



Foreign Policy -- Defense -- Documents on the web -- August 2010

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS:

The White House: Remarks by the President

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT AT IFTAR DINNER

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. State Dining Room. August 13, 2010.
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/08/13/remarks-president-iftar-dinner-0>

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT AT DISABLED VETERANS OF AMERICA CONFERENCE IN ATLANTA, GEORGIA

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Hyatt Regency Hotel, Atlanta, Georgia. August 2, 2010.
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-disabled-veterans-america-conference-atlanta-georgia>

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT OBAMA AND PRIME MINISTER CAMERON OF THE UNITED KINGDOM IN JOINT PRESS AVAILABILITY

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. East Room. July 20, 2010.
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-cameron-united-kingdom-joint-press-avail>

BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ON AL SHABAAB TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Via Conference Call. July 14, 2010.
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/background-briefing-senior-administration-officials-al-shabaab-terrorist-organizati>

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT OBAMA AND PRESIDENT FERNANDEZ OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC IN JOINT PRESS AVAILABILITY

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Oval Office. July 12, 2010.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-president-fernandez-dominican-republic-joint-press-avail>

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE U.S.-EUROPEAN UNION AGREEMENT ON THE TERRORIST FINANCE TRACKING PROGRAM (TFTP)

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. July 8, 2010.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-us-european-union-agreement-terrorist-finance-tracking-program>

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT OBAMA AND PRIME MINISTER NETANYAHU OF ISRAEL IN JOINT PRESS AVAILABILITY

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Oval Office. July 6, 2010.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-netanyahu-israel-joint-press-availabilit>

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT AT SIGNING OF THE IRAN SANCTIONS ACT

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. East Room. July 1, 2010.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-signing-iran-sanctions-act>

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT OBAMA AND HIS MAJESTY KING ABDULLAH OF SAUDI ARABIA BEFORE MEETING

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Oval Office. June 29, 2010.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-his-majesty-king-abdullah-saudi-arabia-meeting>

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT OBAMA AND PRIME MINISTER KAN OF JAPAN AFTER BILATERAL MEETING

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Toronto Convention Center, Toronto, Canada. June 27, 2010.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-kan-japan-after-bilateral-meeting>

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT OBAMA AT G-20 PRESS CONFERENCE IN TORONTO, CANADA

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Toronto Convention Center, Toronto, Canada. June 27, 2010.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-g-20-press-conference-toronto-canada>

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT OBAMA AND PRIME MINISTER SINGH OF INDIA BEFORE BILATERAL MEETING

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Toronto Convention Center, Toronto, Canada. June 27, 2010.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-singh-india-bilateral-meeting>

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT OBAMA AND PRESIDENT HU JINTAO OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA BEFORE BILATERAL MEETING

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Toronto Convention Center, Toronto, Canada. June 26, 2010.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-president-hu-jintao-peoples-republic-china-bilateral-meeting>

Department of State: Remarks by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton

BRIEFING ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

By Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State; George Mitchell, Special Envoy for Middle East Peace. Washington, DC. August 20, 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/08/146156.htm>

ANNOUNCING THE PAKISTAN RELIEF FUND

By Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State. Washington, DC. August 19, 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/08/146093.htm>

REMARKS ON FLOODING IN PAKISTAN

By Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State. UN Headquarters, New York City. August 19, 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/08/146110.htm>

UPDATE: U.S. RESPONSE TO PAKISTAN'S FLOODING DISASTER

Office of the Spokesman. Washington, DC. August 17, 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/08/146049.htm>

BRIEFING BY U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ CHRISTOPHER R. HILL

Christopher R. Hill, Ambassador to Iraq. Washington, DC. August 17, 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/146037.htm>

SECURITY SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

Philip J. Crowley, Assistant Secretary. Daily Press Briefing. Washington, DC. August 16, 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2010/08/146001.htm>

PERSECUTION OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN IRAN

By Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State. Washington, DC. August 12, 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/08/145953.htm>

NEW START TREATY RATIFICATION

By Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State; Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation; Richard Verma, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Legislative Affairs. Treaty Room, Washington, DC. August 11, 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/08/145879.htm>

RAMADAN MESSAGE

By Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State. Washington, DC. August 11, 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/08/145916.htm>

URGING IRAN TO RESPECT THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS OF ITS CITIZENS

By Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State. Washington, DC. August 10, 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/08/145857.htm>

RELIEF WORKERS KILLED IN AFGHANISTAN

By Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State. Treaty Room, Washington, DC. August 9, 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/08/145820.htm>

KILLING OF MEDICAL AID WORKERS IN AFGHANISTAN

By Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State. Washington, DC. August 8, 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/08/145782.htm>

REMARKS WITH NIGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HENRY ODEIN AJUMOGOBIA

By Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State. Washington, DC. August 5, 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/08/145738.htm>

REMARKS ON THE FLOODING IN PAKISTAN

By Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State. Treaty Room, Washington, DC. August 4, 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/08/145686.htm>

EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN IRAN SANCTIONS

By Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State; Secretary of the Treasury Timothy F. Geithner. Washington, DC. July 26, 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/145147.htm>

FIRM SUPPORT OF THE DEFENSE OF SOUTH KOREA (AP SOUNDBITE)

By Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State. Press Availability During ASEAN Ministerial. Hanoi, Vietnam. July 23, 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/145111.htm>

