

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY / MIDDLE EAST UPDATE
April 24 - 30, 2013

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1. Hagel, Onodera Discuss U.S.-Japanese Security Concerns (04-29-2013)

By Jim Garamone
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, April 29, 2013 – North Korea, the East China Sea and creating a new working group for joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities were on the table as Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera met here today.

The U.S.-Japan alliance remains the cornerstone of security and prosperity in Northeast Asia, Hagel reaffirmed following Pentagon meetings.

The most obvious threat to stability in Northeast Asia is North Korea. The two men agreed to close cooperation and coordination to monitor and respond if needed to North Korean provocations. This will most definitely include increased cooperation on missile defense.

“Today we made progress on plans to deploy a second TPY-2 radar to Japan, which will help protect both of our nations from the threat of North Korean ballistic missiles,” Hagel said during a news conference following the meeting. “The United States remains steadfast in our defense commitments to Japan, including extended deterrence and a further nuclear umbrella.”

Onodera and Hagel discussed continuing friction in the East China Sea. Hagel stressed the American position that the regional security challenge must be resolved peacefully and cooperatively between the parties involved.

“In our discussion today, I reiterated the principles that govern longstanding U.S. policy on the Senkaku Islands,” the secretary said. “The United States does not take a position on the ultimate sovereignty of the islands, but we do recognize they are under the administration of Japan and fall under our security treaty obligations.”

China and Japan both claim the islands, and confrontations have resulted from the conflicting claims.

“Any actions that could raise tensions or lead to miscalculations affect the stability of the entire region,” Hagel said. “Therefore, the United States opposes any unilateral or coercive action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administrative control.”

Hagel and Onodera agreed that Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan security treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands and “that we are opposed to any unilateral action that aims to change the status quo by force,” the Japanese defense minister said through a translator.

Hagel said Army Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, delivered that message to Chinese officials during his visit to Beijing last week.

U.S. and Japanese defense planners also looked beyond the short-range threats in the region. The United States is working to rebalance forces to the Asia-Pacific area, and within the theater is rebalancing forces in Japan.

“Our staffs have been working for some time on a review of roles, missions and capabilities to inform any revisions to the defense guidelines that underpin our alliance cooperation,” Hagel said.

The staffs identified intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities as a critical priority.

“Today we announce the formation of a defense ISR working group to deepen cooperation in this area,” the secretary said.

The two leaders discussed moving U.S. forces in Japan, and specifically on Okinawa. Onodera said he and Hagel confirmed U.S. plans to send 12 MV-22 Ospreys through Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni this summer and then move them to Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.

Onodera also invited Hagel to Japan for “Two-Plus-Two” meetings that bring together U.S. and Japanese ministers of defense and foreign affairs.

Biographies:
[Chuck Hagel](#)

Related Sites:
[Press Conference with Secretary Hagel and Defense Minister Onodera from the Pentagon](#)
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2. Leaving Asia, Dempsey Discusses Combined Defense, China Engagement (04-27-2013)

By Karen Parrish
American Forces Press Service

ABOARD A MILITARY AIRCRAFT, April 27, 2013 – The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff returned today from a week in Northeast Asia that he spent exploring possibilities in China and seeking to strengthen allied capabilities against a sustained threat of nuclear attack from North Korea.

Army Gen. Martin E. Dempsey told American Forces Press Service that now is the right time, with the right capabilities in place, to “seek to establish a collaborative, trilateral ballistic missile defense architecture” incorporating U.S., Japanese and South Korean military assets.

Dempsey visited both nations and spoke to his counterparts about establishing such an arrangement, he said. The chairman acknowledged there is a degree of political friction between Japan and South Korea, some of it stemming from events in World War II.

“There are some historic sensitivities, there are some political dynamics,” he noted. “I’m not trying to suggest to either country’s political leaders that they brush those aside at my request.”

What he proposes, he added, is that the senior military officers of all three countries advise their political leaders to integrate air and missile defense systems. Such a joint, combined system would link ground-based, aerial and maritime assets from all three nations to form a defensive capability “because it will be better than the sum of its individual parts.”

All three nations should be mature enough to set aside their differences, Dempsey said, and focus on the common, prolonged threat of ballistic missiles from Pyongyang and North Korea’s young leader Kim Jong Un -- the third member of his family to rule the reclusive nation since his grandfather, Kim Il Sung, took power in 1948. The elder Kim invaded South Korea in 1950, and North Korea has since been isolated and antagonistic to the United States, South Korea and Japan.

Dempsey noted North Korea’s nuclear threat puts South Koreans, Japanese and U.S troops and families in the region at risk, so establishing a common defense makes sense. He added that while Japan and South Korea have issues to resolve from their history, “we’re also trying to make history.”

Turning to his visit to China this week, which was his first, the chairman said initial visits primarily set the tone for further engagement. He has said repeatedly this week that his message to both China and allies in the region is that, as the United States and China pursue the “new relationship” President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to in principle, it has to be forged in the context of America’s “long-standing and other important relationships in the region.”

Dempsey added, “I sensed, at the military-to-military level, an appreciation for that fact. Although the Chinese preference might be to have a blank slate ... that’s not possible.”

The chairman also took to China the message that with great power comes great responsibility. As a rising China becomes more central to the world stage, he added, he sees that responsibility likely playing out first in two areas.

“One is on these territorial issues,” Dempsey said, referring to disputes China has with other countries in the region over islands in both the East China Sea and South China Sea.

“The idea of great power and great responsibility would mean, to them, that they shouldn’t try to resolve those territorial issues coercively, just because they happen to be a hundred times bigger than some of their neighbors,” he said.

The chairman noted that when the United States seeks to exert its influence worldwide, “we do so in the knowledge that ... we have significant power. And with that power comes the responsibility to act more deliberately, more pragmatically, more carefully, because of that great power that can so change the global geostrategic and economic environment.”

A second area where Chinese power holds great potential influence, he said, is in the future of the Pacific region.

“One of the things I asked my counterpart is, ‘As we begin to build this new relationship, can we share some thoughts with each other about how we see our individual nations continuing to contribute to global security?’” Dempsey said.

