more protection soon, as two of the military's newest armored vehicles are on their way to the theater.

Two Buffalo Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, known as "MRAPs," were loaded onto C-5 Galaxy aircraft last night at Charleston Air Force Base, S.C., to be shipped to Iraq. This latest shipment is part of the Defense Department's push to get as many of the new vehicles to troops in combat as quickly as possible.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has been pushing the production and delivery of MRAPs, which boast a V-shaped hull that deflects bomb blasts and protects troops inside better than the military's current vehicles. The Defense Department awarded two more contracts for the vehicles the week of Aug. 10, which brings the number of vehicles on contract to 6,415. An estimated 3,500 MRAPs are expected to be shipped to Iraq by Dec. 31.
<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=47093>

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT PURSUES 'AGGRESSIVE' MRAP FIELDING STRATEGY. By Donna Miles. American Forces Press Service. July 2, 2007

The Defense Department is taking unprecedented steps to get Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles to deployed troops as quickly as possible – from fast-tracking the acquisition process to airlifting models as they roll off the assembly line. Marine Corps Systems Command flew a shipment of MRAPs to the theater this past weekend to cut the normal transit time, Bryan Whitman, deputy assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, told Pentagon reporters today. Marine Corps officials would not divulge details about how many vehicles were shipped, or specifically where they were destined to go, citing security concerns.

The delivery occurred just days after the Defense Department's Joint Requirements Oversight Council endorsed procuring as many MRAPs as industry can provide in fiscal 2008. The top-level panel, which validates military requirements, recommended evaluating the situation in Iraq periodically and adjusting the acquisition plan based on the need.
<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=46616>

CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS (HEARINGS, REPORTS, ETC.)

NATO IN AFGHANISTAN: A TEST OF THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE. Paul Gallis. Congressional Research Service (CRS), Library of Congress. Updated July 16, 2007. 07AD834

NATO in Afghanistan is a “test of the alliance’s political will and military capabilities.”

The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) faces such obstacles as shoring up a weak government, using military capabilities in a distant country, and rebuilding a country devastated by years of war.

The allies agree on ISAF’s mission, but differ on how to accomplish it. Thus far, ISAF has tried to stabilize the country in stages, but most experts predict that ISAF will need at least five years to accomplish this goal. “U.S. leadership of the alliance as well as NATO credibility are at issue,” and U.S. leadership “may well affect NATO’s cohesiveness and its future.”

Full Text:

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf> [pdf format, 26 pages]



LONG-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE IN EUROPE. Steven A. Hildreth. Congressional Research Service (CRS), Library of Congress. June 22, 2007. 07AD771

Successive administrations have sought the creation of anti-missile defense systems to protect against rogue states. The Bush Administration has built long-range missile defense bases in Alaska and California, but tests on these systems have produced mixed results. The Administration has also proposed a ground-based, mid-course defense (GMD) system in Europe although this proposal has encountered resistance in some European countries. Both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees have made recommendations that would significantly slow down this proposal.

Full Text:

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34051.pdf> [pdf format, 14 pages]



NATO

NATO AND RUSSIA: SOBERING THOUGHTS AND PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS. Dmitri Trenin. NATO Review, Summer 2007

Dmitri Trenin takes a hard look at the NATO-Russia relationship on the fifth anniversary of the NATO-Russia Council and the tenth of the Paris Founding Act on Mutual Relations. For nearly a decade after the emergence of the Russian Federation, NATO-related issues were a key focus of Moscow’s foreign policy. The Alliance was both a symbol of the Cold War and the premier Western club. Russia vacillated between half-hearted attempts to join the Alliance on special terms, and futile efforts to prevent the country’s neighbours from seeking membership as a security guarantee against Russia itself.

Three main developments shaped the relationship during the 1990s:

- Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the NATO/US use of force in 1995 led to the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, and the subsequent peacekeeping operations, in which Russian troops took part under NATO command;
- NATO's enlargement invitation in 1997 to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, and their accession in 1999, a bitter pill barely sweetened for Moscow by the creation of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC), a consultative mechanism between Russia and the Alliance; and
- the 1999 Kosovo crisis, which culminated in NATO's 78-day air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, despite Russia's most vehement protests.

Despite these serious issues, Russia continued to participate in Stabilisation Force (SFOR) operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and indeed requested to join the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in June 1999, again under NATO command. Nevertheless, by the end of President Yeltsin's time at the Kremlin, Russia-NATO relations were in a deep freeze.

<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue2/english/art1.html>

NATO AND THE BALKANS: THE CASE FOR GREATER INTEGRATION. Dr Amadeo Watkins and Srdjan Gligorijevic. NATO Review, Summer 2007

The authors discuss the past, present and immediate future of NATO's role in the western Balkans.

NATO's post-Cold war evolution has been strongly influenced by events in the Balkans. And although at each consecutive NATO summit meeting, the Alliance expands its areas of strategic interest and engagement, the Balkans remains a region of special concern to the Organisation.

But the view of NATO from the region itself is not so positive. Now that peace has largely been secured, questions remain. What will it take for the Alliance to win over the 'hearts and minds' of the people of the region – and more importantly, what needs to happen to increase stability in the area?

<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue2/english/art3.html>

THINK TANK PUBLICATIONS

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

WHAT THE NIE REALLY SAYS. By Frederick W. Kagan. AEI. Published in *The Daily Standard*, August 24, 2007

The summary of the findings of the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq released today is the predictable product of the process that created it. The consensus report of 16 intelligence agencies is full of on-the-one-hand-on-the-other-hand paragraphs that allow partisans of either side to make their points, if they are willing to quote selectively from the 4-page document. And it is a 4-page document (not 10 pages, as some media reports have it--the first six are title pages and descriptions of the methodology, and only the last four discuss Iraq). Its findings are broad and sweeping generalizations backed by little or nothing in the way of facts (which is natural, since intelligence agencies do not generally declassify the factual basis of such estimates).

The main conclusions of the document is clear: the strategy inaugurated in January 2007 has improved security in Iraq and will continue to do so; the development of grassroots movements within the Sunni Arab community focused on fighting al Qaeda in Iraq is an extremely important and positive development; Iraqi Security Forces are fighting effectively, if not yet independently of Coalition assistance; Sunni and Shia are not yet reconciled; the Maliki government is under great pressure and is not yet able to govern the country effectively; and Iraq-wide political progress will be required to solidify the gains made by the new strategy.

http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.26693,filter.all/pub_detail.asp

TERRORIST THREATS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA. A Net Assessment. By Christopher Griffin, Oriana Scherr. National Security Outlook, AEI Online. July/August 2007



The struggle against Islamist extremism has been dubbed the "Long War" by America's military leadership, but there is no agreed-upon model to forecast the development of this conflict.[1] The challenge of assessing the Long War is exacerbated by the differences between the adversaries: the United States and its allies form the core of the international system, while the Salafist jihadists at the extreme of radical Islam comprise an irregular transnational movement that has adaptively spread throughout the world from its Middle East base. Comparing the structure, goals, strategy, and tactics of these fundamentally asymmetric forces is a chore to which our analytic tools developed during the Cold War do not lend themselves. This National Security Outlook examines whether the "net assessment" concept might serve as an appropriate framework for understanding the Long War and predicting its likely development.

