

# U.S. EMBASSY JAKARTA-SPEAKER PROGRAM

## Sheldon W. Simon

April 2010

### Bio



"The energy, the faith, the devotion which we bring to this endeavor will light our country and all who serve it—and the glow from that fire can truly light the world."  
—John F. Kennedy



Sheldon Simon (Ph.D., University of Minnesota) is professor of international politics and a specialist on Asian international politics and U.S. national security at Arizona State University where he has been a member of the faculty since 1975. The author or editor of ten books and approximately 150 scholarly articles and book chapters, Professor Simon's most recent books are *Religion and Conflict in South and Southeast Asia: Disrupting Violence* (2007) and *China, the United States, and Southeast Asia: Contending Perspectives on Politics, Security, and Economics* (2008).

Dr. Simon consults regularly with the U.S. State and Defense Departments on Asian security issues and travels abroad annually for guest lectures. He has held faculty appointments at The George Washington University, the Universities of Hawaii, Kentucky, and British Columbia, Carleton University (Ottawa), The American Graduate School of International Management, and The Monterey Institute of International Studies where he occupied the Gordon Paul Smith Visiting Chair in International Politics. For the 2008-09 academic year, he was Visiting Asia Mentor Professor at The U.S. Naval War College.

Dr. Simon is the "U.S.-Southeast Asia" chapter author of the highly regarded *E-Journal Quarterly, Comparative Connections*, published by the Pacific Forum of The Center for Strategic and International Studies. Source: <http://www.asu.edu/clas/polisci/>

| Content:  |   |
|---|---|
| • U.S.-Indonesia Relations                                    | 1 |
| • Remarks Following a Meeting With President SBY in Singapore | 4 |
| • US-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership: Will It Work?       | 5 |
| • Indonesia: The Obama Effect                                 | 7 |
| • Other resources   | 9 |

## U.S. Foreign Policy towards Southeast Asia in the Obama Administration

### U.S.-Indonesia Relations

Source: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2748.htm#relations>

The United States has important economic, commercial, and security interests in Indonesia. It remains a linchpin of regional security due to its strategic location astride a number of key international maritime straits, particularly the Malacca Strait. Relations between Indonesia and the U.S. are positive and have advanced since the election of President Yudhoyono in October 2004. The U.S. played a role in

Indonesian independence in the late 1940s and appreciated Indonesia's role as an anti-communist bulwark during the Cold War. Cooperative relations are maintained today, although no formal security treaties bind the two countries. The United States and Indonesia share the common goal of maintaining peace, security, and stability in the region and engaging in a dialogue on threats to regional security. Cooperation between the U.S. and Indonesia on counterterrorism has increased steadily since 2002, as terrorist attacks in Bali (October 2002

## **U.S. Foreign Policy towards Southeast Asia in the Obama Administration**

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and October 2005), Jakarta (August 2003 and September 2004), and other regional locations demonstrated the presence of terrorist organizations, principally Jemaah Islamiyah, in Indonesia. The United States has welcomed Indonesia's contributions to regional security, especially its leading role in helping restore democracy in Cambodia and in mediating territorial disputes in the South China Sea. During Secretary's Clinton's visit to Indonesia in early 2009, she and Foreign Minister Wirajuda announced that the U.S. and Indonesia would begin discussions on developing a comprehensive partnership between the two countries.

The U.S. is committed to consolidating Indonesia's democratic transition and supports the territorial integrity of the country. Nonetheless, there are friction points in the bilateral political relationship. These conflicts have centered primarily on human rights, as well as on differences in foreign policy. The U.S. Congress cut off grant military training assistance through International Military Education and Training (IMET) to Indonesia in 1992 in response to a November 12, 1991, incident in East Timor when Indonesian security forces shot and killed East Timorese demonstrators. This restriction was partially lifted in 1995. Military assistance programs were again suspended, however, in the aftermath of the violence and destruction in East Timor following the August 30, 1999, referendum favoring independence.

