

U.S., China Share Concern over Iranian Nuclear Program

Chinese President Hu Jintao met with President Obama on the sidelines of the two-day Nuclear Security Summit in Washington April 12.

By Merle David Kellerhals Jr.

Washington — President Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao have instructed their delegations to work with other nations and the U.N. Security Council in drafting potential sanctions against Iran over its nuclear development program, a senior presidential adviser says.

“The Chinese very clearly share our concern about the Iranian nuclear program,” said Jeff Bader, senior director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council. “The resolution will make clear to Iran the costs of pursuing a nuclear program that violates Iran’s obligations and responsibilities.”

The five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council — Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States — plus Germany have been conducting intensive diplomacy with Iranian officials over its nuclear program. This group grew out of earlier efforts by Britain, France and Germany to convince Iran to suspend uranium enrichment in return for a package of incentives. The six powers offered Iran a package of trade and diplomatic incentives three years ago to forgo its uranium enrichment efforts, and have added to the incentives, but Iranian authorities continue to reject suspension of uranium enrichment.

Obama and Hu met for about 90 minutes April 12 on the sidelines of the two-day, U.S.-hosted Nuclear Security Summit in Washington. It was the fourth time that Obama and Hu have met directly. Bader told reporters during a conference call that the two leaders held a conversation about issues that affect China and the United States, but also on more strategic issues such as Iran.

“The two presidents agreed that the two delegations should work on a sanctions resolution in New York, and that’s what we’re doing,” Bader said. “We’re going to be working on that in the coming days and weeks.”

Bader also said the discussion sends a clear signal of international unity to the Iranian leadership, and that the Chinese are actively at the negotiating table at the U.N. Security Council.

“It’s also, I think, a strong indication of the way in which the U.S. and China are working together in a positive way on Iran and other issues,” he said.

SANCTIONS IMPOSED

The U.N. Security Council has previously imposed three rounds of political and economic sanctions to convince Iranian leaders to halt uranium enrichment and give up plans for a weapons program. The first set concerns sensitive nuclear materials and froze the assets of individual Iranians and some companies. The second set included new arms and financial sanctions, and the third set added further travel and financial sanctions.

The United States shut out Iran’s Bank Saderat from the U.S. financial system in September 2006, and added Bank Melli and Bank Mellat in October 2007. The United States has also sanctioned Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard, which controls the nuclear development program.

The European Union has imposed visa bans on senior Iranian officials and its top nuclear and ballistics experts. Britain has frozen Iranian assets under EU- and U.N.-imposed sanctions.

Clinton, Gates Interview on ABC's "This Week"

Secretaries answer questions on Iran, nuclear security, Israel, more

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Office of the Spokesman

April 11, 2010

INTERVIEW

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton

And Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

With Jake Tapper of ABC's "This Week"

April 9, 2010

Department of Defense

Washington, D.C.

QUESTION: Secretary Clinton, I'd like to start with you. This has been a big week for talking about deterrents. Especially deterrents against Iran. And yet we learned that Iran is announcing the third generation of centrifuges. Six times faster than the previous generation. Is Iran not saying to the United States, "We are not deterred"?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, Jake, it has been a very positive week for American foreign policy, and particularly with respect to our nuclear posture. When it comes to Iran, we take everything they say with more than a grain of salt, because we know that they have a -- a tendency to say things that may or may not be carried out. May or may not be accurate. But in fact their belligerence is helping to make our case every single day.

Countries that might have had doubts about Iranian intentions, who might have even questioned whether Iran was seeking nuclear weapons, are having those doubts dispelled as much by the evidence we present as by what comes out of the leadership of Iran.

QUESTION: Secretary Gates, just a year and a half ago you had a different boss but you had the same job. And you were expressing support for the idea that nuclear weapons can be an effective deterrent against chemical and biological weapons:

GATES (from October 28, 2008): "In the first Gulf War, we made it very clear that if Saddam used chemical or biological weapons, then the United States would keep all options on the table. We later learned that this veiled threat had the intended deterrent effect as Iraq considered its options."

QUESTION: It's a refrain that a lot of Republicans have talked about that the United States is taking things off the table that would deter other countries.

Did you change your mind?

SECRETARY GATES: Well I think what's happened is the situation has changed. We have more robust deterrents today, because we've added to the nuclear deterrent missile defense. And -- and with the phased adaptive approach that the president has approved, we will have significantly greater capability to deter the Iranians, because we will have a significantly greater missile defense.

We're also developing this conventional prompt global strike, which really hadn't gone anywhere in the -- in the Bush administration, but has been embraced by the new administration. That allows us to use long range missiles with conventional warheads. So we have -- we have more tools if you will in the deterrents kit bag than -- than we used to.

QUESTION: Secretary Clinton, the United States according to the nuclear posture review -- the United States will not be developing new nuclear weapons. China will. Russia will. You said, when you were running for president in 2007:

CLINTON (from August 2, 2007): "Presidents should be very careful at all times in discussing the use or non-use of nuclear weapons. Presidents since the cold war have used nuclear deterrents to keep the peace. I don't believe that any president should make any blanket statements with respect to the use or non-use of nuclear weapons."

QUESTION: Did you change your mind?

SECRETARY CLINTON: No, Jake. Because I think if you actually read the nuclear posture review, you would make three conclusions. First -- we intend to maintain a robust nuclear deterrent. Let no one be mistaken. The United States will defend ourselves, and defend our partners and allies. We intend to sustain that nuclear deterrent by modernizing the existing stockpile. In fact, we have \$5 billion in this year's budget going into that very purpose.

We believe, and this is a collective judgment from this government that is certainly shared by the secretary of defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the secretary of energy, and the others along with the State Department who worked on this nuclear posture review, that we can have the kind of deterrent that we need by modernizing our stockpile, but not necessarily having to replace and build new nuclear weapons.

But if there is a conclusion down the road that there does have to be consideration for some kind of replacement, that decision will go to the president. We don't think that we'll get there. We think that we have more than an adequate nuclear deterrent.

And with this emphasis on our nuclear stockpile, and the stewardship program that we are engaged in, that we'll be, you know, stronger than anybody in the world as we always have been with more nuclear weapons than are needed many times over. And so we do not see this as in any way a diminishment of what we are able to do.

SECRETARY GATES: Let me -- let me just chime in, in this respect. The reliable replacement warhead program that existed in the past was really a means to an end. It was a means to modernizing the nuclear stockpile as Secretary Clinton says. Making it more reliable, safer, and -- and more secure. It -- that -- the policy of the Bush administration was also not to -- to -- not to add new nuclear capabilities. This was about how do you make the stockpile safer and more reliable.

The approach that we now have is -- is intended to do exactly that. It offers us a path forward, as Secretary Clinton says, in terms of reuse, refurbishment, and -- and if necessary, replacement of components. Not an entire warhead necessarily. So the chiefs, and I and -- and the directors of the nuclear labs are all very comfortable that -- that this puts us in a position to modernize the stockpile and -- and the \$5 billion dollars that Hillary has referred to is actually just what's in our budget to -- for this program.

There is another big chunk of money in the Department of Energy budget for this infrastructure and modernization program as well. So we think this is a pretty robust approach to -- to sustaining and modernizing the stockpile.

QUESTION: Let's turn to the nuclear security summit that's about to start. Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel has said he's -- he's not going to come amidst concerns that some of the Arab and Muslim countries -- Egypt and Turkey in particular -- were going to raise the worst kept secret in the world that Israel has nuclear weapons and the fact that Israel is not a signatory to the non-proliferation treaty.

Don't they have a point?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well part of the goal of the nuclear security summit is to focus on the threat from nuclear terrorism. And we don't believe the threat from nuclear terrorism comes from states. Our biggest concern is that terrorists will get nuclear material. We fear North Korea and Iran, because their behavior as -- the first case, North Korea being -- already having nuclear weapons, and Iran seeking them -- is that they are unpredictable. They have an attitude toward countries like Israel, like their other neighbors in the Gulf that makes them a danger.

So we are focusing on the two states, but we are also very concerned about nuclear material falling into terrorists' hands. And that's a concern that we all share. So part of the challenge is to bring the world together as President Obama is doing in the nuclear security summit. To have everyone sign off on an agreed upon work plan that will enable us to begin to try to tie up these loose nukes, and these loose nuclear materials. To make sure they don't fall into the wrong hands.

And Israel will be represented by the deputy prime minister. And will be at the table as we begin to try to figure out how to deal with this particular problem.

QUESTION: Is that a good thing, because it would have made the summit into a -- a side show?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well that's a decision for every government to make as to who comes and who doesn't come.

So the point is that countries will be represented. And the overall goal of this nuclear security summit is to make progress. I have to say, Jake, you know this is something that Secretary Gates and I have said repeatedly. You know, the threat of nuclear war -- nuclear attack as we grew up with in the Cold War has diminished. The threat of nuclear terrorism has increased. And we want to get the world's attention focused where we think it needs to be with these continuing efforts by Al Qaeda and others to get just enough nuclear material to cause terrible havoc, destruction, and loss of life somewhere in the world.

QUESTION: President Obama officials say he's contemplating presenting a peace plan to help jump start the process between the Israelis and the Palestinians. What advice do you give President Obama when it comes to whether or not he should offer a peace plan?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well I never share advice that I give directly to any president.

QUESTION: Well then, hypothetically?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well -- and I don't answer hypotheticals. But I will say this. That this administration from the very first day has made it clear we are committed to pursuing a path of peace in the Middle East. And to get the two parties to get to a point where they can engage in negotiations again to deal with these very difficult final status issues.

Our goal remains the resumption -- the relaunch of negotiations. Both indirect -- eventually leading to direct, and that's our focus.

QUESTION: Secretary Gates, turning to Afghanistan, when you hear President Karzai refer to the 87,000 troops under your command when you -- as occupiers, and suggest that he could envision joining the Taliban, how does that affect you? Does it make your blood boil?

SECRETARY GATES: Well I think, you know, this is a -- a man who's first of all a political leader. He has domestic audiences as well as foreign audiences. What I can tell you is that General McChrystal continues to meet with him regularly. They have a very positive relationship. He gets very good cooperation out of President Karzai. I think that the -- the Afghans are very concerned about their sovereignty. And they are very concerned that -- that it be clear who -- who is the president of Afghanistan.

And -- and that he be treated with respect, because he is the representative of the people of Afghanistan and their sovereignty. And I think that -- I think that that kind of cooperative relationship, certainly that he has with -- I can only speak for General McChrystal's side of it. But I think General McChrystal feels that this is a man he can work easily with. And -- and he has taken him to Kandahar. He has indicated he's willing to go to Kandahar repeatedly for the Shuras as the Kandahar campaign gets underway.

So I think that the -- that the day to day working relationship, certainly on the military side, and -- and between General McChrystal and President Karzai is -- is working well. And I think -- I think we frankly have to be sensitive in our own comments about President Karzai in terms of being mindful that he is the embodiment of sovereignty for Afghanistan also in the way we treat him.

QUESTION: Secretary Gates, WikiLeaks recently released a video that showed U.S. troops killing some civilians in Iraq. I understand the fog of war, and I understand that -- that this was a very difficult situation. Does the release of that video, and the fact that that happened damage the image of the U.S. in the world?

SECRETARY GATES: I don't think so. They're -- they're in a combat situation. The video doesn't show the broader picture of the -- of the firing that was going on at American troops. It's obviously a hard thing to see. It's painful to see, especially when you learn after the fact what was going on. But you -- you talked about the fog of war. These people were operating in split second situations.

And, you know, we -- we've investigated it very thoroughly. And it's -- it's unfortunate. It's clearly not helpful. But by the same token, I think -- think it should not have any lasting consequences.

QUESTION: Secretary Clinton. I -- I do want to ask you a couple of domestic questions.

First of all, there was a Supreme Court opening. What advice would you give President Obama?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well I think President Obama is fully aware of this great responsibility and opportunity that Justice Stevens' retirement presents him. And as a former law professor, I know he is devoted to the Constitution. And understands the critical role that the court plays in so many areas of our - our lives as Americans.

And I'm confident that he's going to nominate a highly qualified person. And I hope that there will be a smooth confirmation, because whoever the president nominates will be qualified to sit on the court. And I

think it would be really reassuring for the country to see Republicans and Democrats working together to confirm a nominee as soon as possible.

QUESTION: And lastly, healthcare reform. When you look at President Obama's success that he was able to get this done. Do you think, "Oh, that's how you do it?" Or do you think that the only way he was able to do it was because you and your husband stormed the castle first. And even if it didn't work, you laid the ground work for President Obama to help to be able to succeed?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Jake, I don't think either of those things. I think thank goodness. Finally the United States is going to have a system that will begin to meet the needs of all of our people, reform our insurance industry which is long overdue. Begin to control costs, which is absolutely critical. And, you know, it's been a long time coming. It goes back many decades. And I think it's an extraordinary historical achievement. And I'm delighted to, you know, have -- have seen it come to pass.

QUESTION: Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, thanks so much for joining us.

SECRETARY GATES: Pleasure.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you.

Biden at Nuclear Security Summit Luncheon with Leaders

Biden welcomes leaders to historic summit in search of a common goal

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Vice President

April 12, 2010

REMARKS BY THE VICE PRESIDENT BEFORE A LUNCH MEETING WITH FOREIGN LEADERS AND DIGNITARIES

Naval Observatory

Washington, D.C.

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Before we begin, I would like to ask for a moment of silence for the passing of our colleague, Polish President Lech Kaczynski, who with other members of the Polish government perished this week. Thank you.

Once again, I welcome all of you to Washington and welcome you to our home. This week, in my view and the President's view, represents a historic gathering of leaders working toward a historic task of creating a better and a safer world for all our peoples.

The President and I are honored that you've all agreed to be here this week. We value deeply the ability to bring so many important voices together, so many diverse opinions, in search of a common goal.

The goals of the non-aligned movement and my country on the important issues of nuclear security, non-proliferation, as well as other issues have never been closer than they are today, in our view. Our nuclear posture review that we've just completed has made it clear that the United States is committed to reducing the number of nuclear weapons in our arsenal and reducing their role in our defense.

Along with the START treaty signed with Russia last week, we've made clear that the reductions that are going to take place between our countries are going to be real, transparent, and legally binding.

And the President of the United States has committed our country to seek peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. We believe that is ultimately an achievable goal, and that is our goal.

We know that some of the countries here and elsewhere believe that we have not been moving fast enough or that we can do more. Well, there is room to disagree on the exact approach of reducing nuclear weapons, but make no mistake about it this administration is intent on reducing and continuing to reduce our nuclear weapons.

The one thing we can all agree on, I hope, is that adding more nuclear weapons or more nuclear-weapon states is the exact wrong approach at this moment in the world's history, one that endangers the entire community of nations were we allow it to happen.

We can also agree, I hope, that controlling all nuclear materials that can produce a bomb is in the interest of every one of us gathered around this table and everyone in the world. As world leaders, we all know that there are extremist groups and non-state actors seeking that capability right now, seeking to gain access to nuclear materials to make a nuclear bomb.

There are hundreds of tons of nuclear material scattered over 40 countries, including the United States of America and many in the countries here. And just 50 pounds of high purity uranium smaller than a soccer ball could destroy the downtown of all our capital cities and kill tens if not hundreds of thousands of individuals. So it's very much in our interest to gain control.

This is the horrific threat that we all face together, and one that we are determined we will defeat together. This week is testament to the common ground we all share. But just as we all agree on the need to prevent a nuclear disaster, we also agree on the benefits of nuclear technology and peaceful nuclear power, what it can do to bring the world -- if properly managed and protected -- to a better place.

The United States of America stands fully committed to supporting the promotion of peaceful benefits of nuclear power, in the context though -- in the context of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. But, again, here we can all agree that those who have developed nuclear technology should do so -- are going to develop a peaceful nuclear technology must do so wisely, with a proper attention to security, good governance, and as safely as it can possibly be done.

As countries seeking to develop your nuclear sectors, we stand ready to support you, to share our experience with you.

And we recognize that it is not a problem for governments alone to control this fissile material, it requires good regulations and public-private partnerships to get it right.

More than half the world's dangerous nuclear materials are owned not by governments but by industry. And we will work with them, as we will work with you, to address our common concerns.

Later this week, I'll be hosting a roundtable for companies from the world's leading nuclear industries to see how we can further enhance a partnership and guarantee their safety and security.

So, again, let me thank each and every one of you for coming today this afternoon to our home. And I ask that this week we help each other seize this historic opportunity that is in front of us to make the world we share together a safer and a more harmonious place.

I thank you all for coming, and I thank the press for being here. And now we'll have some lunch, and have a discussion. Thank you.

Communiqué from Washington Nuclear Security Summit

Nations pledge to strengthen nuclear security, reduce nuclear terrorism

April 13, 2010

Nuclear terrorism is one of the most challenging threats to international security, and strong nuclear security measures are the most effective means to prevent terrorists, criminals, or other unauthorized actors from acquiring nuclear materials.

In addition to our shared goals of nuclear disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, we also all share the objective of nuclear security. Therefore those gathered here in Washington, D.C. on April 13, 2010, commit to strengthen nuclear security and reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism. Success will require responsible national actions and sustained and effective international cooperation.

We welcome and join President Obama's call to secure all vulnerable nuclear material in four years, as we work together to enhance nuclear security.

Therefore, we:

1. Reaffirm the fundamental responsibility of States, consistent with their respective international obligations, to maintain effective security of all nuclear materials, which includes nuclear materials used in nuclear weapons, and nuclear facilities under their control; to prevent non-state actors from obtaining the information or technology required to use such material for malicious purposes; and emphasize the importance of robust national legislative and regulatory frameworks for nuclear security;
2. Call on States to work cooperatively as an international community to advance nuclear security, requesting and providing assistance as necessary;
3. Recognize that highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium require special precautions and agree to promote measures to secure, account for, and consolidate these materials, as appropriate; and encourage the conversion of reactors from highly enriched to low enriched uranium fuel and minimization of use of highly enriched uranium, where technically and economically feasible;
4. Endeavor to fully implement all existing nuclear security commitments and work toward acceding to those not yet joined, consistent with national laws, policies and procedures;
5. Support the objectives of international nuclear security instruments, including the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, as amended, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, as essential elements of the global nuclear security architecture;
6. Reaffirm the essential role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the international nuclear security framework and will work to ensure that it continues to have the appropriate structure, resources and expertise needed to carry out its mandated nuclear security activities in accordance with its Statute, relevant General Conference resolutions and its Nuclear Security Plans;
7. Recognize the role and contributions of the United Nations as well as the contributions of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the G-8-led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction within their respective mandates and memberships;

8. Acknowledge the need for capacity building for nuclear security and cooperation at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels for the promotion of nuclear security culture through technology development, human resource development, education, and training; and stress the importance of optimizing international cooperation and coordination of assistance;

9. Recognize the need for cooperation among States to effectively prevent and respond to incidents of illicit nuclear trafficking; and agree to share, subject to respective national laws and procedures, information and expertise through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms in relevant areas such as nuclear detection, forensics, law enforcement, and the development of new technologies;

10. Recognize the continuing role of nuclear industry, including the private sector, in nuclear security and will work with industry to ensure the necessary priority of physical protection, material accountancy, and security culture;

11. Support the implementation of strong nuclear security practices that will not infringe upon the rights of States to develop and utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and technology and will facilitate international cooperation in the field of nuclear security; and

12. Recognize that measures contributing to nuclear material security have value in relation to the security of radioactive substances and encourage efforts to secure those materials as well.

Maintaining effective nuclear security will require continuous national efforts facilitated by international cooperation and undertaken on a voluntary basis by States. We will promote the strengthening of global nuclear security through dialogue and cooperation with all states.

Thus, we issue the Work Plan as guidance for national and international action including through cooperation within the context of relevant international fora and organizations. We will hold the next Nuclear Security Summit in the Republic of Korea in 2012.

Nuclear Posture Review Report: Executive Summary

Outlines U.S. administration's approach to use of nuclear weapons

U.S. Department of Defense
April 6, 2010

Nuclear Posture Review Report

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In his April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama highlighted 21st century nuclear dangers, declaring that to overcome these grave and growing threats, the United States will “seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” He recognized that such an ambitious goal could not be reached quickly – perhaps, he said, not in his lifetime. But the President expressed his determination to take concrete steps toward that goal, including by reducing the number of nuclear weapons and their role in U.S. national security strategy. At the same time, he pledged that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal, both to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America's security commitments.

The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) outlines the Administration's approach to promoting the President's agenda for reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, while simultaneously advancing broader U.S. security interests. The NPR reflects the President's national security priorities and the supporting defense strategy objectives identified in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review.

After describing fundamental changes in the international security environment, the NPR report focuses on five key objectives of our nuclear weapons policies and posture:

1. Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism;
2. Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy;
3. Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels;
4. Strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and
5. Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.

While the NPR focused principally on steps to be taken in the next five to ten years, it also considered the path ahead for U.S. nuclear strategy and posture over the longer term. Making sustained progress to reduce nuclear dangers, while ensuring security for ourselves and our allies and partners, will require a concerted effort by a long succession of U.S. Administrations and Congresses. Forging a sustainable consensus on the way ahead is critical.

The Changed – and Changing – International Security Environment

The international security environment has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. The threat of global nuclear war has become remote, but the risk of nuclear attack has increased.

As President Obama has made clear, today's most immediate and extreme danger is nuclear terrorism. Al Qaeda and their extremist allies are seeking nuclear weapons. We must assume they would use such weapons if they managed to obtain them. The vulnerability to theft or seizure of vast stocks of such nuclear materials around the world, and the availability of sensitive equipment and technologies in the

nuclear black market, create a serious risk that terrorists may acquire what they need to build a nuclear weapon.

Today's other pressing threat is nuclear proliferation. Additional countries – especially those at odds with the United States, its allies and partners, and the broader international community – may acquire nuclear weapons. In pursuit of their nuclear ambitions, North Korea and Iran have violated non-proliferation obligations, defied directives of the United Nations Security Council, pursued missile delivery capabilities, and resisted international efforts to resolve through diplomatic means the crises they have created. Their provocative behavior has increased instability in their regions and could generate pressures in neighboring countries for considering nuclear deterrent options of their own. Continued non-compliance with non-proliferation norms by these and other countries would seriously weaken the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), with adverse security implications for the United States and the international community.

While facing the increasingly urgent threats of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation, the United States must continue to address the more familiar challenge of ensuring strategic stability with existing nuclear powers – most notably Russia and China. Russia remains America's only peer in the area of nuclear weapons capabilities. But the nature of the U.S.-Russia relationship has changed fundamentally since the days of the Cold War. While policy differences continue to arise between the two countries and Russia continues to modernize its still-formidable nuclear forces, Russia and the United States are no longer adversaries, and prospects for military confrontation have declined dramatically. The two have increased their cooperation in areas of shared interest, including preventing nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation.

The United States and China are increasingly interdependent and their shared responsibilities for addressing global security threats, such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and terrorism, are growing. At the same time, the United States and China's Asian neighbors remain concerned about China's current military modernization efforts, including its qualitative and quantitative modernization of its nuclear arsenal. China's nuclear arsenal remains much smaller than the arsenals of Russia and the United States. But the lack of transparency surrounding its nuclear programs – their pace and scope, as well as the strategy and doctrine that guides them – raises questions about China's future strategic intentions.

These changes in the nuclear threat environment have altered the hierarchy of our nuclear concerns and strategic objectives. In coming years, we must give top priority to discouraging additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities and stopping terrorist groups from acquiring nuclear bombs or the materials to build them. At the same time, we must continue to maintain stable strategic relationships with Russia and China and counter threats posed by any emerging nuclear-armed states, thereby protecting the United States and our allies and partners against nuclear threats or intimidation, and reducing any incentives they might have to seek their own nuclear deterrents.

Implications for U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policies and Force Posture

The massive nuclear arsenal we inherited from the Cold War era of bipolar military confrontation is poorly suited to address the challenges posed by suicidal terrorists and unfriendly regimes seeking nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is essential that we better align our nuclear policies and posture to our most urgent priorities – preventing nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation.

This does not mean that our nuclear deterrent has become irrelevant. Indeed, as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will sustain safe, secure, and effective nuclear forces. These nuclear forces will

continue to play an essential role in deterring potential adversaries and reassuring allies and partners around the world.

But fundamental changes in the international security environment in recent years – including the growth of unrivaled U.S. conventional military capabilities, major improvements in missile defenses, and the easing of Cold War rivalries – enable us to fulfill those objectives at significantly lower nuclear force levels and with reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. Therefore, without jeopardizing our traditional deterrence and reassurance goals, we are now able to shape our nuclear weapons policies and force structure in ways that will better enable us to meet our most pressing security challenges.

- By reducing the role and numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons – meeting our NPT Article VI obligation to make progress toward nuclear disarmament – we can put ourselves in a much stronger position to persuade our NPT partners to join with us in adopting the measures needed to reinvigorate the non-proliferation regime and secure nuclear materials worldwide.
- By maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent and reinforcing regional security architectures with missile defenses and other conventional military capabilities, we can reassure our non-nuclear allies and partners worldwide of our security commitments to them and confirm that they do not need nuclear weapons capabilities of their own.
- By pursuing a sound Stockpile Management Program for extending the life of U.S. nuclear weapons, we can ensure a safe, secure, and effective deterrent without the development of new nuclear warheads or further nuclear testing.
- By modernizing our aging nuclear facilities and investing in human capital, we can substantially reduce the number of nuclear weapons we retain as a hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise, accelerate dismantlement of retired warheads, and improve our understanding of foreign nuclear weapons activities.
- By promoting strategic stability with Russia and China and improving transparency and mutual confidence, we can help create the conditions for moving toward a world without nuclear weapons and build a stronger basis for addressing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.
- By working to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in international affairs and moving step-by-step toward eliminating them, we can reverse the growing expectation that we are destined to live in a world with more nuclear-armed states, and decrease incentives for additional countries to hedge against an uncertain future by pursuing nuclear options of their own.

Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Terrorism

As a critical element of our effort to move toward a world free of nuclear weapons, the United States will lead expanded international efforts to rebuild and strengthen the global nuclear nonproliferation regime – and for the first time, the 2010 NPR places this priority atop the U.S. nuclear agenda. Concerns have grown in recent years that we are approaching a nuclear tipping point – that unless today’s dangerous trends are arrested and reversed, before very long we will be living in a world with a steadily growing number of nuclear-armed states and an increasing likelihood of terrorists getting their hands on nuclear weapons.

The U.S. approach to preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism includes three key elements. First, we seek to bolster the nuclear non-proliferation regime and its centerpiece, the NPT, by reversing the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran, strengthening International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and enforcing compliance with them, impeding illicit nuclear trade, and promoting the

peaceful uses of nuclear energy without increasing proliferation risks. Second, we are accelerating efforts to implement President Obama's initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide in four years.

And third, we are pursuing arms control efforts – including the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and negotiation of a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty – as a means of strengthening our ability to mobilize broad international support for the measures needed to reinforce the non-proliferation regime and secure nuclear materials worldwide.

Among key Administration initiatives are:

- Pursuing aggressively the President's Prague initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide, including accelerating the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the International Nuclear Material Protection and Cooperation Program. This includes increasing funding in fiscal year (FY) 2011 for Department of Energy nuclear nonproliferation programs to \$2.7 billion, more than 25 percent.
- Enhancing national and international capabilities to disrupt illicit proliferation networks and interdict smuggled nuclear materials, and continuing to expand our nuclear forensics efforts to improve the ability to identify the source of nuclear material used or intended for use in a terrorist nuclear explosive device.
- Initiating a comprehensive national research and development program to support continued progress toward a world free of nuclear weapons, including expanded work on verification technologies and the development of transparency measures.
- Renewing the U.S. commitment to hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts.

Reducing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons

The role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security and U.S. military strategy has been reduced significantly in recent decades, but further steps can and should be taken at this time.

The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons, which will continue as long as nuclear weapons exist, is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners.

During the Cold War, the United States reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a massive conventional attack by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. Moreover, after the United States gave up its own chemical and biological weapons (CBW) pursuant to international treaties (while some states continue to possess or pursue them), it reserved the right to employ nuclear weapons to deter CBW attack on the United States and its allies and partners.

Since the end of the Cold War, the strategic situation has changed in fundamental ways. With the advent of U.S. conventional military preeminence and continued improvements in U.S. missile defenses and capabilities to counter and mitigate the effects of CBW, the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks – conventional, biological, or chemical – has declined significantly. The United States will continue to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks.

To that end, the United States is now prepared to strengthen its long-standing “negative security assurance” by declaring that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against

non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.

This revised assurance is intended to underscore the security benefits of adhering to and fully complying with the NPT and persuade non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty to work with the United States and other interested parties to adopt effective measures to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

In making this strengthened assurance, the United States affirms that any state eligible for the assurance that uses chemical or biological weapons against the United States or its allies and partners would face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response – and that any individuals responsible for the attack, whether national leaders or military commanders, would be held fully accountable. Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of bio-technology development, the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat.

In the case of countries not covered by this assurance – states that possess nuclear weapons and states not in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations – there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW attack against the United States or its allies and partners. The United States is therefore not prepared at the present time to adopt a universal policy that deterring nuclear attack is the sole purpose of nuclear weapons, but will work to establish conditions under which such a policy could be safely adopted.

Yet that does not mean that our willingness to use nuclear weapons against countries not covered by the new assurance has in any way increased. Indeed, the United States wishes to stress that it would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners. It is in the U.S. interest and that of all other nations that the nearly 65-year record of nuclear non-use be extended forever.

Accordingly, among the key conclusions of the NPR:

- The United States will continue to strengthen conventional capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, with the objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States or our allies and partners the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons.
- The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.
- The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations.

Maintaining Strategic Deterrence and Stability at Reduced Nuclear Force Levels

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia have reduced operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons by about 75 percent, but both still retain many more nuclear weapons than they need for deterrence. The Administration is committed to working with Russia to preserve stability at significantly reduced force levels.

New START. The next step in this process is to replace the now-expired 1991 START I Treaty with another verifiable agreement, New START. An early task for the NPR was to develop U.S. positions for the New START negotiations and to consider how U.S. forces could be structured in light of the reductions required by the new agreement. The NPR reached the following conclusions:

- Stable deterrence can be maintained while reducing U.S. strategic delivery vehicles – intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and nuclear-capable heavy bombers – by approximately 50 percent from the START I level, and reducing accountable strategic warheads by approximately 30 percent from the Moscow Treaty level.
- Building on NPR analysis, the United States agreed with Russia to New START limits of 1,550 accountable strategic warheads, 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, and a combined limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed strategic launchers.
- The U.S. nuclear Triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers will be maintained under New START.
- All U.S. ICBMs will be “de-MIRVed” to a single warhead each to increase stability.
- Contributions by non-nuclear systems to U.S. regional deterrence and reassurance goals will be preserved by avoiding limitations on missile defenses and preserving options for using heavy bombers and long-range missile systems in conventional roles.

Maximizing Presidential decision time. The NPR concluded that the current alert posture of U.S. strategic forces – with heavy bombers off full-time alert, nearly all ICBMs on alert, and a significant number of SSBNs at sea at any given time – should be maintained for the present. It also concluded that efforts should continue to diminish further the possibility of nuclear launches resulting from accidents, unauthorized actions, or misperceptions and to maximize the time available to the President to consider whether to authorize the use of nuclear weapons. Key steps include:

- Continuing the practice of “open-ocean targeting” of all ICBMs and SLBMs so that, in the highly unlikely event of an unauthorized or accidental launch, the missile would land in the open ocean, and asking Russia to re-confirm its commitment to this practice.
- Further strengthening the U.S. command and control system to maximize Presidential decision time in a nuclear crisis.
- Exploring new modes of ICBM basing that enhance survivability and further reduce any incentives for prompt launch.

Reinforcing strategic stability. Given that Russia and China are currently modernizing their nuclear capabilities – and that both are claiming U.S. missile defense and conventionally-armed missile programs are destabilizing – maintaining strategic stability with the two countries will be an important challenge in the years ahead.

- The United States will pursue high-level, bilateral dialogues on strategic stability with both Russia and China which are aimed at fostering more stable, resilient, and transparent strategic relationships.

A strategic dialogue with Russia will allow the United States to explain that our missile defenses and any future U.S. conventionally-armed long-range ballistic missile systems are designed to address newly emerging regional threats, and are not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia. For its part, Russia could explain its modernization programs, clarify its current military doctrine (especially the extent to which it places importance on nuclear weapons), and discuss steps it could take to allay concerns in the West about its non-strategic nuclear arsenal, such as further consolidating its non-strategic systems in a small number of secure facilities deep within Russia.

With China, the purpose of a dialogue on strategic stability is to provide a venue and mechanism for each side to communicate its views about the other's strategies, policies, and programs on nuclear weapons and other strategic capabilities. The goal of such a dialogue is to enhance confidence, improve transparency, and reduce mistrust. As stated in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, "maintaining strategic stability in the U.S.-China relationship is as important to this Administration as maintaining strategic stability with other major powers."

Future nuclear reductions. The President has directed a review of post-New START arms control objectives, to consider future reductions in nuclear weapons. Several factors will influence the magnitude and pace of future reductions in U.S. nuclear forces below New START levels.

First, any future nuclear reductions must continue to strengthen deterrence of potential regional adversaries, strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia and China, and assurance of our allies and partners. This will require an updated assessment of deterrence requirements; further improvements in U.S., allied, and partner non-nuclear capabilities; focused reductions in strategic and nonstrategic weapons; and close consultations with allies and partners. The United States will continue to ensure that, in the calculations of any potential opponent, the perceived gains of attacking the United States or its allies and partners would be far outweighed by the unacceptable costs of the response.

Second, implementation of the Stockpile Stewardship Program and the nuclear infrastructure investments recommended in the NPR will allow the United States to shift away from retaining large numbers of non-deployed warheads as a hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise, allowing major reductions in the nuclear stockpile. These investments are essential to facilitating reductions while sustaining deterrence under New START and beyond.

Third, Russia's nuclear force will remain a significant factor in determining how much and how fast we are prepared to reduce U.S. forces. Because of our improved relations, the need for strict numerical parity between the two countries is no longer as compelling as it was during the Cold War. But large disparities in nuclear capabilities could raise concerns on both sides and among U.S. allies and partners, and may not be conducive to maintaining a stable, long-term strategic relationship, especially as nuclear forces are significantly reduced. Therefore, we will place importance on Russia joining us as we move to lower levels.

Key NPR recommendations include:

- Conduct follow-on analysis to set goals for future nuclear reductions below the levels expected in New START, while strengthening deterrence of potential regional adversaries, strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia and China, and assurance of our allies and partners.
- Address non-strategic nuclear weapons, together with the non-deployed nuclear weapons of both sides, in any post-New START negotiations with Russia.
- Implement U.S. nuclear force reductions in ways that maintain the reliability and effectiveness of security assurances to our allies and partners. The United States will consult with allies and partners in developing its approach to post-New START negotiations.

Strengthening Regional Deterrence and Reassuring U.S. Allies and Partners

The United States is fully committed to strengthening bilateral and regional security ties and working with allies and partners to adapt these relationships to 21st century challenges. Such security relationships

are critical in deterring potential threats, and can also serve our nonproliferation goals – by demonstrating to neighboring states that their pursuit of nuclear weapons will only undermine their goal of achieving military or political advantages, and by reassuring non-nuclear U.S. allies and partners that their security interests can be protected without their own nuclear deterrent capabilities.

U.S. nuclear weapons have played an essential role in extending deterrence to U.S. allies and partners against nuclear attacks or nuclear-backed coercion by states in their region that possess or are seeking nuclear weapons. A credible U.S. “nuclear umbrella” has been provided by a combination of means – the strategic forces of the U.S. Triad, non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed forward in key regions, and U.S.-based nuclear weapons that could be deployed forward quickly to meet regional contingencies. The mix of deterrence means has varied over time and from region to region.

In Europe, forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons have been reduced dramatically since the end of the Cold War, but a small number of U.S. nuclear weapons remain. Although the risk of nuclear attack against NATO members is at an historic low, the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons – combined with NATO’s unique nuclear sharing arrangements under which non-nuclear members participate in nuclear planning and possess specially configured aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons – contribute to Alliance cohesion and provide reassurance to allies and partners who feel exposed to regional threats. The role of nuclear weapons in defending Alliance members will be discussed this year in connection with NATO’s revision of its Strategic Concept. Any changes in NATO’s nuclear posture should only be taken after a thorough review within – and decision by – the Alliance.

In Asia and the Middle East – where there are no multilateral alliance structures analogous to NATO – the United States has maintained extended deterrence through bilateral alliances and security relationships and through its forward military presence and security guarantees. When the Cold War ended, the United States withdrew its forward deployed nuclear weapons from the Pacific region, including removing nuclear weapons from naval surface vessels and general purpose submarines. Since then, it has relied on its central strategic forces and the capacity to redeploy nuclear systems in East Asia in times of crisis.

Although nuclear weapons have proved to be a key component of U.S. assurances to allies and partners, the United States has relied increasingly on non-nuclear elements to strengthen regional security architectures, including a forward U.S. conventional presence and effective theater ballistic missile defenses. As the role of nuclear weapons is reduced in U.S. national security strategy, these non-nuclear elements will take on a greater share of the deterrence burden. Moreover, an indispensable ingredient of effective regional deterrence is not only non-nuclear but also non-military – strong, trusting political relationships between the United States and its allies and partners.

Non-strategic nuclear weapons. The United States has reduced non-strategic (or “tactical”) nuclear weapons dramatically since the end of the Cold War. Today, it keeps only a limited number of forward deployed nuclear weapons in Europe, plus a small number of nuclear weapons stored in the United States for possible overseas deployment in support of extended deterrence to allies and partners worldwide. Russia maintains a much larger force of non-strategic nuclear weapons, a significant number of which are deployed near the territories of several North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries.

The NPR concluded that the United States will:

- Retain the capability to forward-deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on tactical fighter-bombers and heavy bombers, and proceed with full scope life extension for the B-61 bomb including enhancing safety, security, and use control.
- Retire the nuclear-equipped sea-launched cruise missile (TLAM-N).

- Continue to maintain and develop long-range strike capabilities that supplement U.S. forward military presence and strengthen regional deterrence.
- Continue and, where appropriate, expand consultations with allies and partners to address how to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the U.S. extended deterrent. No changes in U.S. extended deterrence capabilities will be made without close consultations with our allies and partners.

Sustaining a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Arsenal

The United States is committed to ensuring that its nuclear weapons remain safe, secure, and effective. Since the end of U.S. nuclear testing in 1992, our nuclear warheads have been maintained and certified as safe and reliable through a Stockpile Stewardship Program that has extended the lives of warheads by refurbishing them to nearly original specifications. Looking ahead three decades, the NPR considered how best to extend the lives of existing nuclear warheads consistent with the congressionally mandated Stockpile Management Program and U.S. non-proliferation goals, and reached the following conclusions:

- The United States will not conduct nuclear testing and will pursue ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
- The United States will not develop new nuclear warheads. Life Extension Programs (LEPs) will use only nuclear components based on previously tested designs, and will not support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities.
- The United States will study options for ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of nuclear warheads on a case-by-case basis, consistent with the congressionally mandated Stockpile Management Program. The full range of LEP approaches will be considered: refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads,

and replacement of nuclear components.

- In any decision to proceed to engineering development for warhead LEPs, the United States will give strong preference to options for refurbishment or reuse. Replacement of nuclear components would be undertaken only if critical Stockpile Management Program goals could not otherwise be met, and if specifically authorized by the President and approved by Congress.

Consistent with these conclusions, the NPR recommended:

- Funding fully the ongoing LEP for the W-76 submarine-based warhead and the LEP study and follow-on activities for the B-61 bomb; and
- Initiating a study of LEP options for the W-78 ICBM warhead, including the possibility of using the resulting warhead also on SLBMs to reduce the number of warhead types.

In order to remain safe, secure, and effective, the U.S. nuclear stockpile must be supported by a modern physical infrastructure – comprised of the national security laboratories and a complex of supporting facilities – and a highly capable workforce with the specialized skills needed to sustain the nuclear deterrent. As the United States reduces the numbers of nuclear weapons, the reliability of the remaining weapons in the stockpile – and the quality of the facilities needed to sustain it – become more important.

Human capital is also a concern. The national security laboratories have found it increasingly difficult to attract and retain the most promising scientists and engineers of the next generation. The Administration's commitment to a clear, long-term plan for managing the stockpile, as well as to preventing proliferation and nuclear terrorism will enhance recruitment and retention of the scientists and engineers of tomorrow, by providing the opportunity to engage in challenging and meaningful research and development activities.

The NPR concluded:

- The science, technology and engineering base, vital for stockpile stewardship as well as providing insights for non-proliferation, must be strengthened.
- Increased investments in the nuclear weapons complex of facilities and personnel are required to ensure the long-term safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal. New facilities will be sized to support the requirements of the stockpile stewardship and management plan being developed by the National Nuclear Security Administration.
- Increased funding is needed for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory to replace the existing 50-year old facility, and to develop a new Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

Looking Ahead: Toward a World without Nuclear Weapons

Pursuing the recommendations of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review will strengthen the security of the United States and its allies and partners and bring us significant steps closer to the President's vision of a world without nuclear weapons.

The conditions that would ultimately permit the United States and others to give up their nuclear weapons without risking greater international instability and insecurity are very demanding. Among those conditions are success in halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, much greater transparency into the programs and capabilities of key countries of concern, verification methods and technologies capable of detecting violations of disarmament obligations, enforcement measures strong and credible enough to deter such violations, and ultimately the resolution of regional disputes that can motivate rival states to acquire and maintain nuclear weapons. Clearly, such conditions do not exist today.

But we can – and must – work actively to create those conditions. We can take the practical steps identified in the 2010 NPR that will not only move us toward the ultimate goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons worldwide but will, in their own right, reinvigorate the global nuclear non-proliferation regimes, erect higher barriers to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials by terrorist groups, and strengthen U.S. and international security.

Washington Nuclear Security Summit Work Plan

Participating states commit to work together and support continued dialogue

April 13, 2010

Work Plan of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit

This Work Plan supports the Communiqué of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit. It constitutes a political commitment by the Participating States to carry out, on a voluntary basis, applicable portions of this Work Plan, consistent with respective national laws and international obligations, in all aspects of the storage, use, transportation and disposal of nuclear materials and in preventing non-state actors from obtaining the information required to use such material for malicious purposes.

Recognizing the importance of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as an important legally binding multilateral instrument addressing threats posed by acts of nuclear terrorism:

1. Participating States Parties to the Convention will work together to achieve universality of the Convention, as soon as possible;
2. Participating States Parties to the Convention will assist States, as appropriate and upon their request, to implement the Convention; and
3. Participating States Parties to the Convention encourage discussions among States Parties to consider measures to ensure its effective implementation, as called for in Article 20 of the Convention.

Recognizing the importance of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, as the only multilateral legally binding agreement dealing with the physical protection of nuclear material in peaceful uses, and the value of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention in strengthening global security:

1. Participating States Parties to the Convention will work towards its universal adherence and where applicable, to accelerate the ratification processes of the Amendment to the Convention and to act for early implementation of that Amendment;
2. Participating States Parties to the Convention call on all States to act in accordance with the object and purpose of the Amendment until such time as it enters into force; and
3. Participating States Parties to the Convention will assist States, as appropriate and upon their request, to implement the Convention and the Amendment.

Noting the need to fully implement United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (2004) on preventing non-State actors from obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their means of delivery and related materials, in particular as it relates to nuclear material:

1. Participating States support the continued dialogue between the Security Council committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1540 and States and support strengthened international cooperation in this regard, in accordance with relevant United Nations resolutions and within the framework of the United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy;

2. Participating States support the activities of the Security Council committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1540 to promote full implementation;
3. Participating States recognize the importance of complete and timely reporting as called for by UNSCR 1540, and will work with other States to do so, including by providing technical support or assistance, as requested;
4. Participating States note the outcome of Comprehensive Review by the Security Council committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1540, including the consideration of the establishment of a voluntary fund, and express their support for ensuring the effective and sustainable support for the activities of the 1540 Committee;
5. With respect to the nuclear security-related aspects of Paragraph 3, sections (a) and (b) of UNSCR 1540, Participating States recognize the importance of evaluating and improving their physical protection systems to ensure that they are capable of achieving the objectives set out in relevant International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Series documents and as contained in the document “Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities,” (INFCIRC/225); and
6. Participating States in a position to do so are encouraged to provide technical assistance to those States that request it through appropriate mechanisms, including through the Committee’s efforts to match needs with available resources.

Welcoming IAEA activities in support of national efforts to enhance nuclear security worldwide and commending the work of the IAEA for the provision of assistance, upon request, through its Nuclear Security Programme and for the implementation of the Nuclear Security Plan 2010 – 2013, approved by the Board of Governors in September 2009 and noted by the IAEA General Conference, and welcoming IAEA programs to advance new technologies to improve nuclear security and nuclear materials accountancy.

Recognizing that the IAEA is facilitating the development by member states, in the framework of the Nuclear Security Series, of guidance and recommendations relating to the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access and illegal transfer, or other malicious acts involving, inter alia, nuclear material, and associated facilities, and is providing guidance in developing and implementing effective nuclear security measures.

Noting that pursuit of the objectives of this Work Plan will not be interpreted so as to alter the mandate or responsibilities of the IAEA:

1. Participating States note that the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Series of documents provides recommendations and guidance to assist States in a wide range of aspects of nuclear security, and encourage the widest possible participation by all its member states in the process;
2. Participating States in a position to do so, will work actively with the IAEA towards the completion and implementation, as appropriate, of the guidance provided by the Nuclear Security Series, and to assist, upon request, other States in doing so;
3. Participating States in particular welcome and support the IAEA’s efforts to finalize the fifth revision of the recommendations contained in INFCIRC/225, which will be published in the Nuclear Security Series;

4. Participating States recognize the importance of nuclear material accountancy in support of nuclear security and look forward to the completion of the technical guidance document on “Nuclear Material Accountancy Systems at Facilities”;
5. Participating States will endeavor to incorporate, as appropriate, the relevant principles set out in the Nuclear Security Series documents, into the planning, construction, and operation of nuclear facilities;
6. Participating States, when implementing their national nuclear security measures, will support the use of the IAEA Implementing Guide on the Development, Use and Maintenance of the Design Basis Threat to elaborate their national design basis threat as appropriate, to include the consideration of outsider and insider threats;
7. Participating States welcome the IAEA’s efforts to assist States to develop, upon request, Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans to consolidate their nuclear security needs into integrated plans for nuclear security improvements and assistance;
8. Participating States recognize the value of IAEA support mechanisms such as the International Physical Protection Advisory Service missions to review, as requested, their physical protection systems for civilian nuclear material and facilities; and
9. Participating States call upon all member states of the IAEA in a position to do so to provide the necessary support to enable the IAEA to implement these important activities.

Noting the contributions to the promotion of nuclear security by the U.N. and initiatives such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, as well as other bilateral, regional, multilateral, and nongovernmental activities within their respective mandates and memberships:

1. Participating States will work together, as appropriate, to ensure that nuclear security cooperation mechanisms are complementary, reinforcing, efficient, consistent with related IAEA activities, and appropriately matched to identified needs in those States requesting assistance;
2. Participating States encourage, where appropriate, expanded participation in and commitment to international initiatives and voluntary cooperative mechanisms aimed at improving nuclear security and preventing nuclear terrorism; and
3. Participating States welcome the intent of the members of the G-8 Global Partnership, in a position to do so, to undertake additional programming to enhance nuclear security.

Recognizing States’ rights to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and noting the responsibility of each State for the use and management of all nuclear materials and facilities under its jurisdiction and recognize that highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium are particularly sensitive and require special precautions:

1. Participating States will consider, where appropriate, the consolidation of national sites where nuclear material is held;
2. Participating States will continue to exercise particular care in ensuring the safe and secure transport of nuclear materials, both in domestic and international transport;

3. Participating States, where appropriate, will consider on a national basis the safe, secure and timely removal and disposition of nuclear materials from facilities no longer using them;
4. Participating States will continue to exercise particular care in securing and accounting for separated plutonium, taking into consideration the potential of various forms for use in a nuclear explosive device;
5. Participating States will consider, where appropriate, converting highly-enriched-uranium fueled research reactors, and other nuclear facilities using highly enriched uranium, to use low enriched uranium, where it is technically and economically feasible;
6. Participating States, as appropriate, will collaborate to research and develop new technologies that require neither highly enriched uranium fuels for reactor operation nor highly enriched uranium targets for producing medical or other isotopes, and will encourage the use of low enriched uranium and other proliferation-resistant technologies and fuels in various commercial applications such as isotope production;
7. Participating States in a position to do so will provide assistance to those States requesting assistance to secure, account for, consolidate, and convert nuclear materials; and
8. Participating States will consider how to best address the security of radioactive sources, as well as consider further steps as appropriate.

Mindful of the responsibilities of every Participating State to maintain effective nuclear security and a robust domestic regulatory capacity:

1. Participating States will establish and maintain effective national nuclear security regulations, including the periodic review and adjustment of the regulations as the State considers appropriate;
2. Participating States undertake to maximize regulatory independence, consistent with each State's particular legal and institutional structures;
3. Participating States will undertake to build regulatory capacity and ensure sufficiently trained and fully vetted professional nuclear security staff and adequate resources, taking into account current needs and future expansion of their respective nuclear programs; and
4. Participating States will pursue the review and enforcement of compliance with national nuclear security regulations as a matter of priority.

Understanding the role of the nuclear industry, including the private sector, in nuclear security and recognizing that national governments are responsible for standard setting within each State:

1. Participating States will work, in guiding the nuclear industry, to promote and sustain strong nuclear security culture and corporate commitment to implement robust security practices, including regular exercises and performance testing of nuclear security features, consistent with national regulations;
2. Consistent with State requirements, Participating States will facilitate exchange of best practices, where legally and practically feasible, in nuclear security in the nuclear industry, and in this respect, will utilize relevant institutions to support such exchanges; and
3. Participating States encourage nuclear operators and architect/engineering firms to take into account and incorporate, where appropriate, effective measures of physical protection and security culture into the

planning, construction, and operation of civilian nuclear facilities and provide technical assistance, upon request, to other States in doing so.

Emphasizing the importance of the human dimension of nuclear security, the need to enhance security culture, and the need to maintain a well-trained cadre of technical experts:

1. Participating States will promote cooperation, as appropriate, among international organizations, governments, industries, other stakeholders, and academia for effective capacity building, including human resources development in nuclear security programs;
2. Participating States will encourage the creation of and networking among nuclear security support centres for capacity building to disseminate and share best practices and will support IAEA activities in this area;
3. Participating States encourage the creation of adequate national nuclear security capacities, and encourage supplier countries and technology suppliers to support those capacities in the recipient countries, including human resources development through education and training, upon request and consistent with each State's particular legal and institutional structures;
4. Participating States will encourage an integrated approach to education and training and institutional capacity building by all stakeholders having a key role in establishing and maintaining adequate security infrastructure; and
5. Participating States will encourage the implementation of national measures to ensure the proper management of sensitive information in order to prevent illicit acquisition or use of nuclear material, and, where appropriate, will support bilateral and multilateral capacity building projects, upon request.

Underscoring the value of exchanging accurate and verified information, without prejudice to confidentiality provisions, to detect, prevent, suppress, investigate, and prosecute acts or attempted acts of illicit nuclear trafficking and nuclear terrorism:

1. Participating States will strive to improve their national criminal laws, as needed, to ensure that they have the adequate authority to prosecute all types of cases of illicit nuclear trafficking and nuclear terrorism and commit to prosecuting these crimes to the full extent of the law;
2. Participating States are encouraged to develop and apply mechanisms to expand sharing of information on issues, challenges, risks and solutions related to nuclear security, nuclear terrorism and illicit nuclear trafficking in a comprehensive and timely manner; and
3. Participating States are encouraged to develop methods and mechanisms, where appropriate, to enhance bilateral and multilateral collaboration in sharing urgent and relevant information on nuclear security and incidents involving illicit nuclear trafficking.