“I’d be happy to tell them what I see as the future of our forward presence, of our rotational deployments and of our readiness stance at home,” he said. “I’d love to hear that level of detail from them, and see if on that basis of ... greater transparency, we might have a better understanding of each other.”

The road to a sustained closer relationship between the two powers will likely not always proceed in a straight line, the chairman said, but the interaction he had with Chinese political leaders and military members at all levels can help set the conditions for closer interaction.

Dempsey said he and his military counterparts agree on three lines of effort they will recommend to their respective leaders:

-- More frequent and regular engagements at every level, including greater participation in each other’s military training exercises as well as establishing a video teleconference link to ease communications between Dempsey and his Chinese counterpart, Gen. Fang Fenghui, People’s Liberation Army chief of the general staff;

-- Staff consultations to compare “not strategy as much as vision,” Dempsey said; and

-- Developing an agreed-upon approach or code of behavior to apply to encounters in the air, sea, and cyber domains.

The chairman said of the VTC link, “I told Fang, this is the 21st century and we both consider ourselves on the leading edge of information technology, and we’re using this -- what I find to be -- rather cumbersome telephone linkage. So we’re going to try to advance that.”

The third objective, developing a mutual code of behavior, could begin with a discussion of theoretical encounters, Dempsey suggested.

“Maybe through a series of vignettes, we would notionally discuss a vignette where U.S. and Chinese forces encounter each other in the air, at sea, or the more difficult one, ... cyber,” the chairman said. “But we have to work toward it.”

At this stage those efforts “are all aspirations on the part of those of us who had these discussions,” he noted. “We have to make aspiration become motivation, and motivation become implementation.”

The chairman said he was very pleased with the program of events his visit included.

“As we prepared for the trip, I asked them if we could focus this trip on people,” Dempsey said, noting he was interested, going into China, in “getting the opportunity to build relationships at my level, and also to interact with their next generation.”

His Chinese hosts arranged that, he said. While official visits -- perhaps particularly in China -- are often tightly scripted, he acknowledged, the visit included several opportunities for candid interaction.

“We went to the aviation regiment,” Dempsey noted. “I’m sure that they invited to that event some of their finest young men, as I would. The young men I met were not scripted. Were they rehearsed at some level? Perhaps.”

The chairman said after 39 years in this business, he knows how to pull people off script.

“And I did that at every opportunity, and at every opportunity, when they moved off script I found them to be engaging, candid and thoughtful,” he added. “And that was true especially at the youngest level, but even at the level of the National Defense Institute. Again, the initial conversation was always what you would expect, the kind of well-honed messages -- but in pulling them off of those, it was actually quite engaging.”

The chairman said first trips are always important in establishing tone.

“I found the tone of the trip, both the reality of it but also how it was reported in the Chinese press, to be very positive,” he noted. “There were some critical comments made about my reaffirmation of some of our long-standing policy positions, but again, once that was established, the tone, both in person and in the reflections of it, was very good.”

Dempsey noted that was true of his interactions and also of those between his wife, Deanie, and the senior spouses she engaged with in China.

“I do think establishing personal relationships is important,” Dempsey said. As the Dempseys left China, he added, their hosts “presented us with eight little stuffed animals, one for each of my grandchildren.” He added one of those grandchildren hasn’t yet arrived, but is expected soon.

“I was very touched by that, actually, and it’s an indication that we connected not only at the official level, but at the personal level as well,” he said. “On that basis, I would consider this trip a success by almost any measure.”

Biographies:

[Army Gen. Martin E. Dempsey](#)

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3. DOD Conducts 'BRAC-like' Review in Europe (04-26-2013)

By Donna Miles
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, April 26, 2013 – While the U.S. continues to reduce its military presence in Europe, the Defense Department is conducting a review to identify more Europe-based installations and training areas to recommend for closure or realignment.

Then-Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta directed the review in January, and results are expected by the year's end, a senior defense official told Congress earlier this week.

The review was ordered in light of force reductions under way or planned in Europe, and also because Congress directed DOD to seek out ways to cut infrastructure in Europe before requesting any more base realignments and closures in the United States.

John Conger, acting deputy undersecretary of defense for installations and environment, described the European base review as a "BRAC-like process" that will help identify excess infrastructure and propose efficiencies in troop basing.

"We're doing a thorough scrub," Conger told the Senate Armed Service Committee's readiness and management support subcommittee.

"We have been reducing our force structure in Europe for quite some time, and we have been reducing our facilities in Europe for that same amount of time," Conger said. "There's a lot that's been done already."

In fact, the U.S. force in Europe has decreased about 80 percent from the height of the Cold War, when the United States had 450,000 service members serving at some 1,200 bases, Navy Adm. James G. Stavridis, the U.S. European Command commander and supreme allied commander for Europe, told Congress last month.

Today, Eucom consists of 64,000 joint forces, representing less than 5 percent of the U.S. military, spread across 21 major bases and smaller supporting sites, Stavridis reported.

Panetta announced details of planned changes in the U.S. military presence in Europe last year. They included the inactivation of two of the four brigade combat teams in Europe by fiscal year 2014, the 603rd Air Control Squadron in Italy in fiscal 2013 and the 81st Fighter Squadron at Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, during fiscal 2013.

The 170th Infantry Brigade inactivation in Baumholder, Germany, is now complete, and the 172nd Separate Infantry Brigade in Grafenwoehr, Germany, is preparing to follow suit. Its last M1 Abrams tanks were shipped back to the United States from the port in Bremerhaven, Germany, last month.

Meanwhile, as Conger testified before Congress on April 24, an A-10 Thunderbolt aircraft whirred over the Joint Multinational Training Command's Grafenwoehr Training Area for the last time. The flight was the end of a 37-year legacy there as the 81st Fighter Squadron prepares to deactivate.

Based on reductions and planned reductions in the force presence in Europe, Conger told Congress DOD has plans to further reduce the number of bases needed to accommodate them.