Separately, the U.S. had urged the Indonesian Government to identify and bring to justice the perpetrators of the August 2002 ambush murders of two U.S. teachers near Timika in Papua province. In 2005, the Secretary of State certified that Indonesian cooperation in the murder investigation had met the conditions set by Congress, enabling the resumption of full IMET. Eight suspects were arrested in January 2006, and in November 2006 seven were convicted.

In November 2005, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, under authority delegated by the Secretary of State, exercised a National Security Waiver provision provided in the FY 2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (FOAA) to remove congressional restrictions on Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and lethal defense articles. These actions represented a reestablishment of normalized military relations, allowing the U.S. to provide greater support for Indonesian efforts to reform the military, increase its ability to respond to disasters and participate in global peacekeeping operations, and promote regional stability.

Under the terms of the FY 2008 FOAA, signed into law in December 2007, Congress did not reimpose restrictions. However, it prevented a portion of U.S. security assistance from being released before the Secretary of

State reported on the status of certain measures of military reform, of accountability for past human rights abuses, of public access to Papua, and of the investigation into the 2004 murder of a prominent human rights activist.

Regarding worker rights, Indonesia was the target of several petitions filed under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) legislation arguing that Indonesia did not meet internationally recognized labor standards. A formal GSP review was suspended in February 1994 without terminating GSP benefits for Indonesia. Since 1998, Indonesia has ratified all eight International Labor Organization core conventions on protecting internationally recognized worker rights and allowed trade unions to organize. However, enforcement of labor laws and protection of workers' rights remain inconsistent and weak in some areas. Indonesia's slow economic recovery has pushed more workers into the informal sector, which reduces legal protection and could create conditions for increases in child labor.

### **Development Assistance from the United States to Indonesia**

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and its predecessor agencies have provided development assistance to Indonesia since 1950. Initial assistance focused on the most urgent needs, including food aid, infrastructure rehabilitation, health care, and training. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, a time of great economic growth in Indonesia, USAID played a major role in helping the country achieve self-sufficiency in rice production and in reducing the birth-rate. Today, USAID assistance programs focus on basic and higher education, democratic and decentralized governance, economic growth, health, water, sanitation, and the environment. Future programs will place a greater emphasis on energy.

The United States was one of the lead donors in the reconstruction efforts in the tsunami-hit area of Aceh. Most of the U.S. tsunami relief program is complete, although our efforts toward the construction of the Aceh west coast highway continues. The U.S. will remain actively engaged in conflict prevention and resolution efforts in Aceh.

**Improving the Quality of Education:** In October 2003, President Bush announced a \$157 million Indonesia Education Initiative for 2004-2009 to improve the quality of education in Indonesia. This initiative is a cornerstone of the U.S. Government assistance program in Indonesia, directly responding to Indonesia's priorities and reflecting a joint Indonesia-U.S. commitment to revitalize education for the next generation of

## U.S. Foreign Policy towards Southeast Asia in the Obama Administration

Indonesia's leaders. Since the initiative began in 2005, more than 1,476 schools, 23,612 educators, and 345,983 students have benefited from the assistance to improve teaching and learning, education governance, community involvement in school management, and public-private alliances. The initiative has also sparked donor interest toward increased coordination and cooperation both at the national and field levels. By 2010, the program will promote ownership of new methods for delivering basic education assistance directly to the local level where it can be more effectively and accountably targeted. Programs include: the program will promote ownership of new methods for delivering basic education assistance directly to the local level where it can be more effectively and accountably targeted. Programs include:

- Decentralized Basic Education (DBE)
- Opportunities for Vulnerable Children
- Sesame Street Indonesia/Jalan Sesama
- Higher Education

### Effective Democracy and Decentralized

**Governance:** This objective aims to support democratic reforms by supporting effective and accountable local governance, addressing conflict and encouraging pluralism, and consolidating national-level democratic reforms.