CELEBRATION OF THE 15TH ANNIVERSARY OF UNITED STATES-VIETNAM RELATIONS

By Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State. Hanoi, Vietnam. July 22, 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/145064.htm>

INTERVENTION AT KABUL CONFERENCE

By Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State. Kabul, Afghanistan. July 20, 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/144961.htm>

OPENING REMARKS AT U.S.-PAKISTAN STRATEGIC DIALOGUE

By Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State. Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi. Foreign Ministry, Islamabad, , Pakistan. July 19, 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/144827.htm>

REMARKS WITH PAKISTANI FOREIGN MINISTER SHAH MEHMOOD QURESHI FOLLOWING THE U.S.-PAKISTAN STRATEGIC DIALOGUE

By Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State. Foreign Ministry, Islamabad, Pakistan. July 19, 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/144858.htm>

TELEVISION ROUNDTABLE WITH PAKISTANI JOURNALISTS

By Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State. Pakistani National Council of the Arts. Islamabad, Pakistan. July 19, 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/145009.htm>

REMARKS WITH IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER HOSHYAR ZEBARI AFTER THEIR MEETING

By Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State. Treaty Room, Washington, DC. July 13, 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/144515.htm>

**REMARKS TO MEMBERS OF THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE NEW START NEGOTIATIONS
AND NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW DEPARTMENT STAFF**

By Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State; Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security; Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation. Dean Acheson Auditorium, Washington, DC. July 13, 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/144577.htm>

JOINT PRESS AVAILABILITY WITH GEORGIAN PRESIDENT SAKASHVILI

By Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State. Presidential Palace, Tbilisi, Georgia. July 5, 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/143973.htm>

**“CIVIL SOCIETY: SUPPORTING DEMOCRACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY,” AT THE COMMUNITY
OF DEMOCRACIES**

By Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State. Slowacki Theater, Krakow, Poland. July 3, 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/143952.htm>

**U.S.-POLAND BILATERAL MISSILE DEFENSE SIGNING AND JOINT PRESS AVAILABILITY WITH
POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER SIKORSKI**

By Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State. City Hall, Krakow, Poland. July 3, 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/143948.htm>

INTERVIEW WITH SAVIK SHUSTER OF TRK UKRAINA

By Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State. Kyiv, Ukraine. July 2, 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/144057.htm>

REMARKS AT THE CLOSING OF THE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP COMMISSION

By Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State. Kyiv, Ukraine. July 2, 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/143934.htm>

REMARKS WITH UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT VIKTOR YANUKOVYCH

By Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State. Kyiv, Ukraine. July 2, 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/143924.htm>

REMARKS WITH UKRAINIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KOSTYANTYN GRYSHCHENKO

By Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State. Kyiv, Ukraine. July 2, 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/143933.htm>

Department of Defense

SECRETARY GATES ANNOUNCES REFORM PLANS

DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates from the Pentagon. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). August 9, 2010.

<http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4669>

Key U.S. Government Reports

COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2009

Department of State. August 5, 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/index.htm>

U.S. law requires the Secretary of State to provide Congress, by April 30 of each year, a full and complete report on terrorism with regard to those countries and groups meeting criteria set forth in the legislation. This annual report is entitled Country Reports on Terrorism. Beginning with the report for 2004, it replaced the previously published Patterns of Global Terrorism.

TO WALK THE EARTH IN SAFETY: THE UNITED STATES' COMMITMENT TO CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

Annual Report, U.S. Department of State. July 2010. 60 pages.

<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/145116.pdf>

Explosive remnants of war (ERW), at-risk small arms and light weapons (SA/LW), including man-portable air-defense systems (MANPAD S), and unsecure or unstable conventional munitions pose both a national security threat and a humanitarian threat. The Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the Department of State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM /WRA) addresses these hazards comprehensively through its Conventional Weapons Destruction Program.

IRAN SANCTIONS: NEW ACT UNDERSCORES IMPORTANCE OF COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT OF SANCTIONS' EFFECTIVENESS

U.S. Government Accountability Office. Testimony Before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives. July 29, 2010. 14 pages.

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10928t.pdf>

This testimony discusses the GAO's work on the implementation of U.S. sanctions against Iran, the continuing challenges the United States faces and how the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (signed into law on July 1, 2010)

addresses these challenges. This testimony is drawn from prior GAO work related to sanctions against Iran.

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT: DOD'S ABILITY TO MEET FUTURE REQUIREMENTS IS UNCERTAIN, WITH KEY ANALYSES NEEDED TO INFORM UPCOMING INVESTMENT DECISIONS

U.S. Government Accountability Office. Report to the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives. July 29, 2010. 80 pages.

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10789.pdf>

From 2011 through 2015, DOD plans to spend over \$336 billion to operate, maintain, modernize, and recapitalize its tactical air forces. Since DOD projects tactical aircraft inventory shortfalls over the next 15 years, it must effectively balance resources between an increasingly expensive Joint Strike Fighter program and the need to keep its legacy aircraft viable. GAO was asked to assess DOD's tactical aircraft requirements, the extent to which plans for upgrading and retiring legacy aircraft and acquiring new aircraft are likely to meet the requirements, and how changes in strategic plans and threat assessments have affected requirements. GAO analyzed tactical aircraft requirement and inventory data, key plans and threat assessments.