Noting the IAEA's and Participating States' work in the field of nuclear detection and nuclear forensics, aimed at assisting States in connection with the detection of and response to illicitly trafficked nuclear material, and determination of its origin, and recognizing the importance of respecting provisions on confidentiality of information:

1. Participating States will consider taking further steps, nationally, bilaterally or multilaterally, to enhance their technical capabilities, including the appropriate use of new and innovative technologies, to prevent and combat illicit nuclear trafficking;

2. Participating States will explore ways to work together to develop national capacities for nuclear forensics, such as the creation of national libraries and an international directory of points of contact, to facilitate and encourage cooperation between States in combating illicit nuclear trafficking, including relevant IAEA activities in this area; and

3. Participating States will explore ways to enhance broader cooperation among local, national and international customs and law enforcement bodies to prevent illicit nuclear trafficking and acts of nuclear terrorism, including through joint exercises and sharing of best practices.

Highlights of Nuclear Security Commitments

Countries contribute to prevention of nuclear terrorism in many ways

Armenia: Ratified International Convention on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, passed new export control law

Argentina: Joined the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism; moving toward the ratification of the International Convention on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and 2005 Amendment of the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials

Australia: Moving toward the ratification of the International Convention on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

Belgium: Contributing \$300,000 to International Atomic Energy Agency's Nuclear Security Fund

Canada: Returning a large amount of spent highly enriched uranium fuel from their medical isotope production reactor to the United States; championing the extension of the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction; funding highly enriched uranium removals from Mexico and Vietnam; hosting and funding a World Institute of Nuclear Security best practices workshop in Ottawa; unveiling \$100 million in new bilateral security cooperation with Russia

Chile: Removed all highly enriched uranium (18kgs) in March 2010

China: Announce cooperation on nuclear security Center of Excellence

Egypt: Passed new comprehensive nuclear law in March 2010 that includes nuclear security, criminalization of sabotage and illicit trafficking provisions as well as envisaging an independent regulatory authority

France: Ratifying the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear materials; inviting an International Physical Protection Advisory Service security review from the International Atomic Energy Agency; incorporating training in nuclear security at the European Nuclear Safety Training and Tutoring Institute and the International Nuclear Energy Institute (announced during March 2010 Paris nuclear energy conference)

Finland: Invited an International Physical Protection Advisory Service security review from the International Atomic Energy Agency

Germany: Moving toward ratifying 2005 Amendment of the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials

Georgia: Signed instrument of approval for International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism on April 7, 2010

India: Announcing the creation of a Nuclear Energy Center with a nuclear security component

Italy: Signed a Megaports agreement (to install detection equipment at ports) with U.S.; establishing a school of nuclear security in Trieste, in collaboration with the Abdus Salam International Center for Theoretical Physics and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to train nuclear personnel from developing countries

Japan: Launching an integrated regional support center; research and development on detection and forensics; contributing new resources to International Atomic Energy Agency's Nuclear Security Fund; hosting and funding a World Institute of Nuclear Security best practices conference

Kazakhstan: Converting a highly enriched uranium research reactor and eliminating remaining highly enriched uranium; cooperative work on BN-350 reactor shutdown and fuel security; hosting a Global Initiative Activity in June; considering a International Nuclear Security Training Center.

Malaysia: Passed new export control law

Mexico: Converting a highly enriched uranium research reactor and eliminating remaining highly enriched uranium working through IAEA

New Zealand: Contributing to International Atomic Energy Agency's Nuclear Security Fund; contributing to the U.S. Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative

Norway: Contributing \$3.3 million over the next four years to the IAEA nuclear security fund (flexible funds for use for activities in developing countries); contributing \$500,000 in additional support to Kazakhstan's efforts to upgrade portal monitors to prevent nuclear smuggling as part of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

Philippines: Joining the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

Republic of Korea: Hosting 2012 Nuclear Security Summit; hosting a Global Initiative activity

Russia: Signing Plutonium Disposition protocol; ending plutonium production; contributing to International Atomic Energy Agency's Nuclear Security Fund

Saudi Arabia: Hosting a UNSCR 1540 conference for Gulf Cooperation Council

Thailand: Joining the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

Ukraine: Removing all highly enriched uranium by next Summit—half of it by year's end

United Arab Emirates: Signed a Megaports Agreement with the U.S.

United Kingdom: Contributing \$6 million to International Atomic Energy Agency's Nuclear Security Fund; inviting an International Physical Protection Advisory Service security review from the International Atomic Energy Agency; ratification of the International Convention on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and 2005 Amendment of the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials

Vietnam: Converting a highly enriched uranium research reactor; joining the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

IAEA: Completing final review of the next revision of INFCIRC 225, the IAEA nuclear physical security guidance document

Key Facts on the Nuclear Security Summit

Background and way forward on global threats posed by nuclear terrorism

Nuclear Security Summit
Washington 2010
April 13, 2010

Key Facts about the Nuclear Security Summit

An Historic Event

Not since 1945 has a U.S. President hosted a gathering of so many Heads of State and Government. This unprecedented meeting is to address an unprecedented threat — the threat of nuclear materials in the hands of terrorists or criminals.

The Promise of Prague

In April 2009, in Prague, President Obama spoke of his vision of a world without nuclear weapons even as he recognized the need to create the conditions to bring about such a world. To that end, he put forward a comprehensive agenda to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, reduce nuclear arsenals, and secure nuclear materials.

In April 2010, the United States took three bold steps in the direction of creating those conditions with the release of a Nuclear Posture Review that reduces our dependence on nuclear weapons while strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and maintaining a strong deterrent; signing a New START treaty with Russia that limits the number of strategic arms on both sides, and renews U.S.-Russian leadership on nuclear issues; and now has convened a gathering of world leaders to Washington to discuss the need to secure nuclear materials and prevent acts of nuclear terrorism and trafficking.

The Threat

Over 2000 tons of plutonium and highly enriched uranium exist in dozens of countries with a variety of peaceful as well as military uses. There have been 18 documented cases of theft or loss of highly enriched uranium or plutonium, and perhaps others not yet discovered. We know that al-Qa'ida, and possibly other terrorist or criminal groups, are seeking nuclear weapons — as well as the materials and expertise needed to make them. The consequences of a nuclear detonation, or even an attempted detonation, perpetrated by a terrorist or criminal group anywhere in the world would be devastating. Any country could be a target, and all countries would feel the effects.

The Solution

The best way to keep terrorists and criminals from getting nuclear weapons is to keep all weapons and materials, as well as the know-how to make and use them, secure. That is our first and best line of defense. We must also bolster our ability to detect smuggled material, recover lost material, identify the materials origin and prosecute those who are trading in these materials.

The Nuclear Security Summit

Just as the United States is not the only country that would suffer from nuclear terrorism, we cannot prevent it on our own. The Nuclear Security Summit highlights the global threat posed by nuclear

terrorism and the need to work together to secure nuclear material and prevent illicit nuclear trafficking and nuclear terrorism.

The leaders of 47 nations came together to advance a common approach and commitment to nuclear security at the highest levels. Leaders in attendance have renewed their commitment to ensure that nuclear materials under their control are not stolen or diverted for use by terrorists, and pledged to continue to evaluate the threat and improve the security as changing conditions may require, and to exchange best practices and practical solutions for doing so. The Summit reinforced the principle that all states are responsible for ensuring the best security of their materials, for seeking assistance if necessary, and providing assistance if asked. It promoted the international treaties that address nuclear security and nuclear terrorism and led to specific national actions that advanced global security.

The Communiqué

The Summit Communiqué is a high-level political statement by the leaders of all 47 countries to strengthen nuclear security and reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism and:

- Endorses President Obama's call to secure all vulnerable nuclear material in four years, and pledges to work together toward this end;
- Calls for focused national efforts to improve security and accounting of nuclear materials and strengthen regulations — with a special focus on plutonium and highly enriched uranium;
- Seeks consolidation of stocks of highly enriched uranium and plutonium and reduction in the use of highly enriched uranium;
- Promotes universality of key international treaties on nuclear security and nuclear terrorism;
- Notes the positive contributions of mechanisms like the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, to build capacity among law enforcement, industry, and technical personnel;
- Calls for the International Atomic Energy Agency to receive the resources it needs to develop nuclear security guidelines and provide advice to its members on how to implement them;
- Seeks to ensure that bilateral and multilateral security assistance would be applied where it can do the most good; and
- Encourages nuclear industry to share best practices for nuclear security, at the same time making sure that security measures do not prevent countries from enjoying the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy.

The Work Plan

The Summit Work Plan represents guidance for national and international actions to carry out the pledges of the Communiqué. This detailed document lays out the specific steps that will need to be taken to bring the vision of the Communiqué into reality. These steps include:

- Ratifying and implementing treaties on nuclear security and nuclear terrorism;
- Cooperating through the United Nations to implement and assist others in connection with Security Council resolutions;
- Working with the International Atomic Energy Agency to update and implement security guidance and carry out advisory services;
- Reviewing national regulatory and legal requirements relating to nuclear security and nuclear trafficking;
- Converting civilian facilities that use highly enriched uranium to non-weapons-usable materials;
- Research on new nuclear fuels, detection methods, and forensics techniques;
- Development of corporate and institutional cultures that prioritize nuclear security;
- Education and training to ensure that countries and facilities have the people they need to protect their materials; and

- Joint exercises among law enforcement and customs officials to enhance nuclear detection approaches.

Country Commitments

In addition to signing on to the Communiqué and Work Plan, many Summit Participants have made commitments to support the Summit either by taking national actions to increase nuclear security domestically or by working through bilateral or multilateral mechanisms to improve security globally. These specific commitments will enhance global security, provide momentum to the effort to secure nuclear materials, and represent the sense of urgency that has been galvanized by the nature of the threat and the occasion of the Summit. Many of these commitments are outlined in National Statements.

Next Steps

In preparation for the Summit, each participating entity named a “Sherpa” to prepare their leadership for full participation. This cadre of specialists, each of whom has both the expertise and leadership positions in their countries to effect change, is a natural network to carrying out the goals of the Summit. The Sherpas plan to reconvene in December to evaluate progress against Summit goals. Additionally, Summit participants plan to reach out to countries who were not able to attend the Washington Summit to explain its goals and outcomes and to expand the dialogue among a wider group. In 2012, leaders will gather again — this time the Republic of Korea — to take stock of the post-Washington work and set new goals for nuclear security.

U.S. National Statement on Nuclear Security Summit

Highlights U.S. efforts to secure nuclear material at home and abroad

April 13, 2010

National Statement of the United States

In April 2009, President Obama addressed the citizens of Prague and the world, stating clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world free of nuclear weapons. Recognizing this goal is not immediately achievable, the President laid the groundwork to ensure that through the steady accumulation of progress we move continually along the path toward this critical objective.

In that speech, the President identified the risk of nuclear terrorism as the most immediate and extreme threat to global security, called for an international four-year effort to secure vulnerable nuclear material, and announced his intent to host a Nuclear Security Summit. Over the past year, with the leadership of President Obama, we have made progress on this unprecedented call to action. At the United Nations Security Council last fall, we unanimously passed Resolution 1887 endorsing the goal of securing all nuclear materials and preventing the spread and use of nuclear weapons.

This Nuclear Security Summit takes place on April 12-13, 2010. Leaders from 47 nations as well as the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Union will gather in Washington, DC – the largest gathering of heads of state and government in Washington's history.

Our objective is clear: ensure that terrorists never gain access to plutonium or highly-enriched uranium – the essential ingredients of a nuclear weapon. The challenge we face is how to lock down the over 2000 tons of plutonium and highly enriched uranium exist in dozens of countries with a variety of peaceful as well as military uses. The consequences of a nuclear detonation, or even an attempted detonation, perpetrated by a terrorist or criminal group anywhere in the world would be devastating. Not only could there be an enormous loss of life but there would also be overwhelming economic, political and psychological consequences that would reverberate worldwide.

Just as the United States is not the only country that would suffer from nuclear terrorism, we cannot prevent it on our own. The goal of the Nuclear Security Summit is to highlight this global threat and agree to steps we can take together to secure nuclear material and prevent illicit nuclear trafficking. The Nuclear Security Summit provides an occasion for the United States to highlight some of its recent and future efforts to show leadership in improving the security of nuclear materials both at home and abroad.

Domestic Nuclear Security: Our first priority is to ensure that nuclear materials and facilities in the United States are secure. Through sustainable security programs, including a continual evaluation of the threat, inspections, and emergency response, preparedness and coordination programs, the United States keeps its materials secure. Following September 11, 2001, security at domestic facilities was enhanced and is evaluated on a continuous basis. Most recently, on March 22, 2010, the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee — an ultra-secure uranium warehouse that replaces multiple aging facilities with a single, state-of-the-art storage facility — came on-line as one measure of our increased security posture.

As part of our ongoing efforts to evaluate the security of its nuclear facilities, we will request an advisory mission from the International Atomic Energy Agency's International Physical Protection Advisory Service to review physical protection at the National Institute of Standards and Technology's Center for

Neutron Research, licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Center's reactor supports a broad program of research using neutron techniques, and develops and applies new neutron measurement technologies. NIST has committed to convert its reactor from highly enriched uranium to a new low enriched uranium fuel once that has been tested and approved for use. This advisory mission will provide an independent, confidential comparison of the physical protection regulations and their implementation with international guidelines and best practices.

Ratifying Conventions: The United States has accelerated efforts to complete ratification procedures for the two key international treaties governing nuclear security, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Legislation that brings U.S. laws into line with these treaties has been submitted to the Congress. Once laws are in place implementing the conventions, the United States will deposit its instruments of ratification.

Minimizing Highly Enriched Uranium: In 2009, the United States completed conversion of all 20 of our highly-enriched-uranium-fueled reactors that could be converted to use low enriched uranium fuel. There are six remaining highly-enriched-uranium-fueled reactors in the United States that will be converted to use low enriched uranium fuel once acceptable fuel has been developed.

Plutonium Disposition: The United States and Russia have just signed the Protocol to the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, which commits both countries to eliminate 68 metric tons of plutonium (34 each) from their weapons programs—enough material for approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons combined. Furthermore, the United States is in the final stages of approval to bring up to 100 kilograms of plutonium from sites of concern into the United States pending disposition, thereby eliminating vulnerable, weapons-usable plutonium in certain cases where no other solution is available.

Nuclear Detection: Due to shortages in materials for current neutron detectors, the United States is working to develop and deploy new neutron detection technologies through an aggressive program of research, development, test, and evaluation. The time frame for this effort has been shortened from 5 years to 18 months.

Nuclear Forensics: With the emerging discipline of nuclear archeology, the United States has launched an international effort to develop nuclear forensics library, exercises, common lexicons, and other foundational elements that will provide the framework for cooperation between governments investigating the illicit use of nuclear materials.

Sharing Best Practices: Nuclear security can be advanced through sharing best practices among those with responsibility for securing and accounting for nuclear materials in the private and public sectors. We are working with Russia and other members to turn the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism into a durable international institution. The United States strongly supports the World Institute for Nuclear Security as an effective forum for sharing best security practices, based on its broad membership in 44 countries, representing private industry, police, government agencies, state regulators and national laboratories. We will continue to provide financial support and expertise and encourage other countries to do so as well.

International Cooperation: Working within existing legal and multilateral nuclear security frameworks, U.S. nuclear security cooperative activities help states worldwide meet their nuclear security obligations, uphold the highest international nuclear security recommendations and standards, and maximize the peaceful benefits of nuclear materials while reducing the risks of their misuse. In its Fiscal Year 2011 budget request, the U.S. has requested the largest amount ever – \$1.6 billion, a 31% increase over the previous year – for these programs across multiple agencies working with countries around the world.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540: In 2009 the UN Security Council created a committee to assist states in implementing their obligations under this universal, binding resolution. The United States has proposed, and intends to contribute to, a voluntary fund to help countries meet the obligations this resolution places on them, and to match them up with wide range of national, international, and nongovernmental sources of assistance.

Nuclear Security Programme of the International Atomic Energy Agency: In 2009, the United States led efforts to gain agreement of the 150-plus nations of the International Atomic Energy Agency to establish for the first time a dedicated budget line for nuclear security, which had until then been funded exclusively through voluntary contributions from member states. The U.S. voluntary contribution to this effort has risen 59% since 2007.

G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction: In 2002, under the leadership of Canada, the G8 committed \$20 billion over ten years to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Eight years later, the 23 G8 Partners have allocated more than \$18 billion to this effort. We have made progress with Russia to eliminate stocks of chemical weapons and to dismantle decommissioned nuclear submarines. We are ready to join with our Canadian colleagues and call for another ten-year extension with an expanded scope/mission and to commit up to another \$10 billion towards new projects, including expanding our efforts to improving nuclear security to countries not previously eligible for G8 assistance.

Secretary Clinton Outlines Nuclear Security Strategy in International Op-Ed

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton today told European publics that the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is one of several concrete steps the U.S. is taking to reduce the global threat of nuclear weapons, proliferation and terrorism.

In an op-ed originally published in The Guardian newspaper in the United Kingdom and also appearing in Germany's Berliner Zeitung, Frankfurter Rundschau, Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger and Mitteldeutsche Zeitung; Austria's Der Standard; Poland's Gazeta Wyborcza; France's Le Figaro; Turkey's Hurriyet; Croatia's Vjesnik; Serbia's Politika; Slovakia's Pravda; Spain's ABC; Bosnia and Herzegovina's Dnevni Avaz and Nezavisne Novine; Bulgaria's Kapital; and Cyprus' Phileleftheros, Secretary Clinton cited the progress achieved since President Obama's speech in Prague last April and stressed the importance of international cooperation in addressing nuclear security challenges. Other international newspapers will carry the Secretary's column tomorrow.

Read more at The Guardian's web site here:

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/apr/07/world-nuclear-danger-treaty-america>.

The full text of Secretary Clinton's op-ed follows:

Our Giant Step Towards a World Free from Nuclear Danger

This treaty shows the strength of America's commitment to global disarmament – and to our national security

By Hillary Rodham Clinton

Today the United States and Russia will sign the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in Prague, reducing the number of strategic nuclear warheads in our arsenals to levels not seen since the first decade of the nuclear age. This verifiable reduction by the world's two largest nuclear powers reflects our commitment to the basic bargain of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) -- all nations have the right to seek the peaceful use of nuclear energy, but they all also have the responsibility to prevent nuclear proliferation, and those that do possess these weapons must work toward disarmament.

This agreement is just one of several concrete steps the United States is taking to make good on President Obama's pledge to make America and the world safer by reducing the threat of nuclear weapons, proliferation and terrorism.

On Tuesday, the President announced the U.S. Government's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which provides a roadmap for reducing the role and numbers of our nuclear weapons while more effectively protecting the United States and our allies from today's most pressing threats.

Next week, President Obama will host more than 40 leaders at a Nuclear Security Summit for the purpose of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials as swiftly as possible to prevent them from falling into the hands of terrorists.

And along with our international partners, the United States is pursuing diplomatic efforts that create real consequences for states such as Iran and North Korea that defy the global nonproliferation regime.

These steps send clear messages about our priorities and our resolve.

To our allies and partners, and all those who have long looked to the United States as an underwriter of regional and global security: Our commitment to defend our interests and our allies has never been stronger. These steps will make us all safer and more secure.

To those who refuse to meet their international obligations and seek to intimidate their neighbors: The world is more united than ever before and will not accept your intransigence.

Today's agreement is a testament to our own determination to meet our obligations under the NPT and the special responsibilities that the United States and Russia bear as the two largest nuclear powers.

The New START Treaty includes a 30 percent reduction in the number of strategic nuclear warheads the United States and Russia are permitted to deploy and a strong and effective verification regime, which will further stabilize the relationship between our two countries as well as reduce the risks of miscommunication or miscalculation.

And the Treaty places no constraints on our missile defense plans – now or in the future.

President Obama's Nuclear Posture Review makes the principles behind this Treaty – and our larger nonproliferation and arms control agenda – part of our national security strategy. Today nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism have replaced the Cold War-era danger of a large-scale nuclear attack as the most urgent threat to U.S. and global security. The NPR outlines a new approach that will ensure that our defenses and diplomacy are geared toward meeting these challenges effectively.

As part of this new approach, the United States pledges not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapons state that is party to the NPT and in compliance with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations. The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners. There should be no doubt, however, that we will hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction.

The NPR also emphasizes close cooperation with our allies around the world, and maintains our firm commitment to mutual security. We will work with our partners to reinforce regional security architectures, such as missile defenses, and other conventional military capabilities. The United States will continue to maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent for ourselves and our allies so long as these weapons exist anywhere in the world.

Nuclear proliferation and terrorism are global challenges, and they demand a global response. That is why President Obama has invited leaders from around the world to Washington for a Nuclear Security Summit and will seek commitments from all nations – especially those that enjoy the benefits of civilian nuclear power – to take steps to stop proliferation and secure vulnerable nuclear materials. If terrorists ever acquired these dangerous materials, the results would be too terrible to imagine.

All nations must recognize that the nonproliferation regime cannot survive if violators are allowed to act with impunity. That is why we are working to build international consensus for steps that will convince Iran's leaders to change course, including new UN Security Council sanctions that will further clarify their choice of upholding their obligations or facing increasing isolation and painful consequences. With respect to North Korea, we continue to send the message that simply returning to the negotiating table is not enough. Pyongyang must move toward complete and verifiable denuclearization, through irreversible steps, if it wants a normalized, sanctions-free relationship with the United States.

All these steps, all our treaties, summits and sanctions, share the goal of increasing the security of the United States, our allies, and people everywhere.

Last April, President Obama stood in Hradcany Square in Prague and challenged the world to pursue a future free of the nuclear dangers that have loomed over us all for more than a half century. This is the work of a lifetime, if not longer. But today, one year later, we are making real progress toward that goal.

U.S. Officials Brief on New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

Officials answer questions on arms-control agreement

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

April 8, 2010

PRESS BRIEFING BY PRESS SECRETARY ROBERT GIBBS,
DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS BEN RHODES,
AND SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR RUSSIAN AFFAIRS
MICHAEL McFAUL

MR. GIBBS: Good afternoon, folks. I will just start off, speak for a few seconds, turn this over to Ben, who will give you a little bit of the -- talk a little bit about today, Mike will talk a little bit about the bilateral meeting with President Medvedev, and then we'll take some of your questions.

I think we've got -- if you don't have them already, we've got fact sheets. You should be able to access now on the White House Web site the full text of the treaty and the protocols. So if there are any questions along those lines, certainly let us know.

I am -- we'll turn this over now to Ben, who will walk you guys through a little bit about today.

MR. RHODES: Great, well, thanks, everybody. And I'll just set this up for Mike, who can speak more specifically to both the bilateral meeting and the treaty.

But I mean, the first thing I wanted to do is just kind of put this into context. The President, obviously, you've heard him speak many times about the fact that he believes that nuclear weapons, non-proliferation nuclear security, is a top priority for this administration when it comes to national security, because really there's no greater threat of greater consequence to the American people than the threat placed by nuclear weapons if they fall into the wrong hands, or, for that matter, to global security if proliferation continues unimpeded.

To that end, when he came to Prague one year ago this week, he laid out a comprehensive agenda to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, to secure vulnerable nuclear materials in the ultimate pursuit of a world without nuclear weapons.

Again, the President expressed then, as he did today, that it's obviously a long-term goal, one that may not even be reached in his lifetime, but the pursuit of that goal enhances our security and global security.

I'll just point to three key pieces of that speech and that agenda that we've been focusing on this week. The first one obviously is the START treaty. In that speech he called for a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with the Russians. Since then -- Mike can speak to this -- but he's met or phoned President Medvedev I think 15 times, investing a lot personally in the negotiation of this treaty.

I'll just cover some of the topline points because you're familiar with it, but I think that he believes that on its own -- on its merits, the treaty does a substantial amount of things to enhance American national security: reducing our deployed warheads, launchers; having a comprehensive verification regime; having

no constraints on our missile defense. He also believes it's very important and fundamental to the kind of agenda he laid out in Prague for the United States and Russia to work together to show leadership in the effort to turn the tide against nuclear proliferation and to achieve nuclear security.

Of course, that's related to both our own nuclear arsenals; that's related to our ability to secure vulnerable nuclear materials; and that's related to the United States and Russia showing leadership within the Non-Proliferation Treaty. By keeping our own obligations, we put ourselves in a stronger position to hold others accountable for violating their own obligations.

Secondly, in Prague a year ago, the President said he wanted to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our National Security Strategy. We did that this week with the release of our Nuclear Posture Review, which had a change in American declaratory policy, again focused very -- in a very targeted way on the Non-Proliferation Treaty and strengthening that treaty so that non-nuclear states who are not in compliance with the treaty or their obligations do not get a security assurance that non-nuclear states that are in compliance with the treaty do get, again, reinforcing this fundamental centerpiece of the global non-proliferation regime, which is the NPT.

The NPR also contains our substantial investments in the stockpile, which will make it possible for the United States to maintain an effective, safe, reliable nuclear deterrent as we pursue these reductions and as we forsake the development of new nuclear warheads. So, again, I think that the second piece of this week that is very critical to the Prague agenda is the NPR that was released earlier.

And then the third thing is, again, in Prague a year ago he called for global effort to secure vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in four years so that they do not fall into the hands of terrorist groups. Again, this is the most immediate and grave threat to American national security. And to that end, he called for a summit of nations that he would host to rally international action behind this goal. We'll be hosting that summit in Washington early next week; 47 nations will be there as well as several international organizations in what is really a gathering of unprecedented scope as it relates to this particular topic and also as it relates to a gathering hosted by an American President in many decades.

So with that I'll turn it over to Mike, who can speak a little bit more about the bilateral meeting, and then we can take your questions.

MR. McFAUL: Thank you, Ben. Let me just start with two points of contact. This is roughly the anniversary of the Prague speech, as you all know, as Ben just said. It's also roughly the anniversary of the first meeting that President Medvedev and President Obama had in London on April 1st. And I want to remind you of that, as we talk about what happened today, and to remind you just how, in a short amount of time, we have gone from aspiration -- if you go back and you read that statement of aspiration of what were going to try to do together to advance our mutual interest -- to actually turning aspiration into concrete outcomes that advance the national security of the United States and advance the national security of Russia. As President Medvedev I think quite rightly said, this is a win-win outcome for both of our countries -- a phrase that President Obama first used in a discussion with President Medvedev on April 1st in London a year ago.