- Mitigation of Conflict and Support for Peace
- Fighting Trafficking in Persons
- Justice Sector Reforms
- Legislative Strengthening
- Local Governance Strengthening and Decentralization Support
- Promoting Democratic Culture
- Elections and Political Process

**Tsunami Reconstruction:** The U.S. Government was one of the first donors to respond to the disaster. Through numerous grants to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations, and UN agencies, USAID has helped stabilize the humanitarian situation in Aceh, avert a public health crisis, and provide relief services to survivors.

- Rebuilding Shelter and Key Infrastructure
- Restoring Livelihoods
- Strengthening Capacity and Governance

### Economic Growth Strengthened and Employment

**Created:** Assistance to the Indonesian Government and private sector focuses on sustaining growth and creating jobs by improving the trade and investment climate, increasing competitiveness in key agribusiness and industry sectors, and enhancing the safety and soundness of the financial system. USAID is working with Indonesians to ensure that future generations enjoy an increasingly prosperous, democratic, and stable country.

- Trade and Investment Climate
- Agribusiness and Industry Competitiveness
- Financial Sector Safety and Soundness

### Improving the Quality of Basic Human Services:

The USAID Basic Human Services Office provides assistance to Indonesia through an integrated strategy that aims to improve the health of local communities through support for maternal and child health, disease surveillance and control, food and nutrition, and access to safe drinking water through better watershed management and water treatment.

- Environmental Services
- Orangutan Conservation Service program
- Health Services
- USAID's avian influenza (AI) program
- Food and Nutrition

### Principal U.S. Embassy Officials

Ambassador--Cameron R. Hume  
 Deputy Chief of Mission--Ted Osius  
 Minister-Counselor for Political and Economic Affairs--Peter D. Haas  
 Political Counselor--Darcy Zotter  
 Economic Counselor--Debra Juncker  
 Management Counselor--Michael C. Mullins  
 USAID Director--Walter E. North  
 Defense Attaché--COL Kevin E. Richards  
 Consul General--Jeffrey S. Tunis  
 Public Affairs Officer--Michael H. Anderson

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**U.S. Foreign Policy towards Southeast Asia in the Obama Administration**


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Commercial Counselor--Joseph B. Kaesshaefer  
 Department of Agriculture Office--Dennis Voboril  
 Regional Security Officer--Jeffrey D. Lischke  
 Office of Defense Cooperation--LTC James O. Robinson  
 Legal Attaché--(Acting) David C. Smith  
 Department of Justice Office--Gerald H. Heuett Jr.

The U.S. Embassy in Indonesia is located at Jalan Medan Merdeka Selatan 3-5, Jakarta (tel. (62-021) 3435-9000). U.S. mail to the Embassy may be addressed to FPO AP 96520.

**The U.S. Consulate General in Surabaya** is located at Jl. Dr. Sutomo 33, Surabaya, East Java (tel. (62-31) 568-2287).  
 Principal Officer--Caryn R. McClelland

**American Presence Post Medan** is located Uni Plaza Building 4th Floor, West Tower, Jl. Let. Jend. MT. Haryono A-1 Medan  
 Tel: (62-61) 451-9000  
 Principal Officer--Stanley Harsha

**The U.S. Consular Agency in Bali** is located at Jalan Hayam Wuruk 188, Bali (tel. (62-361) 233-605).

The State Department lifted its travel warning for Indonesia in May 2008 due to objective improvements in the security situation in the country.

For information on economic trends, commercial development, production, trade regulations, and tariff rates, contact the [www.trade.gov](http://www.trade.gov) U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, DC 20230.