DEFENSE MANAGEMENT: IMPROVED PLANNING, TRAINING, AND INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION COULD STRENGTHEN DOD'S EFFORTS IN AFRICA

U.S. Government Accountability Office. Report to the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives. July 28, 2010. 68 pages.

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10794.pdf>

When the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) became fully operational in 2008, it inherited well over 100 activities, missions, programs, and exercises from other Department of Defense (DOD) organizations. AFRICOM initially conducted these inherited activities with little change. However, as AFRICOM has matured, it has begun planning and prioritizing activities with its four military service components, special operations command, and task force. For this report, GAO was asked to assess AFRICOM in five areas with respect to activity planning and implementation. To do so, GAO analyzed DOD and AFRICOM guidance; observed portions of AFRICOM activities; interviewed officials in Europe and Africa; and obtained perspectives from interagency officials, including those at 22 U.S. embassies in Africa.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO IMPROVE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT

U.S. Government Accountability Office. Report to Congressional Committees. July 26, 2010. 48 pages.

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10695.pdf>

Major defense acquisition programs are used to acquire, modernize, or extend the service life of the Department of Defense's most expensive assets, primarily military equipment. The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-23), section 304(b), directed

us to perform a review of weaknesses in DOD's operations that affect the reliability of financial information for assets acquired through MDAP. To do so, GAO identified and reviewed previously reported weaknesses that impair DOD's ability to provide reliable cost information for military equipment acquired through MDAPs, and determined what actions DOD has taken to address them. GAO searched databases of audit reports issued during calendar years 2005 through 2009 to identify previously reported weaknesses. Using applicable criteria, GAO assessed whether the actions taken by DOD adequately addressed these weaknesses.

DRUG CONTROL: INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS FACE SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES REDUCING THE SUPPLY OF ILLEGAL DRUGS BUT SUPPORT BROAD U.S. FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

U.S. Government Accountability Office. Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Domestic Policy, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives. July 21, 2010. 23 pages.

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10921t.pdf>

The overall goal of the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy, prepared by the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy is to reduce illicit drug use in the United States. GAO has issued more than 20 products since 2000 examining U.S.-funded international programs aimed at reducing the supply of drugs. These programs have been implemented primarily in drug source countries, such as Colombia and Afghanistan as well drug transit countries, such as Mexico, Guatemala, and Venezuela. They have included interdiction of maritime drug shipments on the high seas, support for foreign military and civilian institutions engaged in drug eradication, detection, and interdiction; and rule of law assistance aimed at helping foreign legal institutions investigate and prosecute drug trafficking, money laundering, and other drug-related crimes.

ENGAGING FOREIGN AUDIENCES: ASSESSMENT OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PLATFORMS COULD HELP IMPROVE STATE DEPARTMENT PLANS TO EXPAND ENGAGEMENT

U.S. Government Accountability Office. Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. July 21, 2010. 48 pages.

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10767.pdf>

Following budget cuts and attacks against U.S. embassies in the 1990s, the Department of State began to close some public diplomacy facilities, such as American libraries, and move others onto secure embassy compounds. As a result, the number of visitors to these facilities declined and face-to-face interaction with foreign publics became more difficult. To improve its engagement with foreign audiences, State's new public diplomacy strategic framework calls for expanding outreach platforms. GAO analyzed State's public diplomacy framework and planning documents; interviewed State officials; and conducted fieldwork in Brazil, China, and Indonesia.

MILITARY TRAINING: ARMY AND MARINE CORPS FACE CHALLENGES TO ADDRESS PROJECTED FUTURE REQUIREMENTS

U.S. Government Accountability Office. Report to Congressional Committees. July 16, 2010. 42 pages.

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10720.pdf>

The Army's and Marine Corps' major training facilities have focused on training units for counterinsurgency missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. As troop levels decrease in Iraq and increase in Afghanistan, larger numbers of forces will be training for Afghanistan. To meet future requirements, the services plan to adjust training to train forces on a fuller range of missions. The House report to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 directed GAO to report on any challenges the Department of Defense faces as it adjusts training capacities.

AFGHANISTAN DEVELOPMENT: USAID CONTINUES TO FACE CHALLENGES IN MANAGING AND OVERSEEING U.S. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

U.S. Government Accountability Office. Testimony Before the Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Committee on Appropriations. July 15, 2010. 17 pages.

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10932t.pdf>

This testimony discusses oversight of U.S. assistance programs in Afghanistan. Strengthening the Afghan economy through development assistance efforts is critical to the counterinsurgency strategy and a key part of the U.S Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Afghanistan. Over the course of this work, the authors have identified improvements that were needed, as well as many obstacles that have affected success and should be considered in program management and oversight. While drawing on past work relating to U.S. development efforts in Afghanistan, this testimony focuses on findings in GAO's most recent report released yesterday on the USAID's management and oversight of its agricultural programs in Afghanistan.

OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS: COMPARISON OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS FUNDING REQUESTS FOR FISCAL YEARS 2010 AND 2011

U.S. Government Accountability Office. Report to Congressional Committees. July 6, 2010. 23 pages.