As the Long War against the global jihad movement continues, there is a debate over the nature of the conflict: is it principally an ideological struggle, pitting jihadist dogma against Western liberalism; an organizational fight against the al Qaeda terrorism network; a regional struggle centered on the Middle East (or the Islamic world broadly); or a war with a limited number of charismatic personalities like Osama bin Laden, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, and Fazul Abdullah Mohammed?[2] It is all four, to some extent, but it is difficult to evaluate their comparative strengths and weaknesses against the capabilities of the United States and its security partners. This analytic muddle, which conflates counterinsurgency, terrorism, religious fundamentalism, and the risk of failing states, stands to benefit from an important tool known as net assessment.

http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.26568/pub_detail.asp

THE GLOBALIZATION OF SECURITY OR THE MILITARIZATION OF GLOBALIZATION? By Mauro De Lorenzo, Terence McNamee, Greg Mills, Matthew Uttley. AEI. Brenthurst Foundation PAPERS AND STUDIES. July 26, 2007

In October 2008, the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) will be "stood up" as a unified combatant command. In Africa this announcement has been met with trepidation and controversy.



Resistance to the idea is fuelled primarily by fears that it could lead to the militarisation of American foreign policy towards Africa. Of its numerous critics, South Africa has been especially vocal. Yet in other parts of Africa there is a cautious optimism based on the hope that Washington is finally taking the relationship between African security and development seriously.

However, there appears to be agreement on two key points. The first is that AFRICOM is still an enigma. No one is sure what it will do or how, and what it means for Africa. The second is that AFRICOM's success will ultimately depend on how well the U.S. understands and responds to the security priorities of Africans. . . .

http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.26551/pub_detail.asp

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

IRAQ TRIP REPORT. Michael E. O'Hanlon and Kenneth M. Pollack. Brookings Institute, August 2007

"From July 17-25 we travelled extensively in central, western and northern Iraq. The trip was sponsored by the Multi-National Force—Iraq (MNF-I) command and so afforded unparalleled access to U.S. and Iraqi military personnel. We spoke at length with the four principal American division commands in those sectors, as well as nearly half of the brigade commanders and their staffs, as well as several battalion and even company commanders. We also met with senior U.S. personnel from the Detainee Forces command, and from the training command known as MNSTCI, as well as a number of Iraqi police and army officers. Similarly, MNF-I saw to it that we were able to meet with key civilian personnel in a variety of PRTs/EPRTs, the U.S. Ambassador, the President's Special Envoy, the CIA station, the US AID mission, and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq. Both through our own contacts and those of the military, we also were able to meet with a number of the seniormost members of the current Iraqi government (including President Talabani, Vice President 'Abd al-Mahdi, Foreign Minister Zebari, Deputy Prime Minister Salih, and National Security Adviser ar-Rubaie).

These various meetings were considerably bolstered by numerous "sidebar" conversations with Iraqis and Americans as well as meetings with a number of old friends, Iraqi and American. These helped us to check the veracity of points being made in formal briefings and by those we did not know well. Overall, the trip afforded us a good perspective on American and Iraqi military operations throughout this area, local level economic and political developments in many parts of it, as well as an adequate perspective on the state of play in the high-level political negotiations in Baghdad. Although we were able to meet with several dozen Iraqi civilians—from people on the streets to local shaykhs—because we were nearly always in the presence of American military personnel, we felt we had little ability to gauge the mood of the Iraqi people.

http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/research/2007august_iraqreport.pdf

WILL SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1769 MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN DARFUR? Roberta Cohen, Nonresident Senior Fellow and Senior Adviser, Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement. The Brookings Institution, August 9, 2007



The Security Council's July 31 resolution on Darfur is the strongest so far. To begin with, it was unanimously adopted, which sharply contrasts with earlier resolutions, whose authority was undercut by the abstentions of China, Russia or members of the Arab League. Second, it promises nearly to quadruple the number of troops and police on the ground from the current 7,000 African Union (AU) forces, which proved insufficient to Darfur's size, to 26,000 AU/United Nations forces. Third, it gives the troops a stronger mandate, authorizing them under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter to take the "necessary action" to prevent armed attacks, ensure the security of humanitarian workers and protect civilians, both of whom have been under ongoing attack. At the same time, the resolution emphasizes the importance of a political process, endorsing Sudanese government-rebel talks under UN/AU auspices and rightly affirming that "there can be no military solution" to the Darfur conflict. Fifth, the resolution expresses "strong concern" about the ongoing attacks on humanitarian workers and calls for their full, safe and unhindered access to populations in need, in particular internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. And it looks forward to the reconstruction and development of Darfur, including the return of IDPs, compensation programs, and security in return areas. Finally, the resolution is noteworthy in not explicitly inviting Sudan's consent as did last summer's Resolution 1706, which enabled Sudan then to refuse the deployment of a Chapter 7 UN force.

http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/projects/idp/cohen_20070809.pdf

THE IRAQ WAR AND THE NEW TERRORIST THREAT FACING THE MIDDLE EAST AND U.S. Daniel Benjamin, Director, Center on the United States and Europe. Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, July 31, 2007

This is part 4 of a 4 part series by the subcommittee. Brookings experts Daniel Byman and Michael O'Hanlon testified in front of the subcommittee on this topic as well.

<http://www3.brookings.edu/views/testimony/benjamin/20070731.pdf>

A THIRD WAY: ALTERNATIVES FOR IRAQ'S FUTURE. Daniel L. Byman, Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy. House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, July 18, 2007

<http://www3.brookings.edu/views/testimony/byman20070718.pdf>

A DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE FOR IRAQ. Carlos Pascual and Larry Diamond. Policy Brief, Brookings Institution. Web posted June 25, 2007. 07AD766

According to the Iraq Study Group, U.S. Iraqi policy must address both diplomatic and military strategies to obtain a sustainable peace. Historically, civil wars characterized by insurgency and guerilla fighting require peace settlements of some type. U.S. troops must provide security to create an



environment where a peace agreement can be negotiated. “This mediation should be an intensive and well-coordinated joint effort of the United States, the United Nations, and the European Union.”

[Note: Contains copyrighted material.]

Full Text:

<http://www3.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb162.pdf>

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

TOP TEN RESULTS FROM THE 2007 CARNEGIE INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION CONFERENCE. Conference Results, August 2007

Participants at the June 2007 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference were asked to identify top solutions to current and future nonproliferation challenges. Based on their responses and our review of the conference proceedings, we describe:

Top 3 Upcoming Challenges to the Nonproliferation Regime

Top 3 Best New Policy Proposals

Top 4 High Impact Ideas to Implement by 2010

<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/toptenresults2007.pdf>



DEATH TOLL IN IRAQ SUICIDE BOMBINGS REACHES 250. By Jessica Tuchman Mathews. *NewsHour* with Jim Lehrer, August 15, 2007

As political instability continues to plague the Iraqi government, and following the deadliest suicide attacks of the war, Carnegie President Jessica T. Mathews and other regional experts discuss the country's political and security struggles on the NewsHour with Jim Lehrer on August 15. Addressing the ongoing political stalemate in Bagdad, Mathews said, “What we need is a more inclusive process that includes both groups outside the government inside Iraq and Syria and Iran.”

Transcript: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/july-dec07/iraq_08-15.html

PAKISTANI POLITICS AFTER LAL MASJID. Event transcript.. Carnegie. Thursday, August 09, 2007

Ambassador Tariq Fatemi discussed the effects of the Lal Masjid episode on the stability of Pakistan including the political transitions slated to occur over the next several months.

Ambassador Fatemi was a distinguished member of the Pakistan Foreign Service from 1969 to 2004. He was Pakistan's Ambassador in Zimbabwe, Washington, Amman and to the European Union in Brussels. He also served in many important Pakistani missions, including Moscow, New York, Washington, Beijing and Brussels. During his long career he oversaw several important political desks in the Foreign Ministry as well as in the Prime Minister's Office where he was responsible for affairs relating to Defense, Defense



Production, Foreign Relations and Atomic Energy. Since retirement in 2004, he teaches in various institutions, writes for the daily DAWN and is also a frequent radio and TV commentator.