For more details, please visit <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2748.htm#relations> or U.S. Embassy Jakarta website at <http://jakarta.usembassy.gov/>

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**Remarks Following a Meeting With President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia in Singapore**

Barack H Obama. Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents. Washington: Nov 15, 2009. pg. 1, 2 pgs

November 15, 2009

Source: <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD-200900919.pdf>

President Obama: Hello, everybody. I just wanted to make a brief statement about the wonderful relationship that I've been able to develop with President Yudhoyono. As many of you know, I have some historic ties to Indonesia, but I am also extraordinarily impressed with the progress that Indonesia has made in developing its democracy. I want to congratulate the President for his recent reelection, and he now has his Government in place.

Indonesia is not only regionally important, but as a member of the G-20, as one of the world's largest democracies, as one of the world's largest Islamic nations, it has enormous influence and really is, I think, a potential model for the kind of development strategies, democracy strategies, as well as interfaith strategies that are going to be so important moving forward.

We had a strong discussion about a range of issues and how we can create even better bilateral relations than we already have, a comprehensive agreement-comprehensive partnership agreement that we're developing that will cover things like education, working on clean energy issues, expanding the Peace Corps' presence in Indonesia, counterterrorism issues. These are all areas in which we intend to focus in the months and years to come.

We discussed some of the broader challenges of getting a meaningful Copenhagen agreement and continuing to stabilize the world economy and promoting growth, both through trade and investment and also through what has been discussed throughout the ASEAN summit, the idea of inclusive development and growth where it's not just at the top but is spread out among the population.

So I am very excited about our prospects for deepening relations in the future, and I want to make sure that

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## U.S. Foreign Policy towards Southeast Asia in the Obama Administration

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everybody knows that I intend to be visiting Indonesia next year. The invitation that's been extended to-by President Yudhoyono is one that I want to take up, and I'm hoping to be able to take Michelle and the girls as well so that they can take a look at some of my old haunting grounds. [Laughter]

And again, I want to thank you, Mr. President, for your leadership and your commitment to improving ties between the United States and Indonesia. Thank you very much.

President Yudhoyono: Thank you. Yes, President Obama and I had a very good discussion on wide range of issues of common interests. President Obama is a friend of Indonesia. He knows Indonesia very well, and he is well-respected in Indonesia.

In this meeting, I told President Obama that I really appreciate his fresh, new approach to the world, to many international issues, including his positive outreach to the Islamic world.

We also renewed our commitment to elevate our relation at higher level for comprehensive partnerships, and I welcome also the future cooperation between Indonesia and the United States in various fields such as trade and investment, education and technology, climate change, food and energy security, countering communicable diseases, and also counterterrorism and people-to-people contact.

And lastly, as has been shared by President Obama, I look forward to welcoming President Obama to Indonesia next year, and he will be warmly welcomed by the Indonesian people.

Thank you.

President Obama: Thank you so much.

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### US-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership: Will It Work?

January 28, 2010

By: Fabio Scarpello

Source: <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=5006>

Indonesia — Under the leadership of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, U.S.-Indonesia ties have progressively strengthened since he first took office in 2004. Yudhoyono earned a masters degree in the U.S. and has never hidden his liking for the States. So it came as no surprise when, in November 2008, the former general-turned-president called for a U.S.-Indonesia strategic partnership, later renamed a comprehensive partnership.

The move was in turn welcomed by U.S. President Barack Obama, who himself is sentimentally attached to the archipelagic nation where he spent a part of his childhood. soon after Obama's inauguration, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated the administration's commitment to work toward such a partnership, guided by a concrete agenda.

While the two leaders share a mutual fondness for each other's country, the partnership itself is based on rational foreign policy objectives, and is designed to frame U.S.-Indonesia bilateral relations for the next decade. As such, it is meant to cover issues of importance to both nations — including educational exchanges, trade and investment cooperation, climate change policy, food security and non-traditional security issues, such as the fight against terrorism, transnational drug syndicates and people smuggling, among others.