The second contextual point I want to remind you of is where this relationship was just 15 or 18 months ago. In the fall of 2008, I think it's fair to say most analysts would agree that we were at a low point in U.S.-Russian relations; that you have to go back to the early '80s to remember a time when there was such confrontation, such zero-sum thinking in terms of this relationship. And since the election, since April 1st, and now on this day, we're in a very different place in terms of how we interact with the Russian government, and especially how the two Presidents interact at the highest levels.

Today's meeting of course was a celebratory meeting to talk about this historic treaty that was signed today. But it was a substantive bilateral meeting. And in fact, the first half of the meeting was on a whole host of economic issues that both President Obama and President Medvedev have challenged each other to bring to the fore of the relationship. They have both stated many times that they do not want this relationship to be unidimensional; they want it to be multidimensional. And we want to talk about arms control, and not just talk but do concrete things, as we did today.

We want to talk about regional security issues -- North Korea, Iran, Afghanistan -- as we always do, and how we can work together to advance our national interests in all three of those places. Speaking of -- I just noted here -- we also talked about Kyrgyzstan today in the meeting. And I would just note that at the beginning of the administration, when we first got here, there was a sense of, it's us against them, the Manas Air Base; who's going to put more money on the table to win that piece of territory.

What was striking today as we talked about our mutual interests and security in Kyrgyzstan was we were not talking in zero-sum terms; we were talking about our mutual interests there.

And then finally, in addition to economics, regional security, arms control issues, the Presidents also talked about advancing our contacts between our civil societies, and our societies more generally. We had a report out from both Foreign Minister Lavrov and Secretary Clinton about the bilateral national commission -- 16 working groups, 15 meetings -- lots of smaller things we can get into details if you're interested of things that are happening to -- again, things like child protection programs that before we didn't have; now we're cooperating together. Counterterrorism was another one of those things.

Again, just to emphasize, this is a multidimensional relationship, and in the discussion today they went through the full range of issues, in addition, of course, to the START treaty.

MR. GIBBS: We will be happy to take some questions. Ms. Loven.

Q: I'd like to ask any of you who want to elaborate on the comments that Medvedev made about how he outlined the limits of sanctions that Russia would support on Iran. Can you talk about that a little bit?

MR. McFAUL: We obviously had a very substantive discussion of Iran in the small meeting that the two Presidents had. We are in the process of beginning a negotiation about a sanctions resolution. All sanctions -- I mean, all negotiations, people talk about their red lines and bottom lines, and we negotiate. The START treaty was all about that, by the way, and as Ben has already noted, takes a lot of work where we try to establish where those are. And that's the context I think you should understand.

President Medvedev has made publicly very clear that he does not support sanctions that will lead to economic hardship for the Iranian people, that would foment economic chaos, or would lead to regime change. We actually agree with him on that.

As he said I think very clearly today in his press -- in his statements, we want to use sanctions as a tool to change Iranian behavior. That's exactly what we're talking about. So when I heard him say we have certain red lines, I think that's the context in which it should be understood.

MR. RHODES: Yes, and I'd just add a couple of things. Mike got it exactly right, in terms of what he described. The other thing I'd say is, we -- it would have been hard to foresee a scenario 15 months ago, given where U.S.-Russia relations were, given where the international community was with regard to Iran. Again, we have to go back to that place where essentially there was no process to apply additional pressure on Iran. They made steady progress on their nuclear program over a period of several years. The

great issue was whether the United States would engage with the P5-plus-1 or not. That was the context that this administration came into.

Now, here we are 15 months later, and you heard the President outline basically his theory on the case of sanctions in the press conference where he said we need to hold Iran accountable for their failure to live up to their obligations despite the good faith efforts of the international community. Those sanctions need to be targeted in a way that they're strong and they're smart and they affect Iranian behavior.

President Medvedev spoke right after that and said, I wouldn't disagree with anything that President Obama said. So I think the international community has come a long way in forging a united front that leaves Iran more isolated.

And I'd echo Mike's point, too, which is that as it relates to sanctions that would cause grave humanitarian consequences for the Iranian people, we're not interested in that either. Again, what I would say is what's happening now is the negotiation of a package of measures that are focused in different areas in the best way possible to change Iran's behavior. So that's what's going on in New York right now.

MR. GIBBS: Let me just add one thing. I sat at lunch with Bill Burns, who is a career diplomat, who the President first met in 2005 when he traveled with Senator Lugar to Russia. Bill said to me, the type of conversation the two Presidents had today, he could not even envision that conversation starting in January of 2009. That gives you a sense, as Mike said, at the level at which our relationship existed.

And as I said when we briefed a few of you guys on the plane, we're no longer coming out of these meetings in a pool spray, you guys are looking to see if the Russians are going to come to the table or going to be part of what's happening in the U.N. Security Council. That's what's taking place. That's a -- we've crossed that bridge to a place, again, that I think very few people thought we would get to or would be attainable at this point in the relationship.

Q: (Inaudible) conversation that took place today figuring in the conversations that the President will have with Hu Jintao -- I guess is it Monday or whatever -- Monday or Tuesday, whatever day --

MR. GIBBS: I think it's Monday morning.

MR. RHODES: Yes, I'd just say a couple things, Jennifer. First of all, the negotiations -- the Chinese are an active part of the negotiations in New York. And so there's a multilateral negotiation taking place about the package of sanctions that we aim to pass this spring.

Secondly, these meetings, therefore, at the leader level are an attempt for leaders to discuss their view of the current state of play as it relates to Iran; their view of what should go into a sanctions regime and the package that might be developed; and again, to have a bilateral discussion about how each country sees this particular challenge.

So there's a bilateral -- and I think what we've seen throughout the year is that at important junctures the President's bilateral meetings and conversations with these leaders helps kind of move things forward, reinforces our positions, what we're trying to achieve. But as it relates to the detailed negotiation, that's taking place in a multilateral setting, because it's not just the United States and Russia, it's not just the United States and China, it's the P5-plus-1 and the members of the U.N. Security Council.

Q: Follow up on the Iran thing. Did Medvedev outline his limits, as he did publicly? In other words, no hardship, blah, blah, blah, or did he get more specific? "I would agree that we need three types of things; I don't favor these two types of things." How tangible --

MR. McFAUL: We discussed the categories of the new resolution today, Peter. Just as in the START negotiations, we didn't read out where we're at every point, I think it would be inappropriate to do here as well. And I would just remind you that this is not just a bilateral negotiation; it's multilateral.

But we're into the heart of discussion, what should be in the resolution. We have moved beyond just saying sometimes sanctions are necessary or inevitable. We are talking about a concrete process, concrete categories.

Q: -- he gave you specifics that you have not heard before.

MR. McFAUL: Yes, we had specific discussions on the range of categories which you're all familiar with, where we talked about what should be in the resolution and what should not.

MR. RHODES: And I'd just add one thing, which is that -- both Presidents made this point today, too. The sanctions are part of a broader strategy, right, which is designed to affect Iran's behavior. So these categories are part of a discussion of steps that could be taken to have the greatest chance of applying that cost-benefit analysis without having undue other negative consequences like we've discussed with the humanitarian situation, for instance.

And again, it's also part of a range of actions that we're taking as it relates to Iran. We've tightened enforcement on unilateral sanctions as well. Again, our NPT, we believe -- our NPR, I'm sorry -- and the actions we've taken to strengthen the NPT has been part of an effort that has isolated Iran from the international community because of its failure to live up to its obligations.

So this is all taking place from the details of the sanctions regime to the broader picture of steps that we're taking across a spectrum of areas to affect the behavior of the Iranian regime going forward and their continued failure to live up to their obligations.

MR. McFAUL: Can I add just one other thing? One other thing I wanted to say -- I apologize -- it's important to understand one other thing, at least it's striking to me, again, remembering the -- where we were just 15, 18 months ago. These two Presidents now have negotiated really hard, big things already. They've been through a process to do it. So we're having a real conversation. We're not reading talking points and we're not talking about we'll get back to you. They have an ability now, because of the experience of the START treaty, to get into it in a very substantive way.

MR. GIBBS: Mike.

Q: So just to continue just a little bit more on what Peter said, do you guys have paper now that you have brought back from this that you guys will then go evaluate and do you have any sense of whether or not the things that came up in his list of things that he would do and that he wouldn't do have sort of pushed forward or pulled back in terms of where you guys would like to be?

And then finally, last question is, there were some diplomats out there saying they want to get this done by the end of April. Does that match up with your spring timeline, or is that too soon to you?

MR. GIBBS: I can confirm April is in spring. (Laughter.)

MR. McFAUL: Just on the process, again, having just emerged from very complex negotiations about START, it's a multi-tiered process that Ben alluded to. They meet, they have discussions. They then send instructions -- and that was a word used today -- to their negotiators, and here we have this interim step as well, the P5-plus-1. That process took a step forward today. And so that will continue. But it took a step forward.

Q: And end of April?

MR. McFAUL: I'll leave April to these guys.

MR. GIBBS: I don't know that I'd parse April, May. I would just leave it in the broader context of the spring.

Q: So you're leaving out (inaudible) May through June? (Laughter.)

MR. GIBBS: No, those also are part of spring. Thank you.

Q: Can you elaborate a bit more on the discussions on Kyrgyzstan between the two leaders? And also, to follow up on Jennifer's question, you said that now President Obama and President Medvedev, that they have moved past talking points. How then does that help to bring China onboard? How can that be used to get China?

MR. McFAUL: So, on Kyrgyzstan, President Medvedev brought it up. He pulled the President aside; he wanted to just exchange notes and kind of exchange information about what we know.

As you know, we have the Manas Transit Center there, so we're very keenly following what's happening in Kyrgyzstan.

The tone of the conversation, just to, again, as I remember, this is one of the first things we had to deal with when we came in. And as you may recall, the Russians offered a \$2 billion package to President Bakiev, in fact, and the quid pro quo implicitly was at, you know, you got to get rid of the Americans.

That was an entirely different conversation today. We have interest in stability. We want to make -- we want to monitor that the troops stay where they are; exchanged information about what we knew about the opposition leaders and the regime. We were thinking about cooperative measures, perhaps the OSCE. We didn't get into details, but should there be joint statements, that that could help to facilitate -- to deal with this crisis together.

MR. RHODES: On your second question, Julianna, I'd say we've always had a view that there are different layers at which you can apply pressure. We in the United States could simply pursue sanctions and strongly condemn Iranian actions. We could work kind of exclusively with a smaller number of countries to do the same.

But what our view from the beginning has been is that if you really want to broaden the ability to isolate Iran and to affect its cost-benefit analysis as it relates to their continued failure to live up to their obligations, that you needed to bring in a broader coalition, and that Russia and China would be important parts of that effort.

So that's the strategy that we've pursued in our engagement throughout the course of the last 15 months is facilitated the broadening of this coalition and the transition from the focus being on the United States to the focus being on the Iranians.

At every step, I think what you've seen, as Mike said, what's really interesting is that at key junctures, the ability of President Obama and President Medvedev to work together has been important, and reinforcing the unity of the P5-plus-1, and again, and applying greater pressure on the Iranians. And that helps add momentum to this process.

So as it relates to China, they have actually been there throughout the P5-plus-1 process. They've signed on to the dual-track approach in the fall. They, too, have an interest in preventing a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. And they've now entered into the multilateral negotiations that we're having.

So to the extent to which our continued work with the Russians reinforces the broader P5-plus-1 unity, that can only be helpful to our efforts at the United Nations and our efforts to build a broad-based coalition.

Q: The President and President Hu -- they meet on Monday morning?

MR. RHODES: They meet on Monday, I believe, yes, that's right. And they'll discuss, as was the case today, and as you all know, a broad range of issues, one of which will be Iran, but the United States-China relationship is very comprehensive.

MR. GIBBS: Let me just -- I just want to add one thing broadly to the series of questions about negotiation and the sort of dialogue and relationship between the two leaders now.

As you've heard Ben and Mike mention, they've met and talked on the phone, I think this was their 15th time of doing that. Just to give you guys a little bit of background, the smaller bilateral meeting, which was the President, Secretary of State Clinton, National Security Advisor Jones and Mike -- there were two meetings, that and an expanded bilateral meeting. The space for both meetings was to take 85 minutes. The meeting that -- the smaller meeting that Mike, Secretary Clinton, Jones and the President were in went 85 minutes. We essentially got -- we were behind schedule on some of this stuff today largely because the space that that took up, they met an additional 15 minutes in the expanded bilateral.

And I would say this, in riding back to the hotel with the President, he remarked to a couple of us as we were driving that -- to give you just a little context of the not-trading-talking-points type of relationship, he genuinely feels like they can sit down or call each other and work through a series of issues in a very frank and honest way; that each side is negotiating -- always negotiating in good faith, and that there's a level of confidence and trust also that's built up in the two sides working together on issues like this, which I think is certainly important as we move forward in both multilateral relationships that involve the two countries, as well as the continued level of bilateral issues that the two leaders will work through over the course of the next several years.

Jonathan.

Q: Afterward -- after the President and Medvedev, the two Presidents spoke, we spoke with Sergei Ryabkov, who said that a total embargo on deliveries of refined oil products to Iran would be a slap, a blow, a huge shock for the whole society, and it was something that they were absolutely not going to entertain. So what is the status right now of possible sanctions on the Iranian energy sector? Does it mean that -- basically that the Russians have taken that off the table?

MR. McFAUL: Again, I want to not get into reading out the negotiations. But we discussed energy today. You shouldn't be -- obviously. And it is not off the table.

Where it ends out, I honestly don't know, but it is not a category that has been taken off the table today.

Q: So did you talk about refined oil products?

MR. GIBBS: Jonathan, I don't think we're going to get a whole lot more specific than --

MR. RHODES: But, wait, wait -- I'd say one thing, Jonathan. Again, what we're talking about is putting together a package. Energy can be one category in which we continue to pursue discussions about measures that could be a part of it. But there's also a very broad range of different places in which you could apply pressure on a regime.

So, again, this is going to be -- the reason this takes time to put together is that we want to put together the most effective package that is strong and smart, as I think both Presidents said today, and again, as both Presidents said, have the aim of affecting the Iranians' calculus.

So I wouldn't get into the specifics within those categories, but I would just echo what Mike said, too. We have made it clear, too, that we would not want the result of these sanctions and the aim of these sanctions to be, as the President said, the bringing down of Iranian society. We have not set regime change as a goal for these sanctions. And we would not want the purpose of these sanctions to be widespread suffering among the Iranian people. We want the focus of these sanctions to be the Iranian government and the cost-benefit analysis that affects their choices going forward over time, because this is not something that's going to happen at once. It's going to be a steady process of applying different kinds of pressure from different places. One of those is a multilateral sanctions regime, but of course there are other ways of applying pressure as well, some of which we're already pursuing.

MR. GIBBS: Yunji.

Q: In that same conversation with the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, they seem to indicate that the START treaty is not at all a done deal for them. He said to us that they don't want to hold the Duma hostage and that they hope to have something passed by the U.S. midterm elections when it comes to START ratification. Is that a timeframe that works for the U.S.? And what is the parallel timeline for the Senate?

MR. GIBBS: Well, the timeline that we've largely laid out is this year. So I think the timeline that he laid out seems quite parallel to what we're doing. I've made this point on a number of occasions; I'll take the opportunity to do it again, as the President did. I think if you look at a series of nuclear arms reduction treaties, you see broad bipartisan majorities. You see votes in the 90s; you see the dissenting vote in the single digits. This has traditionally been a bipartisan issue.

That is why you have folks like Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, who have taken the positions that they have. You see Senator Lugar as somebody, again, who wants to see the Senate take this up and work on it quickly.

So I do think it will be a test for Washington to see whether or not the traditional bipartisanship that we have generally seen on these types of treaties -- 1988, 1992, 2003 -- if that kind of bipartisan cooperation in our national interest is -- continues.

Q: So it sounds to me like you're not anticipating a fight?

MR. GIBBS: I don't doubt that -- I have turned on C-SPAN-2 sometime in the last 15 months; I understand you could probably quibble over renaming a post office on any given day in the United States

Senate. That's not to say at the end of the day there isn't enough space and time to do this this year, and to demonstrate again for the American people that we have the ability to work together on things that make sense for our national interest.

The President reiterated today this is something that his Secretary of Defense was heavily involved in; that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were heavily involved in. So I don't see why there wouldn't be an opportunity to redemonstrate bipartisanship.

MR. RHODES: I would just add to that -- and then Mike might speak to the Duma --

MR. McFAUL: No, I want to talk about the treaty, a historical comparison. (Laughter.)

MR. RHODES: What I want to say about the -- why we feel like -- again, this is going to be -- this is in the tradition of strong bipartisan support for arms control. We believe that this treaty does a range of things to advance America's national security, from the cooperation with Russia, to the reduction in our deployed warheads and delivery vehicles and the benefits that that has as relates to broader non-proliferation nuclear security. And we also have been consulting with the Senate throughout some of these negotiations.

Secretary Gates alluded to some of those consultations when he briefed that -- the treaty when we announced the agreement, and he said, well, look, we took onboard, for instance, that there is great interest from some senators in missile defense. And this treaty doesn't place any constraints on the missile defense that we are developing in Europe, and so we feel very comfortable that on missile defense we can go to the Senate and say there are no constraints on missile defense in this treaty.

As it relates to the stockpile -- because any time you have reductions, very legitimately, people are interested in maintaining the reliability of the deterrent -- we've made substantial investments in the infrastructure, the science and technology and human capital around our stockpile, in a manner that Secretary Gates also spoke to the other day, that really increases his confidence in actually maintaining a safe, effective, and reliable stockpile at lower numbers.

So we believe that on some of the key issues that will be of interest to people, as well as the broader and fundamental issue of the importance of this kind of arms control agreement and this cooperation that we're pursuing on non-proliferation in nuclear weapons with Russia, we believe that we have a very effective case to make that the treaty that was reached today is comprehensive, in our national interest, and in the global interest.

MR. McFAUL: I'm not going to speak about the politics in either country, but I do want to say a little bit about the treaty, just compared to other treaties. There have been other treaties that have been signed that were not completed, and therefore they had to be completed before they could go up to the Senate. There have been other treaties where the balance of what's in the treaty, the protocol, and the annexes fell more to the annexes.

We had to make a decision whether we should sign the treaty and leave the protocol for later, and it was President Obama's view is we're not going to do that because when we get to this moment we want to have everything lined up. We did something historic today -- it's up, right, guys? We did something historic today. Usually you sign the treaty and it goes off in some box and then months -- it goes to the senators and then you see it later. You can all see it right now because the treaty and the protocol is done. And if you were at the signing ceremony you saw them sign the treaty, and then you saw that big black thing and the red -- that's the protocol. We made a determination to finish that first.

There are some technical annexes, but we're -- there are only three, and we're days from completing them. So we're -- and then the other thing I would say, different -- two other things I'd say that's different from previous processes, we've had an interagency process in our government; at an intense period, we had two SVTSEs a day with our negotiators in Geneva, with the full interagency there, including the intelligence community, where we were in sometime four hours of interaction. So the knowledge about the treaty among all those in the government that need to know, that need to report on it, is already way beyond what it would have been for earlier treaties when that was not happening.

And then the last thing I would just mention is we have already begun to brief our colleagues on the Senate. We've had Senator Lugar in; we've had Senator Kerry in twice now already -- maybe, Robert, you want to say more about -- including right now.

MR. GIBBS: I would say that Denis and other members of the negotiating team are at the hotel right now briefing Senate staff over secure video teleconference on the specifics of what are in the treaty. They're having obviously, because it's on the Internet, an opportunity to look through and ask questions of that. I think it's safe to say that we will spend a lot of time and our team will spend a lot of time meeting with individual senators and individual senators' staffs over the next many months to make this happen.

Ben [Chang] has -- \$4.95 you can get a copy of that right over there.

Q: A couple of questions about Kyrgyzstan. A senior Russian official accompanying Medvedev is saying that Russia --

MR. GIBBS: I think that got read out just a minute ago, so I don't know if we need to do the senior official. But go ahead.

Q: No, it's about something different -- it's saying that Russia will urge the new Kyrgyzstan government to close the U.S. base. Does this go against the new, better tone in the relationship?

And also, Michael, you said that -- you talked about issuing a joint statement on Kyrgyzstan, but why did you opt not to? Is it because you couldn't agree? And then, finally, are you going to recognize the Kyrgyzstan government, the interim government?

MR. McFAUL: well, on the first issue, I was standing next to the two Presidents discussing Kyrgyzstan and the notion that we need to close the Manas Air Base or the Manas Transit Center was not discussed. That just simply seems spurious to me, but I don't know who that person is. That was not at all discussed in the conversation.

Second, on whether a joint statement or not, we're just -- we're trying to keep the peace right now. Recognizing governments, all those processes, that comes way down the line. It's really too early to get into those kind of discussions. The people that are allegedly running Kyrgyzstan -- and I'm emphasizing that word because it's not clear exactly who's in charge right now -- these are all people we've had contact with for many years. They're not -- this is not some anti-American coup. That we know for sure. And this is not a sponsored-by-the-Russian coup. I've heard some reports of that. There's just no evidence of that as yet.

By the way, one last thing, because we are in Prague and I wanted to mention it in the beginning; I forgot -- if Robert will forgive me. Robert rightly talked about the relationship that these two gentlemen have in talking about a lot of issues. This is not a talking point reading conversation; this is a give-and-take, this is where they're really trying to solve problems and advance our, for us, our interest, and for them, their interest. Nobody is going to do anything that's not in their interest.

But I also want to -- and I think we've made remarkable achievement in a short amount of time. But I also want to underscore we also talked about the things that we disagree about. Today we had a very long conversation, for instance, about European security. And 15 months ago, that was a very -- before we were here, you all know, there was a lot of confrontation, including military confrontation, about European security, and very much a zero-sum mentality about Russia versus Europe versus United States.

The conversation today was not about that. Neither -- we're going to disagree about things, and we did today -- I want to underscore that -- but this notion that somehow if we work with Russia that's to the disadvantage of our allies, like the Czech Republic -- that's absolutely absurd. And the fact that these two guys know each other well enough and can speak candidly and frankly about red lines, about security and alliances and things we cannot do and can do, shows I think the maturity of where this relationship is now that it simply wasn't just a couple of years ago.

Q: Can I just clarify one thing? So the reason you didn't issue the joint statement was that you're trying to keep the peace and it's an evolving situation, you just felt it was too soon? Is that --

MR. McFAUL: We need to find the right modality for the right time. We've already put things on the record; they have put things on the record. I don't -- I wouldn't focus on the -- we didn't discuss a joint statement. We talked in general terms about things we've got to coordinate and they instructed people like me to go off and do that. And when we're done here I'll go off and do that.

We just want to think about what is the problem and what are the mechanisms to solve them. I wouldn't focus too much on whether a joint statement is the right tool or not.

MR. GIBBS: Mike, do you have a follow?

Q: Yes, just a real quick follow-up. You guys several times now have talked about the relationship, the personal relationship between these two guys. A year ago, maybe in this room -- I can't remember -- I think also in London on the first trip, you guys talked specifically about how you wanted to reject the kind of "look into your soul," the sort of personal relationship between Bush and the other -- and sort of focus more on the kind of interest of the countries and less on the relationship. Has that changed? Have you guys after 15 months or 12 months sort of come to the conclusion that those personal relationships are more important than you thought they were?

MR. McFAUL: No. I would put it this way -- I think I know who you're quoting back -- we want to have a substantive relationship with Russia that advances American interests -- security, economic, our interest in promoting universal values. That's the relationship we want with Russia. Putting an adjective -- "friendly," "happy," all that kind of stuff -- that's not the objective of our policy towards Russia.

Now, as it happens, if you can build a constructive relationship, it helps to have chemistry, and I would say the reverse is true. You develop chemistry if you get things done. And the fact that these guys are getting things done -- they're just extremely pragmatic. I really cannot emphasize that enough, that both President Obama and President Medvedev look at the issues and say, okay, how can we advance our -- how can we get things done that's good for you and good for me. Not grandiose speeches about -- big slogans about this or that. That's the kind of relationship they have. And if you get things done then you feel good about the relationship.

MR. RHODES: I'd just add the relationships do extend throughout the government, right? And you actually heard both Presidents make this point today. They negotiated very closely. Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov were there; Admiral Mullen and his counterpart. I'm sure they put up with Mike.

So there's a deep -- our negotiating team is in Vienna. So there was a very deep -- it's not simply the two leaders; there's a broader context to this.

But again, I'll just -- to return to where I started, the President laid out -- the reason we're here today in part is that the President -- well, the reason we're in Prague is because the President laid out this agenda on what he believes to be the top national security danger to the United States, which is nuclear proliferation and nuclear security. He sees that as a fundamental interest of the United States.

And so we're here one year later because he worked with Russia on behalf of that interest. And I think you've heard me say that we believe that that action, too, is in service of a range of other things we're going to do, because when we work with Russia we're better able to secure vulnerable nuclear materials and we're better able to apply pressure to those nations like Iran that break the rules.

So this relationship that the two of them have struck we believe is part of a broader interest-based cooperation between the United States and Russia. And frankly, I think, as relates to Russia, our theory from the beginning was when the United States and Russia can work together on areas of common interest it's a huge benefit to American national security, to Russian security, and to global security. So when this relationship is working it can have great benefit for us.

And the case the President made when he was in Moscow was that our interests are common. Russia does not have an interest in an arms race in the Middle East. They've been with us on North Korea, as have the Chinese, because they don't have an interest in an arms race in East Asia -- and on a range of other issues that were discussed today.

MR. McFAUL: Just a footnote on Ben's very excellent point, next week we have a major delegation from Russia attending the nuclear security summit. The following week we have a major delegation from their security council coming to see General Jones and us. The following week after that we have General Makarov that Admiral Mullen is hosting the following week after that. And the following week after that we have a very senior-level delegation from Russia coming to the White House and to other agencies to talk about WTO. And that is a normal month in the pace of U.S.-Russia relations today that was not there before.