The new review, he said, will help identify ways to consolidate operations where it makes sense with an eye toward increased efficiency as well as cost-savings.

“We are developing business case analyses for this task, taking operational impacts, return on investment, and military value into consideration,” Conger said. “By the end of this year, we plan to conclude with a fully vetted list of options from which the secretary can make strategic investment decisions.”

The process will help DOD realize long-term savings by eliminating excess infrastructure, recapitalizing where possible and closing or consolidating sites where feasible, he said.

“We are going to look for ways to leverage the various services together in order to maximize the amount of consolidation,” he told the Senate panel. “The results will ultimately validate our enduring European infrastructure requirements, providing an analytical basis to support sustainment funding and future recapitalization.”

Biographies:

[John Conger](#)

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[Official Makes Case for More Base Closures, Realignments](#)

[4. Hagel: Intel Community Says Syria Has Used Chemical Weapons \(04-25-2013\)](#)

By Cheryl Pellerin

American Forces Press Service

ABU DHABI, United Arab Emirates, April 25, 2013 – The U.S. intelligence community assesses with varying degrees of confidence that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons -- specifically the nerve-agent sarin -- on a small scale in that violence-torn nation, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said here tonight.

On the last evening of his five-nation inaugural trip to the Middle East as defense secretary, Hagel told reporters traveling with him that the White House delivered a letter on the topic this morning to several members of Congress.

“The intelligence community has been assessing information for some time on this issue, and the decision to reach this conclusion was made within the past 24 hours,” the secretary said. “I have been in close contact with senior officials in Washington since then to discuss this serious matter.”

Hagel said the United States can’t confirm the weapons’ origin, but “we do believe that any use of chemical weapons in Syria would very likely have originated with the Bashar Assad regime.”

The White House letter, signed by Miguel Rodriguez, director of the Office of Legislative Affairs, on President Barack Obama’s behalf, responded to an April 24 inquiry by unidentified members of

Congress. They asked, “Has the Assad regime, or Syrian elements associated with or supported by the Assad regime used chemical weapons in Syria since the current conflict began in March 2011?”

In response, the letter said, “our intelligence committee does assess with varying degrees of confidence that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons on a small scale in Syria, specially the chemical agent sarin. This assessment is based in part on physiological samples.”

According to the letter, though, the chain of custody is not clear, so it’s not clear how the exposure occurred or under what conditions.

“We need to know the full story and get it right,” Hagel told reporters.

“Thus far,” according to the letter, “we believe that the Assad regime maintains custody of these weapons and has demonstrated a willingness to escalate its horrific use of violence against the Syrian people.”

The Obama administration will remain in close consultation with you and the Congress on these matters, the letter continued. “In the interim, the administration is prepared for all contingencies so that we can respond appropriately to any confirmed use of chemical weapons, consistent with our national interests.”

“As the letter states,” Hagel said, “the president has made it clear that the use of chemical weapons or the transfer of such weapons to terrorist groups would be unacceptable.”

The United States has an obligation to fully investigate, including with key partners and allies and through the United Nations, evidence of chemical weapons use in Syria, the secretary added.

Over the past week, Hagel has traveled to Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, and the military and government leaders of each country have expressed concern about the deteriorating situation in Syria, he observed.

“This subject, Syria, and in particular chemical weapons, is just part of a larger challenge in the Middle East,” Hagel said.

“It is so vitally important for our United States interests, as well as for our allies, that we work ... to stabilize and secure these Middle East countries,” the secretary concluded, “because if this region of the world essentially gets itself into a situation where it’s ungovernable and out of control, then this will be an astoundingly huge problem for all of the world.”

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5. Dempsey: U.S. Will Remain World Power Despite Budget 'Mess' (04-25-2013)

By Karen Parrish
American Forces Press Service

YOKOTA AIR BASE, Japan, April 25, 2013 – The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff didn't mince words when he spoke about the Defense Department's fiscal challenges during a town hall gathering here today.

"OK, the budget," Army Gen. Martin E. Dempsey said. "It's a mess. It's just a real mess."

Dempsey landed in Japan today on the last leg of a weeklong trip that also has taken him to South Korea and China. He spoke to an audience of several hundred, mostly airmen, minutes after landing.

This year's budget is particularly difficult because we're trying to absorb all these changes in the last six months of the fiscal year," the chairman said.

"And we are generally about 80 percent spent with 50 percent of the year left," he added. "So we have 20 percent of what we thought we'd have, to stretch ourselves out to the end of the fiscal year."

Dempsey said the military will get through the rest of the fiscal year, which ends Sept. 30, by stretching its readiness as far as possible and being "extraordinarily careful about how we spend our money." The services have reduced maintenance, flying hours and steaming hours, he noted.

"So we're going to have to play some catch-up in fiscal year 2014," he said. "We're working to really get our legs under ourselves in fiscal 2015 and beyond."

Aspects of the funding squeeze "just are heart-wrenching," Dempsey said. He told civilian employees in the audience that he is "personally embarrassed" about "this issue of furlough that hangs over you." Current Defense Department plans call for cutting 14 days from civilian employees' work schedules and paychecks between June and the end of September. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel has told the chairman and the service chiefs to "get that number of furlough days down as low as you can," Dempsey said.

"And we will," he added, noting that the challenge in doing so is getting to the end of the fiscal year with a force that is still ready. The answer, he said, is that money has to come out of modernization, maintenance, training and compensation.

During his 39 years of service, the chairman said, this is the third time he's seen serious defense budget crunches.

"It's a pain in the neck. ... The budget's coming back to something like a historic norm -- it's just coming down faster than it really should," he said.

In response to a question about changes to the military retirement system, Dempsey said any changes will be "grandfathered" to exclude those currently serving. Service members have a right to expect that the promises made to them when they joined up will be kept, he said, adding, "I haven't heard anyone waffle about that."

Any changes to retirement will be subject to a committee or a commission's study, he said, and will not happen quickly.

"I do think we need to change," the chairman said. He explained that while only 17 percent of those who serve eventually retire, the Defense Department is required to set aside retirement funds for 100 percent of the force.