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10889r.pdf>

Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Department of Defense has been engaged in domestic and overseas military operations in support of overseas contingency operations (OCO). Obtaining an accurate picture of OCO costs is of critical importance given the need to evaluate trade-offs and make more effective use of defense dollars in light of the nation's long-term fiscal challenges. In February 2009, the Office of Management and Budget in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense developed new guidance for use when constructing the initial fiscal year 2010 OCO funding request that more narrowly defined what should be considered an OCO funding need. The guidance remained in effect for building the fiscal year 2010 OCO supplemental request and the fiscal year 2011 OCO budget request.

CYBERSPACE: UNITED STATES FACES CHALLENGES IN ADDRESSING GLOBAL CYBERSECURITY AND GOVERNANCE

U.S. Government Accountability Office. Report to Congressional Requesters. July 2, 2010. 53 pages.

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10606.pdf>

Recent foreign-based intrusions on the computer systems of U.S. federal agencies and commercial companies highlight the vulnerabilities of the interconnected networks that comprise the Internet, as well as the need to adequately address the global security and governance of cyberspace. Federal law and policy give a number of federal entities responsibilities for representing U.S. cyberspace interests abroad, in collaboration with the private sector. GAO was asked to identify significant entities and efforts addressing global cyberspace security and governance issues, U.S. entities responsible for addressing these issues and the extent of their involvement at the international level, and challenges to effective U.S. involvement in global cyberspace security and governance efforts.

Congressional Research Service

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SUDAN: THE CRISIS IN DARFUR AND STATUS OF THE NORTH-SOUTH PEACE AGREEMENT

By Ted Dagne. Congressional Research Service. August 5, 2010. 34 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/146412.pdf>

SECURITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN PAKISTAN

By Bruce Vaughn, Nicole T. Carter, Pervaze A. Sheikh, Renée Johnson. Congressional Research Service. August 3, 2010. 21 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/146411.pdf>

IRAN: U.S. CONCERNS AND POLICY RESPONSES

By Kenneth Katzman. Congressional Research Service. July 23, 2010. 69 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/145574.pdf>

AFGHANISTAN: POST-TALIBAN GOVERNANCE, SECURITY, AND U.S. POLICY

By Kenneth Katzman. Congressional Research Service. July 21, 2010. 102 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/145575.pdf>

PROJECT BIOSHIELD: AUTHORITIES, APPROPRIATIONS, ACQUISITIONS, AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS

By Frank Gottron. Congressional Research Service. July 7, 2010. 17 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/145573.pdf>

U.S.-CHINA MILITARY CONTACTS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS

By Shirley A. Kan. Congressional Research Service. July 6, 2010. 64 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/145572.pdf>

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

By Moshe Schwartz. Congressional Research Service. July 2, 2010. 29 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/145569.pdf>

NAVY SHIP NAMES: BACKGROUND FOR CONGRESS

By Ronald O'Rourke. Congressional Research Service. July 2, 2010. 18 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/145571.pdf>

STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED PROGRAMS: FY2011 BUDGET AND APPROPRIATIONS

By Marian Leonardo Lawson, Susan B. Epstein, Kennon H. Nakamura. Congressional Research Service. July 2, 2010. 32 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/145567.pdf>

TAIWAN: MAJOR U.S. ARMS SALES SINCE 1990

By Shirley A. Kan. Congressional Research Service. July 2, 2010. 68 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/145570.pdf>

IRAQ: POLITICS, ELECTIONS, AND BENCHMARKS

By Kenneth Katzman. Congressional Research Service. July 1, 2010. 26 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/145562.pdf>

NAVY AEGIS BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE (BMD) PROGRAM: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS

By Ronald O'Rourke. Congressional Research Service. July 1, 2010. 65 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/145561.pdf>

THINK TANKS AND RESEARCH CENTERS:

The opinions expressed in these publications do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Government

AFGHANISTAN – PAKISTAN

CONFLICTING OBJECTIVES FOR U.S. IN AFGHANISTAN

Council on Foreign Relations interview with Col. Gian P. Gentile. August 17, 2010.

http://www.cfr.org/publication/22808/conflicting_objectives_for_us_in_afghanistan.html

General David H. Petraeus, in his first extended public interviews as chief U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, made news over the weekend when he argued against a hasty withdrawal of U.S. troops in July 2011 and expressed optimism that an achievement of the U.S. objectives there is possible. But Colonel Gian P. Gentile, a visiting CFR fellow who heads West Point's military history program, says there is a mismatch between U.S. President Barack Obama's limited political objectives in Afghanistan, which could be accomplished in some eighteen months, and the U.S. military's "operational objectives."

HOLBROOKE: PAKISTAN AID INADEQUATE

Council on Foreign Relations' Interview with Richard Holbrooke, U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. August 11, 2010.

http://www.cfr.org/publication/22794/holbrooke.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fby_type%2Finterview

Deadly floods in Pakistan have killed more than 1,600 people, according to the United Nations, and affected nearly fourteen million. The UN launched a fresh appeal on August 11 for \$459 million (BBC), and international relief agencies warn many more people are at risk without additional aid. The international response to Pakistan's latest crisis has been inadequate so far, says Richard C. Holbrooke, U.S. special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

THE NEED FOR PUBLIC TRANSPARENCY AND INTEGRITY: THE REAL MEANING OF THE LEAKS ON THE AFGHAN CONFLICT

By Anthony H. Cordesman. Center for Strategic and International Studies. August 2, 2010.