Q: What can the President do or say tonight to reassure the Central Europeans that this warming relationship between the U.S. and Russia does not come at their expense?

MR. McFAUL: The very way you set up the question is wrong. I mean, we have been clear-cut from day one, from April 1st, that as we advance our interests with Russia in seeking mutual cooperation, we're not going to link that to other places as a quid pro quo. And we've been criticized for that policy because some people want us to link other things, right -- to link the START treaty to human rights. The Russians would like us to link cooperation in this area to cooperation in that. And we've been categorical from the Vice President's speech in Munich to that April 1st meeting, that just is simply not a game we're going to play.

And on the -- conversely, the more positive way, just rejecting that it comes that way, conversely, we believe that a more substantive relationship with Russia where we can talk about the things that Robert described, including the things that we disagree about, and including just informing them about things that maybe we wouldn't have talked about before -- when I think about some of the things that they'll be talking about tonight -- that that actually is good for security in this region of the world, not bad for security. It's not a zero-sum game. It actually can be beneficial to both.

Conversely, when we have a confrontational relationship with Russia -- and I would add, if you think historically, thinking of where we're at here today -- when we're in a very confrontational relationship with Russia that generally has not been good for security in this region of the world.

Q: (Inaudible) treaty, but the President did say he wants to go further. So I'd like to ask Mike what's next on the agenda? What do you envision the next treaty will confront, deal with, try to solve? Do you agree with most arms control experts that the next one will be much more difficult than this initial one? And what degree of concern do you have about Russian anxiety about missile defense and Prompt Global Strike weapons in those negotiations?

MR. RHODES: Yes, I'd say a number of things, Major. Actually the President, even as early as here in Prague a year ago, forecasted that there would be future negotiations for reductions after START. I think that today he spoke to certain categories that we were going to look at; that that would include both strategic and tactical reductions and it would include non-deployed weapons.

Obviously there's -- we recognize the fact that missile defense, as we were talking about offensive weapons, that the defensive system of our missile defense is of great interest to us because we want to be able to preserve the flexibility that we need to protect the American people, and to the Russians because they're interested in their strategic balance, as you heard President Medvedev say. So as you heard President Obama say today, we'd like to have a very comprehensive dialogue with the Russians about how we can build cooperation on missile defense.

So I think what -- and this goes to the broader point, but the ability to get this treaty done -- and it's a very comprehensive treaty that involves both deployed warheads, launchers, verification regimes -- I mean, in that sense, that's why it's broader than the -- it's more comprehensive than the Moscow Treaty -- it's a follow-on to START -- the ability to get that done, again, develops these contexts. We've already discussed some of these issues in the context of START. They'll be very difficult and this will be a process that unfolds over time.

But the President's fundamental view is that we -- when we move in the direction of reductions, when we're cooperating with other nuclear weapons states, particularly Russia given the size of our two arsenals, that that enhances global non-proliferation, global nuclear security, and again, that fundamental mechanism by which we hold nations accountable, the NPT, because we are keeping our commitments to reduce.

And you're absolutely correct. The lower you go, the more complicated the negotiations get, because as the President would say, as long as nuclear weapons exist we would never compromise our deterrent and our ability to extend that deterrent to the American people and to our allies. And naturally that's a view that the Russians have as well.

So those discussions will continue. We believe START is a very historic and landmark milestone along the way -- I just used three words in a row -- it's a milestone along the way in this effort, but it's not the end of the journey. But it opens the door to further reductions because it provides for that drop in strategic warheads and delivery vehicles.

MR. McFAUL: Just one quick note on missile defense. You already heard -- I'm sorry -- you heard what the President said already. I'd just note that in the private meeting they also discussed in more substance how we can cooperate on missile defense. It's going to be a long negotiation but it's a subject that we've already begun to discuss.

Q: I was wondering if you could just talk a little bit about the summit next week, elaborate on its unprecedented scope and particularly how you think today's signing will impact the dialogue.

MR. RHODES: Yes, I'd say a number of things and I think we'll have a more detailed briefing tomorrow with

Gary Samore and some of the folks who are particularly focused on the summit.

Q: Here?

MR. RHODES: No, on a call. I think there is a call. People will be in different places, so we'll get you a time.

But a few things I'd say on the historic nature. I think that -- I think that we found -- Ben [Chang], who is a State Department guy, can correct me if I'm wrong -- that this is the largest summit hosted by an American President since the San Francisco conference related to the United Nations. Obviously there have been other summits connected to existing bodies like the U.N. or the G20, but this kind of gathering that is focused on an issue, that the President calls a gathering of nations around a particular issue, I think it's been that many decades since we've seen anything like that in the United States.

We believe that -- the reason we're doing that is because, again, it cannot be underscored enough and it can be lost, frankly, somewhat in the discussions about other elements of this broader non-proliferation package. We've spent a lot of time talking, for instance, about Iran, understandably and correctly today, but the vulnerable nuclear material around the world that exists is a great threat to the United States because we know that terrorist groups are actively seeking to buy or obtain those materials. That's a threat to the United States. It's obviously a threat to Russia, which has a terrorist threat as well.

So what we want to do, because we know this problem is out there, there are measures that can be taken to address it, to lock down this vulnerable material. So we want to bring together 47 countries with a critical interest in this and rally them behind the kind of collective action that can secure these vulnerable materials within the next four years.

And just to give you one example, I think today you saw the story of Chile shipping its high-enriched uranium out of the country as a part of this effort to provide greater nuclear security. So what we're trying to do is build a collective action as well as the specific steps that individual countries can take.

Now, the United States and Russia, again, as the countries that have the two -- 90 percent of the nuclear weapons and a lot of experience, frankly, with the Cooperative Threat Reduction in some of these lockdown mechanisms, when we're working together it's almost inconceivable to think through how you could pursue an ambitious nuclear security agenda without the United States and Russia being a leading part of that effort.

So again, we think that this is an area where the partnership that we've developed with the Russians that is embodied and is best demonstrated by the New START treaty will help us advance this other very important component of the nuclear security and non-proliferation agenda which will be the focus of the summit. Because, again, all of these different pieces -- the reduction of our arsenals, the investment in our reliability of our stockpile, the NPT, the actions with regard to Iran, nuclear security -- they are all mutually reinforcing as it relates to our ability to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to secure the American people and to secure these nuclear materials.

MR. GIBBS: Let's make this the last one --

Q: We'll make it a two-part then.

MR. GIBBS: This will be the second to the last and then --

MR. RHODES: I started to get really tired. (Laughter.)

Q: Mike said we're going to disagree, and there are things we disagreed on today. I wonder if you could tell us what they were. Secondly, in the treaty you say -- the treaty specifically says that the number of -- aggregate number of these launchers and warheads and so forth is going to be released to the public. And you're talking about transparency and putting this up on the Web. Can you give us, either now or at some point in the -- soon -- the number of warheads and launchers that you all believe you have, as counted by this treaty, now, so we can know exactly how much impact this will have?

MR. McFAUL: That's really a declassification issue we're talking about. I think we need to get back to you, Peter, in terms of on the second -- on the second. Sorry?

Q: The treaty specifically says all that information can be released so --

MR. GIBBS: They're ahead of us on the declassification. (Laughter.)

MR. McFAUL: Like I said, it's historically unprecedented that we hit the send button in the 21st century and this is part of -- but I'll get you a better answer to that because there is an answer to it and it does have to do with our declassification process, which we're pushing on but it's -- we're not done yet.

On the first question, I would just say in broad terms, we had lots -- it was particularly talking about European security. What I was struck by is an assessment of the problems, some interesting agreement about some possible solutions, and again, I think it would be premature to get into the modalities, but how -- like really practical problem-solving, but perhaps some disagreement about what setting, where, institutions -- we just have a different view about which is the right setting to deal with that. I would not overplay it, but on those kinds of things.

Before we'd have a long list of things we disagree about. Georgia came up today again. And we --

Q: (Inaudible.)

MR. McFAUL: Just in the kinds -- (laughter) --

MR. GIBBS: You only got two questions, Peter, and that was -- that now falls outside the realm of --

Q: (Inaudible.)

Q: Mike was so eager to tell us about the differences. He was eager to tell us.

MR. McFAUL: Let me say one thing -- can I say one thing? One thing, let me say this. So -- and this is something we said well before the election, that mechanisms for crisis prevention in Europe need to be strengthened. That's something we've said. It's part of the way we talk about security. Prevention mechanisms, alert, all those kinds of things that so when we see a potential conflict brewing we have ways to defuse it, rather than just reacting to it after -- afterwards. And Georgia was invoked today in that discussion, right?

And we agree on that. And that was interesting, that we both think that to enhance that, to enhance transparency of forces in Europe -- we agree. And by the way, our colleagues tonight agree on that, too. That will be a subject we discuss on that.

How to do it, what's the modality, treaties, institutions, that's the part that we haven't got there. But we did make progress, I believe, on saying that this was a problem. We had a disagreement, now we have agreement that this would be, for instance, one very concrete thing that would enhance security in Europe. Now let's just figure out the right way to do it.

MR. RHODES: The only thing I'd add to that is that this gets at the zero-sum question, which you heard President Medvedev mention win-win today but --

Q: In English.

MR. RHODES: In English. I wouldn't know how to say it in Russian. But I think the President's point, right, as it relates to Russia, to Europe, and frankly to a whole set of relationships around the world is that when you really get down to core issues, whether it's economic growth, nuclear proliferation, climate change, that there is a very broad basis of shared interests and common interests, and that in certain instances -- in many instances, actually, and Russia was one of them when we came in -- habits of international relations and relationships between nations didn't reflect those common interests.

So we fundamentally believe that -- and I think if you looked at where things are today in terms of European security and Russia generally, that they've advanced since we've been in office; and that the President can come here to Prague and sign a major arms control agreement with the Russian President and have dinner with 11 NATO allies that night, and it underscores the fact that these relationships in no way come at the expense of the other, and in fact when the United States and Russia are able to address these issues in a very candid and robust way, that it can enhance the security of Europe more broadly.

So, with that, we'll take -- I think we're done.

MR. GIBBS: One more. One question. We're not doing a seven-part Peter Baker question. Sorry, I had to -- it was more like four, but we'll -- go ahead, I'm sorry.

Q: The President mentioned that he brought up the suicide bombing in Moscow to Medvedev. Can you elaborate a little bit what he talked about and what he said, what the United States would be doing to help?

MR. McFAUL: They did discuss it, obviously. The President -- President Medvedev was very gracious and thanked President Obama that he called that day, and he said that meant a lot to him. They talked about this is a common problem, this is an international problem. We have a working group on counterterrorism that we stood up as part of the binational commission. They talked about ways that they might enhance that and have a focus -- more resources, higher-level discussion. Actually we're going to be discussing it in two weeks' time in Washington with our Russian counterparts. That was planned well before the terrorist attacks in Moscow.

And it just was talked about in the context of, all right, this is a global problem. It obviously affects your national security; it obviously affects our national security. Let's think of ways that we can work together and work in parallel. It doesn't necessarily have to be joint projects to advance our common goal when it comes to this other issue.

MR. GIBBS: Thanks, guys.

Press Gaggle by National Security Advisor General Jim Jones and NSC Chief of Staff Denis McDonough
Aboard Air Force One
Aboard Air Force One, En route Andrews Air Force Base
7:19 A.M. EDT

MR. McDONOUGH: Hey, everybody. Sorry to bother you. We wanted to get you early enough in the flight, but we also wanted to get you a shot at General Jones, and I know that some of you were resting -- apologize for that. But we also wanted to do it soon enough so you can go back to rest.

So General Jones has got a couple of minutes. This will be on the record and I think he's got a couple of remarks and then we'll take your questions for a little bit. So, sir, you want to fire away?

GENERAL JONES: Thank you. I'm going to talk a little bit about the dinner last night and the final breakfast this morning, or the outcall with our Czech friends.

First, to the dinner last night. This was an all-NATO, all-EU attendance, basically all EU except for Croatia, 11 countries with their leaders. It was a very private dinner in the sense that the heads of state and heads of government were by themselves in a dining room. Adjacent to that was another room where people could take notes. But other than interpreters, the Presidents dined by themselves.

The President greeted each head of government, head of state individually and personally, welcomed them. And I will start out by saying that we have -- we had four themes that the President was interested in exploring, not necessarily in order of importance, but there was Afghanistan, Iran, European security and, finally, NATO.

The President started out in his opening remarks by emphasizing the importance of U.S. relations with each one of their countries and how much we value them. He thanked them each for their contributions to Afghanistan, emphasized that many of their contributions surpassed their national capacity -- in other words, many of them were actually doing more than was expected and he thanked them profusely for that.

He asked them to comment individually about their concerns and their evaluation of the themes, particularly NATO, the European Union and their relations with Russia.

He emphasized in his opening comments also that his administration, however long it lasted, was always going to place a high priority on the transatlantic relationship and the transatlantic partnership.

So each head of state, head of government individually spoke around the table. The President listened very attentively. The common themes that the other heads of state, heads of government presented was first an appreciation for the START treaty and the work that's been done with the Russian relations. They characterized the START treaty as increasing adding to their security, and for that they were very grateful.

They also emphasized at some length the value and the progress of U.S.-Russian relations and the impact that it's had on their region. And they characterized it by saying that, indeed, not only is it decreasing tensions, that it's increasing the opportunity for cooperation with Russia and reasonable dialogue.

Perhaps the most eloquent spokesman on that issue was the President of Estonia, President Ilves, who made that intercession, which was supported by his colleagues around the table.

They also emphasized their collective importance to NATO and to their security in the 21st century, obviously keying very much on Article 5.

Fourthly, they asked the President to make sure that we don't take our eye off the Balkans and to keep working on those issues as they are issues that are of great importance to them.

And lastly they also expressed their concern for their energy security -- for obvious reasons -- their dependence on certain sources.

So those were really the five themes that the leaders evoked during their presentations.

The President, in his closing comments, expressed his appreciation. He commented on all of those things. He gave them a general overview of our approach with regard to Iran. He reiterated our support for NATO, said a few words about the evolution of the NATO security strategy that's being written, emphasized that their role within that strategy and that determination was very important.

On energy security he said this is a 21st century asymmetric threat for all of us, that we all have to work on it; suggested to them that they do collectively within the European Union and suggested that diversity in sources of energy supply was a good thing for everyone, but pledged cooperation and support with regard to that issue.

At breakfast this morning the President used the opportunity, with his team, meeting with the President and his cabinet, to thank the President and his cabinet for the reception that we received not only this time, but also a year ago in Prague, which kicked off the commitment to achieve a START treaty; mentioned that forevermore Prague and the Czech Republic would be associated with this historic treaty and was very grateful for the warm reception that we had, including the location, the lunch that was held by the President with Russians, Czechs and Americans sitting at every table in the wonderful area in which we had the lunch yesterday.

The President recommitted to the security architecture and the importance of NATO once again, to the strategic concept where he overtly and sincerely supported President Klaus's request and his cabinet's request that they be full participants in the emergence of the NATO strategic concept. The President again said that there are no old members or new members in NATO, only members, and that they're a full member of NATO and they should have no fear about anything be imposed on them without their full participation.

He also commented on the security architecture for Europe and the United States' plan for missile defense and the phase adaptive approach, and reassured our host that this was in fact solid, well thought out and well supported.

And finally just reiterated his appreciation for the visit and pledged to stay in touch and looked forward to our continuing bilateral relations.

MR. McDONOUGH: Let me just add two things. One is a fact, the second is hearsay. But the fact is General Jones was SACEUR, obviously, when seven of the 11 allies joined the alliance, who had dinner with the President last night. So it's obviously that this is something that we, from our leadership, the President and --

GENERAL JONES: Got my uniform on this morning. (Laughter.)

MR. McDONOUGH: -- the National Security Advisor take very seriously.

And the second instance, this is hearsay, but I gather from General Jones that President Klaus mentioned that President Obama spent so much time in Prague that he might have a job here in retirement as a tour guide in Prague. So while the President is not eager to look at post-current job options, he did take note of the fact that he has enjoyed his time in Prague very much.

GENERAL JONES: Actually, the President said that by the time his administration is over that might be all the energy he has left to -- you know, an appropriate way to spend his time.

MR. McDONOUGH: So why don't we take a couple of questions, if you've got them.

Q I'd like to ask if the President is disappointed that Netanyahu is not going to be able to make it to the nuclear summit next week.

GENERAL JONES: The President invited -- his invitation was to heads of state and heads of government. In the case of the Prime Minister's decision he understands that their Holocaust Day events were going to make it difficult for the Prime Minister to be in two places at once. We obviously would like to have had the Prime Minister, but the Deputy Prime Minister will be leading the delegation and there will be a robust Israeli delegation. And we'll still have a great conference, but he understands the reasons why.

Q Is that the real reason, sir? Or is it that they didn't want to be in the same room when countries like Turkey or Egypt or others in the Middle East might start talking about their nuclear holdings?

GENERAL JONES: I think that the Israelis did not want to be a catalyst for changing the theme of the summit, and I think that they will be at the table. The Prime Minister will be in Israel, but he is committed to the theme of the summit and the President's initiatives on proliferation and counter-proliferation and the spread of nuclear weapons.

So, again, we'll be sorry that the Prime Minister can't be there, but we're delighted that we'll have a very, very good Israeli delegation.

MR. McDONOUGH: I would just say on that -- obviously you guys have been talking with Robert about this since the idea and the schedule for the summit was first announced last -- I forget the seasons now, but several months ago. And obviously it's very important to the President that our ally, Israel, be at the summit. And obviously, as General Jones outlined and as he's discussed with his colleague, the Prime Minister's national security advisor, over the last several days, there are a variety of issues that we're going to work very closely on all these things.

Q People are describing relations with Israel as being in a state of crisis. What do you think of that characterization?

GENERAL JONES: Well, as Denis just pointed out, and I should have mentioned, I was in touch with the Prime Minister's national security advisor this morning. Last week we had an Israeli delegation in town working on mutual security interests. The national security advisor is coming into Washington next week and I'll be meeting with him as well.

So I think -- I know that the relationships are ongoing and fine and continuous. We're talking about the importance of starting the proximity talks and I think everybody is pulling on the same oar in that direction.

Q Is the White House serious about drafting a U.S-Mideast peace plan? And is there a strong contingent within the White House that thinks that that's a good idea?

GENERAL JONES: There's been no decision on that. Obviously there's been some reporting about former National Security Advisors that I convene in the White House, which I do regularly to benefit from their experience on issues that they were working on and that we're still working on, like the Middle East. But we are focused on the proximity talks, eventual resumption of peace talks and getting to the two state solution in a manner that's befitting and deserving for the people of the region, and the overall security of the region and the impact on the global playing field.

This is obviously a very strategic moment with Iran and our efforts there. The two are very closely linked because of the region that both efforts are ongoing in, and we have to treat that with the seriousness that it deserves.

Q It sounds as if you're leaving room for the possibility that that could be under consideration. And also is the White House satisfied with how serious the Israelis appear to be in the current conversations?

GENERAL JONES: Well, these are ongoing discussions and I think that while we've not taken any decision to jumpstart any dramatic shift in our strategy, I think we should say to make clear that we don't intend to surprise anybody at any time, and that whatever we do will always be done with the effort to help both Israel in its legitimate and our unqualified pledge to their security, and the emergence of a new Palestinian state that has legitimate claims on sovereignty and what that would look like; that we will be a full time player and we will do everything we can to bring this about so that all sides are satisfied.

Q What are the President's goals for the meeting with President Hu on Monday? And has the President been briefed yet on Secretary Geithner's trip to Beijing?

GENERAL JONES: I don't know the answer to that right now.

MR. McDONOUGH: You know, I think as it relates -- I think you'll probably have an opportunity to get a better read on the meeting on Monday. General Jones has provided a bunch of material for the President to work on the way home, provided -- included in that was a report from the Secretary on his trip. But I don't think we're in a position right now to kind of lay that out for you. But I'm sure over the course of the next couple days you'll have a shot at that as you all prepare for the bilats on Monday.

Q General Jones, can you talk about what you make of Karzai's statements? I mean, they've been rather weird and sort of up and down, and I know there's been a lot of controversy about what it means and what might happen. Can you talk about what the White House makes of it, how you assess the way he's talking just a few days after the President was there?

GENERAL JONES: We believe that we are on an encouraging glide path in Afghanistan, and Pakistan I might add. We have a number of significant events coming up: President Karzai's visit to the U.S., the Kabul conference later on, the --

Q The Karzai visit is on definitely?

MR. McDONOUGH: Absolutely.

GENERAL JONES: There's no modification to that whatsoever.

We have been in contact, as you all know. President Karzai and Secretary Clinton had a clarifying conversation. We have consistently said since the elections that President Karzai is our strategic partner. We have a huge amount of work to do in terms of bringing all these pieces of our strategy together so they function in a cohesive way. We see indications on the ground that they are, in fact, moving in that direction. We have I think a successful operation in Marja. We have strategic objectives to achieve by the end of this year to solidify the gains that we think we're making now.

And I believe that the rhetoric on perhaps both sides ought to -- we ought to calm the rhetoric and engage as strategic partners intent on bringing about peace and security in not only Afghanistan and Pakistan, but in the region as well. And that's what we're doing.

Q What exactly was clarified in the conversation? How was this -- how were things clarified?

MR. McDONOUGH: That's a good question for Secretary Clinton.

Q Secretary Clinton?

MR. McDONOUGH: That sounds like a question for her.

GENERAL JONES: Yes, I think the Secretary could answer the question, since she had the conversation. But President Karzai did not intend to create any damage to the relationship. And the President has sent a letter to President Karzai, which was delivered by the ambassador, basically recommitting ourselves to the success of our operation and our partnership and looks forward to greeting him in Washington to continue that progress.

Q Don't Karzai's remarks lately, though, underscore what Ambassador Eikenberry said in his memo to you all, his cable to you all during the Afghan review -- that this was not a reliable partner and therefore that strategy ought not to rely on him as a foundation for success there?

GENERAL JONES: Well, first of all, on that issue we have a democratically elected President who by definition is our partner. And he, I think, will prove himself over time as we tackle all of these important issues to be very reliable and is very appreciative of everything that we're doing.

But this is not easy and there are times when in the region he probably is provoked in one way or the other to make certain statements that can be misinterpreted. And I think we have gotten through this period. Secretary Clinton's conversation was clarifying and I think you'll find over the days and weeks ahead that we'll get back to regular order here to do the things that we have to do. We have people who are laying their lives on the line -- both Afghans and coalition members, U.S. forces. This is what we're about. We're trying to bring about peace and stability. And I think that this matter is really behind us now and I think you'll see that in the weeks ahead.

Q When was the letter sent? The letter from the President, when was that sent?

MR. McDONOUGH: I think -- what day is it? Is today Friday? This week.

GENERAL JONES: Probably delivered yesterday.

Q Was there any admonishment in it or any --

GENERAL JONES: Absolutely not. It was a very respectful letter. The President thanked President Karzai for his hospitality during the trip. I might say that having been in on the conversation between the

two Presidents, that there was far too much reporting on lecturing and making corruption the centerpiece of everything we talked about -- that wasn't the case. The conversation between the two was very respectful, very friendly. It was very direct and frank.

And then the other significant event I thought was a first was the dinner that President Karzai hosted in which most of the members of his cabinet were also at the table interspersed and were each able to give a short presentation about their ministry and the progress and the problems that they have. And I think we all came away -- I know I came away being generally impressed with the quality of the ministers and the seriousness with which they're approaching their job -- and that included several ministers who spoke out on women's rights in Afghanistan and things of that nature.

So I actually came away from that -- and I know the President did, too -- fortified by the conversations he had, reassured by the conversations with the President. And also we had a favorable opinion of the quality of the ministers that are advising him.

MR. McDONOUGH: Can I just add to this. The letter was a thank you letter, because the President was very grateful for the fact that on such short notice that President Karzai and his government did receive him and the delegation at the palace, had the dinner that the General spoke about.

And so as the General said, in fact as is typically the case with very gracious actions, it was General Jones' idea to send a letter. So that's the letter that we sent, and as he said it was delivered earlier this week. It's hard for me to remember the day, so it may have been yesterday or the day before.

GENERAL JONES: I know the letter was delivered. If you'd like to know exactly when we can find out, but I think it was delivered yesterday, it could have been the day before.

I want to confirm that this was in fact exactly what it is: It was a thank you note and a pledge to continue our common efforts towards success in Afghanistan and a statement of support and willingness to work together. There was absolutely no reference to anything else.

Q Can I ask about Kyrgyzstan, what's happening in Kyrgyzstan, do you recognize the new government and what do you think is going to happen with the Manas base?

GENERAL JONES: Well, those are good questions that we're asking ourselves, it's an ongoing situation that we'll have to watch carefully and we'll be back talking to the Secretary of State today; as we get back this will be an evolving matter that I shouldn't comment on now as it's unfolding. We're watching it as it unfolds.

Q Prime Minister Putin called Rosa Otunbayeva the new declared leader of Kyrgyzstan. Have we had any high-level contacts with their government, their new government, or transition government?

GENERAL JONES: Well, not from this flight. I think the President will look forward to getting a report from Secretary Clinton. Obviously Manas is a very important air base for our operations in Afghanistan, but all that we'll just have to wait and see how it plays out because it's just too early.

Q As long as we're talking about Central Asia, President Obama is meeting with President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan next week, who's been criticized for his human rights record and democracy and so forth. Is that something the President would bring up?

GENERAL JONES: I'm sorry, I missed the last part of the question.

Q Democracy, human rights, is that something the President would bring up?

GENERAL JONES: The President will never hesitate to speak up on democracy and human rights, which was the cornerstone of our own democracy. President Nazarbayev is recognized in the context of this nuclear security summit as having done something very courageous and exemplary for his country and for proliferation in general. And it's in that context that the President will be receiving him.

But there will be other subjects the we'll bring up with each different head of state with whom he's going to have a bilateral.

Q General, looking ahead to the nuclear security summit coming up this week, with so many parties that have so many different interests, can we expect anything more than, say, a broad commitment of some sort to deal with loose nukes and the concerns the President has mentioned?