<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/0809fatemi.pdf>

WOMEN IN ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS: TOWARD AN ISLAMIST MODEL OF WOMEN'S ACTIVISM. By Omayma Abdel-Latif, Marina S. Ottaway. Carnegie Endowment. Carnegie Paper, July 2007

Islamist women are increasingly involved in political processes and could spawn a full-fledged Islamist movement for women's rights, finds a new study by the Carnegie Endowment. In *Women in Islamist Movements: Toward an Islamist Model of Women's Activism*, Carnegie scholars Omayma Abdellatif and Marina Ottaway argue that women's participation in Islamist movements reflects a growing trend toward women's activism in the Arab world, though quite different from Western norms.

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cmec2_women_in_islam_final1.pdf



IRAQ FOUR YEARS AFTER THE U.S.-LED INVASION: ASSESSING THE CRISIS AND SEARCHING FOR A WAY FORWARD. Faleh A. Jabar. Policy Outlook, Carnegie Middle East Center, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. July 2007. 07AD811

“Iraq is stalemated between two trends: one bent on escalating sectarian violence into full-fledged civil war; the other on transforming the conflict into peaceful institutional politics.” The present U.S. strategy is to break this stalemate. This paper “examines the viability of the current U.S. strategy in the context of domestic (Iraqi), regional, and international factors.”

[Note: Contains copyrighted material.]

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/faleh_al_jabba_formatted.pdf




RETHINKING WESTERN STRATEGIES TOWARD PAKISTAN: AN ACTION AGENDA FOR THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE. Frédéric Grare. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. July 2007. 07AD794

“This report makes the case that the Pakistani state bears responsibility for the worsening security situation in Afghanistan, the resurgence of the Taliban, terrorism in Kashmir, and the growth of jihadi ideology and capabilities internationally.” In the past, the U.S. and most western countries have dealt with Pakistan on short-term interests, and Pakistan has taken advantage of this by assisting in urgent U.S. objectives. “This report calls for a new strategy designed to encourage Pakistanis, particularly the military, to reestablish the preeminence of civilian government according to the Pakistani constitution.”

[Note: Contains copyrighted material.]

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/grare_pakistan_final.pdf [pdf format, 60 pages]



CATO

ESCAPING THE TRAP: THE CASE FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ. CATO Policy Forum. July/August 2007

President Bush vetoed a bill that called for the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq by March 2008, but the debate over the exit strategy for U.S. forces in Iraq continues. On March 14 Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for foreign policy and defense studies at Cato; Steven Simon, senior fellow for Middle East studies at the Council on Foreign Relations; and Lt. Gen. William Odom, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and former director of the National Security Agency, addressed whether and how the United States should leave Iraq.

http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy_report/v29n4/cpr29n4-4.html

CENTER FOR ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION

EXCESSIVE CLAIMS FOR MISSILE DEFENSE. By Dr. Lieutenant General Robert G. Gard, Jr. (USA, ret.), Senior Military Fellow. Center for Arms control and Non-Proliferation. August 8, 2007

Since the launch of a ballistic missile can be traced to its source, it is highly doubtful that a rogue state would choose to attack the U.S. in this fashion, thereby inviting a devastating retaliatory strike. Even in the unlikely event that the expensive GMD system of systems eventually proves workable, the opportunity cost of its deployment should be compared to expending the funds to counter more likely threats to U.S. security.

http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/policy/missiledefense/articles/excessive_claims_for_missile_defense

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS)

THE CHANGING CHALLENGES OF US DEFENSE SPENDING: AN UPDATE. Anthony H. Cordesman and Ionut C. Popescu. CSIS. August 23, 2007

US ability to outspend its enemies has long been a key advantage of the American way of war. This advantage has increased with time. President Bush's decision to engage in a Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in the aftermath of 9/11 has been followed by a period of steady increases in Pentagon baseline spending, in addition to constantly larger GWOT budgetary supplementals.


(...) The actual level of total spending has been raised far beyond the baseline request by an increasing reliance on large "war supplementals." Funds appropriated through these less scrutinized

funding mechanisms have come to represent more than a third of DoD baseline spending in the FY2008 budget request (\$141.7 billions for GWOT supplemental, compared to the \$481.3 billions for baseline spending). Almost a quarter of all the money requested for defense has been classified as "emergency" spending.

This growing reliance on supplemental funding has had a serious negative impact on the development of long-term defense programs and budgets. It has made it progressively more difficult to develop a future year defense program (FYDP) that properly funds multiyear efforts such as force reset, long-term readiness, increases in manpower, or force transformation when a large share of their money comes as a war supplemental.
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070823_popescu_report.pdf

IRAQ'S INSURGENCY AND CIVIL VIOLENCE: DEVELOPMENTS THROUGH LATE AUGUST 2007. Anthony H. Cordesman. CSIS. August 22, 2007

The attached report examines how changes in the American military posture in Iraq and the build up of US troops to 160,000 military personnel in June 2007 has impacted the Sunni and Shi'ite insurgency. There were both positive and negative developments. Violence in Anbar Province decreased, and US and Iraqi forces inflicted serious damage to Al Qa'ida and extremist Shi'ite militia forces while increase the security of large areas in Baghdad.




However, large-scale bombings with mass-casualties continued in other areas. Operation Phantom Thunder drove many insurgents out of highly patrolled areas, and increased activity in areas that were previously relatively quiet, particularly in the north.

The continued implosion of the British presence in southeastern Iraq reduced British forces to three token enclaves in the Basra area. The end result was to turn the four provinces in southeastern Iraq over to feuding Shi'ite factions whose actions were mixed with corruption, extortion, and links to criminal activity. The result was to create Shi'ite zones in the south, Sunni zones in the west, and Kurdish zones in the north, with tension, violence, and insurgency in mixed areas in central and northern Iraq.

The report covers the current stalemate in the Iraqi government and its implications. The ISF did perform well in some areas, and the Iraqi Army did show a steadily increasing capability to operate with reduced US support. However, the security forces in many areas were still not capable of independent operations, and some had clear sectarian allegiances.
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070822_cordesman_iraq_report.pdf

IMPROVING U.S. AND SYRIAN RELATIONS: SOME POSSIBLE BEGINNINGS. Anthony H. Cordesman. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Web posted July 19, 2007. 07AD831



“There are many areas where the U.S. and Syria do have common interests and might be able to move forward without some kind of formal improvement in relations. It is not necessary to have ‘breakthroughs’ to make progress or to wait on the next Administration. In fact, waiting nearly two years for a new Administration to fully take office is in neither nation’s interest. There is too much instability in the region; there are too many areas where leaving things unintended can only make things worse.”


[Note: Contains copyrighted material.]

Full Text:

http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/071907_syrian-us_relations.pdf [pdf format, 9 pages]

ISRAEL AND SYRIA: THE MILITARY BALANCE AND PROSPECTS OF WAR. Anthony H. Cordesman CSIS. August 15, 2007


The Arab-Israeli military balance now consists of two largely separate balances: The first such balance is the balance between Israel and the Palestinians. Since 2000, this has been an asymmetric war that Israel has largely won. Its politics poison the region, and have led to a civil conflict among the Palestinians that may take years to resolve. At least for the present, however, this balance is so clearly in Israel's favor that the Israeli-Palestinian War that has gone on since 2000 is more a political struggle than a military one.