<http://csis.org/publication/need-public-transparency-and-integrity>

So far, the main impact of the Wikileaks release of some 90,000 classified documents on Afghanistan has been a fruitless search for new headlines and some form of "smoking gun" that reveals a secret no one has known in the past. The net result has been an almost relentless effort to spin largely historical documents into the kind of revelations they don't provide. Efforts that have been fueled by Wikileaks relentless search for publicity and charges of concealed civilian casualties and "war crimes" that are both irresponsible and ignore years of prior reporting on the subject. So what is the real meaning of these documents?

AFGHAN AND IRAQI METRICS AND THE IED THREAT

By Anthony H. Cordesman, Vivek Kocharlakota, Jason Lemieux. Center for Strategic and International Studies. July 26, 2010.

http://csis.org/files/publication/100722_ied_iraq_afghan.pdf

The JIEDDO recently issued updated information on the IED threat in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Burke Chair has prepared short analyses of the trends in the data for both Iraq and Afghanistan. The first study covers Iraq and is entitled IED Metrics for Iraq January 2004-May 2010. The second study covers Afghanistan and is entitled IED Metrics for Afghanistan January 2004-May 2010. The combined version of both studies is entitled Afghan and Iraqi Metrics and the IED Threat in Afghanistan.

THE FALLOUT OF THE AFGHANISTAN FILES

By Micah Zenko. The Council on Foreign Relations. July 26, 2010.

http://www.cfr.org/publication/22705/fallout_of_the_afghanistan_files.html

While the sheer volume of Wikileaks' secret U.S. military documents from 2004 to 2009 is staggering, the information contained therein is well-known. Instead, what these reports convey are specific and vivid snapshots of issues already apparent to any engaged follower of the war in Afghanistan.

REFOCUSING AFGHAN METRICS ON KEY LOCAL AREAS AND POPULATION CENTERS

By Anthony H. Cordesman. Center for Strategic and International Studies. July 22, 2010. 10 pages.

http://csis.org/files/publication/100722_AfghanOperMetrics.final.pdf

It is useful to have a broad set of measures at the national level, but this is not where the war will be fought, or how either military or civil operations should be judged.

Counterinsurgency is inherently local, and this is particularly true in a country with as many tribal, ethnic, sectarian, and geographic divisions as Afghanistan -- and Pakistan. This brief details what is needed to reform Afghan metrics.

PAKISTAN'S GAMBIT IN AFGHANISTAN

By Daniel Markey, Bernard Gwertzman. The Council on Foreign Relations. June 30, 2010.

http://www.cfr.org/publication/22567/pakistans_gambit_in_afghanistan.html

The recent replacement of General Stanley McChrystal, the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, has led to increased criticism of the war in Afghanistan and concerns about whether the White House is looking for an exit strategy. There's also a sense that Afghans are losing confidence in the allied operations, and Pakistan is looking to "exploit that advantage."

COULD THE TALIBAN TAKE OVER PAKISTAN'S PUNJAB PROVINCE?

By Ahmad Majidiyar. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. June 2010.

<http://www.aei.org/outlook/100967>

While Washington and Islamabad have directed considerable attention and resources to fighting terrorism in Pakistan's tribal areas, rising militant activity and growing Taliban and al Qaeda influence in the country's most populous province of Punjab have been largely ignored. Under increasing pressure from U.S. drone attacks and the Pakistani Army's continuing offensives in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the Taliban and al Qaeda are looking to Pakistan's political and military heartland for refuge, revenge, and new

alliances. Banned Punjabi terrorist groups are operating freely across the province and have deepened ties with the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and al Qaeda. Although Punjab is not in imminent danger of a Taliban takeover, the growth of terrorist activity in the region, if unchecked, could have serious consequences for Pakistan's stability, the war in Afghanistan, India-Pakistan relations, and international terrorism.

AFRICA

NIGERIA'S MULTIFACTED PROBLEMS CHALLENGE U.S. POLICY

By Andrew Sweet, Michael Werz. Center for American Progress. August 5, 2010.

http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/08/nigeria_problems.html

Nigeria's quickly changing demographics are playing host to challenges ranging from environmental degradation to internal conflict, according to the authors.

ASIA

THE MANAS BASE AND CHALLENGES TO THE U.S. PRESENCE IN KYRGYZSTAN

By Ariel Cohen. The Heritage Foundation. July 27, 2010.

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/07/The-Manas-Base-and-Challenges-to-the-US-Presence-in-Kyrgyzstan>

The United States and governments of Central Asia have a critical common interest in denying Russia increased presence and influence in the region, as well as denying terrorists and drug lords sanctuaries in Central Asia. This has to come as part of a comprehensive, long-term strategy.

DEFENSE

THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF A STRONG NATIONAL DEFENSE

The Heritage Foundation. August 17, 2010.

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/08/The-Building-Blocks-of-a-Strong-National-Defense>

Today, every branch of America's active duty military forces, as well as the National Guard and Reserves, are strained by the high level of operations that began in the 1990s. Despite the procurement holiday and dramatic defense budget cuts of the 1990s and the increasing investments since 2001, the demands on the U.S. forces are shortchanging their preparedness. Their wartime footing in Iraq and Afghanistan and the multi-theater war against terrorism, the economic downturn, and the rising costs of entitlements are forcing defense planners to make risky assumptions and trade-offs.