"That accrual fund tends to suck money off the budget every year," he noted. While the retirement system may in the future change in a number of ways, he said, veterans associations work diligently to protect health care, compensation and retirement.

"That is their charter," he said, "and unless we can convince them we're actually making it better for you, we tend to be at odds with each other. ... We've got to find a system that will be acceptable -- not only to those now serving, but to those who will serve, and that we can reconcile with the veterans support organizations."

Manpower costs at their current level will overwhelm modernization and training, Dempsey said.

"I don't want to be the chairman known for having taken a machete to your paycheck," he said. "That's not the reputation I want to have. ... But I don't want you being the most well compensated military on the planet that doesn't train."

Dempsey also responded to a question about whether the United States can remain a global power in light of its fiscal difficulties.

Given America's role in maintaining open markets and access to resources, as well as assuring freedom of navigation in the sea and air domains, he said, "we can't afford not to be the stabilizing influence that we are."

"Although some are hoping that this budget challenge rocks us back a bit," he added, "I think ... they still want us to provide a stabilizing platform."

The U.S. military won't withdraw to "Fortress America," Dempsey said, and the Defense Department has pared back its forward presence in places such as Japan, the Korean Peninsula and Europe "about as far as we can."

Rotational deployments and other measures can help the nation's military "accomplish almost the same thing, but with smaller force structures," he said.

"We're going to have to think about how to remain a global power with fewer resources, and also managing it inside of an operational tempo that is acceptable to you. ... I'm actually quite confident we'll be able to figure that out," he said.

Dempsey told the troops to remember one thing: "We are going to do less with less, but not less well. That's the commitment. ... You're still going to be the best-trained, best-equipped, best-led force on the planet."

Dempsey's visit to Japan will continue in the coming days, and is scheduled to include senior-level meetings and other engagements.

Biographies:

[Army Gen. Martin E. Dempsey](#)

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6. State's Yun on Security, Defense Rebalance to Asia (04-25-2013)

*Testimony by Joseph Yun, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, Washington, DC*

Rebalance to Asia II: Security and Defense: Cooperation and Challenges

Mr. Chairman, Senator Rubio, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you very much for inviting me here today to testify on this important topic. I would like to thank you for your work to build a bipartisan consensus on the importance of engaging the Asia-Pacific region and advancing U.S. interests there. We value working with you and look forward to continuing to work closely with you and other Members of Congress in the future.

United States' policy toward East Asia and the Pacific reflects the profound recognition that the future prosperity and security of our nation will be defined by events and developments in the region. While our commitments to other regions remain strong, it is also important to recognize just how significant East Asia and the Pacific are to the United States. Home to two-thirds of the world's population and the world's fastest growing economies, the Asia-Pacific offers growing opportunities and challenges for U.S. strategic interests. Placing U.S. interests in context, the annual flow of U.S. investment into East Asia has increased from \$22.5 billion in 2009 to \$41.4 billion in 2011. U.S. exports to the Asia-Pacific totaled over \$320 billion in 2012 after growing nearly eight percent since 2008.

As the region rapidly grows and transforms, visible, sustained, U.S. commitment is increasingly essential.

Our commitment to the Asia-Pacific region is demonstrated in a number of ways, including through security and defense-related cooperation. However, I would like to emphasize that security and defense cooperation is only one part of the policy and to provide you with the larger context of our engagement with the region.

Though we continue to face military challenges in the region, non-military issues are critically important to American and East Asian prosperity and security and necessitate a broad diplomatic approach. Although our security and defense commitments remain strong and unequivocal, we must put more emphasis on strengthening our non-military engagement.

As our response to recent events in North Korea demonstrates, and as Secretary Kerry emphasized on his recent trip to Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul, there is no doubt about U.S. military resolve in the region when it comes to threatening behavior. Indeed, our allies and partners continue to tell us that our clear and visible military presence is reassuring to them and contributes to the stability of the region. But what they also tell us is that, as we deepen our military engagement, we should continue also to emphasize the diplomatic, development, economic, and people-to-people engagement in order to demonstrate our longer-term commitment to our rebalance strategy. To be sure, there are those in the region who have doubts about our ability to sustain our high level of engagement, particularly in the current fiscal environment. But we continue to reassure them that our

commitment is strong and enduring, because, as a Pacific nation, the United States' prosperity and security are inherently tied to the region.

To date we have demonstrated our commitment through intensive engagement at every level, including interacting with our regional partners at the highest levels. Last year, that high-level engagement included 35 bilateral meetings, six trilateral meetings, 32 multilateral meetings, and numerous strategic dialogues. The result of these engagements was progress on trade agreements, closer coordination on law enforcement and counter-terrorism initiatives, and advancing anti-human trafficking measures, and other efforts to advance good governance, democracy and human rights in the region. And we will continue to press forward this year. In June, Secretary Kerry will participate in the ASEAN Regional Forum ministerial meetings in Brunei, demonstrating U.S. commitment to the region and support for strengthened regional institutions. At the fifth meeting of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in Washington in July, Secretary Kerry and Treasury Secretary Lew will be joined by their Chinese counterparts for a discussion of challenges and opportunities on a range of bilateral, regional, and global issues. In October, President Obama will attend the APEC Summit in Bali, his third East Asia Summit in Brunei, and the Global Entrepreneurship Summit in Kuala Lumpur, all of which showcase our commitment to comprehensive regional engagement.

Our cooperation with the region is not limited to top-level engagement. It also extends to ordinary citizens, including young people. Public diplomacy initiatives, such as educational and cultural exchange programs with citizens from across the Asia-Pacific region, are increasing grass-roots support for partnering with the United States. In addition, we are utilizing new outreach platforms such as social media and the innovative American cultural spaces in Rangoon and Jakarta, to reach younger audiences, highlight the multi-dimensional nature of U.S. foreign policy, and foster direct and long-term relationships with broader and more diverse populations.