The second balance is shaped by Israel and Syria. Israel's peace with Egypt and Jordan have left Syria isolated from Israel's main Arab neighbors in both military and political terms. Syria has made things worse by weakening its ties to other Arab power like Saudi Arabia, adventures in Lebanon, ties to Iran, mismanagement of its economic development, and poor force planning and military development. Syria can use terrorist and extremist movements as proxies, but only as a "spoiler" effort that irritates Israel more than it pressures or threatens it. It can join with Iran in backing a movement like the Hezbollah, but – as the Israeli-Hezbollah War showed in 2006 – such conflicts do not give Syria military leverage or clear strategic benefits.

http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/070815_cordesman_israel_syria.pdf

THE UNCERTAIN COST OF THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR. Anthony H. Cordesman. CSIS. August 9, 2007



The CRS found that the estimates of expenditures being issued by the U.S. government understated the real cost of operations because they included only current obligations, not the cost in terms of worn equipment, future replacements, paying the long-term costs of increased pensions and payments for killed and wounded, and paying for a long list of additional costs such as support by the national intelligence agencies.

There is no way to do more than guess at the ultimate cost of the Iraq War, the Afghan War, and the war on terrorism. CBO projected the cost of war for the 2008-2017 period under two scenarios. The first case assumes a more rapid drawdown of the troops deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan and other places in support of GWOT operations; the cost in such a situation would range from \$481 to \$603 billion, depending on the duration of the surge in Iraq. Under a second scenario, assuming a more gradual drawdown, the extra cost for the next decade would be between \$924 and \$1,010 billion, again depending on how long the current level of troops is maintained in Iraq.

http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/080907_thecostsofwar.pdf

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

U.S. AND UN SHIFT ON IRAQ. Greg Bruno. Daily Analysis. August 22, 2007

Four years after a suicide bomb ripped through UN headquarters in Baghdad, killing envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello and 21 members of his staff, the Security Council is expanding the UN's role (Guardian) in Iraq in an effort to rein in sectarian violence. The world body has vowed to focus on national reconciliation in the ethnically-splintered nation, increase humanitarian aid, and attend to human rights. The Security Council vote on August 10 marks a symbolic if vague course correction for the UN after years of security concerns forced a low profile. The resolution allows for a modest increase (NYT) in UN personnel—though still considerably less than its presence before the 2003 bombing—and staff members recently complained about the plan's lack of attention (al-Jazeera) to security.

http://www.cfr.org/publication/14038/us_and_un_shift_on_iraq.html?breadcrumb=%2F

AFGHANISTAN'S AID CHALLENGE. Greg Bruno.CFR. Updated: August 22, 2007

The abduction of twenty-three South Koreans by the Taliban has renewed fears of escalating violence against aid workers in Afghanistan. The South Koreans, abducted on July 19, are members of a Christian group reported to be providing medical and other aid to Afghans. Two men in the group have been killed (Reuters), and two ailing women were set free in what kidnappers called a “gesture of goodwill.” The remaining nineteen hostages have launched a hunger strike (Yonhap) protesting their treatment. Meanwhile, South Korean embassy officials ordered (AP) their aid organizations out of the country by the end of August. South Korea, which has Christian aid groups active in 160 countries, has spent some \$60 million on reconstruction (IRIN) in Afghanistan since 2002.

http://www.cfr.org/publication/14062/afghanistans_aid_challenge.html?breadcrumb=%2F

TURNING THE SCREWS ON IRAN. Robert McMahon. Updated: August 20, 2007

The Bush administration's plans to target the business dealings (IHT) of Iran's Revolutionary Guards, the largest branch of the country's armed services, set in motion what is expected to be a lively new round of diplomacy aimed at getting Tehran to suspend its uranium enrichment program. The administration's point man on Iran policy, Undersecretary R. Nicholas Burns, earlier this month predicted “increasingly tough” international action against Iran because they refuse to negotiate and they refuse to slow down their nuclear efforts.” The United States has been the motor behind such action through a two-pronged approach involving UN Security Council sanctions and separate initiatives by the U.S. Treasury Department to pressure (BusinessWeek) Western financial institutions to cut off dealings with Iran. Activities in both arenas are expected to intensify in the next few months.

http://www.cfr.org/publication/14043/turning_the_screws_on_iran.html

RUSSIA'S WRONG DIRECTION: WHAT THE UNITED STATES CAN AND SHOULD DO: REPORT OF AN INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE. Independent Task Force, Council on Foreign Relations. Web posted July 5, 2007. 07AD816

For the past fifteen years, the U.S. has had good relations with the Soviet Union; but in recent years, Russian society and its foreign policy have changed raising questions and concerns for

the U.S. The Task Force was set up in 2005 to examine these developments and assess the U.S.-Russian relationship. The report offers a broad strategy and makes recommendations for policymakers.

[Note: Contains copyrighted material.]

http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Russia_TaskForce.pdf [pdf format, 104 pages]



FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS (FPIF)

THE DANGERS OF SCOLDING AN EMBATTLED ARAB LEADER. Erica Bouris. FPIF Commentary. August 24, 2007

One could chalk this up to the ongoing drivel of diplomacy and the occasional harsh attacks that are bound to happen when dozens of people continue to be killed everyday. Both Bush and Maliki find themselves losing support, even among their core constituents and it is August, which brings out the crankiness in all those political leaders forced to continue working through the heat and humidity. Or maybe it is just the 2008 election campaign bug that finally pushed Bush over the edge -- ready to lash out at Maliki in an attempt to disavow responsibility for a rabid war broken free from its chain long ago. In that case, these words are more a performance for the American voters than anything else. But no matter the reason, make no mistake: these words are dangerous.

<http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4501>

PAKISTAN UNDER SIEGE. Zia Mian. Foreign Policy In Focus. August 22, 2007

Pakistan's leaders have failed it from the beginning. At independence, its founding father, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, adopted the British colonial title and powers of governor-general. He died within a year, leaving no clear vision of the country's identity or future, no broad-based, cohesive, national political party or movement to guide it, no tradition of democracy. Pakistan fell into the hands of a civil service and army that knew only colonial habits.

There were four governor-generals and seven prime ministers in the first 10 years, rising and falling through palace intrigues, but all powerless in the end. Pakistan could not even create a constitution. Then, in 1958, came the first military coup. General Ayub Khan told the country the army had no choice. There was, he said, "total administrative, economic, political and moral chaos" brought about "by self-seekers, who in the garb of political leaders, have ravaged the country.

General Ayub Khan ruled for a decade. ...) By the end of his rule, it was said that 22 families controlled two-thirds of Pakistani industry and an even larger share of its banking and insurance sector.

Eventually, the people rose in revolt. The demands for representation were greatest in East Pakistan, home to the majority of Pakistan's people. Elections were held and a nationalist party from the East emerged victorious, but the army and its political allies were mostly from West Pakistan and would have none of it. The army went to war against its own people.

There were appalling massacres. In 1971, with help from India, East Pakistan broke free and became Bangladesh.”

<http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4490>

HERITAGE FOUNDATION

RELEASE OF CIA REPORT ON 9/11: SIMPLE LESSONS FOR THE LONG WAR. James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.. Heritage Foundation WebMemo #1589. August 22, 2007

The release of the executive summary of an internal CIA investigation into the agency's efforts against al-Qaeda up to 9/11 holds important lessons for combating transnational terrorism. Though the report has garnered significant attention in the press, the controversy over assigning responsibility for the agency's inability to thwart the attack has overshadowed the report's most important finding, which is its reaffirmation that the best way to combat terrorism is concerted and sustained intelligence and counterterrorism operations.

http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/upload/wm_1589.pdf



AFTER THE 9/11 ACT: HOMELAND SECURITY GRANTS STILL MOVING IN THE WRONG DIRECTION. Matt A. Mayer and James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. Heritage Foundation. Backgrounder #2059. August 3, 2007

Nearly six years after September 11, 2001, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is still struggling to keep homeland security grants from becoming just another federal entitlement program. To make matters worse, Congress recently passed a bill (S. 4 and H.R. 1) that will make the DHS's job more difficult.