ENHANCING ARMY JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS CAPABILITIES

By Timothy M. Bonds, Myron Hura, Thomas-Durell Young. RAND Corporation. August 10, 2010. 139 pages.

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG675.pdf

The research in this document is aimed at helping the Army improve its ability to command and control joint, interagency, and multinational forces to accomplish diverse missions in a range of settings. The monograph describes steps that the Army might take to improve the ability of Army Service headquarters to command joint task forces. This monograph also describes the capabilities that the Army will have to depend on others to provide to accomplish future missions and addresses specific concerns expressed by policymakers in the Department of Defense.

ALARMIST DEFENSE CUTS WON'T HELP THE DEFICIT

By Lawrence J. Korb. Center for American Progress. August 10, 2010.

http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/08/gates_announcement.html

Secretary Gates's announced staff and contracting cuts would not help reduce the deficit and distract from real solutions to downsizing the budget, according to the author.

AIR POWER

By Karl Mueller. RAND Corporation. August 10, 2010. 23 pages.

http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/2010/RAND_RP1412.pdf

This encyclopedia article surveys the subject of air power as an area of research in international security studies. It addresses the evolution of military air power and classical theories about its use, the strategic employment of air power for coercion, air power in counterinsurgency warfare, legal and moral issues in air warfare, and the relationship between air and space power. The article includes a bibliography of significant works and useful on-line resources for students and scholars in the field.

COUNTERINSURGENCY'S IMPOSSIBLE TRILEMMA

By Lorenzo Zambernardi. Center for Strategic and International Studies. The Washington Quarterly. July 2010. 14 pages.

http://twq.com/10july/docs/10jul_Zambernardi.pdf

Ever since the conventional wars in Iraq and Afghanistan turned into irregular conflicts, both students of war and practitioners have furiously debated counterinsurgency's logic, goals, and chances of success. Counterinsurgency doctrine, however, has experienced no radical change since its original development. Even the new counterinsurgency doctrine devised by General David Petraeus in Iraq and Afghanistan does not represent a fundamental shift away from its traditional understanding, which sees this type of conflict as a contest for the support and control of population and, in turn, places the security of the populace at the hub of military operations. While at present there is general agreement on how to carry out counterinsurgency, a clear analysis of the tradeoffs that all counterinsurgents have to deal with is still lacking. While challenges within the field remain, counterinsurgency still faces numerous challenges in theory. Neither scholars nor practitioners have developed a theoretical framework that has been able to explicitly specify the existing tradeoffs among the three typical goals involved in this doctrine.

IRAN

IRANIAN STRATEGIC COMPETITION WITH THE U.S.: THE MILITARY DIMENSION

By Anthony H. Cordesman, Vivek Kocharlakota and Adam Seitz. Center for Strategic and International Studies. August 13, 2010.

<http://csis.org/publication/iranian-strategic-competition>

U.S. competition with Iran has become the equivalent of a game of three-dimensional chess, in which other states are outside players that can constantly intervene, and one where each side can modify at least some of the rules with each move. It is a game that has been going on for some three decades. It is clearly unlikely to be ended by better dialog and mutual understanding, and that Iran's version of "democracy" is unlikely to change the way it is played in the foreseeable future.

CAN SANCTIONS BRING IRAN TO THE TABLE?

By Greg Bruno. Council on Foreign Relations. August 3, 2010.

http://www.cfr.org/publication/22746/can_sanctions_bring_iran_to_the_table.html#

After a ten-month delay punctuated with fresh rounds of economic noose-tightening, stalled talks over Iran's controversial nuclear program appear to have new energy. But whether diplomacy can bear fruit is an open question: some critics are skeptical; others believe sanctions and Iranian overtures give hope that new talks can succeed.

IF IRAN CAME CLOSE TO GETTING A NUCLEAR WEAPON, WOULD OBAMA USE FORCE?

By Steven Simon, Ray Takeyh. Council on Foreign Relations. Article originally released in the Washington Post. August 1, 2010.

http://www.cfr.org/publication/22736/if_iran_came_close_to_getting_a_nuclear_weapon_would_obama_use_force.html

The authors imagine a moment when President Obama would have only two alternatives: prepare to live with a nuclear-armed Iran or embark on the perilous path of military action to stop it; that diplomacy has run its course, after prolonged and inconclusive negotiations; that surging international oil prices have undercut the power of economic sanctions against Tehran; and that reliable intelligence says the Islamic republic's weapons program is very close to reaching its goal. Facing such conditions, would Obama use force against Iran?

IRAQ

GETTING THE TROOPS OUT OF IRAQ: LESSONS FROM THE BALKANS

By Stephen Biddle, senior fellow for defense policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. Article released in the New York Times. August 9, 2010.

http://www.cfr.org/publication/22748/getting_the_troops_out_of_iraq.html#

Should the U.S. draw down to a non-combat presence of 50,000 troops by the end of August? The answer depends on the purpose of the U.S. presence and what problem it's meant to solve. The Balkan experience offers some useful insights.

GETTING THE TROOPS OUT OF IRAQ

By Michael E. O'Hanlon. The Brookings Institution. August 2, 2010.