For Indonesia, the partnership is part of a broader initiative that has seen the country inking similar agreements with the major regional powers — China, India, South Korea and Japan — as well as with the European Union. It is also an attempt to move the bilateral agenda beyond the limited security issues that dominated Jakarta-Washington relations during the Bush administration.

For the U.S., on the other hand, closer ties with Indonesia, the world's largest majority-Muslim country and a key player in Southeast Asia, fit perfectly with Obama's outstretched hand towards the Islamic world as well as his administration's attempt to regain some

## U.S. Foreign Policy towards Southeast Asia in the Obama Administration

as well as his administration's attempt to regain some of the terrain the U.S. has lost to China in the region over the last few years.

Southeast Asia figures prominently in some of Washington's global preoccupations, including transnational crime, energy and food security, and climate change. It is therefore likely that Washington also sees the partnership with Indonesia as a means to channel its concerns, and desired solutions, for the region.

However, although the rationale to seal the deal is strong and the partnership is expected to be inked when Obama travels to Indonesia sometime during 2010, questions remain about whether it will have any real effect on the ground.

A key problem is Indonesia's capacity to follow up on agreements, which was recently highlighted once more by the desire, among some in Jakarta, to reassess the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, on the basis that it could negatively impact the country's manufacturing sector.

The trade deal, which took effect on Jan. 1, will scrap import duties on thousands of Chinese products, a fact that has led Indonesian industry groups to call for parts of the deal to be renegotiated. The Ministry of Industry initially submitted a letter to the coordinating economic minister in late December 2009 to request that scheduled tariff reductions on 146 products be delayed by one year.

This weekend, Trade Minister Mari Elka Pangestu ultimately declared that Indonesia would not seek to postpone the deal's implementation. Still, the China-ASEAN deal was signed in 2005, after years of negotiations and Jakarta's preliminary studies have shown a lack of depth that should also serve as a warning signal for Washington.

Another question mark is the level of participation of the various Indonesian and American constituencies targeted by the agreement. Obama and Yudhoyono will sign the partnership, but for it to have an impact, it needs the support, supervision and enthusiasm of large segments of the two countries' civil societies and political establishments.

Currently, Indonesia remains off the radar for U.S. civil society, while the U.S. Congress remains wary, due to sensitive issues such as Indonesia's efforts to reform its abuse-tainted army, the Tentara Nasional Indonesia.

In Indonesia, on the other hand, public opinion regarding the U.S. is split, with the Obama effect mitigating, but not eliminating, the reservations of those who see America as a neoliberal, imperialistic power. This segment of society, which partly coincides with radical Islamic groups, is very active and has a noticeable influence on the political discourse.

Some Indonesian lawmakers as well as senior members of the TNI also remain guarded about the U.S., who they accuse of being a volatile partner. The description refers mostly to Washington's decision to impose a ban on military-to-military relations after the TNI and its militias went on a rampage in the aftermath of East Timor's 1999 vote for independence.

Under the Bush administration, the U.S. lifted restrictions limiting military training and financing as well as weapons sales. But other restrictions remain, particularly regarding U.S. training of Kopassus, the notorious Indonesian special forces.

Moreover, while there seems to be a good chance of improving education-related exchanges — currently at a historic low, according to the United States-Indonesia Society — it is debatable whether the partnership will lead to any increase in bilateral trade and U.S. investment in Indonesia.

With regards to the latter, U.S. firms have traditionally been interested in Indonesia's natural resources, but that enthusiasm has lately been dampened by Jakarta's nationalistic approach. Despite Yudhoyono's commitment to an open economy, in fact, Indonesia remains cautious in matters of foreign ownership.

More broadly, U.S. investors have often been put off by Indonesia's high level of corruption, red tape and lack of infrastructure. The comprehensive partnership envisages U.S. support for Indonesia's drive towards good governance, but analysts agree that this is mostly an internal battle that must be fought by Jakarta, and which needs time to be won.

In the end, while most observers agree that the partnership is a step in the right direction, few are ready to celebrate it just yet.