Our Asia-Pacific policy is multifaceted. Security takes a number of forms and should not be defined or characterized solely by our military engagement. Here are the key areas of our focus:

Asia's future stability and security are linked to its prosperity and economic development. We are boosting U.S. trade in the region, increasing investment flows, and deepening economic integration, all of which will benefit U.S. businesses and help create jobs here at home, while also creating improved and more inclusive development outcomes in the region itself. Inward investment accounts for over two million American manufacturing jobs, a number we are working to increase. Similarly, exports generate over 10 million jobs for American workers. Asia's prosperity is America's prosperity, and we will continue our work to secure markets for U.S. goods and services and welcome tourists, students, and investors to our shores. Establishment of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement with 11 partners will be one of the cornerstones of our "rebalance" toward the Asia-Pacific. Our promotion, through the TPP, APEC and elsewhere, of a regional economic architecture in which the rules are open, transparent, free, and fair helps U.S. businesses gain access to this dynamic region and further integrate the regional economy under a set of high-standard trade and investment rules. Meanwhile, State Department missions in the field are stepping up their commercial promotion efforts to supplement the Commerce Department's mission to promote exports, tourism, education, and investment opportunities within the United States.

We are also engaging with an emerging and growing regional architecture of robust regional institutions and multilateral agreements that result in a more positive political and economic environment for the United States and strengthen regional stability, security, and economic growth. Multilateral institutions are positioning themselves to better handle territorial and maritime disputes such as in the South China Sea. Through engagement with multilateral structures such as the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), we are able to encourage a peaceful resolution of contentious transnational issues and discourage escalation of tensions.

By developing our relationships with partners and emerging leaders, and deepening cooperation across the region, we are strengthening U.S. national security, promoting economic growth and trade, and creating a better platform from which to tackle transnational challenges such as terrorism, organized crime, and trafficking.

This kind of cooperation very much includes China. We want China and the countries of the region to partner not only with us, but with each other and multilaterally so that we can deal with shared challenges like cyber security, climate change, and North Korea, which were significant points of discussion with the Chinese on Secretary Kerry's most recent trip.

At the heart of our efforts to contribute to a peaceful, prosperous, secure, and stable region is a desire to expand democratic development and human rights. Our commitment to advancing freedom, democracy, and the rule of law has manifested itself in our steadfast support for reform and opening in Burma, where positive developments on a range of concerns of the international community have allowed us to open a new chapter in bilateral relations. However, there is still a great deal to be done, for example in terms of the widespread abuses targeting Muslims, including ethnic Rohingya. We will continue to press for improvements with governments that fall short on human rights and democracy issues while supporting those promoting the values we share. We work closely with key allies and partners to find ways to support the return of democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights standards to Fiji.

So, as we deepen our traditional security ties and build on our alliances to deter and defend against military and non-military threats to the United States and the region, we will continue to seek peaceful resolution of disputes and confront emerging challenges that could harm U.S. national security interests. We will do so in a way that engages our partners, helps build multilateral cooperation and solutions, encourages economic growth and prosperity, and promotes democratic development and human rights. Each element of our engagement strategy is mutually reinforcing. And thus far, Asian states have warmly welcomed our efforts.

Of course, the stability that has enabled the Asia-Pacific's remarkable economic growth over the past decade has long been upheld by the U.S. military. And we are seeking to ensure that our military activities, force posture, and presence enable us to improve our cooperation with our allies and partners and respond to current as well as emerging security challenges and threats. Together with our Department of Defense colleagues, we have begun work on a comprehensive defense strategy review to develop a force posture and presence in the region that can better respond to non-traditional security threats, protect allies and partners, and defend U.S. national interests. And in our military-to-military engagement throughout the region, we continue to emphasize norms regarding respect for human rights, civilian populations, and the law.

As our military cooperation around the Asia-Pacific continues to evolve and adapt to 21st century challenges, we strive to optimize our military force posture so that it is geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. An example of how we're doing this is our close cooperation with Japan on consolidation and realignment issues.

The Japanese government's March submission of the landfill permit request for construction of a replacement Marine Corps Air Station to the Okinawa governor, together with the April bilateral announcement of a Consolidation Plan, are significant milestones in our bilateral partnership and important steps closer to realizing the vision of the 2006 Realignment Roadmap. Both sides have

reaffirmed that the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Henoko remains the only viable alternative to the current location of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.

We take our alliance responsibilities seriously. The Consolidation Plan will help us maintain a sustainable U.S. military presence in Japan with a reduced impact on crowded urban areas. This step will also help ensure the strength of the U.S.-Japan Alliance and promote peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. Due to its geographic location, Okinawa plays a crucial role in the defense of Japan and the preservation of peace and security in the region. U.S. forces on Okinawa are ready to respond to regional contingencies, including humanitarian crises and natural disasters. We recognize the impact that our bases have on local communities, and we are committed to continuing to address those concerns.

In addition to this work with Japan, we are also strengthening and modernizing our long-standing treaty alliances with the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines. This year marks the 60th anniversary of our alliance with the Republic of Korea, a linchpin of security and prosperity in Northeast Asia. Our cooperation has evolved over the years into a truly global partnership, and we are working together in places such as Afghanistan, South Sudan, and off the coast of Somalia. The United States is steadfast in its commitment to the defense of the ROK, and both governments fully support the modernization of our alliance, including the U.S.-ROK Strategic Alliance 2015 plan. Strengthening our alliance includes both preparing for and deterring North Korean aggression. Building on our successful counterterrorism partnership with the Philippines, we are expanding our security engagement to focus on building the Philippines' military and law enforcement agencies' indigenous capacity in order to address areas of common interest in maritime security, disaster relief, and non-proliferation.

Our force posture initiative with Australia, another close ally, supports a more flexible and resilient capability to respond to contingencies across the region and globally. Our Defense Strategic Talks with Thailand have yielded a new Joint Vision Statement that is a blueprint for our 21st century security partnership and a reflection of Thailand's key role in our rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. Given the strategic importance and collective significance of Southeast Asia and the Pacific, we have increased our military engagement with Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands. The U.S. Pacific Fleet's Pacific Partnership program brings the best of our and our partners' military expertise and capabilities to multiple Pacific Island countries to help meet critical infrastructure, water, sanitation, and health challenges.