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0802_iraq_withdrawal_ohanlon.aspx

President Obama's planned drawdown to 50,000 U.S. troops by the end of August is a prudent course of action. The fact that these troops have been redesignated "advise and assist" brigades rather than traditional combat units matters little; they still carry enormous firepower, and that firepower makes them useful.

WHITHER AL-ANBAR PROVINCE? FIVE SCENARIOS THROUGH 2011

By James B. Bruce, Jeffrey Martini. RAND Corporation. July 30, 2010. 28 pages.

http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP278.pdf

The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq will create a vacuum in the way security is achieved and power is exercised throughout Iraq. As U.S. Marines draw down in al-Anbar Province, significant changes can be expected throughout the province in security, political, economic, and even cultural relationships.

A GOVERNMENT FOR BAGHDAD

By Kenneth M. Pollack. The Brookings Institution. July 27, 2010.

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0727_iraq_government_pollack.aspx

It's been over four months since Iraq's national elections on March 7 and still there is no sign that the various parties are enough in agreement to form a new government. Given the fragility of Iraq's nascent democracy, and the importance of this particular transition -- which will set precedents for decades to come-- the United States and the Iraqis have good reason to be patient. If we want a government bad, we can get one bad, but that won't serve anyone's interests.

THE POLITICAL BATTLE IN IRAQ

By Kenneth M. Pollack. The Brookings Institution. June 30, 2010.

http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2010/0630_iraq_trip_pollack.aspx

In late June 2010, the author traveled to Iraq for a bit less than one week with another well-known Middle East expert. The trip was organized and partially-funded by the U.S. military command in Iraq. They had superb access to U.S. military and civilian personnel at all levels of the chain of command, met with senior UN officials in Iraq and had numerous private meetings with many of the most senior Iraqi officials and party leaders from all of the most powerful parties. This document presents Mr. Pollack's impressions, conclusions, and analysis from that trip.

KOREAS

U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE KOREAN PENINSULA

By Charles L. "Jack" Pritchard, John H. Tilelli Jr., Scott A. Snyder. Council on Foreign Relations. June 2010. 101 pages.

http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Korean_PeninsulaTFR64.pdf

As tensions on the Korean peninsula rise after an international investigation found that North Korea was responsible for the sinking of a South Korean warship, a Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force warns that North Korea's continued provocations pose a serious threat to its neighbors and that its nuclear weapons program must be stopped.

"The United States must seek to resolve rather than simply manage the challenge posed by a nuclear North Korea," asserts the Task Force.

MIDDLE EAST

2010 ARAB PUBLIC OPINION POLL: RESULTS OF ARAB OPINION SURVEY CONDUCTED JUNE 29-JULY 20, 2010

By Shibley Telhami. The Brookings Institution. August 5, 2010. 95 pages.

http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/reports/2010/08_arab_opinion_poll_telhami/08_arab_opinion_poll_telhami.pdf

On Thursday, August 5, Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland and nonresident senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, released the 2010 Arab Public Opinion Poll, which is produced each year in conjunction with Zogby International. This year's poll surveyed 3,976 people in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon, and the United Arab Emirates. Among others it discloses a change in the assessment of President Obama, stable views on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and a majority of the Arab public now seeing a nuclear-armed Iran as being better for the Middle East.

CAN EGYPT CHANGE?

By Lisa Anderson, Steven A. Cook. The Council on Foreign Relations. July 22, 2010.

http://www.cfr.org/publication/22695/can_egypt_change.html

Mubarak's imminent demise has prompted analysts, policymakers, journalists and other observers to ask, "Can Egypt change?" While the question seems apt at the twilight of the Mubarak era, it nevertheless seems oddly ahistoric.

FIRE THE MIDEAST POLICY TEAM!

By Leslie H. Gelb. Council on Foreign Relations. July 7, 2010.

<http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-07-07/obama-gets-more-bad-advice-on-israel-leslie-gelb/>

Obama's bow to Netanyahu was just the latest in a series of disastrous missteps in U.S. policy toward Israel. Leslie H. Gelb on who's to blame -- and how the White House can get back on course.

NUDGING ISRAEL FORWARD

By Martin S. Indyk. The Brookings Institution. July 7, 2010.

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0707_obama_netanyahu_indyk.aspx

The meeting was bound to succeed. In the run-up to mid-term elections, President Obama needed to calm Jewish voters offended by his previous backhanded treatment of America's Israeli ally. Prime Minister Netanyahu needed to reassure his public that he could right the ship of state after the bungled flotilla interception highlighted Israel's isolation. But beyond the "confounding of cynics" trumpeted by Bibi in Tuesday's remarkable Oval Office press availability may lie a more subtle development: a mood shift among Israelis and Palestinians that may signal an opportunity for serious movement toward peace. That was the conclusion I reached after visiting Ramallah and Israel last week.

A THIRD LEBANON WAR: CPA CONTINGENCY PLANNING

By Daniel C. Kurtzer. Council on Foreign Relations. July 2010. 11 pages.

http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/CPA_contingencymemo_8.pdf

There is growing concern of renewed war between Israel and Hezbollah, the Lebanese militant Islamist group. This Center for Preventive Action Contingency Planning Memorandum by Daniel C. Kurtzer discusses the most plausible scenarios and associated warning signs of a "Third Lebanon War," its implications for the United States, and U.S. policy options to reduce the likelihood of renewed Israel-Hezbollah conflict and mitigate the consequences should it occur.