The bill's official purpose is to implement the reforms proposed by the 9/11 Commission, but it also will proliferate new grants and add additional requirements that will keep the department from focusing grants on strategic priorities. In addition, new research suggests that federal homeland security grants are largely just supplanting state and local spending rather than promoting national prepared-ness and raising standards.

Congress needs to start over by eliminating mini-mum grant allocations, boosting matching requirements for grants, consolidating grant categories, and requiring the DHS to conduct a full assessment of national capabilities.

http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/upload/bg_2059.pdf



TERRORISTS IN THEIR OWN WORDS. James Phillips and James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #2057. August 1, 2007

Islamist terrorists have long been at war with the United States and frequently have proclaimed their determination to win the war. In fact, they see their enemies' unwillingness to acknowledge this war as an act of cowardice. If their enemies refuse to wear the mantle of warrior, terrorists assume that they are weak, lacking in honor, and spiritually inferior—and



the notion that their enemy is vulnerable emboldens them. Failing to acknowledge that we are at war only encourages the enemy to be more warlike.

Conclusive proof that terrorists are at war with us requires little more than reading their own words. A compilation drawn from translations of a number of authoritative sources illustrates the nature of the challenge that America and its allies face and what needs to be done to combat it.

http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/upload/bg_2057.pdf

ADVANCING FREEDOM IN IRAQ. Steven Groves. Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #2056 July 30, 2007



Helping Iraq to become a secure and stable nation in the heart of the Middle East is in the national inter-est of the United States. Iraq's best chance for long-term stability is to develop democratic institutions that will protect the basic civil, political, and human liberties and rights of the Iraqi people.

In Iraq, freedom, democracy, and civil society— nonexistent under Saddam Hussein—remain precari-ous. U.S. government efforts, as well as the efforts of non-governmental organizations, to promote democ-racy and good governance rely on the security umbrella provided by the U.S. military presence. A precipitous U.S. military withdrawal would almost certainly doom U.S. and Iraqi efforts to build a free and democratic Iraq.

The Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds, and other factions require a secure environment to reach political accom-modation. The United States and the international community should do everything possible to help to stabilize Iraq. Specifically, the U.S. Congress should not interfere with ongoing military efforts to secure and stabilize Iraq or legislate restrictions on the use of U.S. military force.

http://www.heritage.org/Research/WorldwideFreedom/upload/bg_2056.pdf

NATIONAL SECURITY AND BIOTECHNOLOGY: SMALL SCIENCE WITH A BIG POTENTIAL. James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. and Andrew Gudgel. Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #2055 July 23, 2007

Biotechnology is one of the world's fastest growing commercial sectors. Since 1992, the number of bio-technology companies in the United States alone has tripled. These firms are research-intensive, every day bringing into the marketplace new methods and prod-ucts that may reshape medical practices and human performance, allowing for unprecedented improve-ments in health care.

Many of biotechnology's benefits are dual-use, increasing the possibility that knowledge, skills, and equipment could be adapted for use as biological weap-ons. As the global biotechnology industry expands, the



U.S. government should therefore increase its capacity to exploit biotech advances for national security.

http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/upload/bg_2055.pdf

THE LEVIN-REED AMENDMENT ON IRAQ: CUT IN THE U.N. AND RUN. James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. and James Phillips. Heritage Foundation WebMemo #1558. July 17, 2007

Senators Carl Levin (D-MI) and Jack Reed (D-RI) drafted an amendment, since introduced by themselves and other senators as S.A. 2087 to the defense authorization bill, that would require the Bush Administration to begin redeploying U.S. forces from Iraq within 120 days; restrict the role of any remaining forces to force protection, counterterrorism, training, and logistical support operations by April 2008; and turn over the big issues in Iraq to a U.N.-authorized mediator. The forced, premature withdrawal of American troops from Iraq would have disastrous consequences for Iraq, the Middle East, and American foreign policy and would lead to a full-scale humanitarian disaster. Congress should reject outright calls for America to cut and run and in-stead allow the military to finish the job of training Iraqi security forces that are capable of supporting the gov-ernment, dealing with sectarian violence, and providing for the safety of the civilian population.

http://www.heritage.org/research/middleeast/upload/wm_1558.pdf



HUDSON INSTITUTE

DISCUSSION PAPER ON APPROACHES TO ANTI-RADICALIZATION AND COMMUNITY POLICING IN THE TRANSATLANTIC SPACE. Jonathan Paris. Hudson Institute, July 10, 2007

A trend common across Europe is that there is a decrease in terrorist incidents driven by Al Qaeda (AQ) command and control in South Asia. The conviction earlier this month of the UK dirty bombers under Dhiren Barot represents one of the last of this kind of 'outside-inside' attack. Governments are increasingly confronted, instead, with 'homegrown' terrorist networks. The threat has morphed from a jihadi organization with a physical headquarters and chain of command to a jihadi movement – an ideology motivating dispersed groups internationally.

<http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/JonathonParisAug232007.pdf>



U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: IS CONFLICT INEVITABLE? Hudson Institute Symposium. Summer 2007

Fifteen years after the fall of communism, Russia is reverting to patterns of behavior characteristic of the Soviet Union. This is reflected in foreign policy, in domestic policy, and in the realm of ideas. In foreign policy, Russia increasingly seeks to frustrate the goals of the West. On February 7, President Putin, in a speech to the Munich security conference, accused the U.S. of "overstepping its borders in all spheres," and imposing itself on other states.



He accused the U.S. of a “hyper-inflated use of force.” Insofar as the policies of the U.S. have been undertaken either to protect the U.S. and other countries against terrorism or to promote and strengthen democracy, it is hard to interpret Putin’s words other than as a call for the U.S. to forswear almost all influence in the world and to leave the fate of democracy to the world’s dictators.

[http://hudson.org/files/pdf_upload/Russia-Web%20\(2\).pdf](http://hudson.org/files/pdf_upload/Russia-Web%20(2).pdf)

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (ICG)

BREAKING THE KOSOVO STALEMATE: EUROPE’S RESPONSIBILITY. ICG Europe Report N°185. 21 August 2007



The preferred strategy of the European Union (EU) and the U.S. to bring Kosovo to supervised independence through the United Nations Security Council has failed, following Russia’s declared intention to veto. With Kosovo Albanians increasingly restive and likely soon to declare unilateral independence in the absence of a credible alternative, Europe risks a new bloody and destabilising conflict. To avoid chaos on its doorstep, the EU and its member states must now accept the primary responsibility for bringing Kosovo to supervised independence.

The risks to Europe of inaction are substantial. Before the end of the year, Kosovo Albanian leaders will be under what is likely to be irresistible internal pressure to declare independence, with or without external support. If they act and are not supported, Kosovo would fracture: Serbia reclaiming the land pocket north of the Ibar River, Serbs elsewhere in Kosovo fleeing, and eight years of internationally guided institution-building lost. The implosion would destabilise neighbouring countries, increasing pressure for further fractures along ethnic lines. The EU would quickly experience refugee flows and feel the impact of the boost that disorder would give to organised crime networks in the Balkans that already distribute most of Europe’s heroin, facilitate illegal migration and are responsible for nearly 30 per cent of women victims of the sex trade worldwide.

http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/185_breaking_the_kosovo_stalemate__europe_s_responsibility.pdf

THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: CREATING AND IMPLEMENTING A NEW INTERNATIONAL NORM. Address by Gareth Evans, President, International Crisis Group, to Human Rights Law Resource Centre, Melbourne, 13 August 2007 and Community Legal Centres and Lawyers for Human Rights, Sydney, 28 August 2007

It has taken the world an insanely long time, centuries in fact, to come to terms conceptually with the idea that state sovereignty is not a license to kill — that there is something fundamentally and intolerably wrong about states murdering or forcibly displacing large numbers of their own citizens, or standing by when others do so, and that it is unacceptable for the rest of the world to allow that to happen. With the emergence of the responsibility to protect concept — or 'R2P' as we are now all calling it in this age of acronymomania — and in particular with its endorsement by the World Summit of 2005, and subsequently by the Security Council, we seem to have at last passed that milestone.