Fabio Scarpello is the Southeast Asia correspondent for the Italian news agency Adnkronos International. He is based in Denpasar, Indonesia.

Photo: White House photo by Pete Souza

**U.S. Foreign Policy towards Southeast Asia in the Obama Administration**


**Indonesia: The Obama Effect**

by Richard Wike, Associate Director and Kathleen Holzwart Sprehe, Research Associate, Pew Global Attitudes Project  
 March 17, 2010

Source: <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1529/indonesian-views-america-image-president-obama-trip>

When President Barack Obama finally takes his twice-delayed trip to Indonesia, where he lived for several years as a child, he will visit a country where his personal popularity has dramatically transformed America's image. Of course, Indonesia is not alone in this pattern -- Obama's election led to better ratings for the United States in many nations around the globe. However, Indonesia -- the world's largest predominantly Muslim country -- is an outlier in the Muslim world, where opinions of the U.S. remain mostly negative.

**Volatile Ratings for the U.S.**




Over the last decade, Indonesian opinions about the U.S. have fluctuated considerably. A 2002 poll by the Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project found that roughly six-in-ten Indonesians (61%) had a favorable view of the U.S., while only 36% expressed an unfavorable view.

With the onset of the Iraq war, however, ratings for the U.S. turned sharply negative. In a 2003 Pew Global Attitudes survey taken shortly after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, only 15% of Indonesians had a positive view, while 83% voiced a negative opinion. America's image

rebounded somewhat in response to U.S. relief efforts following the December 2004 tsunami. A Pew Research survey in April-May 2005 found the percentage of Indonesians with a favorable opinion of the U.S. had risen to 38%.

It was not until the election of Barack Obama, however, that positive ratings for the U.S. returned to their pre-Iraq war level. A Pew Research survey conducted in May-June of 2009 found a dramatic improvement in America's overall image -- the percentage of Indonesians with a favorable opinion jumped from 37% in 2008 to 63% in 2009, while the percentage with an unfavorable view dropped from 53% to 30%.

The U.S. received especially high marks from young Indonesians -- 69% of those ages 18-29 expressed a positive view of the U.S., compared with smaller majorities of those ages 30-49 (60%) and over 50 (57%).



The 2009 poll revealed big improvements in America's image in many other nations as well, especially in Western Europe. Indeed, France and Germany were the only countries where overall ratings for the U.S. improved more than in Indonesia. But -- with the exception of Indonesia -- there was generally much less improvement in the predominantly Muslim nations surveyed.

Positive views of the U.S. became slightly more common in Lebanon, rising from 51% in 2008 to 55% in 2009. However, Lebanese attitudes toward the U.S. remained sharply divided along religious lines -- 90% of the country's Sunni Muslim population, 66% of Chris-

## U.S. Foreign Policy towards Southeast Asia in the Obama Administration

Positive views of the U.S. became slightly more common in Lebanon, rising from 51% in 2008 to 55% in 2009. However, Lebanese attitudes toward the U.S. remained sharply divided along religious lines -- 90% of the country's Sunni Muslim population, 66% of Christians and just 2% of the Shia community expressed a positive opinion of the U.S.

U.S. favorability also rose in Egypt (from 22% favorable to 27%) and Jordan (from 19% to 25%), although in both countries only about one-in-four respondents offered a positive assessment of the U.S. In Pakistan, the Palestinian territories, and Turkey there was essentially no change, and positive opinions about the U.S. remained rare.

### Positive Ratings for Obama ... and High Expectations

|               | Bush |      | Obama | Diff |
|---------------|------|------|-------|------|
|               | 2008 | 2009 | 2009  |      |
| % confident   | %    | %    | %     |      |
| Indonesia     | 23   | 71   | 71    | +48  |
| Egypt         | 11   | 42   | 42    | +31  |
| Turkey        | 2    | 33   | 33    | +31  |
| Jordan        | 7    | 31   | 31    | +24  |
| Palest. ter.* | 8    | 23   | 23    | +15  |
| Lebanon       | 33   | 46   | 46    | +13  |
| Pakistan      | 7    | 13   | 13    | +6   |

\*Bush confidence from 2007.