THE OBAMA-NETANYAHU MEETING: CLOSER COOPERATION NEEDED

By James Phillips. The Heritage Foundation. July 2, 2010.

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/07/The-Obama-Netanyahu-Meeting-Closer-Cooperation-Needed>

When Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu meets with President Barack Obama, they will discuss several important policy questions, but the main purpose of the summit will be to build better personal relations between the two leaders, restore mutual trust at the highest levels of their governments, and lay the foundation for closer cooperation in the future. No significant progress is possible on peace negotiations, or on stabilizing Israel's volatile neighborhood, without a strong and effective Israeli-American partnership.

NUCLEAR

A TACTICALLY SOUND NUCLEAR ARMS STRATEGY: THE CASE FOR LEAVING TACTICAL WEAPONS OUT OF NEW START

By Ben Morris-Levenson. Center for American Progress. August 3, 2010.

http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/08/tactical_weapons.html

New START has been working its way through the Senate Armed Services Committee since Presidents Obama and Medvedev signed the arms control treaty in April. It's a modest treaty, reducing the number of American and Russian strategic nuclear weapons and launchers and continuing the mutual inspection regime that has been in place since the

Reagan administration. Yet a group of conservatives are opposing the treaty partially on the grounds that it does not address tactical nuclear weapons.

THE NEW START TREATY: WHY IT MATTERS

The Brookings Institution. July 23, 2010. 51 pages.

http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2010/0723_new_start/20100723_scowcroft_start.pdf

This document provides a discussion featuring former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft.

NEW START IS NO MISTAKE

By Steven Pifer, Strobe Talbott. The Brookings Institution. July 7, 2010.

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0707_start_talbott_pifer.aspx

Mitt Romney's criticism of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) raises several concerns about the agreement and its impact. A close reading of the treaty and understanding of its terms, however, should assuage most concerns.

TERRORISM - COUNTERTERRORISM

THE ISI AND TERRORISM: BEHIND THE ACCUSATIONS

By Eben Kaplan. Council on Foreign Relations. July 26, 2010.

http://www.cfr.org/publication/11644/isi_and_terrorism.html

Pakistan's military intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), has long faced accusations of meddling in the affairs of its neighbors. A range of officials inside and outside Pakistan have stepped up suggestions of links between the ISI and terrorist groups in recent years. Numerous U.S. officials have also accused the ISI of supporting terrorist groups, even as the Pakistani government seeks increased aid from Washington with assurances of fighting militants. Gates and others suggest the ISI maintains links with groups like the Afghan Taliban as a "strategic hedge" to help Islamabad gain influence in Kabul once U.S. troops exit the region. These allegations surfaced yet again in July 2010 when WikiLeaks.org made public (NYT) a trove of U.S. intelligence records on the war in Afghanistan. Pakistan's government has repeatedly denied allegations of supporting terrorism, citing as evidence its cooperation in the U.S.-led battle against extremists.

LASHKAR E TAYYIBA, AL QAEDA, AND PAKISTAN: TIME TO CLEAN HOUSE

By Bruce Riedel. The Brookings Institution. July 20, 2010.

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0720_pakistan_riedel.aspx

While in Kabul, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told reporters that "somebody in this Pakistani government does know where Usama bin Laden is hiding" within Pakistan. It is an extraordinary statement, one that the Secretary has made before, and it illustrates dramatically the difficulty America has in working with Pakistan. On the one hand, we suspect elements of the Pakistani army remain closely connected to the global Islamic jihad

movement that they helped nurture for three decades; on the other we need their help to defeat the terrorists. Pakistan is our most important ally in the war against al Qaeda and its affiliates, and our most difficult ally.

TURKEY

TURKEY'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY DIRECTION: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS

By Michael Rubin. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. July 28, 2010.

<http://www.aei.org/speech/100160>

Testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee by Michael Rubin, resident scholar at AEI.

COUNTERING TURKEY'S STRATEGIC DRIFT

By Sally McNamara , Ariel Cohen, James Phillips. The Heritage Foundation. July 26, 2010.

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/07/Countering-Turkey-s-Strategic-Drift>

For decades, Turkey and the United States cooperated in the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and even Korea. However, Turkish and U.S. interests in the Balkans, Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf have recently diverged. On its current trajectory, Turkey's traditional strategic relationship with the West could devolve into a looser affiliation while Turkey enters into a closer alliance with Iran and other Middle Eastern powers hostile to U.S. leadership. The U.S., in concert with its European allies, needs to address the serious differences that are emerging.

UNDERSTANDING TURKEY TODAY: THIS PIVOTAL DEMOCRACY REMAINS KEY TO U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

By Max Ehrenfreund. Center for American Progress. July 26, 2010.

http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/07/understanding_turkey_today.html

Turkish foreign policy over the past two months is sparking debate among analysts and commentators in Europe and the United States, with many of them wondering aloud whether Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government no longer shares strategic goals with the rest of the Western world. Their concern? That Ergodan now sees Iran, China, and the Arab countries as are more natural allies for Turkey.

Previous issues of Foreign Policy -- Defense -- Documents on the Web are available at:

<http://france.usembassy.gov/web-alert.html>