But there is still a big distance to go before we can be comfortable that emerging R2P situations will be understood as such; that there will be a reflex international response — both

among governments and publics — supportive of the need to respond appropriately, both preventively before the event and reactively after it, even when no national interests can be directly called in aid; and that the necessary policy tools and mechanisms will be in place, able and ready to be quickly mobilised. Anyone who thinks we no longer have to fear another Holocaust, Rwanda, Srebrenica or Kosovo just hasn't been concentrating.
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5036&l=1>

AFTER GAZA. ICG Middle East Report N°68. 2 August 2007



Hamas's takeover of Gaza and President Abbas's dismissal of the national unity government and appointment of one led by Salam Fayyad amount to a watershed in the Palestinian national movement's history. Some paint a positive picture, seeing the new government as one with which Israel can make peace. They hope that, with progress in the West Bank, stagnation in Gaza and growing pressure from ordinary Palestinians, a discredited Hamas will be forced out or forced to surrender. They are mistaken. The Ramallah-based government is adopting overdue decisions to reorganise security forces and control armed militants; Israel has reciprocated in some ways; and Hamas is struggling with its victory. But as long as the Palestinian schism endures, progress is on shaky ground. Security and a credible peace process depend on minimal intra-Palestinian consensus. Isolating Hamas strengthens its more radical wing and more radical Palestinian forces. The appointment of Tony Blair as new Quartet Special Envoy, the scheduled international meeting and reported Israeli-Palestinian talks on political issues are reasons for limited optimism. But a new Fatah-Hamas power-sharing arrangement is a prerequisite for a sustainable peace. If and when it happens the rest of the world must do what it should have before: accept it.

http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/arab_israeli_conflict/68_after_gaza.pdf

NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE (NTI)

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SOUTH ASIA: RECENT TRENDS.: Sharad Joshi, Postdoctoral Fellow, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. NTI Issue Brief. August 2007

In recent years, experts have closely studied two main aspects of regarding South Asian nuclear issues. First, nuclear modernization in the region continues with the development of longer-range and more reliable delivery systems, as well as qualitative and quantitative increases in fissile material and warheads. Initiatives, such as the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, have brought renewed focus on this issue due to its potential impact on proliferation in South Asia. Second, the A.Q. Khan network confirmed the entry of non-state actors into the realm of nuclear proliferation. Lingering questions regarding the network's activities suggest that its impact has not yet been fully assessed. There is still considerable demand for nuclear technology, both through horizontal proliferation from aspiring nuclear states such as Iran, and terrorist networks looking to augment their capabilities. This study will analyze these varied developments and investigate proliferation trends in the region.

http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_91.html

PEW

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OVERTAKES IRAQ AS MEDIA'S TOP STORY: A QUARTERLY REPORT OF THE PEJ NEWS COVERAGE INDEX. PEW Project for Excellence in Journalism, August 20, 2007



The 2008 Presidential campaign -- with its crowded field and accelerated timetable -- emerged as the leading story in the American news media in the second quarter of 2007, supplanting the policy debate over Iraq. And the once lopsided gap favoring Democrats over Republicans in campaign coverage became more balanced, according to a new study of the U.S. media.

In the derby for "free media" exposure, Barack Obama overtook fellow Democrat Hillary Clinton, who led in the first three months of the year, the report found. Among Republicans, the race for media attention was a tight contest among John McCain, Rudy Giuliani and Mitt Romney. And one unannounced candidate, actor and sometime politician Fred Thompson, emerged as a leading recipient of coverage even without formally entering the race. These are some of the findings drawn from the second quarterly report of the Project for Excellence in Journalism's News Coverage Index, a weekly content analysis of a broad cross-section of American news media.

Another major change in the period from April through June of 2007 was that press coverage of the war in Iraq declined markedly. Together the three major storylines of the war -- the policy debate, events on the ground, and the impact on the U.S. homefront -- filled 15% of the total newshole in the quarter, a drop of roughly a third from the first three months of the year, when it filled 22%.

<http://journalism.org/node/7069>

PAKISTANIS INCREASINGLY REJECT TERRORISM... AND THE U.S. Richard Wike. Pew Global Attitudes Project. August 8, 2007


As American leaders from George W. Bush to Barack Obama talk tough with Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf about getting tough with al Qaeda, Pakistanis may feel torn between sympathy and outrage. On one hand, they increasingly reject terrorist tactics and al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. But on the other, they continue to express both fear and loathing of the United States. Most Pakistanis fear the U.S. could become a military threat to their country, and despite their opposition to terrorism, few support the U.S.-led war on terror.

According to the recently released National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Pakistan remains a safe haven and base of operations for al Qaeda. Nonetheless, public opinion in Pakistan has actually grown considerably less supportive of terrorism in recent years. In 2004, 41% of Pakistani Muslims said that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilians were "often" or "sometimes justified" in order to defend Islam from its enemies, while only 35% felt that such attacks were never justified.¹ Today, only 9% say suicide attacks are often or sometimes justified, while 72% say this kind of violence is never defensible (another 9% say they are "rarely" justified).

<http://pewresearch.org/pubs/561/pakistan-terrorism>

RAND

UNGOVERNED TERRITORIES: UNDERSTANDING AND REDUCING TERRORISM RISKS. By: Angel Rabasa, Steven Boraz, et.al. RAND. August 23, 2007



Ungoverned territories — failed or failing states or ungoverned areas within otherwise viable states — generate all manner of security problems and can become terrorist sanctuaries. Using a two-tiered framework areas applied to eight case studies from around the globe, the authors seek to understand the conditions that give rise to ungoverned territories and what makes some ungoverned territories more conducive to a terrorist or insurgent presence than others. On the basis of this ground-breaking analytical work, they identify three types of ungoverned territories and their effects on U.S. security interests and develop strategies to improve the U.S. ability to mitigate these effects.

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG561.pdf

Summary only: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG561.sum.pdf

A CAPABILITIES-BASED STRATEGY FOR ARMY SECURITY COOPERATION. Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Adam Grissom, Jefferson P. Marquis. RAND Monograph



U.S. Army planners working on the problem of multinational force compatibility require a planning framework to guide and focus the service's long-term compatibility investments with partner armies of varying capabilities. This report defines and describes such a framework, called the Niche Capability Planning Framework. It provides a conceptual template for integrating the various considerations, ranging from U.S. Army capability gaps, to the politics of collaborating with foreign armies, to the coordination of Army and Department of Defense security cooperation activities, implicit in a strategy for cultivating compatible niche capabilities in non-core partner armies, which lack a stable, long-


term, collaborative program of assistance with the U.S. Army. The report concludes with specific recommendations for implementing the Niche Capability Planning framework, which should, at a minimum, incorporate analyses of projected Army capability gaps, key partner characteristics, and the resources required to match capabilities with partners in a systematic way.

Full Document: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG563.pdf

Summary only: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG563.sum.pdf

U.S. POLICY OPTIONS FOR IRAQ: A REASSESSMENT. By: Olga Olikier, Keith Crane, Audra K. Grant, Terrence K. Kelly, Andrew Rathmell, David Brannan. August 2007.