We also continue to seek improved military-to-military relations with China by advancing our successful high-level dialogues and exchanges, as well as expanding our cooperation on counterpiracy, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities. Strengthening our military and broader economic and security relationship with China is a critical component of our rebalance. Let me be clear that we have no interest in containing China, but rather our policy is designed to increase cooperation with China on a wide range of bilateral, regional, and global issues.

The United States has also played an important role in ensuring continued cross-Strait stability, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and our one-China policy. The United States makes available to Taiwan defense articles and services necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. This long-standing policy contributes to the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and we welcome the progress that has been made in cross-Strait relations in recent years.

Turning to Southeast Asia, our engagement builds upon the principles of good governance and respect for human rights. Following the restart of our military relationship with Indonesia after that country's democratic transformation, it remains important to continue to provide technical assistance and support to Indonesia's military reform, professionalization, and modernization process. Other priorities in the military-to-military relationship include a focus on maritime security and interoperability to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. These same principles also apply to assistance programs that support the Indonesian National Police – a significant contributor to security forces and the primary implementer of counterterrorism strategies and programs in Indonesia. Among countries in Southeast Asia, Indonesia provides the greatest number of troops to peacekeeping missions worldwide and is also building a training center for peacekeepers that the U.S. government strongly supports.

In Burma, we are increasingly hearing from civil society activists and other reform advocates that the United States can and should help the Burmese military shed its legacy of decades of oppressive rule to become a modern force subordinate to civilian rule that respects human rights and is held accountable for its actions. To that end, we are currently looking at ways to support nascent military engagement – such as exposure to standards on human rights, international humanitarian law, humanitarian assistance, and civilian-control of the military – that would encourage further political reforms. We continue to ask the Burmese government to demonstrate concrete progress in achieving respect for human rights, national reconciliation, democratization, and an end of military ties to North Korea.

While bilateral efforts across the Asia-Pacific are demonstrating positive results, we are also working trilaterally. Our trilateral defense talks, including those with Japan and Australia and with Japan and the Republic of Korea, help coordinate our defense policies, and in tight budget times, reinforce synergies and promote interoperability to deal with regional and global challenges. These trilateral arrangements allow us to work together to address a range of issues, such as humanitarian disaster response efforts and counter piracy operations, while leveraging and learning from major allies' knowledge and experience on security issues from across the region. They also ensure that, working together, we are better able to coordinate on threats such as those from North Korea.

We are working with regional partners, including China, through numerous mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and Asian Defense Ministerial Mechanism Plus to build military and civilian capacity to respond to natural disasters and to support humanitarian relief efforts. Following the devastating experiences of the 2010 earthquake, tsunami, and ensuing Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, nations in the Asia-Pacific are keenly aware of the importance of regional cooperation to respond to natural disasters. Since 1995, the United States has invested more than \$155 million in disaster risk reduction efforts in the region and in 2012 provided an additional \$23 million for disaster risk reduction programs that save lives at the time of disasters. From May 7 to 11, the United States will also participate in the third ARF Disaster Relief Exercise (DiREX) to be held in Thailand. The Pacific Command (PACOM) sponsors a range of exercises hosted by our partner nations that include broad regional participation. My Department of Defense colleague can speak more specifically about those exercises, but I would stress the strong political will to promote closer cooperation, build on essential capabilities, and ensure that, in the face of disaster or threat, the United States and its partners are able to operate effectively and respond smoothly together.

The Department of State works closely with the Department of Defense and PACOM to support military engagement throughout the region in a way that enhances our partnerships, builds local capacity to deal with threats and disasters, and promotes democratic values and development. For the United States to continue to meet our security objectives in the region and build long-term,

meaningful partnerships to deal with emerging challenges, security assistance resources are critical to our mission. In particular, Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs play a key role by building partner capacity, including strengthening maritime domain awareness capabilities, working with partners as they develop and professionalize their armed forces, and enhancing our partner capabilities and interoperability to work with the United States to address emerging challenges, both internationally, and in the region.

Our engagement on the military front is formulated in concert with our allies and partners in the region and will continue to reinforce the other aspects of our Asia-Pacific policy. Our security efforts will continue to underpin stability, and provide reassurance to the region as we concurrently focus on fostering economic growth, increasing coordination on transnational issues, strengthening people-to-people ties, and encouraging democratic development. It is increasingly vital for the United States to demonstrate in concrete terms our firm and unwavering commitment to the Asia-Pacific region, not only through our military presence and alliances, but also through our engagement in the full range of issues important to countries in the region.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to testify on our engagement with and commitment to the Asia-Pacific region. I am pleased to answer any questions you may have.

7. State's Kausner on Security Cooperation at Defense Workshop (04-24-2013)

Remarks by Gregory M. Kausner, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Defense Security Cooperation Agency and 2013 Defense Security Cooperation Workshop, Hyatt Crystal City, Arlington, VA

Opportunities and Challenges in Security Cooperation

Introduction

Thank you all very much. It is my great pleasure to be here. As you know, these workshops can be incredibly valuable, as they help us to stay connected and gain the perspectives of others in the security cooperation field.

This workshop is an especially valuable experience for me, as it is my first public appearance as a representative of the State Department. As Vice Admiral Landay just mentioned, I was, until recently, serving on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Before my time on the Hill, I was an officer in the Navy.

So, I have viewed the issues we'll be discussing over the course of this week through the lens of an operator, a Congressional staffer, and now, an Administration official.

What's readily apparent to me, irrespective of what role I have filled, is how vital all the players – DoD, Congress, and the State Department – are to the effective administration and execution of security cooperation. This all-hands approach is what's required, not only because of the volume of and demand for security cooperation programs, but because of the unique perspective and expertise that our interagency model brings to bear.

Today, as a representative of the Bureau that works every day to bring State and DoD together, I want to discuss the State Department's role in Security Assistance in general, and arms sales in specific. I'll talk about the opportunities that exist and the challenges that stand before us. And I'll

also briefly touch on how we at the State Department are working to overcome such obstacles to advance our U.S. interests.