GENERAL JONES: Well, I think this summit is important. And if you look at the chain of events that's happened very quickly, the signing of the START treaty, the rollout of the NPR, the Nuclear Posture Review, this summit and then in May in New York another proliferation-type conference -- I think it signals the seriousness with which we approach this very, very important issue.

And, you know, many times I'm asked what keeps me awake at night, and the answer is always the same - and that's proliferation, the fact that a weapon of mass destruction could fall into terrorist hands. And my absolute conviction, and I think the President's conviction, that if that happened the terrorists that we're dealing with today would not hesitate to use it, which would change the world as we know it.

So this is a subject that the President is very eager to lead on. You can be sure that the President will devote 100 percent of his time to this summit and to guiding it and keeping it on track, on theme, on message, and will use his persuasive powers to make sure that everyone understands just how serious it was. And the fact that almost 50 countries are coming to Washington, most heads of state, heads of government level, is indicative of the response that these countries are paying to this very important subject. So --

Q Again, sir, the question was will there be some unifying statement or document out of this thing?

GENERAL JONES: Well, I hope so. At the end we'll certainly have a wrap up statement, but I don't want to pre-judge the conference; but yes, absolutely, it would be our goal to have a unifying statement that commits the attendees to keep working on this issue. We're not going to solve everything right now, but I think with the United States leadership, President Hu of China, President Medvedev, President Sarkozy, a significant of the world's leaders coming, Angela Merkel, this is important.

MR. McDONOUGH: Peter, I would just say that as one of the guys who's been tasked by General Jones and the President to make sure that this is a very concrete summit that there will be very concrete actions out of it.

Q Can I just clarify one thing quickly in your response to Christi's question. It sounds like you're saying that the peace plan is under consideration, but it's not -- no decision has been made.

GENERAL JONES: No, there is no change in our strategy in the Middle East. But --

Q But is it under consideration?

GENERAL JONES: -- the idea of a U.S. plan has been talked about for years. It's not something new. But there will be no surprise to any of the participants at all. So we're focused on the resumption of the talks. The best way to help us in our collective goals is to restart the peace talks. It will also help us in what we're trying to achieve with Iran.

Thank you very much.

MR. McDONOUGH: All right guys, thanks a lot.

Q One quick factoid, Denis. Is it possible the President might use this flight to call any senators on the ratification of the new START?

MR. McDONOUGH: I don't think so. I know that he's working on a lot of different things -- the summit and then a bunch of other stuff that's been coming in. But if something like that happens we'll make sure that we let you know.

**Press Briefing to Preview The Nuclear Security Summit by Gary Samore,
White House Coordinator for WMD Counter-Terrorism and Arms Control,
and Ben Rhodes, Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic
Communications**

MR. HAMMER: Hello. Good morning, everyone. Thanks for joining us. Today we have with us Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes, who will kick off a brief introduction of what is coming up this exciting week. And then he will be followed by Gary Samore, who's actually the sherpa for the Nuclear Security Summit and will walk through the specifics of the schedule and some of the issues that we expect will be coming up. So with that, let me just turn it over to Ben. Go ahead, Ben.

MR. RHODES: Great. Thanks, everybody, and thanks for joining the call. We're actually flying back from Prague where we -- the President signed the new START treaty with President Medvedev. So if my connection is not good, I apologize for that, and if I fall off, my colleagues are more than capable of going forward. But I do want to say a few words about the summit before we get into the schedule and then turn it over to Gary Samore, who can walk you through the summit, and then we'll move to your questions.

The first thing I'd just say is that the summit is dedicated to nuclear security and the threat of nuclear terrorism. And I think that it is absolutely fundamental to view this summit with the starting point of the grave nature of the threat of nuclear terrorism. We know that terrorist groups, including al Qaeda, are pursuing the materials to build a nuclear weapon, and we know that they have the intent to use one. This of course would be a catastrophic danger to American national security and to global security were they able to carry out that kind of attack.

To that end, there is a substantial amount of vulnerable nuclear material around the world and some of my colleagues can speak to the specifics of that threat later in the call. And that's why President Obama, frankly, focused on this issue from when he came into the United States Senate; it was a focus of his national security platform in his campaign; and then one year ago in Prague, as a part of his comprehensive nuclear non-proliferation and security agenda, he laid out his aim to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world within four years.

As a part of that effort, he said he would host a global summit to rally the collective action that is necessary to achieve that goal. Obviously no one nation is capable of taking the actions necessary to secure vulnerable nuclear materials that are in many different countries and in many different regions of the world. Similarly, no one nation is capable of pursuing the kind of nuclear security measures that can prevent the transit, illicit transit, of those types of materials.

So this is an unprecedented gathering of nations to address this issue. It's unprecedented given the fact that nuclear security has not been addressed by this many nations at this level before. It's also the largest gathering of countries hosted by an American President dedicated to a specific issue like this in many decades, since the conference in San Francisco around the United Nations. And again, I think that underscores the seriousness of the threat posed by nuclear terrorism.

And also we believe that there are specific steps that can be taken to achieve this goal; that it is possible for nations to take actions to secure vulnerable nuclear materials. So the summit is intended to rally collective action behind the goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials within four years.

Underneath that collective action, of course, different countries will need to make specific commitments of their own because this kind of challenge, as Gary can speak to, is different for each country. But coming out of the summit we expect there to be, again, this collective commitment to pursue this goal, as well as a number of specific actions that will be announced in the -- over the course of the next several days by individual countries.

And the goal here is to, again, achieve agreement behind a plan of action, to initiate specific commitments from countries, and also to provide momentum going forward so that this goal can be achieved. And we believe this summit is the beginning of what will be a very aggressive and international effort that speaks to President Obama's focus on nuclear security as a top national security priority and also speaks to his strong commitment to multilateral cooperation to achieve important goals.

And the only other thing I'd say is that this is also of course connected a broader nuclear non-proliferation and security agenda. Earlier this week we put forward a new Nuclear Posture Review that puts non-proliferation and nuclear terrorism at the center of America's strategy to further strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty by isolating those nations, non-nuclear states that are not in compliance with their international obligations.

We signed yesterday in Prague the new START treaty which reduces the deployed nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles of the United States and Russia, and reaffirmed the strong leadership of the United States and Russia, as the two nations with 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons, to both keep their commitment under the NPT and to demonstrate responsible leadership on nuclear issues.

All of these we believe -- all of these nuclear actions reinforce one another. We believe that they strengthen international cooperation in this critical area. We believe that they, again, incentivize nations to cooperate and to live up to their obligations, while isolating those who don't; and that ultimately they do a great deal to enhance the security not just of the United States but of the world.

With that, I'll start moving into the schedule. I'll just work through what the President is planning -- his day on Monday, and then turn it over to Gary, who can take you through the schedule of the actual summit and explain the purpose of the different sessions.

I'm going to start by saying that I'll be -- I'm going to work through the bilateral meetings that the President currently has scheduled. It's certainly -- at these kinds of occasions, there will be many opportunities for the President to interact on a bilateral basis with his fellow leaders. So in addition to the opportunities that will come at meals and sessions, we expect there to be potential for additional bilateral contacts between the President and his colleagues.

So we will let you know as those take shape and if anything else is scheduled. So I will just be speaking to those meetings that are currently on the schedule.

On Sunday, the 11th, the President will hold a series of meetings at the Blair House. It will begin with a meeting with Prime Minister Singh of India. Obviously the President developed a close working relationship with Prime Minister Singh, who visited the United States for a State Dinner and working visit last year. And we expect, again, to have a dialogue with the Indians, a continuing dialogue on a range of issues that we're working with them together on.

The President will then have a meeting with President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is an important country as it relates to nuclear security and is a partner with the United States on a range of issues. And the President looks forward to hosting this bilateral meeting with President Nazarbayev.

The President will then have a bilateral meeting with President Zuma of South Africa. The President has met with President Zuma in several multilateral forums and we've cooperated with South Africa on a range of issues. Obviously South Africa has been an important nation as it relates to non-proliferation -- forsaking a nuclear weapons program in the past. And they're also an important partner for the United States on a range of issues that the two Presidents will be able to discuss.

And then the President will be hosting a bilateral meeting with Prime Minister Gilani of Pakistan. The United States and Pakistan have a deepening partnership on a range of issues, and the President looks forward to this opportunity to continue strengthening that partnership during discussions with Prime Minister Gilani.

Then the President will then be able to have a courtesy call that we've scheduled with President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria. Nigeria, of course, also being a critical leader in Africa and partner for the United States on a range of issues, so they'll be able to have a courtesy call together to discuss several of those issues.

The next day, on Monday, the President will hold a series of bilateral meetings at the convention center, where the summit will be hosted. The first of those meetings will be with King Abdullah of Jordan. The President and King Abdullah have had a close working relationship for a number of years, dating back to even before the President was elected, when he was able to visit with the King in Amman. The President has been looking forward to an opportunity to host King Abdullah to discuss, again, a range of issues on which we cooperate with -- (connection drops) --

MR. HAMMER: Well, Ben, you may have dropped off -- Ben? One second, folks, we'll see if we can get him right back on -- one moment.

OPERATOR: This is the operator. I do still show him connected though.

MR. HAMMER: Okay. We can't hear him; hopefully he can hear us. One moment -- we'll wait for just another moment and if Ben is unable to rejoin, then we'll proceed with Gary Samore to walk you through the schedule of the actual summit. Just one moment.

OPERATOR: And his line has officially dropped. We'll watch and see if he dials back in.

MR. HAMMER: Well, I'll go through -- this is Mike Hammer -- we'll go through the remaining bilaterals. So Ben mentioned with King Abdullah of Jordan.

Following that, there will be a bilateral with Prime Minister Mohamed Najib Abdul Razak and we -- from Malaysia. And that's an important meeting -- the President has not had an occasion to meet with him -- will be discussing a number of important issues. As a majority-Muslim country, we think this will be an important meeting in terms of the overall agenda the President has in terms of engagement with the Muslim communities around the world.

Following that, we will have -- the President will have a meeting with President Serzh Sargsian of Armenia. Again, there's a very important bilateral relationship that the United States has with Armenia and their issues relating to the protocols that we're trying to encourage in terms of normalization between Armenia and Turkey.

Following that, the President will have an opportunity to have another bilateral meeting with President Hu Jintao of China. I think we're all quite familiar with the extensive relationship that the United States

enjoys with China. So we can expect a number of important bilateral issues to come up during that meeting.

And finally, proceeding then to Tuesday -- that would be the final meeting for -- bilateral that we have scheduled. Actually, I think that one is not quite set as I see it on my schedule. So I think we've covered now the bilateral meetings and then we will now just turn it over to Gary Samore, who will go through the actual schedule of the summit and discuss the substance of the issues that will be presented during those sessions.

MR. SAMORE: Thanks, Mike. Well, I'm going to talk about the summit itself and what we hope to achieve. Now Ben has already given you a good sense of the overall goals of the Nuclear Security Summit and how the summit sits in the President's broader nuclear agenda, including arms control and non-proliferation, as well as peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

As Ben said, the Nuclear Security Summit is focused on a very specific issue of securing nuclear materials and cooperating to prevent nuclear smuggling in order to reduce as much as possible the threat that terrorist groups or criminal gangs get their hands on nuclear materials that can be used for nuclear weapons. And that really focuses on separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Those are the two materials that can be used for nuclear explosives. And if we're able to lock those down and deny them to non-state actors, then we have essentially solved the risk of nuclear terrorism.

So in terms of the actual agenda and structure of the summit, after the President finishes his bilaterals on Monday, April 12th, there will be a welcoming ceremony at the Washington Convention Center starting at 5:00 p.m. And the President will individually greet each of the delegations that are coming to the summit.

As Ben mentioned, this is really unprecedented collection of countries who've come together to talk about the nuclear security issue. There will be a total of 47 countries. Thirty-eight of those countries will be represented at the head of state or head of government level -- kings, presidents, and prime ministers. Nine of those 47 countries will be represented by deputy prime ministers, vice presidents, or foreign and defense ministers. So that's a total of 47 countries. This is by far the largest international gathering to talk about nuclear security issues.

We also have three heads from international organizations. Ban Ki-moon will be there, the Secretary General of the U.N.; Doctor Amano, the head of the IAEA; and the President of the European Council, Van Rompuy, will be there. So we'll have 50 at the table.

After the welcoming ceremony, there will be a very important kickoff working dinner, which will be chaired by President Obama and the other 49 heads of delegation. The focus of this opening dinner is on the threat and the magnitude of the threat. And I think this is a really critical component of the summit, because there are a wide range of views about how serious the threat is. And I think this summit and the meetings that have led up to it have really helped to consolidate a view which President Obama advocates, that the threat of nuclear terrorism is a very serious threat.

As Ben said, there are groups out there that clearly would like to acquire the raw materials for nuclear weapons, and if they were to acquire those materials there's a very high risk that they would use them. And there's a large quantity of nuclear material in the world, some of which needs to be protected and secured at much higher levels.

So I think that dinner is going to set the stage for the next day of discussions on measures that can be taken in order to reduce the risk and to defeat the threat.

So on Tuesday, April 13th, the President will be chairing all day long plenary sessions and a lunch that will focus on how to respond to the threat. In the morning, a plenary session which goes from 9:30 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. The focus will be on national actions that countries can take to secure nuclear material that is under their control and to deal with the risk of nuclear smuggling within their territory.

The important thing here to recognize is that for the most part the primary responsibility for securing nuclear materials, whether in the civil or the military sector, rests with individual countries. And we expect that in these sessions countries will talk about the steps that they're taking to make sure that they have adequate security over the nuclear materials in their possession; talk about the measures they're taking to construct a regulatory and a legal structure to make sure that there's adequate supervision of their nuclear holdings and their nuclear industry. Much of the nuclear materials that are potentially vulnerable or could be used for nuclear weapons are actually in the hands of private industry, so government regulation is a very important component, as well as measures that countries will take so that they have a strong legal system to take action against any individuals who are involved in nuclear smuggling.

We expect in that morning session some countries will announce steps that they are taking to either remove the presence of some nuclear materials on their territory or to consolidate them to protect them better, and to minimize the use in the civil sector, for example, by converting reactors from using highly enriched uranium to using low enriched uranium fuel.

Then there will be a lunch session with the heads of delegations. And that will focus on the role of the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, in the nuclear security area. The IAEA plays a critical role and it's one that is relatively new to the agency's responsibility. The role of the agency is to provide assistance, to provide guidelines for what is considered to be adequate physical protection for holding the nuclear materials, and as well as to provide technical assistance to countries to help achieve those. So I think it's very important that we try to endorse and strengthen the role of the IAEA in this area.

Oh, I forgot to mention -- excuse me for going back -- on Monday evening, at the same time that President Obama is hosting a meeting for the heads of delegations, Secretary Clinton and Secretary Chu will be hosting their own dinner for the foreign ministers and the nuclear officials who will be at the summit. So we'll have two very important simultaneous meetings taking place.

And the same thing is true at lunch -- while the President is hosting a working lunch with the heads of delegations, Secretary Clinton and Secretary Chu will be hosting a lunch for their counterparts at the meeting. And they -- I think they will be having some important members of Congress at that lunch, including Senator Lugar, who of course has been instrumental in leading the way, going back more than 15 years to highlight the threat of nuclear terrorism and the need to ensure adequate nuclear security.

After the lunch there will be an afternoon plenary chaired by President Obama from 2:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. The focus there will be on the international measures that countries can take to strengthen the international system for dealing with nuclear security. That includes two international conventions -- the International Convention for the Protection of Nuclear Materials, which has just been revised under U.S. leadership and where we will be advocating that countries bring into force, improve those amendments to strengthen physical protection. There's a second convention called the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. That was finished in 2005; it's not yet come into force because additional countries need to sign and ratify it. And again, that will be a session for countries to talk about their efforts to take those steps.

There will also be discussion about some of the like-minded efforts that are in place, including the G8 Global Partnership, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 -- there's a whole range of instruments out there on the international front and that afternoon plenary will be focusing on strengthening those measures.

The President will then have a press conference and we will issue the work -- the summit communiqué and then there will be a closing reception.

Let me talk then a little bit about what will be the main areas of outcome from the summit, and there are really three. I won't go into too much detail because we'll save some of that for Tuesday.

But first there will be a high-level communiqué from the leaders which will recognize that nuclear terrorism is a serious threat; which will endorse President Obama's effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials over a four-year period; and will pledge in a general way steps that countries can take on both a national and an international level in order to strengthen nuclear security and prevent terrorists or criminal groups from getting access to materials for nuclear weapons.

Underlining the communiqué there's a more detailed work plan which all the countries have agreed to, and that lays out in more specific detail the concrete commitments that countries will take on a national and an international level to strengthen security. And I discussed earlier the kinds of steps that countries could take both nationally as well as internationally.

And, finally, there will be a number of national actions that countries will announce in the context of the summit. As is already public, it will be things like Chile, which has removed all of the low-enriched uranium -- or all of the highly-enriched uranium from their country. We expect similar kinds of measures will be announced.

Another example is the U.S.-Russia Plutonium Disposition Agreement, where the U.S. and Russia have both agreed to dispose of 34 metric tons each of weapons-grade plutonium that has been removed from our military programs by burning it in reactors. This is an agreement which is very significant in the sense that over a period of a decade or so it will remove very large quantities of weapons-useable materials, and also it's an agreement that's been long stalled. And when I was in the Clinton administration we actually finished the negotiations and announced the completion of the agreement in 2000, but it's been over a decade to actually reach agreement on the implementing measures and it was really President Obama's focus on this issue and the reset of his relationship with Russia that has finally been able to finalize this agreement. And it will be signed on Monday by Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov, and will be one of the kinds of concrete measures that will come out of this summit.

Now, of course, there is still a great deal of things that need to be done in terms of implementing the various commitments that will be made coming out of the summit and additional national actions that countries can take. So we're planning that the summit will be the first to set in motion a series of follow-up actions, including meetings of the sherpas every six months or so in order to judge progress in implementing the work plan and to take whatever additional measures are necessary. And we expect that in the future there will be at least one more summit meeting and we hope perhaps others that, at the leadership level, will be used to announce additional steps and serve to focus attention on action that needs to be taken in order to fulfill the President's four-year lockdown plan.

I'll stop there and would be happy to answer any questions.

MR. HAMMER: Right. I'm just double-checking -- Ben, are you back on?

OPERATOR: He has reconnected and -- he just reconnected again.

MR. HAMMER: Right. Can you talk, Ben, to see if we can hear you?

MR. RHODES: Yes.

MR. HAMMER: Okay, super.

MR. RHODES: Can you hear me?

MR. HAMMER: Yes, we can. Operator, if you can just please now turn it over to questions, please.

OPERATOR: Thank you.

Q Gentlemen, thank you for taking the time to conduct this conference call with us. I wanted to ask you what your understanding is of the reason that Israeli President [sic] Benjamin Netanyahu has decided not to come to the summit? And also I wanted to ask you, what's a sherpa -- what's the role of the sherpas? Thank you.

MR. RHODES: Thanks for the question, Josh. On the first point, I feel -- I think that the Israelis have read out the reasons for which Prime Minister Netanyahu has decided that he won't be able to attend the summit. They've been in close consultations with us about that decision and we appreciated those consultations.

They are sending their deputy prime minister to head their delegation. He is the person within the Israeli government with responsibility for the issues that will be discussed at the summit -- nuclear security issues. So we believe that Israel will be represented by a very effective delegation that will be quite capable of joining with the other 46 nations in pursuing the kind of actions that are necessary to secure vulnerable nuclear materials.

On the second question, I'll turn it over to Gary. I'll first say that efforts of -- international efforts of these kinds often have sherpas. Many of you know Mike Froman as our sherpa to the G20 and to the -- to several other international efforts. But Gary is our sherpa in this instance so I'll let him describe his role.

MR. SAMORE: Well, sherpa is obviously a term borrowed from the world of mountaineering and the sherpas are the people that lead the way to the summit and make sure that it's safe for the important people who are in the climbing team. And as Ben said, a sherpa is an institution which is commonly used in these big international meetings -- G8 and G20 meetings.

So our job was to meet, to prepare the documents for the summit. We've had three sherpa meetings and a number of meetings of the sous-sherpas who get into the real details. And we have also, in addition to preparing the documents that will be issued at the summit, we also obviously have taken a lot of time to prepare the agenda and the schedule and try as much as we can to organize the discussion so that it will be a benefit to all of the leaders.

And I want to just mention in that context, President Obama wanted to make sure that we tried to structure these meetings as a genuine conversation rather than just a series of national speeches. And I think it's a very good opportunity for the leaders to have a real discussion, and we'll try as much as we can to keep the intervention short and as spontaneous as possible.

But at the end of the day, the sherpas are responsible for making sure everybody reaches the summit safely and leading the way. And if they don't, then they fall off the mountaintop first.

Q Hello. I had a quick couple of questions for Gary Samore if I could. First of all, what sort -- we have, as you said, a very tightly focused summit today -- next week, and we then have a very general conference on very wide-ranging issues next month at the NPT review conference in New York. Is there going to be any interplay? Do you expect in the bilats or in any of the margins of the meeting to be discussions of those big, broad issues in terms of getting a tighter non-proliferation regime, given the importance of the summit next month and the presence of so many actors?

And the second question, if I may, the -- is there any kind of current time scale that we can compare President Obama's four-year goal to tie down loose nuclear materials? What kind of is the rhythm that people are working at at the moment? Just I'd like something for comparison's sake. Many thanks.

MR. SAMORE: Sure. On the interplay, we're really focusing the agenda of the summit on the specific issue of nuclear security and the risk that non-state actors will get access to nuclear materials for nuclear weapons. And I think that is something that everybody agrees to. So we don't want to use this summit as a replacement for the NPT review conference or many of the other forums where the broader issues of non-proliferation and peaceful usage and arms control are discussed.

And I think that actually has been very helpful because we want to focus attention on the nuclear security issue, the threat of nuclear terrorism, and we've avoided some of the more contentious issues where there is actually a lot of disagreement and controversy within the international community.

But to answer your question, in the bilateral meetings, not only President Obama's but the other leaders', I imagine there will be broad discussion on a wide range of issues and presumably those will include some of these broader nuclear questions.

On the four-year lockdown, I think the important thing here is that the -- I mentioned earlier Senator Lugar being one of the first to call attention to this threat. People have been working since really the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 and 1991 to try to address concerns about loose nuclear materials.

And I think President Obama is fortunate to come into office at a time when there's been more than a decade of strong work in this area, including by the Bush administration. And I think because of that, we're actually in a good position to try to deal with those remaining issues that are still there. I think the four-year goal is a realistic one and we hope that the summit is going to accelerate activities. And as I mentioned, we do expect that there will be not only concrete commitments but also some concrete actions coming out of the summit that will set the stage for additional actions over the next couple of years.

MR. RHODES: Gary, I'd just add to that on the first question, the NPT angle of this -- we, again, see the four-year lockdown as part of a comprehensive nuclear security and non-proliferation agenda. The NPT has been a focus of several of the steps that we've taken, including as we -- so to reiterate, we've put the NPT at the center of our new declaratory policy by saying that those non-nuclear states that are not in compliance with the NPT or their non-proliferation obligations will not have the reassurance of the United States as it relates to the use of nuclear weapons -- furthering the President's commitment to incentivize countries to live up to their obligations and to find more security within the NPT, and to be isolated and to find less security when they're outside of it.

Similarly, we believe that the new START treaty strengthens the NPT because it renews the commitment of the United States and Russia, as the two leading nuclear powers, to move in the direction of reduction, as is their obligation under the NPT.

Similarly, as Gary referenced, we expect some of the discussions that the President has in the margins of the summit and in his bilateral meetings to address issues related to broader non-proliferation goals, including the need to hold nations accountable when they do not live up to their NPT obligations.

That said, as Gary indicated, the summit itself is focused in a very targeted way on achieving this four-year lockdown goal and rallying international cooperation in that effort. We do believe that, again, this is a unique effort both as it relates to the subject that we're addressing and as it relates to the kind of cooperation that we're trying to foster; and that as we develop that cooperation among nations, that that can have benefits in a range of areas. But in this instance, we're focused particularly on lockdown.

And I might add that, frankly, when you assess the urgency of the threat from nuclear weapons and materials, nuclear terrorism is at the top of that list because we, again, to reiterate, know that terrorist groups currently have the intent to use a nuclear weapon or nuclear materials where they get their hands on it.

So we believe that the focus and the sense of urgency around this effort is fundamental to the purpose of the summit. And we believe that the need to take, as Gary said, some actions that have already taken place, but then some actions that we know need to take place and some actions that can be developed through discussion. Putting together that kind of comprehensive agenda with a sense of urgency is absolutely necessary given the nature of the threat and given our ability to work together to address it within the next several years.

Q I have two questions. You mentioned that Chile is going to send all of its high-enriched uranium to the United States. Do you expect or do you encourage other countries in the region to do the same as to secure the nuclear materials? And also, are the additional protocols of IAEA going to be discussed, since they are a form of ensuring more protection? And there are many countries that have not signed to it, such as Brazil. How are you going to deal -- are you going to encourage this country to do that?

MR. SAMORE: I'll be happy to answer those. In terms of how to handle highly enriched uranium, and in this case -- in the case of Chile, it was spent HEU fuel. The U.S. has in place a international program called the Global Threat Initiative, where we are prepared to cooperate with countries that have U.S. origin HEU fuel. We're happy to take that back. And we think that's one way to address and make sure that those materials are secure. A number of countries have taken advantage of that. But some countries, for a variety of reasons, may not be prepared to do that. And in that case, we're happy to work with those countries to make sure that the material is secure in place.

So I don't think there's any one approach to nuclear security. The main thing is that wherever nuclear materials are located, whether it's in the United States or anywhere in the world, they should have adequate security. And that's something where we think countries can work together. But to the extent that there are some additional stockpiles of spent HEU fuel in Latin America or other parts of the world and it's U.S. origin, we have an open invitation to work with countries to bring that back to the United States.

On the additional protocol issue, it's a very important issue. I think it's likely to be a -- it certainly will be addressed at the NPT review conference. The United States has been working at -- very closely with Brazil and Argentina in order to come up with a common approach to deal with the additional protocol. I think we've made a lot of progress and I'm quite optimistic that at the NPT review conference, the U.S. and Brazil will have a common position.