Obama has a unique relationship with Indonesia, since the future American president lived in its capital city Jakarta from ages six to ten. And overwhelmingly, Indonesians are aware of this special relationship -- 79% said they were aware that he once lived there as a child.

As was the case in nearly all of the 25 countries included in the 2009 Pew Global Attitudes poll, Indonesians gave Obama considerably higher marks than they had given his predecessor, George W. Bush. Roughly seven-in-ten (71%) expressed confidence in Obama to do the right thing in world affairs, while only 23% had felt this way about Bush in 2008.

Among the other predominantly Muslim nations surveyed, there was far less enthusiasm for the new president. For example, just 42% of Egyptians, 33% of Turks and 31% of Jordanians expressed confidence in Obama. However, even in Muslim nations where his ratings tend to be negative, Obama was consistently more popular than Bush.

Indonesians not only expressed general confidence in President Obama; they also had high expectations for how he will approach international policymaking. More than six-in-ten (62%) said that Obama will consider the interests of Indonesia when making foreign policy decisions. Most (54%) also believed he will be fair in dealing with an issue that is a major challenge for America's image among Muslim publics: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

However, confidence in Obama did not translate into support for all of his policies. While most Indonesians approved of his proposals to close the American military prison at Guantanamo Bay (66%) and to withdraw troops from Iraq by 2011 (75%), Obama's Afghanistan policy is generally unpopular. Two-thirds of Indonesians (66%) said the U.S. and NATO should remove their troops from Afghanistan.

### LINKS TO U.S. FOREIGN POLICY/PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WEBSITES

White House

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy>

State Department

<http://www.state.gov/>

U.S. Foreign Policy, American Life and Culture

<http://www.america.gov/>

U.S. Agency for International Development

<http://indonesia.usaid.gov/en/home/>

Foreign Policy/Diplomacy Archive

<http://www.archives.gov/research/alic/reference/foreign-affairs.html>

U.S. Embassy Jakarta

<http://jakarta.usembassy.gov/>

**U.S. Foreign Policy towards Southeast Asia in the Obama Administration**

**More Resources**

**The United States and Asia in 2009: Public Diplomacy and Strategic Continuity**

François Godement. Asian Survey. Berkeley: Jan/Feb 2010. Vol. 50, Iss. 1; pg. 8, 17 pgs

Abstract (Summary)

In crafting an Asia policy during the first year of his presidency, Obama has faced the dilemma of continuing much of his predecessor's policies while answering public expectations for change. A military surge in Afghanistan after a long debate, an attempt to enhance strategic cooperation with China, a disappointing result for climate change policies, a better disposition toward regional organizations, and a growing concern with the course of Japan's alliance policy have been the main threads of a deeply pragmatic approach. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

**Systemic Neglect? A Reconsideration of US-Southeast Asia Policy1**

Alice Ba. Contemporary Southeast Asia. Singapore: Dec 2009. Vol. 31, Iss. 3; pg. 369, 30 pgs

Abstract (Summary)

This article examines contemporary US-Southeast Asia relations as the product of both longstanding forces and a transitioning regional system. First, it highlights systemic forces behind some of the more enduring features and challenges of US-Southeast Asia policy and relations during the presidency of George W. Bush. Systemic forces highlighted include not just the structural-power dynamics that preoccupy International Relations students, but also the interplay of domestic politics, geography and history. It discloses that the key differences between Bush and his predecessors were more of degree and diplomacy than of substance. Bilateralism, sentimental idealism, and a general reactivity characterized Bush policy, much as it did his predecessors, but Bush diplomacy and policy extremes may account for the more negative regional reception to his policies. Second, in describing a regional system in transition, it highlights adaptations and adjustments on both sides that are creating a regional system that is less US-centric practically and conceptually. It argues that these changes may ultimately prove healthy for both a global power with limited attention and more constrained resources as well as its Southeast Asian partners concerned about autonomy and overdepend-

ence. Nevertheless, these changes call for a recalibration of US-Southeast Asia policy and approach in recognition of the region's changing politics. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