Opportunities

During this period in time – when we face a multipolar and complex world – it is worth reexamining the purpose of security assistance. We must not be afraid to challenge conventional norms and widely accepted assumptions, so that we may take hold of the tremendous opportunities that changing regional dynamics present.

The first thing we need to realize is that Arms Sales are not always the culmination of a foreign policy decision - they are instead, often the start of a relationship; a new opportunity for engagement and influence; and an entrée into comprehensive strategic dialogues.

At State, we're working to expand our security partnerships with countries around the world because it is critical to U.S. national security. And that's a point that I want to emphasize: The purpose of our military grant assistance and defense sales is primarily to promote U.S. national security interests.

This is a purpose laid out in the Arms Export Control Act, and it is why the State Department oversees U.S. security assistance: security assistance is after all an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. There is no doubt, however, that those of us in the State Department could not do it alone. We rely heavily on the tremendous expertise and experience of our close partners in DoD.

We also engage in arms sales to promote world peace. Again, the AECA is explicit on this point. To many outside the defense community, this may sound like a non-sequitur. And yet, we find again and again that deterrence is an effective promoter of peace.

The links that we forge with partner nations – and the bonds they form with each other, through mutual awareness and joint exercises – provide a means to de-escalate tensions and improve relations. The nature of our relationships with allies and partners in the modern world is symbiotic when it comes to defense. We are safer when partners can ensure the stability of their regions – and they are safer employing American technology.

In this sense, arms sales and the partnerships built around them are also a force-multiplier. The key here is interoperability: Security assistance allows the United States to leverage the capabilities of our partners and allies to conduct joint operations.

I cannot over-emphasize how vital common platforms are in an operational environment. Those of us who have deployed along-side other nations know this well. When we stand shoulder-to-shoulder with our allies in a combat situation, it makes us more effective when we're employing the same tactics, techniques, and procedures – but that's difficult to do unless we share the same equipment.

We also garner tangible returns for our security assistance. Our arms sales and grant aid is often reimbursed with far-reaching access to everything from basing rights to preferred passage through essential transit routes. Thus, our military is able to maintain its role as a global provider of peace and security.

Yet another reason to offer arms sales to responsible nations is influence. When the United States offers an arms sale, we don't just offer the end item. We provide the user manual, a chain of spare parts, maintenance support, and training. This “total package” approach gives us a tremendous

amount of leverage going forward and establishes crucial relationships, which are often the foundation of diplomacy in tumultuous times.

As Secretary Kerry discussed the situation in Egypt last week before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, he pointed out that, “largely through the ethic that had been created working and training at Fort Benning in America and various places, there were officer-to-officer relationships. We had majors who could talk to each other, we had colonels who could call on the phone and say you guys got to be restrained here...”

Of course, as you’re well aware, there’s another reason why arms sales are critical in this time of budget austerity. There is an economic impact on our defense industrial base.

I know many of you are concerned about the impact of sequestration. Believe me, so are we.

It is clear that the past ten years’ growth in defense budgets will not be replicated in this current decade.

This makes it all the more essential that we encourage others to shoulder more of the costs and responsibilities of global security, and that we provide them the right kind of tools to do so. When the United States enhances the military capabilities of our allies and partners, we strengthen their ability to handle their own security. This potentially reduces the burden that falls on our shoulders.

All of the reasons I just mentioned – national security, regional stability, interoperability, access, influence, economic benefits - these are just a sampling of the opportunities that exist thanks to security cooperation.

It is not pre-ordained, however, that such opportunities will always be available to us. Right now there is no partner more in demand than the United States. As much as it is in our interest to partner with nations around the world, it is also in the interest of foreign nations to partner with us.

But for it to stay that way we’ll have to be realistic about the challenges we face.

Challenges

On the policy side, one of the primary challenges is in finding the balance between security interests and the promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights.

Partner nations may not always use their capabilities with the same discretion that we do; they may not always place the same premium on human rights as does the United States. We work with them constantly – in every high level meeting, at every opportunity – to address these issues.

Yet sometimes, despite our best efforts, we must be aware that the weapons we sell for their legitimate defense purposes could also be used for reasons for which we do not approve, or that such a sale or grant may be interpreted as the United States providing political support to a government that is mistreating its citizens.

Of course, there are many steps we can take to prevent this from happening – from Leahy vetting to End Use Monitoring. These safeguards seek to protect both human rights considerations as well as technology security. In extremis, we may even place a hold on the sale of defense articles to specific elements of a nation’s security forces. Never-the-less, sometimes finding the balance between immediate security needs and human rights will remain a challenge.

A second challenge is ensuring that we are building not just capability, but capacity.

One of the lessons we learned from Iraq and Afghanistan is that a strategy predicated on ‘train and equip’ is destined to require continued American engagement long after the first troop is trained and the last of the equipment is delivered.

Rather, what we should be aiming for is sustainability, built on the capacity of our partners to maintain and develop the capabilities we have helped them obtain. This is particularly the case in the area of defense missions that are mutually beneficial.

In Foreign Military Sales we often talk of a ‘total package approach’ – but the package needs to be greater than a weapons system; it needs to involve, according to the situation, everything from institutional reform to legal reform to professional education.

Unless it is holistic and broad, security assistance designed just to provide a capability can instead provide a dependency – a dependency of the wrong kind.

We must be cognizant of the sum of our security engagement with a country to include arms sales, grant assistance, and DoD security cooperation programs to ensure that we have a truly unified approach that supports broad national security and foreign policy objectives.

Beyond a Total Package Approach, what we need is a Total Sector Approach – in fact, a Total Country Approach. This is a key part of what the State Department brings to each and every arms sale – it’s not just the Total Package for us, it’s about the total picture.

The third challenge is deciding which weapons systems to sell in order to ensure that sales do not destabilize regional security balances or lead to arms races. It is not enough to assess the needs of single partner. Again, we return to that word – holistic. We need to look across a given region to determine if the capability we are selling is a new introduction, or if it will upset the often-delicate balance of power between competing nations.