I don't expect the additional protocol to be a focus of discussion at this Nuclear Security Summit. The additional protocol is important from a safeguard standpoint so that the IAEA can be assured that countries are not engaging in covert or undeclared nuclear activities, but it's not really essential for nuclear security. And there are other measures that need to be in place for nuclear security. And as Ben and I have said, the focus of the Nuclear Security Summit will be on nuclear security, not safeguards.

Q Hi, guys. Thanks very much. I was hoping, Gary, in particular, you could clarify something. When you're talking about additional national actions that countries can take, then you talk about international efforts that can support and sustain those, is that a recognition or otherwise a validation of the idea that national action is the appropriate venue for action on nuclear security with the international measures in support of that action? Or do you think that at some point in time as part of this effort that will shift -- ultimately a more internationalization will take place on these issues?

MR. SAMORE: Well, it's a very good question. I would say this: The current structure that we have available focuses primary responsibility on national actions. And at this time, countries insist that their sovereign responsibility for securing nuclear materials, whether in the civil or the military sector, is primarily a national responsibility and that international efforts should assist and strengthen those national efforts.

So we're trying to, as a practical matter, and I think as Ben said, we are facing here an urgent need to try to take corrective measures within four years. I think we want to focus on the system that is currently available, and we think that that system can be made to work. If we were to spend a lot of time trying to construct a new international architecture, I think it might actually have the unintended effect of really diverting us from taking the practical measures that we want to take in the near term.

Q Hi, I just want to ask a question regarding what the Prime Minister Netanyahu announced today that he pulled his visit because he had learned that Egypt and Turkey, among others, plan to use the event next Monday and Tuesday to push Israel to sign the treaty. My question is, don't you believe addressing such a question of pressure on Israel may help the American effort to confront the Iranian nuclear program?

MR. RHODES: I'll take that question. Again, I'd say two things. First of all, Prime Minister Netanyahu made his decision to not attend the summit, and I think he speaks for himself and his government as it relates to his decision. On the issue of nuclear security, I would also just say though that the, as Gary has said, that this summit is -- it's focused on securing vulnerable nuclear materials; it is not focused on the NPT.

So we believe that this in particular is an area where there is a very broad and deep international consensus that can be developed around the kinds of actions that need to be taken; that it is in the interest, frankly, of all nations to take this action, because nobody -- everybody would be in danger to the potential risks to global security were these materials to fall under the wrong hands.

And similarly, everybody would benefit from strong national and international actions to secure vulnerable nuclear materials. So in other words, this is an area where we do believe that there is the ability to build broad consensus both in the Middle East, in the region, and around the world as to the kinds of actions that need to be taken on behalf of nuclear security.

As it relates to Iran, again, that is an issue that is separate from the agenda of the summit. However, of course the United States continues to work through the U.N. Security Council with its P5-plus-1 partners to insist that Iran meet its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. And this, I'm sure, will be a subject at some of the President's bilats, as it was with President Medvedev. And it's also an issue of multi-lateral discussions and negotiations at the United Nations right now.

Q I just wanted to clarify one thing on the materials that will be collected. You're talking only about the plutonium and HEU -- you're not talking about materials that could be used for a dirty bomb or anything like that? This, in other words, would be basically state-controlled nuclear material?

MR. SAMORE: Yes. The focus of the summit is on materials that can be used for nuclear weapons, and that's separated plutonium or high-enriched uranium. Now, that's not to say that the -- obviously, the -- there is I think a very legitimate concern about the security of radiological materials that can be used for dirty bombs, and that's certainly mentioned in the context of the summit communiqué and the work plan. It's an important issue, but it's not the focus of the summit. We're focusing here on the most potentially catastrophic threat, which is terrorist groups acquiring or manufacturing nuclear explosives.

MR. RHODES: I would just add to what Gary said that -- I'd just add to that by saying that the -- again, the reason for this unprecedented action and the nature of the summit that the President has chosen to take, and the reason for the focus, is the fact that this is the highest order of threat; that if you survey the consequences of a security risk in the United States right now, there is nothing greater than that of a nuclear weapon that is in the hands of a terrorist that could cause hundreds of thousands of death and widespread destruction if detonated.

Similarly, we believe that this is a risk to many nations, those nations that are -- have been directly targeted by terrorist groups, including those terrorist groups that we know are pursuing this kind of capacity. And also, frankly, global security, because the consequences of the world -- the kind of world that we would live in the day after that kind of attack would be grave to global security writ large.

So that is why this summit is dedicated to addressing really what is the most urgent and gravest danger to American and global security as it relates to the nuclear issue right now. As Gary said, the radiological threat is one that also needs to be addressed. And as you've heard me say, that there are many other pieces. While this is focused on nuclear materials potentially falling into the hands of an extremist group, there are -- there is obviously the grave concern of the proliferation of nuclear weapons to states, which is why we have the kind of comprehensive approach that is embedded in our efforts related to the NPT, related to new START, related to our Nuclear Posture Review, and our continued insistence that nations live up to their non-proliferation obligations.

So with that, I think -- Mike, I don't know if you want to wrap up the call. I appreciate everybody for putting up with the call sometimes cutting in and out. Even our Air Force One connections can be a little rough sometimes. But I really appreciate everybody for getting on the call and allowing us to walk you through this. And we'll have the ability over the next several days to continue to inform you about the activities of the summit. And the President -- again, as the President's schedule, if there are additions to it, we'll let you know that and we'll be able to provide you with updates as it relates to his bilateral meetings heading into Sunday and Monday.

MR. HAMMER: Perfect. Yes, I think that pretty much wraps it up. Thank you, everybody, for spending this Friday morning with us. And we look forward to a successful week next week.

Clinton's Speech at University of Louisville on Nuclear Security

Addresses global challenges of nuclear terrorism, nuclear proliferation

University of Louisville
Louisville, KY
April 9, 2010

Remarks on Nuclear Nonproliferation at the University of Louisville as Part of the McConnell Center's Spring Lecture Series

SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you. Thank you very, very much. (Applause.) Oh, it is wonderful to be here and to see this kind of a crowd on a beautiful Friday afternoon to talk about foreign policy here at this great university, and I am honored to be the sixth Secretary of State to have been privileged to participate in this important event here at the McConnell Center.

I, of course, want to thank Gary Gregg, who has been a real joy for my staff to work with in planning this. I think we gave Gary a bit of a scare when we had to tell him I had to go to Prague on my way to Louisville – (laughter) – and it all worked out fine, so he's breathing a little easier. And to the university president and provost, thank you for having me here on this absolutely wonderful day at this exciting venue to talk about issues that are important to our citizens.

I see a lot of familiar faces in the audience, and I am delighted to be back here in Kentucky with all of you. (Applause.) I had a lot of fun two years ago – (laughter) – covered a lot of ground. This is a long state. (Laughter.) I learned that firsthand, and made many friends. And although my travel takes me all over the world today rather than across a great commonwealth like this, I have many, many wonderful memories and just am so pleased to be back here with all of you.

I'm out of politics now. That's what I say all the time to everybody who asks me an opinion about anything, except foreign policy things. And I am excited to be part of this Administration at this point in history.

And I want to thank my former colleague, Senator McConnell, for inviting me here and for that very kind introduction. During the eight years that I served in the Senate with Mitch, I was fortunate to find common cause and work with him on a number of foreign policy issues: human rights in Burma; legislation to support small businesses and micro-credit lending in Kosovo; promoting women and civil society leaders in Afghanistan; strengthening the rule of law in parts of the Islamic world. And I've appreciated working with him in my new capacity upon becoming Secretary of State.

I think this McConnell Center really demonstrates Mitch's deep appreciation not only for the political process of which he's been a part for years – I didn't know until he was introduced that he is the longest serving senator in Kentucky history – but also to the importance of education and the role that education plays in the life of our country. And it is a real tribute to him that this idea which he put forth so many years ago has created the McConnell Center, and certainly these young people who are here studying as part of the center.

Now, I have to say that for some of you McConnell Scholars, graduation is approaching quickly. And I want you to know that we are hiring at the State Department. (Laughter.) We are looking forward to filling our ranks with the best and brightest of young Americans to do the work that needs to be done on behalf of diplomacy and development, two of the three legs of the stool that represents American foreign policy; the other, of course, being defense. And we've been fortunate to have bipartisan support of which

Senator McConnell was a part, to make sure that we had the personnel that we needed to be able to tackle all of the challenges we face.

I always knew the world was big, but it just seems to have gotten bigger and bigger since I've been Secretary of State, and that there isn't any place – it's not like being in a big house where you say, "Well, I think we'll just shut off that third floor so that we don't have to heat it. Because sure enough, you try to do that, you're going to have a fire and then you're in trouble. So you have to paying attention all the time. And we need young people with patriotism, a sense of civic responsibility, a keen awareness of their citizenship and patriotic duty to serve in the State Department and USAID on behalf of the United States.

Back in Washington these days, our policy discussions can get pretty lively. We can both vouch for that, both Senator McConnell and I, because anybody who's turned TV during the last few months will remember some of the heated exchanges. But in foreign policy, we have a long tradition of coming together across party lines to face America's toughest national security challenges. That commitment to cooperation helped protect our nation through two World Wars and the Cold War. And Senator McConnell and I were part of that legacy in our cooperation when I was in the Senate. And appreciate the work he's done and the leadership he has demonstrated encouraging Republicans and Democrats to work together as we deal with the extremely complex situations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

Well, today, I want to speak about another challenge that is bigger than any one Administration or any political party – it's protecting our families, our neighbors, our nation, and our allies from nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation.

Now, for generations, Republican and Democratic Administrations have recognized the magnitude of this challenge. And they have worked together in partnership with the Congress to reduce the danger posed by nuclear weapons and to maintain a safe, secure, and effective deterrent to protect the United States and our allies across the world.

President Reagan had these goals in mind in 1987 when he negotiated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty, which eliminated an entire class of nuclear armed missiles. And that agreement was ratified in the Senate by a vote of 93-5.

President George H.W. Bush presided over ratification of the START I treaty, which was approved 93-6. And President George W. Bush's Moscow Treaty passed 95-0. And two years ago this week, President George W. Bush issued a joint statement with the Russians in support of negotiating a successor to the START agreement.

This issue has united national security experts from both political parties. And four of the strongest advocates for action like this are former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, and former Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn – two Republicans and two Democrats. Faced with what they said is "a very real possibility that the deadliest weapons ever invented could fall into dangerous hands," they have come together repeatedly to demand a global effort to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, prevent their spread, and ultimately end them as a threat to the world.

And so the Obama Administration is committed to building on the work of the last four administrations, and we've worked on these issues hand-in-hand with Republicans and Democrats in Congress.

Just this past Tuesday, we released the latest Nuclear Posture Review. That review provides the strategic framework for our nuclear weapons policy and represents the culmination of months of work by the Department of Defense under Secretary Gates' leadership, and the Departments of State and Energy.

Yesterday, I was in Prague in the Czech Republic with both President Obama and President Medvedev to witness the signing of an historic new START agreement between the United States and Russia that will reduce the number of strategic nuclear warheads deployed by both countries to 1,550 on each side, a level not seen since the 1950s – the first full decade of the nuclear age.

Now next week, leaders from around the world – 47 nations will gather in Washington for a major summit meeting on securing nuclear materials from terrorists. And next month in May, we will come together with partners in the United Nations in New York to review global efforts on nonproliferation.

Now, this is a lot of activity. But it's fair to ask whether it matters to people in New York or in Los Angeles or Louisville or, frankly, anywhere else beyond Washington, D.C. Discussions of nuclear issues are often conducted in a language of acronyms – NPR, NPT, SALT, SORT, START. At the White House two weeks ago, a reporter asked me why everyone's eyes glaze over when we talk about arms control. Now, I'm sure that won't happen in this audience today.

Because it is easy to conclude that this is a subject that doesn't have much impact on our daily lives or that this issue is a relic of the Cold War. I'm old enough to remember, even though I wasn't around in 1933 – (laughter) – I am old enough to remember when I was in elementary school having those duck-and-cover drills. You remember those, Mitch. I bet there are a lot of heads – there's a lot of heads nodding out there. I mean, why in the world our teachers and our parents thought we should take cover under our desks in the case of – (laughter) – of a nuclear attack is beyond me. But every month, we practices. And we'd get up and we'd get under our desks and we'd put our hands over our heads and we'd crouch up. We lived with the Cold War. We lived with the threat of nuclear weapons.

And it seems so long ago now, but it was so real in our daily lives. It wasn't something left to presidents and senators and secretaries of state, it was something you talked about around the dinner table. And it made the threat of nuclear war something that nobody could escape. So today, it seems like a good time ago. And it would be easy to think, well, that's a relic of the past. But that is not the case.

The nature of the threat has changed. We no longer live in constant fear of a global nuclear war where we're in a standoff against the Russians with all of our nuclear arsenal on the ready, on a hair-trigger alert. But, as President Obama has said, the risk of a nuclear attack has actually increased. And the potential consequences of mishandling this challenge are deadly.

So, I want to speak about why nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and nuclear security matter to each of us, and how the initiatives and the acronyms that make up our bipartisan work on these issues are coming together to make our nation safer.

There is a reason that presidents and foreign policy leaders in both parties are determined to address this danger. A nuclear attack anywhere could destroy the foundations of global order. While the United States and old Soviet Union are no longer locked in a nuclear standoff, nuclear proliferation is a leading source of insecurity in our world today.

And the United States benefits when the world is stable: our troops can spend more time at home, our companies can make better long-term investments, our allies are free to work with us to address long-term challenges like poverty and disease. But nuclear proliferation, including the nuclear programs being pursued by North Korea and Iran, are in exact opposition to those goals. Proliferation endangers our forces, our allies, and our broader global interests. And to the extent it pushes other countries to develop nuclear weapons in response, it can threaten the entire international order.

Nuclear terrorism presents a different challenge, but the consequences would still be devastating. A 10-kiloton nuclear bomb detonated in Times Square in New York City could kill a million people. Many more would suffer from the hemorrhaging and weakness that comes from radiation sickness. And beyond the human cost, a nuclear terrorist attack would also touch off a tsunami of social and economic consequences across our country.

We all remember the aftermath of the September 11th attacks. Air travel in the United States was suspended. Here in Louisville, for example, that meant planes couldn't get in or out of UPS's WorldPort where, I understand, three-quarters of the employees are local students. Those attacks ended up costing UPS – a company based far away from ground zero and from the Pentagon – over \$130 million. That's a lot of work-study jobs. And if you multiply those losses across our economy, you can imagine the consequences we would face in the event of a nuclear terrorist attack. In our interconnected world, an attack or disruption anywhere can inflict political and economic damage everywhere. That's why nuclear security does matter to us all, and why we're determined to meet this challenge.

There are three main elements of our strategy to safeguard our country and allies against nuclear attack. First, we begin with our support for the basic framework of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The global nuclear nonproliferation regime is based on a three-sided bargain: countries without nuclear weapons agree not to acquire them; countries with nuclear weapons work toward disarmament; and every nation is afforded the right to access peaceful nuclear energy under appropriate safeguards.

Unfortunately, this bargain has been under assault. North Korea began developing nuclear weapons as an NPT party before announcing its withdrawal from the treaty. And Iran is flouting the rules, seeking to develop a nuclear weapons capability under the guise of a peaceful enrichment program. We have an urgent interest in bolstering the world's nuclear nonproliferation framework and enforcement and verification mechanism. And the new START treaty signed yesterday by President Obama and President Medvedev in Prague helps us advance that goal.

The United States and Russia still today have over 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons, and the new START treaty will mean lower, verifiable limits on the number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed in our countries. Ratification of the treaty will also allow us to continue establishing a more constructive partnership with Russia. And that's important in its own right, but also because Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and our cooperation is a prerequisite for moving forward with tough, internationally binding sanctions on Iran.

The diplomatic benefits of ratifying the new START treaty could also extend to our cooperation with other countries. In agreeing to abide by the new START treaty, we would demonstrate that the United States is living up to our obligations under the NPT. This boosts our credibility as we ask other countries to help shore up the nonproliferation regime. It's becoming increasingly fragile, and we need a stronger hand as we push for action against nuclear proliferators.

Now, I'm not suggesting that a move by the United States and Russia to reduce our nuclear stockpiles will convince Iran or North Korea to change their behavior. But ask yourselves, can our efforts help to bring not only the new START treaty into force, but by doing so help persuade other nations to support serious sanctions against Iran? I believe they could. And since I'm on the phone or in meetings constantly with heads of state or government, foreign ministers and others, making the case that they must join us in these strong sanctions against Iran, I know from firsthand experience that this START treaty has left little room for some nations to hide. They are finding it more and more difficult to make the case that they don't have their own responsibilities.

I believe the new START treaty does put us in a better position to strengthen the nonproliferation regime when parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty meet together in May. Now, we'll need support to oppose – to impose tougher penalties on violators and create new, 21st century tools to disrupt these proliferation networks.

The foundation provided by our military planners in our Nuclear Posture Review has also strengthened our hand. It contains our newly announced assurance that the United States will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations. We believe states that shun nuclear weapons and abide by their commitments under the NPT should not have to fear a nuclear attack. For states not covered by this assurance, there is a range of options in which our nuclear weapons will play a role in deterring a conventional, chemical, or biological attack against us, our allies or partners.

Now, the second major element of our strategy is a global effort to secure vulnerable nuclear material and enhance nuclear security. This, unfortunately, is not a theoretical issue. When the United States first started working to secure nuclear materials overseas – principally in the former Soviet Union – our teams of experts found highly radioactive materials stored in open fields without any security. They discovered fissile materials – the ingredients for nuclear bombs – warehoused in facilities without electricity, telephones, or armed guards. The International Atomic Energy Agency has released the details of 15 cases of smuggling involving weapons-grade nuclear materials since 1993. But we have no idea how many other smuggling operations have gone undetected. Nuclear terrorism has been called the world's most preventable catastrophe. But to prevent it, the world needs to act.

And the importance of this issue demands American leadership. So next Tuesday, the President will convene a meeting in Washington as part of an unprecedented summit intent on keeping nuclear materials out of the hands of terrorists. To put it in context, this summit hosted by the United States is the largest conference since the one that came together around the founding of the United Nations in 1945.

Many of the countries who will be there have already taken concrete steps to strengthen nuclear security. And we expect announcements of further progress on this issue during our talks. But we will also hear from other countries that are helping us keep a very close watch on anyone we think could be part of a network that could lead to the sale of or transfer of nuclear material to al-Qaida or other terrorist organizations. We are trying to make this Summit the beginning of sustained international effort to lock down the world's vulnerable nuclear materials within four years and reduce the possibility that these materials will find their way into the hands of terrorists.

Two Senators – Republican Richard Lugar and former Senator – Democratic Sam Nunn – have worked together to champion this issue since the Cold War ended. Their bipartisan cooperation and the threat reduction legislation that bears their names – now Lugar legislation – has helped to make securing nuclear materials a priority for both Republican and Democratic administrations. And I think their work has made the world safer.

A lot of times that Senator McConnell and I believe in and that I was privileged to do for eight years in the Senate and that he does every day in the Senate today that we think is the most important, doesn't get the headlines. Getting rid of nuclear material is not something that is going to get people excited on cable TV. And yet that work is among the most important that any senators have done in the last 20 years. And it moves toward a vision of a world, a world in which nuclear materials are not easily available in all states – adopt responsible stewardship of all nuclear materials as part of their basic obligations.

Finally, the third component of our strategy must be to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent ourselves. For generations, our nuclear forces have helped prevent proliferation by providing

our non-nuclear allies in NATO, the Pacific, and elsewhere with reassurance and security. An ally or a partner that has confidence that the United States and our arsenal will be there to defend them in the event of an attack is a country that is less likely to develop its own nuclear deterrent. And we are committed to continuing that stabilizing role for us as long as nuclear weapons exist.

Our latest budget request asks for significant resources to modernize our nuclear complex and maintain our nuclear arsenal. Our budget devotes \$7 billion for maintaining our nuclear weapons stockpile and complex. This commitment is \$600 million more than Congress approved last year. And over the next five years we intend to boost funding for these important activities by more than \$5 billion dollars. We are committed to reducing the role and number of our nuclear weapons. But at the same time, we are investing to ensure that the weapons we retain in our stockpile are safe, secure, and effective.

The fact that we are maintaining this arsenal does not mean that we intend to use it. We are determined to see that nuclear weapons are never used again. But the new START treaty will enable us to retain a strong, flexible deterrent. And our military will continue to deploy every leg of what's called our nuclear triad – land-based missiles, submarine-based missiles, and bombers.

The treaty will enable us to maintain this arsenal, and also provide strong verification provisions. We think it will enable us to develop greater understanding maybe even allow trust between Russian and American forces, while eliminating potential opportunities for mistakes and miscalculation.

Now, one aspect of our deterrent that we specifically did not limit in this treaty is missile defense. The agreement has no restrictions on our ability to develop and deploy our planned missile defense systems or long-range conventional strike weapons now or in the future. The Pentagon's recent Quadrennial Defense Review and Ballistic Missile Defense Review both emphasize that improving our missile defense and conventional capabilities will help strengthen our deterrence. And in the future, we feel that regional missile defense will be an important source of protection for allies as well. Used wisely, missile defense could further reduce our dependence on nuclear weapons.

So these three elements of our strategy – strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime, combating the threat of nuclear terrorism, and maintaining a safe nuclear deterrent – are not new. And they're not controversial. Leaders in both parties have been pursuing these goals together for years.

In the course of our work at the State Department and when I was in the Senate, sometimes when you face really tough challenges, it's hard to sort through all of the different course of actions available to you. And there are times when people of good will and great intellect have diverging views on how to deal with complex issues. But I don't think this is one of those times.

The new START agreement is the latest chapter in the history of American nuclear responsibility. It's a chapter that's been co-authored by Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and even further back and overwhelming majorities in the U.S. Congress. Now, we believe strongly that is in our nation's best interest and I'm confident that once senators have a chance to study this new treaty, we will have same high levels of bipartisan support as the agreements that this one builds upon.

But underlining it all is that we are trying to maneuver through a period when our enemies are not just other states who we think of as rational actors, even if we profoundly disagree with them. They are these terrorist networks. And we have to think simultaneously, both about building confidence among other nations, including Russia and other nuclear armed nations, so that they make common cause with us against rogue states and terrorist networks, and sending a message that no state is better off if it pursues nuclear weapons, and any state that gives safe haven to any terrorist network that pursues nuclear

weapons is at risk. By ratifying this treaty, the United States won't give up anything of strategic importance. But in return, we will receive significant, tangible benefits.

Protecting the United States of America from nuclear attack is an issue that should be important to every single American. It's been an issue where our two political parties have always found common ground – with good reason. And advancing these efforts is critical to 21st century national security. These issues will be with us a long time. But if we are true to the legacy of cooperation we have inherited from our predecessors, then I am convinced we can deliver a safer world to the next generation and, indeed, Mitch, to the next generation of policy leaders and decision makers.

And I expect some of you in this audience to be sitting in these chairs and making these speeches in the future. And I want you to know that we did our very best to pass on to you a world that was safer and one in which the threat of nuclear attack was diminished and where we found common cause internationally to isolate those who would pursue nuclear weapons from any place in the world.

I'm convinced that the United States is once again in the lead, as we always have been, and that leadership position is an opportunity for us to demonstrate that we can make our country safer, our world safer, and chart a new and better future.

Thank you all very much. (Applause.)

MR. GREGG: I suppose that applause was for Secretary Clinton. But I thank her for a very substantive address and honoring us with that this morning. She has agreed to take a few questions. So think quickly. We have three people with microphones in the audience. Identify yourselves, hold your microphones up high. Please wait till the microphone gets to you and speak in it in a manner that's a question and not a statement pretending to be a question.

We're going to go straight right here to the first hand that I see.

QUESTION: Senator, could you comment on the fact that Israel may not attend the summit that you've discussed?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, actually, Israel will attend. The prime minister cannot attend, but the deputy prime minister will be there. And I think it's especially important that Israel will be at this conference because Israel shares with us a deep concern about Iran's nuclear ambitions and also about the threat of nuclear terrorism.

MR. GREGG: Let's go right in the middle, then we'll come over to this side. Right behind you.

QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you very much for joining us today, Secretary Clinton. We are immensely proud to have you here at the McConnell Center with us today. Will this treaty be able to strengthen the effectiveness of economic sanctions against rogue states like North Korea and Iran without Chinese involvement?

SECRETARY CLINTON: That's a very good question. You must be one of those McConnell scholars. (Laughter.) Actually, I think the answer is a yes, and here's why. We have noticed in the last several weeks that the Chinese have become more willing to engage with us on Iran. They have been deeply engaged with us on North Korea. And the fact that the United States and Russia reached agreement on this treaty, and in the Nuclear Posture Review we point out that we're aware that China is modernizing its military forces and we would seek to have the same kind of strategic dialogue with China that we have historically had with Russia going back to presidents in the 19 – late '40s and '50s sends a very clear

message that this issue of nuclear proliferation is a matter that Russia is concerned with as well as the United States, and that increasingly, China is hearing from a lot of other countries, countries in the Gulf, countries that believe that Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons will destabilize the Gulf region, that would potentially lead to instability in the oil markets, and China is very dependent upon the Gulf – Iran, Saudi Arabia, et cetera – for oil and gas.

So I think that the cooperation between the United States and Russia has been very beneficial in getting Chinese participation so that the Chinese have begun engaging with us at the United Nations in the drafting of this resolution that we are putting together for Security Council consideration. And I think that the Chinese have become convinced over the last months of what we are definitely convinced of, and that is that Iran is pursuing a program that is hard to explain in terms of the peaceful use of nuclear weapons, and therefore China does not want to look as though it doesn't care about something that has such grave consequences for the world.

With respect to North Korea, our mechanism for dealing with North Korea is one that we inherited from the Bush Administration that we actually think makes a lot of sense. It's called the Six-Party Talks. So China and Russia, the United States, South Korea, Japan, and North Korea are the parties to it. And China has been very strong in pushing North Korea to get back to the talks.