Iraq is the most pressing national security issue facing the United States today. This book evaluates the costs and benefits of five alternative strategies the United States could pursue in Iraq. The authors argue that, as long as the United States remains in Iraq, policy actions must focus on improving the security of Iraq's population by reducing violence. They offer recommendations for ways in which



U.S. political, security, and economic policies in Iraq could be better geared to support this goal, though they emphasize the challenges inherent in this endeavor. Specific recommendations focus on embedding and vetting efforts for both forces and government structures and on targeting economic assistance more effectively. The authors also suggest policies that might be implemented if violence subsides — but that should not be undertaken unless and until it does. The book concludes with a discussion of next steps if the United States decides to withdraw from Iraq, arguing that the United States needs to prepare now to mitigate the effects of failure.

Full document: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG613.pdf

Summary only: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG613.sum.pdf

STANLEY FOUNDATION

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY: 42nd Conference on the United Nations of the Next Decade. Sponsored by The Stanley Foundation, June 8-13, 2007. Posted on the web: August 2007.



What is the status of global counterterrorism efforts? This conference report summarizes the results of five days of intense discussion among assembled officials and experts from the United Nations, regional organizations, national governments, think tanks, and nongovernmental organizations on June 8-13, at St. Michaels, Maryland.

The discussions focused on the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, adopted by the UN General Assembly on September 8, 2006 (General Assembly Resolution 60/288). This event marked the first time member states agreed to a comprehensive, global, strategic framework on counterterrorism since the issue came before the League of Nations in 1934. The strategy aims to bring all the counterterrorism activities of the United Nations system into a common framework, putting special emphasis on the Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate and the Secretariat's Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force. The GA is scheduled to review progress on the strategy in September of 2008, adding additional urgency and incentive for UN agencies, member states, and other actors to back up the resolution with concrete counterterrorism efforts at the global level.

<http://www.stanleyfdn.org/publications/report/UNND807.pdf>

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE. U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

LATIN AMERICA'S NEW SECURITY REALITY: IRREGULAR ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT AND HUGO CHAVEZ. Authored by Dr. Max G. Manwaring. SSI Monograph. August 24, 2007

In 2005, Dr. Manwaring wrote a monograph entitled Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare. It came at a time when the United States and Venezuela were accelerating a verbal sparring match regarding which country was destabilizing Latin America more. President Chavez shows no sign of standing down; he slowly and deliberately centralizes his power in Venezuela, and carefully and adroitly articulates his



Bolivarian dream (the idea of a Latin American Liberation Movement against U.S. economic and political imperialism). Yet, most North Americans dismiss Chavez as a “nut case,” or—even if he is a threat to the security and stability of the Hemisphere—the possibilities of that threat coming to fruition are too far into the future to worry about. Dr. Manwaring’s intent is to explain in greater depth what President Chavez is doing and how he is doing it.
<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB808.pdf>


NEGOTIATION IN THE NEW STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT: LESSONS FROM IRAQ. Authored by Mr. David M Tressler. SSI : Monograph. August 21, 2007

With thousands of negotiations being conducted by U.S. soldiers in Iraq—from junior to senior leaders—the aggregate effect of successful or failed negotiations has an impact on the ability of the U.S. military to accomplish its mission there as well as meet American strategic goals. The author argues that the military’s strategic success in the future may increasingly depend on an expanded range of training that includes negotiation skills and practice. By analyzing the negotiating experience of U.S. Army and Marine Corps officers in Iraq, he offers recommendations to improve negotiating effectiveness and predeployment negotiation training.
<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB792.pdf>



AN INTRODUCTION TO THEATER STRATEGY AND REGIONAL SECURITY. Authored by Lieutenant Colonel Clarence J. Bouchat. SSI Letort Paper. August 2007

Theater strategy and theater security cooperation are two of the most important tools available in attaining national security. They offer an effective means for geographic Combatant Commanders to engage other countries, deter aggression, or resolve crises. However, there is little current, concise, and comprehensive guidance on how they are planned and implemented. This paper explains what theater strategy is, its basis, how it is formulated, and how it is executed with emphasis on theater security cooperation. The author illustrates the role in national affairs of theater strategy and security cooperation through examples from a case study leading up to and during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan.
<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB777.pdf>



SHAPING COMMITMENT: RESOLVING CANADA'S STRATEGY GAP IN AFGHANISTAN AND BEYOND. Authored by Colonel D. Craig Hilton. SSI Student (Carlisle) Papers. August 03, 2007

Alert me when similar studies are published Canada’s first ever National Security Policy (2004), followed by the International (Foreign) Policy Statement and Defence Policy Review (2005), has publicly articulated Canada’s principal security interests for the post-September 11, 2001, world. However, the realities of Canada’s present engagement in Afghanistan have highlighted a gap between stated national security and foreign policy goals on one hand, and the Canadian military, diplomatic, and development effort in theater, on the other. National interests and values are insufficient to frame the context for such




a complex endeavor. Only a clearly defined strategy based upon rigorous analysis of ends, ways, and means and assessment of risk can enable informed national and political debate, provide the required guidance for campaign planning among government departments, and determine Canada's preferred stake in the wider international arena, including the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Recommendations are provided with respect to resolving Canada's strategy gap in both the immediate and longer term.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB799.pdf>


SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR POST-TRANSITION CUBA. Authored by COL Alex Crowther. SSI Monograph. July 30, 2007

Alert me when similar studies are published Change is inevitable in Cuba. Both Fidel Castro and his brother Raul are aging. Their passing will trigger either a succession or a transition. Eventually Cuba will change. With that change, the security requirements of Cuba will change as well. This monograph provides an analysis of security requirements that the new Cuba will face and makes proposals on what missions and structure the Cuban security forces might have after a transition. The overall long-range US goal is a stable, democratic Cuba which is integrated into the global market economy. The U.S. Government Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba says that if a Cuban government asks for assistance, the United States could be made available "in preparing the Cuban military forces to adjust to an appropriate role in a democracy." This monograph proposes a way ahead in preparing Cuban forces for the future.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB785.pdf>



THE IMPLICATIONS OF PREEMPTIVE AND PREVENTIVE WAR DOCTRINES: A RECONSIDERATION. Authored by Dr. Colin S. Gray. SSI Monograph. July 24, 2007



Alert me when similar studies are published Preemption and prevention are different concepts. To preempt is to attempt to strike first against an enemy who is in the process of preparing, or is actually launching, an attack against you. Preemption is not controversial. The decision for war has been taken out of your hands. Prevention, however, is a decision to wage war, or conduct a strike, so as to prevent a far more dangerous context maturing in the future. To decide on preventive war is to elect to prevent a particular, very threatening strategic future from coming to pass. Despite much legal argument, there is no legal difficulty with either concept. The UN Charter, with its recognition of


the inherent right of sovereign states to self-defense, as generally interpreted around the world does not require a victim or target state to suffer the first blow. To strike preventively in self-defense is legal, though it will usually be controversial. Preventive war is simply war, distinguishable only by its timing, and possibly its motivation.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB789.pdf>

2007 KEY STRATEGIC ISSUES LIST (KSIL). Edited by Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria, II. SSI. July 18, 2007

Alert me when similar studies are published Today our nation faces several major challenges, ranging in type from the conflict in Iraq to changes in force size and structure. These challenges may be more significant than any the United States has faced in more than a decade. With the publication of the 2007 KSIL, the Strategic Studies Institute and the U.S. Army War College invite all researchers to contribute their efforts to resolving these challenges. Researchers are encouraged to contact any of the SSI points of contact, or those found in the Expanded KSIL, for further information regarding their desired topics. These points of contact are not necessarily subject experts, but can recommend such experts or additional sponsors.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB796.pdf>



UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

ON THE ISSUES: AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN. USIP. Posted: August 15, 2007

The U.S. Institute of Peace has experts on virtually every major conflict in the world today, from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe. As part of a new series, USIP will publish interviews with our experts to discuss the background and stakes for the United States of recent developments in these conflict zones.