The fourth challenge for the U.S. is the protection of our most sensitive technologies and our military-technological edge. Years ago, there were two monoliths of defense production – the U.S. and Soviet Union.

Today, however, we face a world in which non-state actors actively seek to acquire destabilizing weapons, emerging states strive to improve their domestic production capabilities, and illicit front-companies seek to support such activities.

Ensuring that we can give our partners what they need, while preventing access to sensitive technologies, is an enduring and expanding challenge.

This is not only a reflection of today’s security environment – it is also a reflection of today’s information environment.

Scientific research can spread as quickly as any other kind of information; some of the world’s toughest problems are ‘crowd-sourced’ to the internet community; it is harder than ever for secrets to be kept, but it is a task we must live up to, even as we seek to burden-share with partners.

In all of these examples, we see one final challenge that is pervasive: how we balance the burden of global leadership and our role as the world's primary provider of security with the fiscal constraints of today's environment.

In overcoming this obstacle, we will look to innovative security cooperation programs to help our allies share the burden.

In the end though, our partners must take on an increased responsibility for their own security and that of their regions, whether through participating actively in alliances, such as we have seen in the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia, or through sharing the actual financial cost of American presence around the globe.

The Way Forward

How do we address these challenges going forward? Undoubtedly, as I said in my opening, our approach will need to be a total government effort with State Department in the lead.

In the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, the country has a tremendous asset: a group of exceedingly talented and dedicated individuals who spend every hour of every work day – and many of their days off as well – considering how to balance the challenges of security assistance with the opportunities. They literally do this on a case-by-case basis with the help of the Conventional Arms Transfer Policy (CAT Policy).

This document is the key guide to decision making on arms sales. The criteria laid down by the CAT Policy include, but are not limited to, consistency with U.S. regional stability interests; the impact of a proposed transfer on U.S. technological advantage; the degree to which the transfer supports U.S. strategic and foreign policy interests through increased access and influence; allied burden sharing, and interoperability; the human rights, terrorism and proliferation record of the recipient; the potential for misuse of the export in question; and finally the impact on U.S. industry and the defense industrial base.

As effective as the CAT is, the policy was written after the Cold War and was approved in 1995. So, it is due for an update. With the help of the interagency, we've been reviewing it with an eye towards producing a policy, which is more reflective of the current environment and the way we do business in the 21st century.

Beyond policy lies implementation. On this note, the continued partnership between the State Department and DoD is a key element to our success, in arms sales and across the field of security assistance. I would argue that the State-DoD relationship is the best it has been in a generation, if not longer.

We learned valuable lessons from an unprecedented transition from a military footprint to a civilian-led mission in Iraq, and we are now engaged in a similar level of cooperation in Afghanistan, where State Department civilians work side-by-side on a daily basis with their military counterparts. We have almost doubled the number of professionals exchanged between State and DoD, whether coming from State to DoD via the Policy Advisor's (POLAD) program, or from DoD to State in the form of detailees into the Department, of which there are now the most on record. I think we'd all agree that interoperability isn't just about the way we interact with foreign partners; it's about fine-tuning how we interact with each other.

Another example of this partnership is the Global Security Contingency Fund or GSCF. With the creation of the GSCF, we recognized that security challenges do not confine themselves to departmental jurisdictions, and that we must be agile enough to provide support to partner nations across bureaucratic boundaries. The GSCF allows the Departments of Defense and State to pool funds in an 80/20 ratio. It requires us to not only implement together, but to plan together - from day one. This could be a model for our security assistance going forward – recognizing we need a holistic approach to problems, and addressing them comprehensively.

I would add, however, that even though State-DoD cooperation is closer than ever – and nowhere is it closer than on arms sales – there is still the opportunity for improvement. Now it is time to step to the next level and work together to communicate and bring each other into initiatives earlier. That way we make sure that plans are developed jointly between us, once again, from day one. Such efforts will help us achieve our shared objectives by allowing us to identify potential challenges earlier so that we may work together as team to overcome them.

This leads me to a second aspect of our way forward, the process itself.

It has been asserted by some that our arms sales process is broken. Well, after a year in which 86,000 licenses for Direct Commercial Sales were reviewed, and in which Foreign Military Sales hit an all time dollar record, I would suggest that it's healthier than ever.

That's not to say there aren't complications. We have heard the calls from our foreign partners for more technology release, co-production opportunities, and advanced equipment to come, cheaper and faster. From our perspective, we'll continue to look for efficiencies in the arms sales process. However, these are complex systems and complex situations: we can hurry, and we will - but we must not rush.

We must also be wiser. An excellent example of this right now is my Bureau's work on the implementation of the President's Export Control Reform Initiative.

America's modern export control system was established in the 1960s, and had not undergone significant revision since the early 1990s, even as technology became more diffused around the world. The system was cumbersome and complex – not only for those in industry seeking to export items, but even for enforcement and licensing officials.

For the State Department, one of the most significant areas of focus has been the revision of the State-managed U.S. Munitions List (USML), to migrate items to the Department of Commerce's Commerce Control List (CCL). These revisions are necessary to allow us to shield the technologies and capabilities that truly do give us an edge, protecting national security more effectively while enabling a more reliable and predictable system for U.S. industry and exporters.

On April 16, State and Commerce published the first two – and the largest by dollar value – of the newly revised categories of the USML and CCL – aircraft and engines – and we will be continuing to work across the interagency and with Congress to publish the remaining categories in either proposed or final form by the end of this year.

Conclusion

In closing, I would acknowledge that there is much unfinished business in the area of security cooperation. At the State Department, we will continue to work hard to hone our policies to fit a rapidly changing international environment and our processes to achieve maximum efficiency.

April 30, 2013

We are acutely aware that at a time when the U.S. government is looking for cost-effective ways to achieve its strategic objectives at home and abroad, security cooperation with our allies and partners will continue to be a fundamental tenet of national security.

So let me conclude by thanking you all for the valuable work that you do in this field. I look forward to working with you and collaborating to advance our national security in an increasingly complex atmosphere. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