**Global Perceptions of U.S. Leadership Improve in 2009**


A world median of 51% approves of the leadership of the U.S.

by Cynthia English

Source: <http://www.gallup.com/poll/125720/Global-Perceptions-Leadership-Improve-2009.aspx>

Perceptions of U.S. leadership are more divided in Asia than in any other region. In 2009, a median of more than one-third (38%) say they approve, while 29% disapproved. Pakistanis express the lowest approval of U.S. leadership, at 9%, followed by 14% approval in Iraq, 15% in Syria, and 17% in Vietnam. Approval was highest in Singapore (68%), Japan (66%), Cambodia (64%), Turkmenistan (61%), and Israel (61%).

*Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of the United States?*



GALLUP

Among the Group of Twenty (G-20) members, approval of U.S. leadership changed significantly in 16 of 17 countries where Gallup collected data before and after the Obama administration took office early last year. In 15 of these countries, approval ratings increased substantially, with increases of 39 points or more in Canada, France, and the United Kingdom. Although sentiment improved significantly in Turkey and Saudi Arabia from 2008 to 2009, majorities in these two countries still disapprove of the job performance of U.S. leadership.

## U.S. Foreign Policy towards Southeast Asia in the Obama Administration

*Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of the United States?*

G-20 members (2009 data)

| Country              | Approve | Disapprove | Don't know/<br>Refused | Approval<br>difference from<br>2008 |
|----------------------|---------|------------|------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| South Africa         | 87%     | 10%        | 2%                     | 4                                   |
| Japan                | 66%     | 18%        | 15%                    | 36                                  |
| United Kingdom       | 64%     | 12%        | 25%                    | 41                                  |
| Canada               | 63%     | 27%        | 10%                    | 41                                  |
| South Korea          | 58%     | 21%        | 21%                    | 17                                  |
| Germany              | 57%     | 30%        | 13%                    | 36                                  |
| United States        | 55%     | 42%        | 3%                     | 26                                  |
| Mexico               | 53%     | 24%        | 24%                    | 29                                  |
| France               | 52%     | 14%        | 34%                    | 39                                  |
| Italy                | 49%     | 6%         | 45%                    | 30                                  |
| Brazil               | 48%     | 23%        | 29%                    | 25                                  |
| Argentina            | 42%     | 26%        | 32%                    | 31                                  |
| Indonesia            | 35%     | 23%        | 41%                    | -11                                 |
| India                | 26%     | 13%        | 61%                    | -5                                  |
| Saudi Arabia         | 26%     | 63%        | 11%                    | 13                                  |
| Australia*           | 25%     | 63%        | 12%                    | -                                   |
| Turkey               | 22%     | 61%        | 16%                    | 6                                   |
| Russia               | 20%     | 34%        | 47%                    | 6                                   |
| China**              | -       | -          | -                      | -                                   |
| European<br>Union*** | -       | -          | -                      | -                                   |

Due to rounding, not all rows will add to 100%.

\*Data last collected in 2008.

\*\*Item not asked in China.

\*\*\*Data not collected in all EU countries in 2009.

- Data for this item not collected in 2008.

### GALLUP

To see all countries worldwide for which 2009 U.S. approval data are available, see the updated map and table on the World Citizens' Views on U.S. Leadership, Pre- and Post-Obama page at <http://www.gallup.com/poll/121991/World-Citizens-Views-Leadership-Pre-Post-Obama.aspx>

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