Afghanistan and Pakistan have been very high on the international radar screen in August. Afghan President Hamid Karzai made his first ever visit to Camp David with President Bush to re-focus the U.S.-Afghan partnership on critical challenges, and a few days later, Afghanistan hosted a "Peace Jirga"—an assembly of over 600 tribal elders from the border areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan. As the tribal gathering was underway, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf delayed his trip to Kabul to attend this jirga as he met with advisors, contemplating placing Pakistan under marshal law. And just as reports have emerged that 2007 promises to set new records for opium production in Afghanistan, the U.S. State Department issued a new counter-narcotics strategy to address the problem.


USIP asked Senior Rule of Law Advisor Alex Thier, an attorney who has spent 14 years working on Afghanistan and Pakistan, to put these issues into context.
http://www.usip.org/on_the_issues/afghanistan_pakistan.html

PUBLIC OPINION IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT: FROM GENEVA TO DISENGAGEMENT TO KADIMA AND HAMAS. Jacob Shamir. Peaceworks, U.S. Institute of Peace. Web posted July 2, 2007. 07AD815


This monograph addresses the issue of how public opinion influences domestic policymaking. The research is based on public opinions collected from both Israeli and Palestinian citizens after the start of the second intifada in 2000. The study provides a summary of the public sentiment regarding conflict resolution and peacemaking options. It also examines the “role of public opinion at crucial junctures in the Israeli-Palestinian two-level game.”

Full Text:

<http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pwks60.pdf> [pdf format, 72 pages]




THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR-EAST POLICY

TRAINING THE IRAQI AIR FORCE: LESSONS FROM A U.S. C-130 ADVISORY MISSION. Michael Bauer. The Washington Institute for Near-East Policy. Policy Focus #73. August 2007

Among the many initiatives for training the Iraqi military, one little-publicized but crucial effort has been the U.S. Air Force's ongoing series of comprehensive advisory missions. Central Command's latest plan to develop Iraqi airpower calls for dramatic increases in the number of Iraqi Air Force personnel and aircraft, as well as the number of American advisors. How can the United States meet those goals amid continuing force commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan? And what can incoming personnel learn from past training efforts? In this Washington Institute Policy Focus, Lt. Col. Michael Bauer outlines the history, current status, and future prospects of air force

training programs in Iraq. Drawing from his own experience commanding various C-130 combat and training missions during Operation Iraqi Freedom, he offers an on-the-ground look at the obstacles to successful training and a step-by-step guide to improving both U.S. advisory efforts and the capabilities of Iraqi Air Force personnel. Although challenges always exist when training and advising foreign forces, thorough preparation of American advisors and understanding of Iraq's military culture and unique operating environment can help ensure that their mutual airpower goals are met.

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/download.php?file=PolicyFocus73Initial.pdf>

DETECTING THE AYATOLLAHS: COMPLICATIONS IN APPLYING COLD WAR STRATEGY TO IRAN. Patrick Clawson and Michael Eisenstadt (Eds.) The Washington Institute for Near-East Policy. Policy Focus #72. July 2007

Given the possibility that diplomacy might not succeed and that preventive military action might provide only a temporary fix, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy commissioned a series of essays to investigate the challenges posed by deterring a nuclear Iran. Authors were asked to compare and contrast classic Cold War deterrence with the challenges of deterring a nuclear Iran, and to examine how the idiosyncratic nature of the regime in Tehran would influence efforts to deter it.

Consideration of deterrence should not be read as resigned acceptance that Iran will acquire nuclear weapons. Quite the contrary: a strong deterrent posture implemented now could be a useful way of demonstrating to Iran's leaders that nuclear weapons will bring them little if any benefit, and that the nuclear program is not worth the high political and economic cost. History offers ample precedent for deterrence as a means of dissuasion, such as the Soviet Union's agreement to dismantle the SS-20 missiles after NATO deployed similar intermediate-range missiles. Furthermore, a sober examination of the risks and costs of deterring Iran could be a useful reminder of why a diplomatic agreement is a much better solution, thereby stimulating the international community to more vigorously support diplomatic initiatives, including active enforcement of the diplomacy-supporting sanctions mandated by the UN Security Council.

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/download.php?file=PolicyFocus72FinalWeb.pdf>

ARTICLES FROM U.S. JOURNALS

THE LIMITS OF TRAINING IN IRAQI FORCE DEVELOPMENT. Felicetti, Gary. *Parameters* vol. 36, no. 4, Winter 2006-07, pp. 71-83. AA07283

Summary: Although training Iraqi national security forces is often touted as the key to victory, it may not be a realistic solution. More training will not solve the forces' multiple problems, including improper selection of candidates and leaders, a poor organizational culture, flawed work environments, divided loyalties, and officers focused on basic survival. These challenges must be addressed, not simply through more training exercises, but by the far more complex task of nation-building. Currently available on the Internet at <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06winter/felicetti.htm> [IS;VS]

MY CYBER COUNTER-JIHAD. Rossmiller, Shannen. *Middle East*, Vol. 14, no. 3, Summer 2007. AA07287

Summary: On Sept. 11, the author was a small-town municipal judge in Montana and mother of three with no knowledge of Arabic or expertise in the Middle East. But the 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. and news reports about terrorists and associates using web sites and chat rooms to carry out operations and recruit converts galvanized her to explore the Internet. Soon she would begin studying Arabic online and navigating through a world of what she describes as jihadi websites. Rossmiller improved her Arabic and used an online translation service to make contacts and create a false identity. She fed tips to the FBI that helped their investigations. One of them contributed to the arrest of an American Army National Guard specialist from Washington State who was posing as a Muslim convert and offering information about weaknesses of his tank unit on the eve of its departure for Iraq. The author's identity was compromised during the man's military hearing, making her vulnerable to death threats and leaving her with a bullet-ridden car. While now employing security protection, Rossmiller's online sleuthing continues prompting the now-retired judge to warn that her experience with the terrorists use of web technology suggests that "Western governments lag behind in Internet cyber-warfare with al-Qaida." Available online at <http://www.meforum.org/article/1711> [IS;JSP]

OVERHAULING INTELLIGENCE. McConnell, Mike. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 4, July-August 2007, pp. 49-58 AA07272

Summary: McConnell, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, makes clear how much hard work remains to coordinate the 16 agencies that collect a billion bits of new information a day to thwart terrorists and other threats. The big challenge is striking the right balance between centralized direction and decentralized action. Coordination of domestic and foreign intelligence remains a problem. A new single culture must supplant the differing cultures of the separate agencies. Collaboration among the federal agencies and between them and state and local governments and businesses is more important than ever, given the rapid action required by strategic threats these days. Intelligence officers need to begin viewing their work as sharing information, not owning it, and they need to overcome their risk aversion to hiring native speakers of foreign languages. They need to develop and adapt technology more quickly and efficiently, and they need sustained public and political support. Currently

available online at <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070701faessay86404/mike-mcconnell/overhauling-intelligence.html> [PUBS;BEO]

STORMING THE IVORY TOWER: THE MILITARY'S RETURN TO AMERICAN CAMPUSES. Lindemann, Marc. *Parameters*, vol. 36, no. 4, Winter 2006-07, pp. 44-57. AA07271

Summary: The author, a U.S. Army lieutenant, writes that the U.S. military must take full advantage of recruiting opportunities again available at the most selective university campuses, a result of a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision that removed remaining restrictions and opened up the possibility of reinstating Reserve Officers' Training Corps' (ROTC) in American colleges. The author also traces the history of ROTC at Yale University. Currently available online at <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06winter/lindeman.htm> [IS;VS]

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