Now, both countries, for different reasons, in the last year have experienced a lot of turmoil, turbulence, instability in their own regimes. In North Korea, the leadership – what do they call him, the Dear Leader – has had some health problems. Kim Jong-il has had some difficulties with some of the economic policies that he's put forward that has engendered real popular protest on the part of North Koreans. So it's been difficult to get this regime to move back into the Six-Party Talks, but our alliance with China, Russia, and South Korea and Japan is very strong, and I believe we will eventually get there.

In Iran, because of the elections and the protests and the opposition and the way that the leadership, both the clerical leadership and the elected leadership, have treated the protestors, it's difficult to get decisions made out of Iran of any real consequence. So this has been a turbulent time to press these two countries, but I feel very encouraged by the unity that we've had in both instances. And so as we move forward this month in the Security Council, we're going to get as strong a resolution as we possibly can. And then we also know that countries like the United States, like the European Union countries, are ready to impose more sanctions. And people say to me, "Well, Iran's been sanctioned before. What difference is it going to make?"

But if you look at what we were able to accomplish last year in the toughest sanctions against North Korea, Resolution 1874, we have had international support for interdicting North Korean arms shipments. Countries from Thailand to even Burma, South Africa, the UAE, others have all worked together under the aegis of the Security Council resolution. And if we can get something in that ballpark on Iran, that will give us an international mechanism to really put some pressure on Iran, unlike what we've had available before. And I personally think it is only after we show international unity that the Iranians will – that there will be any chance that the Iranians will actually negotiate with the international community.

So people – a lot of my counterparts around the world say, "Well, we don't – want to try to solve this diplomatically." Well, sanctions, using the United Nations Security Council, is diplomacy and it's international diplomacy. And we need that kind of international front against Iran, and that's what we're attempting to put together in the Security Council.

QUESTION: Thank you, Senator, Secretary Clinton. It's an honor to see you. But you said in the treaty countries will be asked to not pursue a nuclear program. The U.S. is, like you said, spending more money on nuclear program. What other countries will be allowed to spend on nuclear defenses?

SECRETARY CLINTON: That's a good question also, because when the Nonproliferation Treaty came into effect, there was a basic bargain to the treaty. And countries that didn't have nuclear weapons – and there were some that already had acknowledged nuclear weapons – were supposed to move toward disarmament. And actually, the United States, the former Soviet Union, now the United States and Russia, kept their part of the bargain. We did move toward, as I read to you some of the different treaties that have been signed between our two countries cutting certain classes of weapons and certain kinds of delivery systems.

And so there are three pillars to the Nonproliferation Treaty. One is disarmament, one is nonproliferation, and one is the peaceful use of nuclear weapon – nuclear energy, the peaceful use of nuclear energy for civil nuclear purposes. So the United States will continue to demonstrate its willingness, in concert with Russia, because we have so many more weapons than any of the other countries by a very, very big margin. And other countries that have pursued nuclear weapons, like India and Pakistan, for example, have done so in a way that has upset the balance of nuclear deterrent, and that's why we're working with both countries very hard to try to make sure that their nuclear stockpiles are well tended to and that they participate with us in trying to limit the number of nuclear weapons. And both of them will be in Washington this next week.

But I'm a realist. And as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, the United States will have nuclear weapons. We will not unilaterally disarm. We will maintain our nuclear deterrent. We will invest, not in new weapons, but in ensuring that the weapons we have are as effective as they would need to be in order for our deterrent to be credible. And the countries that we know that have actively pursued nuclear weapons that are still doing so today – North Korea, which we know has somewhere between one and six nuclear weapons, and Iran – and that's why we're emphasizing so much international efforts against both of them to try to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula and prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons in the first place.

MR. GREGG: The young lady dying for an answer right back here.

QUESTION: Thanks for being here, Secretary Clinton. With respect to Iran's noncompliance, how is the U.S. practically, socially, and financially prepared for a potential war with Iran?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, we have been very clear that our preference and what we're working toward is international action that would isolate Iran and change the calculus of the Iranian leadership. Let me explain what I mean by that.

The only way we think we're going to convince the Iranians to give up nuclear weapons is if they conclude they will be less safe with them than without them, and that they – their economy and their society will suffer sufficiently that the tradeoff is no longer worth it to them. And there, I think, are a number of different ways that that kind of calculus could change in the Iranian mindset. For example, if the Iranians believe that by having nuclear weapons they will be able to intimidate their neighbors in the Gulf, they're mistaken, because those neighbors will either pursue nuclear weapons for themselves, further destabilizing the region, or they will be provided support from us to defend themselves against a nuclear-armed Iran.

So if you're sitting in Iran and you see the absolute commitment of the international community to prevent this from happening and actions are taken to interfere with your financing and banking system, to go after groups and individuals who play a role in the nuclear program, to figure out ways to try to impinge on your energy sector or your arms flow, it begins to – you begin to pay a cost. And I don't think

Iran wants to be North Korea. They consider themselves a great culture and society going back to Persian times. They see themselves in a leadership role in the world.

So what we believe is likely to happen is a real debate within Iran if we can get to the kind of international isolation that such sanctions would bring. Now, we've always said – and Secretary Gates and I did a number of interviews and press events around these – the Nuclear Posture Review and the START treaty in the last week, and we've always said that, look, all options are on the table. But clearly, our preference is to create conditions that will lead to changes in the policy of the Iranian Government toward the pursuit of nuclear weapons, which, by the way, is their stated policy. Their leadership says all the time we have no intention of obtaining nuclear weapons. It's just difficult to put all the facts together and square that with their stated intentions, so we're going to put them to the test.

MR. GREGG: Let's go back to this side for one more. Is there one on this side? Straight back.

QUESTION: Thank you, Senator Clinton. Given the fact that probably the Cuban missile crisis may be the greatest example of a deterrent, that's been almost 50 years ago. Is there any talk within the Department of maybe normalizing relationships with Cuba?

SECRETARY CLINTON: That's a really – that's a topic of conversation a lot. I don't think that there is any question that, at some point, the people of Cuba should have democratically elected leaders and should have a chance to chart their own future. But unfortunately, I don't see that happening while the Castros are still in charge. And so what President Obama has done is to create more space, more family travel, more business opportunities to sell our farm products or for our telecom companies to compete dealing with common issues that we have with Cuba like migration or drug trafficking. In fact, during the height of the terrible catastrophe in Haiti because of the earthquake, we actually helped some of the Cuban doctors get medical supplies who were already operating there.

So there are ways in which we're trying to enhance our cooperation. But it is my personal belief that the Castros do not want to see an end to the embargo and do not want to see normalization with the United States, because they would then lose all of their excuses for what hasn't happened in Cuba in the last 50 years. And I find that very sad, because there should be an opportunity for a transition to a full democracy in Cuba. And it's going to happen at some point, but it may not happen anytime soon.

And just – if you look at any opening to Cuba, you can almost chart how the Castro regime does something to try to stymie it. So back when my husband was president and he was willing to make overtures to Cuba and they were beginning to open some doors, Castro ordered the – his military to shoot down these two little unarmed planes that were dropping pamphlets on Cuba that came from Miami. And just recently, the Cubans arrested an American who was passing out information and helping elderly Cubans communicate through the internet, and they've thrown him in jail. And they recently let a Cuban prisoner die from a hunger strike. So it's a dilemma.

And I think for the first time, because we came in and said, look, we're willing to talk and we're willing to open up, and we saw the way the Cubans responded. For the first time, a lot of countries that have done nothing but berate the United States for our failure to be more open to Cuba have now started criticizing Cuba because they're letting people die. They're letting these hunger strikers die. They've got 200 political prisoners who are there for trivial reasons. And so I think that many in the world are starting to see what we have seen a long time, which is a very intransigent, entrenched regime that has stifled opportunity for the Cuban people, and I hope will begin to change and we're open to changing with them, but I don't know that that will happen before some more time goes by (Applause.)

MR. GREGG: Madam Secretary, George Schultz, James Baker, Madeleine Albright, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, and today, Secretary Hillary Clinton, thank you for your service to the United States, thank you for being at the University of Louisville.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you so much. (Applause.)

Analysis: U.S. Nuclear Strategy Redefines Deterrence

The new U.S. nuclear posture is one of several elements in President Obama's push for a world without nuclear weapons. By Stephen Kaufman
Staff Writer

Washington — President Obama's new nuclear arms strategy aims to retain nuclear weapons to deter any primary threat of a nuclear strike on the U.S. homeland, while also furthering his ultimate goal of making them obsolete.

The strategy, contained in a 72-page report — the Nuclear Posture Review Report (NPR) — produced jointly by the Defense, State and Energy departments and the National Security Council, addresses what is believed to be the mostly likely threats in the coming decade — terrorists obtaining nuclear materials for “dirty” bombs and an increase in global nuclear proliferation spawned by additional nuclear-armed states. States acquiring nuclear capabilities would provide the more alarming dilemma of an unending proliferation cycle that would destabilize whole regions of the world.

The NPR (PDF, 2.7MB) cites a reduction in the role of nuclear weapons in the overall U.S. national security strategy, and comes as the Obama administration reduces its nuclear stockpiles through the recently concluded new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), maintains the nearly 20-year U.S. moratorium on nuclear testing and says it will not build any additional nuclear weapons.

At the same time, it seeks to dissuade others from seeking their own nuclear arsenals by pledging not to use nuclear weapons on nations that are in compliance with the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and nuclear nonproliferation obligations. The strategy also reassures U.S. friends and allies that the American nuclear deterrent will remain only “as long as nuclear weapons exist,” and will be strong enough that they will have no need to develop their own.

Coming one year after President Obama's April 5, 2009, speech in which he called for concrete steps to eradicate nuclear weapons from the world, the NPR is a clear statement that while the international security environment that existed during the Cold War years has changed, “the risk of nuclear attack has increased.”

During the decades-long standoff between the United States and the former Soviet Union, the concept of mutual assured destruction helped to dissuade both countries from using their nuclear arsenal, since the leaders of both countries were well aware that any nuclear strike would invite a full and debilitating retaliation. The NPR recognizes that the adversarial relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation has ended, and both countries, as well as other nuclear armed powers such as China, now face the common 21st-century threats of nuclear terrorism and unsustainable nuclear proliferation.

“Al-Qaida and their extremist allies are seeking nuclear weapons. We must assume they would use such weapons if they managed to obtain them,” the report states. Along with the willingness of violent extremists to target civilians, the traditional notion of deterrence loses its effectiveness when faced with adversaries who are willing to sacrifice their own lives to inflict massive casualties, it says.

Therefore, the NPR places high importance on preventing extremists and nonstate entities from obtaining nuclear materials, equipment and technologies. The president's convening of the April 12–13 nuclear

security summit in Washington is focused on obtaining wide international agreement on how to secure all of the world's nuclear material within four years to prevent it from being stolen or seized.

The other principal nuclear weapons threat comes from states like North Korea and Iran, which by pursuing their own nuclear weapons programs and missile delivery capabilities in violation of international law, risk not only adding to the existing level of available weapons components and technology, but could provoke their neighbors into developing their own nuclear deterrent, and consequently even greater proliferation of nuclear weapons.

“Continued non-compliance with non-proliferation norms by these and other countries would seriously weaken the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), with adverse security implications for the United States and the international community at large,” the NPR states.

While the United States pledges not to use nuclear weapons against NPT-compliant states that are meeting their obligations, the report sees a “narrow range of contingencies” in which the U.S. nuclear arsenal can help deter a conventional, chemical or biological attack from states that are not compliant.

“That does not mean that our willingness to use nuclear weapons against countries not covered by the new assurance has in any way increased. Indeed, the United States wishes to stress that it would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners,” the NPR states.

As Vice President Biden said in an April 7 article, this separate approach toward states observing international nonproliferation norms versus those who are not provides additional security incentives for continued compliance, while ensuring that those in defiance “will be more isolated and less secure.”

A senior Defense Department official told reporters in an April 6 background briefing that the president considers the NPR “a foundational document of his administration” that reflects both his thinking and his leadership.

The NPR offers “a concrete, pragmatic work plan” for moving forward the president's agenda of a world without nuclear weapons, the official said, and is closely integrated with concurrent U.S. policy and strategy developments, such as START, the nuclear security summit and the upcoming NPT Review Conference at the United Nations in New York in May.

Vice President Biden on a Comprehensive Nuclear Arms Strategy

Op-ed highlights U.S. efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons

The administration's Nuclear Posture Review outlines the means to achieve greater security from worldwide nuclear dangers. Nonproliferation and counter-terrorism are central to the strategy.

By Joe Biden

April 7, 2010

When I joined the Senate in 1973, crafting nuclear policy meant mastering arcane issues like nuclear stability and deterrence theory. With the end of the Cold War and a new relationship between our country and Russia, thankfully these subjects no longer dominate public discourse. Today, the danger of deliberate, global nuclear war has all but disappeared, but the nuclear threats we face from terrorists and non-nuclear states seeking to acquire such weapons are graver than ever.

On Tuesday, President Obama took an important step toward addressing these threats by releasing a plan that will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy while ensuring that our nuclear arsenal remains safe, secure and effective for as long as it is needed. The Nuclear Posture Review outlines a strategy, supported unanimously by the national security cabinet, for greater security from nuclear dangers and implements the agenda that President Obama first outlined in Prague just over a year ago to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to pursue the peace and security of a world without them.

This new strategy, a sharp departure from previous Nuclear Posture Reviews released in 2001 and 1994, leaves Cold War thinking behind. It recognizes that the greatest threat to U.S. and global security is no longer a nuclear exchange between nations, but nuclear terrorism by extremists and the spread of nuclear weapons to an increasing number of states. From now on, decisions about the number of weapons we have and how they are deployed will take nonproliferation and counter-terrorism into account, rather than being solely based on the objective of stable deterrence.

The review contains a clear rationale for the reductions called for under the New START treaty -- a 30% reduction from the previous agreement. Because of advances in conventional capabilities and technologies such as missile defense, we need fewer nuclear weapons to deter adversaries and protect our allies than we did even a decade ago. Under the new review, we will retain only those weapons needed for our core requirements.

The plan also establishes a policy that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, as long as they are party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations. This approach provides additional incentive for countries to fully comply with nonproliferation norms. Those that do not will be more isolated and less secure.

The completion of a Nuclear Posture Review that is grounded in a commitment to American security will better protect us and our allies from nuclear threats. So will the signing of the New START treaty Thursday. And the unprecedented Nuclear Security Summit the president will host next week -- with its focus on securing vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in four years -- will advance these goals still further.

At the same time, the president is determined to ensure that our nuclear weapons remain absolutely safe, secure and effective. That is why he has asked Congress to increase funding for our nuclear complex by \$5 billion over the next five years, allowing us to upgrade aging facilities and recruit and retain the highly skilled scientists and engineers needed to sustain our arsenal. Our plan reverses a decade-long erosion in support for the national laboratories. This commitment will ensure that our arsenal remains ready.

We can achieve these objectives while upholding this country's nearly two-decade moratorium on nuclear tests and continuing our efforts to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. And although we will not develop new warheads or add military capabilities as we manage our arsenal for the future, we will pursue needed life-extension programs so the weapons we retain can be sustained. This approach has broad support, and, as Defense Secretary Robert Gates states in his preface to the Nuclear Posture Review, it is a "credible modernization plan necessary to sustain the nuclear infrastructure and support our nation's deterrent."

The president and I made a promise to the American people to protect them from nuclear risks. We have no higher obligation. Our strategy delivers on that promise and tackles the most immediate threats our planet faces.

Obama Administration Revamps Nuclear Policy

Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton discuss the new Nuclear Posture Review with reporters.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton discuss the new Nuclear Posture Review with reporters.

Washington — The Obama administration issued a new U.S. nuclear strategy April 6 that sharply narrows the use of nuclear weapons, but maintains their traditional role to deter a nuclear strike against the United States.

The Nuclear Posture Review (PDF, 2.7MB) was unveiled at a Pentagon briefing by Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Energy Secretary Steven Chu and Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The review of the nation's nuclear policy is the first since 2001 and the third since the end of the Cold War two decades ago. A review of U.S. nuclear policy is conducted at the start of every new administration; it influences federal spending, treaties, weapon deployments and their eventual retirement over the next five to 10 years.

The new policy defines measures to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime, with emphasis on the importance of international treaties such as the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. And it specifically renews a U.S. commitment to hold accountable those who provide terrorists with nuclear weapons or the materials to make them.

“The NPR provides a road map for implementing President Obama’s agenda for reducing nuclear risks to the United States, our allies and partners and the international community,” Gates said at the Pentagon briefing. “This review describes how the United States will reduce the role and numbers of nuclear weapons with a long-term goal of a nuclear-free world.”

Clinton told reporters the review is a milestone in transforming U.S. nuclear forces and the way in which the nation approaches nuclear issues.

“We are recalibrating our priorities to prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, and we are reducing the role and number of weapons in our arsenal, while maintaining a safe, secure and effective deterrent to protect our nation, allies and partners,” she said.

Release of the strategy in Washington begins nine days of intensive nuclear diplomacy. Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev will meet in Prague April 8 to sign the new START treaty, designed to limit both nations’ nuclear arsenals to 1,550 warheads each, reduce deployed strategic delivery vehicles to 700, and limit deployed and nondeployed launchers to 800. Obama will host more than 40 world leaders at a nuclear security summit in Washington April 12–13 aimed at halting the spread of nuclear weapons and related technology.

Following this series of events, representatives from around the world will converge on the United Nations in New York May 3–28 for debate and review of the NPT, in part to determine if it needs to be amended or expanded. The review process is held approximately every five years.

NPR: FIVE KEY OBJECTIVES

At the Pentagon briefing, Gates told reporters that the Nuclear Posture Review includes significant changes to the U.S. nuclear posture. It focuses on five key objectives.

- The policy emphasizes the prevention of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.
- It reduces the role of nuclear weapons in American national security by committing the United States to not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states that participate in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and are in compliance with its requirements. That policy includes instances of chemical and biological attack, but with some reservations.
- While the United States agrees to reduce its nuclear arsenal in a new treaty with Russia, the policy will maintain the traditional role of strategic deterrence and stability of the nuclear arsenal and the means to deliver them by long-range missiles, nuclear submarines and heavy bombers.
- NPR calls for a broadened regional security structure that includes missile defenses and improved conventional forces. The United States will retain the capability to forward-deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on fighter-bombers and heavy bombers.
- The policy requires the United States to sustain a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal as long as nuclear weapons exist. But the United States will not conduct new nuclear testing, and will not develop new nuclear warheads.

DISSUADING COUNTRIES FROM DEVELOPING WEAPONS

The Obama administration is encouraging global compliance with the NPT. Under the treaty, countries with nuclear weapons agree to move toward disarmament, while countries without nuclear weapons agree not to acquire them, and all have the right to peaceful nuclear energy.

According to the text of the Nuclear Posture Review, “the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations.”

Speaking at the Pentagon April 6, Jim Miller, the principal deputy under secretary of defense for policy, said the vast majority of countries are compliant with the NPT. If any should decide to use chemical or biological weapons (CBW) against the United States, its partners or its allies, they “face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response,” he said, rather than a nuclear attack. Miller said U.S. conventional forces and strike capabilities are developing additional capabilities to create greater deterrence for the use of CBW. However, he said the defense posture could be revised if the United States finds itself unable to cope with a growing threat from those weapons.

Miller said the Obama administration wants its defense posture to dissuade countries from developing nuclear weapons.

“If you are a country considering proliferation ... you put yourself in a different category with respect to our nuclear capabilities,” he said. As the United States continues to develop its conventional and missile-defense capabilities to counter weapons of mass destruction, the hope is that “these states will see less and less of an advantage to going down that path.”

START Reflects U.S. Intent to Create Nuclear-Free World

Clinton says efforts to discourage Iranian and North Korean weapons proliferation show U.S. intent to abolish nuclear weapons.

By Stephen Kaufman

Washington — The landmark agreement between Russia and the United States to reduce their nuclear-weapon stockpiles by 30 percent marks a commitment by the Obama administration to its long-term goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton says.

Speaking at the White House March 26 with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen and Under Secretary of State for Arms Control Ellen Tauscher, Clinton said the steps the Obama administration is taking to reduce the number of nuclear weapons, stop nuclear proliferation and advance nuclear security around the world mark “a very clear statement of intent” to follow through on its vision of a world without nuclear weapons.

The new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) that President Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev will sign in Prague April 8 demonstrates that “the Cold War really is behind us, and these massive nuclear arsenals that both of our countries maintained as part of deterrence no longer have to be so big,” she said.

The new treaty is the first comprehensive deal to reduce nuclear arms since its predecessor was signed by the two former Cold War rivals in July 1991.

“We do not need such large arsenals to protect our nation and our allies against the two greatest dangers we face today, nuclear proliferation and terrorism,” Clinton said.

The treaty “shows the world, particularly states like Iran and North Korea, that one of our top priorities is to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime and keep nuclear materials out of the wrong hands,” and demonstrates the U.S. commitment for progress toward disarmament under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), she said.

President Obama has invited one of the largest gatherings of international leaders since the end of World War II to Washington April 12–13 to discuss preventing rogue regimes and violent extremists from obtaining nuclear materials, and both the United States and Russia “come with more credibility” because of the treaty, Clinton said.

In May, the international community will also gather in New York for the NPT Review Conference, which Clinton said will discuss how to bring the nuclear nonproliferation regime “into the 21st century, when we know unfortunately that terrorist groups are seeking nuclear weapons.”

As the United States and Russia “uphold our commitments and strengthen the NPT, we can hold others accountable to do the same,” Clinton said.

“I’m going to reaffirm our commitment to convincing countries that the path of nonproliferation, of lowering the temperature when it comes to nuclear weapons, which we are doing with this treaty, is the path they want to be on,” she said.

Secretary Gates said having a nuclear arsenal is still “an important pillar of the U.S. defense posture” as both a deterrent to potential adversaries and to provide reassurance to “more than two dozen allies and partners who rely on our nuclear umbrella for their security.” But “it is clear that we can accomplish these goals with fewer nuclear weapons.”

“The journey we have taken, from being one misstep away from mutual assured destruction to the substantial arms reductions of this new agreement, is testimony to just how much the world has changed, and all of the opportunities we still have to make our planet safer and more secure,” he said.

“I don’t think anybody expects us to come anywhere close to zero nuclear weapons any time soon,” Gates said, but the new treaty and efforts to control fissile material and strengthen the NPT “are concrete steps to move in that direction.”

New Treaty Reduces U.S., Russian Nuclear Arsenals

By Merle David Kellerhals Jr.

Washington — President Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev finalized a landmark agreement that will cut the number of deployed nuclear weapons by 30 percent.

Obama and Medvedev completed the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which had been in negotiation for almost a year, with a telephone call March 26.

“I’m pleased to announce that after a year of intense negotiations, the United States and Russia have agreed to the most comprehensive arms control agreement in nearly two decades,” Obama said after talking with Medvedev.

“Since taking office, one of my highest priorities has been addressing the threat posed by nuclear weapons to the American people. And that’s why, last April in Prague, I stated America’s intention to pursue the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, a goal that’s been embraced by presidents like John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan,” the president said.

Obama and Medvedev agreed to meet in Prague on April 8 to sign the treaty. It would replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) agreed to by the United States and the former Soviet Union, and also the 2002 Moscow Treaty.

“Broadly speaking, the new START treaty makes progress in several areas,” Obama said. “It cuts by about a third the nuclear weapons that the United States and Russia will deploy. It significantly reduces missiles and launchers. It puts in place a strong and effective verification regime. And it maintains the flexibility that we need to protect and advance our national security and to guarantee our unwavering commitment to the security of our allies.”

“With this agreement, the United States and Russia — the two largest nuclear powers in the world — also send a clear signal that we intend to lead,” Obama said. “By upholding our own commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, we strengthen our global efforts to stop the spread of these weapons, and [help] to ensure that other nations meet their own responsibilities.”

The agreement limits the countries to 1,550 nuclear warheads, which is 30 percent lower than the limit of the Moscow Treaty, which had set it at 2,200 warheads. The treaty also limits both nations to 800 deployed and nondeployed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.

The treaty has a separate limit of 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.

The treaty’s formal title is the “Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures to Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.” It is commonly known as the New START Treaty. It lasts 10 years and has a provision for a five-year extension.

The White House said this was the 14th direct meeting or telephone conference between Obama and Medvedev on the treaty and it represents “their shared commitment to ‘reset’ U.S.-Russia relations.” Obama had made improving relations with Russia a major foreign policy objective of his administration,

arguing that the Cold War of the 20th century is over and that the two superpowers are partners in the world.

The treaty includes a verification regime that will allow each side to monitor all aspects of the treaty. “At the same time, the inspections and other verification procedures in this treaty will be simpler and less costly to implement than the old START treaty,” the White House said.

“The treaty does not contain any constraints on testing, development or deployment of current or planned U.S. missile-defense programs or current or planned United States long-range conventional strike capabilities,” the White House said.

SENATE AND DUMA APPROVAL

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry and Senator Richard Lugar, the ranking Republican on the committee, met with Obama and his advisers for about an hour March 24 at the White House and received a full briefing on the treaty and the support needed to win approval in the U.S. Senate, which requires a two-thirds majority.

The treaty also has to be approved by the Russian Duma before becoming law.

“A well-designed treaty will send an important message to the rest of the world that America is prepared to lead efforts with key stakeholders to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons,” Kerry said after the meeting with Obama. “Once the treaty and its associated documents are completed and submitted to the Senate, Senator Lugar and I look forward to holding hearings and giving the treaty immediate and careful attention.”

PRAGUE VISION

On April 5, 2009, Obama announced in a major speech at Hradcany Square in Prague that he envisioned a nuclear-free world and would make reducing nuclear weapons a signature piece of his foreign policy agenda.

“Today, I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons,” Obama told the Prague audience. “I’m not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly — perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence. But now we, too, must ignore the voices who tell us that the world cannot change.”

The United States is hosting a Global Nuclear Summit April 12–13 in Washington to promote a worldwide discussion on ways to control nuclear weapons and to begin the effort to reduce them.

“Such actions invigorate our mutual efforts to strengthen the international nonproliferation regime and convince other countries to help curb proliferation,” the White House announcement said.